Accessing short-term memory with semantic and phonological information: A time-course analysis

The time course for accessing short-term memory representations on the basis of item, phonological, and semantic information was measured with a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) variant of a recognition probe task. Subjects studied 5-word lists and then judged whether a test word (1) was in the study list (item judgment); (2) rhymed with a word in the study list (rhyme judgment); or (3) was a synonym of a word in the study list (synonym judgment). Analysis of the SAT retrieval functions demonstrated that judgments based on phonological and semantic information were slower and less accurate than judgments based on composite item representations. The slower retrieval dynamics for rhyme and synonym judgments suggest that judgments based on component properties of the memory trace are mediated by either a generate or recall process distinct from the parallel or direct-access mechanism used in item judgments.     

Recency judgments as a function of word frequency: A framing effect and frequency misattributions

The effects of word frequency on judgments of recency of item presentation were examined in two experiments. Subjects in Experiment 1 were presented two mixed lists of high- and low-frequency words followed by a list assignment task for recognized items. It was found that subjects were biased toward assigning low-frequency words to the more recently presented list. Subjects in Experiment 2 were presented a single mixed list of high- and low-frequency words followed by either a relative recency of presentation judgment task or a relative primacy of presentation judgment task. Each word pair on the tests contained one high-frequency word and one low-frequency word. It was found that, for the recency judgment task, subjects were biased to select the low-frequency item as having been presented more recently. However, on the parallel primacy judgment task, there were no effects of word frequency; moreover, overall accuracy levels were higher with primacy than with recency instructions. We interpret the effects of word frequency on recency judgments in Experiments 1 and 2 in terms of a misattribution of frequency-related differences in recollection-based recognition. The finding that recency and primacy instructions produced different patterns of results provides further evidence (Flexser & Bower, 1974) for an effect on performance of the way in which the temporal judgment task was framed.     

Source memory in the absence of successful cued recall

Five experiments were conducted to address the question of whether source information could be accessed in the absence of being able to recall an item. The authors used a paired-associate learning paradigm in which cue-target word pairs were studied, and target recall was requested in the presence of the cue. When target recall failed, participants were asked to make a source judgment of whether a man or woman spoke the unrecalled item. In 3 of the 5 experiments, source accuracy was at or very close to chance. By contrast, if cue-target pairs were studied multiple times or participants knew in advance of learning that a predictive judgment would be required, then predictive source accuracy was well above chance. These data are suggestive that context information may not play a very large role in metacognitive judgments such as feeling-of-knowing ratings or putting one into a tip-of-the-tongue state without strong and specific encoding procedures. These same results also highlight the important role that item memory plays in retrieving information about the context in which an item was experienced.     

Explaining the forgetting bias effect on value judgments: The influence of memory for a past test

People often feel that information that was forgotten is less important than remembered information. Prior work has shown that participants assign higher importance to remembered information while undervaluing forgotten information. The current study examined two possible accounts of this finding. In three experiments, participants studied lists of words in which each word was randomly assigned a point value denoting the value of remembering the word. Following the presentation of each list participants engaged in a free recall test. After the presentation of all lists participants were shown each of the words they had studied and asked to recall the point value that was initially paired with each word. Experiment 1 tested a fluency-based account by presenting items for value judgments in a low-fluency or high-fluency format. Experiment 2 examined whether value judgments reflect attributions based on the familiarity of an item when value judgments are made. Finally, in Experiment 3, we evaluated whether participants believe that forgotten words are less important by having them judge whether an item was initially recalled or forgotten prior to making a value judgment. Manipulating the fluency of an item presented for judgment had no influence on value ratings (Experiment 1) and familiarity exerted a limited influence on value judgments (Experiment 2). More importantly, participants’ value judgments appeared to reflect a theory that remembered information is more valuable than forgotten information (Experiment 3). Overall, the present work suggests that individuals may apply a theory about remembering and forgetting to retrospectively assess the value of information.     

Effects of aging on the magnitude and accuracy of quality-of-encoding judgments

Age invariance in monitoring associative learning has been the norm in numerous investigations concerning how accurately people predict future recall, predictions that are based partly on people's beliefs about forgetting. In this study, we obtained a measure of monitoring that is minimally influenced by beliefs about forgetting. Participants made quality-of-encoding (QUE) judgments by rating how well each item had been encoded. In 2 experiments, older and younger adults studied 60 paired-associate items; immediately after studying each one, they made a QUE judgment. Each item was presented at a 4-s or 8-s presentation rate. QUEs from both age groups were sensitive to the production of different strategies, presentation rate, and item characteristics. Reliable age differences in the correlation of QUEs and subsequent recall were found for related items but not for unrelated items. The outcomes indicate similar processes for generating QUE judgments by older and younger adults, but they also suggest the possibility of an age-related deficit in the accuracy of monitoring encoding in some experimental conditions.     

Neurophysiology of successful encoding and retrieval of source memory

Event-related potentials were recorded during encoding, to identify whether brain activity predicts subsequent retrieval of spatial source information, and during retrieval, to investigate the neural correlates of successful and unsuccessful spatial context recollection. The amplitude registered during encoding for study items that were later recognized and assigned a correct source judgment was more positive than the amplitude for recognized items given incorrect source judgments; this difference started 480 msec poststimulus, predominantly at central and anterior sites. During retrieval, the waveform was more positive from 250 to 1,600 msec poststimulus when the brain had retrieved episodic information successfully than when it had failed. These findings indicate that brain electrical activity recorded during the first presentation of an item within its context predicts the subsequent retrieval of the specific spatial context. During retrieval, brain activity differed quantitatively at anterior sites and qualitatively at posterior sites according to the accuracy of source memory.     

Rich contexts do not always enrich the accuracy of personality judgments

We test the common assumption that information ‘rich’ contexts lead to more accurate personality judgments than information ‘lean’ contexts. Pairs of unacquainted students rendered judgments of one another's personalities after interacting in one of three, increasingly rich, contexts: Internet ‘chat’, telephone, or face-to-face. Accuracy was assessed by correlating participants' judgments with a measure of targets' personalities that averaged self and informant ratings. As predicted, the visible traits of extraversion and conscientiousness were judged more accurately than the less visible traits of neuroticism and openness. However, judgment accuracy also depended on context. Judgments of extraversion and neuroticism improved as context richness increased (i.e., from Internet ‘chat’ to face-to-face), whereas judgments of conscientiousness and openness improved as context richness decreased (i.e., from face-to-face to Internet ‘chat’). Our findings suggest that context richness shapes not only the availability of personality cues but also the relevance of cues in any given context.     

社会性线索对内隐和外显元认知监控的影响

本研究以词图匹配材料为学习材料,以“大多数人选择的情况”为社会性线索,通过分析行为表现和眼动指标,探讨了社会性线索对内隐和外显元认知监控的影响。结果显示：（1）第一次信心判断时,外显信心判断显著高估,内隐信心判断较为准确。第二次信心判断时,在线索一致条件下,外显信心判断等级显著高于内隐信心判断。（2）在提供社会性线索阶段和第二次再认阶段,与线索一致条件相比,线索不一致条件下被提示项的注视时间更短,而未提示项的注视时间更长,且个体改变选择的次数显著增多。结果表明：内隐和外显元认知监测存在分离,内隐监测的准确性更高,外显监测受社会性线索的影响更大;而内隐和外显的元认知控制受社会性线索的影响趋同。     

Subjective confidence in one's answers: the consensuality principle

In answering general-information questions, a within-person confidence-accuracy (C-A) correlation is typically observed, suggesting that people can monitor the correctness of their knowledge. However, because the correct answer is generally the consensual answer--the one endorsed by most participants--confidence judgment may actually monitor the consensuality of the answer rather than its correctness. Indeed, the C-A correlation was positive for items with a consensually correct answer but negative for items with a consensually wrong answer. Results suggest that the consensuality-confidence correlation may be mediated by 2 internal mnemonic cues that are correlated with consensuality: Consensual answers are reached faster and are selected more consistently by the same person on different occasions than nonconsensual answers. The results argue against a direct-access view of confidence judgments and suggest that such judgments will be accurate only as long as people's responses are by and large correct across the sampled items, thus stressing the criticality of a representative design.     

Frequency, probability, and prediction: easy solutions to cognitive illusions?

Many errors in probabilistic judgment have been attributed to people's inability to think in statistical terms when faced with information about a single case. Prior theoretical analyses and empirical results imply that the errors associated with case-specific reasoning may be reduced when people make frequentistic predictions about a set of cases. In studies of three previously identified cognitive biases, we find that frequency-based predictions are different from-but no better than-case-specific judgments of probability. First, in studies of the "planning fallacy, " we compare the accuracy of aggregate frequency and case-specific probability judgments in predictions of students' real-life projects. When aggregate and single-case predictions are collected from different respondents, there is little difference between the two: Both are overly optimistic and show little predictive validity. However, in within-subject comparisons, the aggregate judgments are significantly more conservative than the single-case predictions, though still optimistically biased. Results from studies of overconfidence in general knowledge and base rate neglect in categorical prediction underline a general conclusion. Frequentistic predictions made for sets of events are no more statistically sophisticated, nor more accurate, than predictions made for individual events using subjective probability.     

The effects of age on the neural correlates of successful episodic retrieval: An ERP study

The neural correlates of successful episodic retrieval (recollection), as reflected in event-related potentials (ERPs), were investigated in young (ca. 20 years; n=18) and older (ca. 70 years; n=16) healthy individuals. Subjects classified a series of pictures according to whether each item was new or had been encountered at study in the context of an animacy or a size judgment task. By manipulating the number of times items were presented for study, subsets of test items were formed for which source accuracy did not differ according to age. Relative to ERPs elicited by unstudied pictures, ERPs elicited by items attracting equivalent levels of source accuracy showed marked age-related differences. Those from younger subjects demonstrated the positive-going left parietal and right frontal old/new effects described in several previous studies of source memory. By contrast, analogous ERPs from older subjects contained a large left-lateralized negative effect that overshadowed the positive-going effects evident in the young. No age-related differences in either parietal or frontal ERP old/new effects were detected at electrode sites overlying the right hemisphere. It is possible that the age-related ERP differences observed in this task primarily reflect the use of different kinds of information as a basis for source judgments.     

Getting at the source of distinctive encoding effects in the DRM paradigm: evidence from signal-detection measures and source judgments

Studying Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists using a distinctive encoding task can reduce the DRM false memory illusion. Reductions for both distinctively encoded lists and non-distinctively encoded lists in a within-group design have been ascribed to use of a distinctiveness heuristic by which participants monitor their memories at test for distinctive-task details. Alternatively, participants might simply set a more conservative response criterion, which would be exceeded by distinctive list items more often than all other test items, including the critical non-studied items. To evaluate these alternatives, we compared a within-group who studied 5 lists by reading, 5 by anagram generation, and 5 by imagery, relative to a control group who studied all 15 lists by reading. Generation and imagery improved recognition accuracy by impairing relational encoding, but the within group did not show greater memory monitoring at test relative to the read control group. Critically, the within group’s pattern of list-based source judgments provided new evidence that participants successfully monitored for distinctive-task details at test. Thus, source judgments revealed evidence of qualitative, recollection-based monitoring in the within group, to which our quantitative signal-detection measure of monitoring was blind.     

Effects of association and repetition in memory for temporal order

Temporal order recognition memory has been examined previously with tasks involving a recency judgment between a pair of items in a preceding string. Recency judgments are impaired when the earlier item is repeated. The present study employed the comparative recency judgment paradigm, with the lists composed of words. The effect of the inclusion in the list of a high associate of the earlier test item was examined and compared to the effect of repetition. Associative interference was observed, but not in all conditions. Direction of association was a significant factor. The results were interpreted in terms of a model of word recognition proposed by Morton.     

Natural sample spaces and uncertain belief.

This article proposes a novel framework for understanding judgments of probability. Both accurate and inaccurate judgments are conceptualized in terms of the sets of information, or sample spaces, on which they are based. When appropriate sample spaces are easily accessed from memory (e.g., when they correspond to natural cognitive categories), people will make relatively accurate judgments; otherwise, people may substitute more accessible but inappropriate sample spaces and make judgment errors. In 3 experiments, the sample space framework was applied to account for the base rate fallacy. Results showed that (a) people spontaneously access sample spaces that correspond to natural categories, (b) reliance on inappropriate sample spaces produces the base rate fallacy, and (c) highlighting appropriate sample spaces improves the sensitivity of people's judgments to base rates. Discussion extends the framework to explain accuracy and error in other judgment domains.     

Differential Automatic Processing Deficits in Early Stage Alzheimer's Disease

This experiment sought further support for the view that early stage Alzheimer's disease (AD) disrupts cognitive structures that cast experience into a temporal framework. Forty participants, evenly divided between normal elderly (NE) and persons diagnosed with mild AD, viewed 19 lists of 14 pictures each. Following the presentation of each list participants were asked to identify the most recently experienced picture (target) from 3 pictures. A second stimulus was a picture never previously seen; the third picture was a distracting item that had appeared in the list on either one or three occasions. The results show that whereas choice accuracy of the NE group remained largely unimpaired regardless of the delay between the target and the judgment task or the frequency of the distractor, the AD participants exhibited large and profound deficits in temporal judgments, especially when distractor frequency was greater than the more recent event. In effect, the AD group relied on how often an event occurred rather than the time of its occurrence. This finding is consistent with previous research that found AD patients deficient in forming a temporal representation of their experience.     

Effects of similarity and repetition on memory: registration without learning?

We investigated judgments of the frequency of test items (Y) that were highly similar to studied items (X) to test a prediction made by several memory models: that the judged frequency of Y should be proportional to the judged frequency of X. Whether stimuli were pictures or words, judged frequency of Y was bimodally distributed with 1 mode at zero, suggesting that frequency judgments involve a 2-stage process in which a zero judgment is made if there is a mismatch between retrieved information and the test item. Nonzero judgements, taken by themselves, were consistent with the prediction of proportionality. In 2 experiments, the percentage of zero judgments made to Y increased with repetition of X, but in 2 others the percentage did not change beyond frequency = 1. The percentage of "new" judgments in recognition memory followed this same pattern. Because the judged frequency of X increased even as X-Y discrimination showed no improvement, we characterize the result as "registration without learning."     

Precise instructions determine participants’ memory search strategy in judgments of relative order in short lists

Memory often requires knowledge of the order of events. Previous findings about immediate judgments of relative order in short, subspan lists are variable regarding whether participants’ strategy is to search memory in the forward direction, starting from the first list item and progressing toward the end item, or in the backward direction, starting from the end item and progressing toward the start. We asked whether wording of the instructions influences participants’ search direction. Participants studied sequences of three to six consonants, and for an immediate, two-item probe of each list, judged which probe was presented earlier (“earlier” instruction) or later (“later” instruction) on the list. Forward and backward searches were supported for “earlier” and “later” instructions, respectively. Our findings suggest that participants have more than one effective strategy for order judgments in short lists, and that subtle instructional differences can bias memory search in either the forward or backward direction.     

Probability judgment in hierarchical learning: a conflict between predictiveness and coherence

Why are people's judgments incoherent under probability formats? Research in an associative learning paradigm suggests that after structured learning participants give judgments based on predictiveness rather than normative probability. This is because people's learning mechanisms attune to statistical contingencies in the environment, and they use these learned associations as a basis for subsequent probability judgments. We introduced a hierarchical structure into a simulated medical diagnosis task, setting up a conflict between predictiveness and coherence. Thus, a target symptom was more predictive of a subordinate disease than of its superordinate category, even though the latter included the former. Under a probability format participants tended to violate coherence and make ratings in line with predictiveness; under a frequency format they were more normative. These results are difficult to explain within a unitary model of inference, whether associative or frequency-based. In the light of this, and other findings in the judgment and learning literature, a dual-component model is proposed.     

SCALING THE EPISODIC FAMILIARITIES OF PICTURES AND WORDS

Abstract— Most current memory theories assume that judgments of past occurrence are based on a unidimensional familiarity signal In a test of this hypothesis, subjects studied mixed lists of pictures and words that occurred up to three times each They then were given two tests a forced-choice frequency discrimination test including all pairs of conditions (e g., picture seen twice vs word never seen) and a numerical frequency judgment test on individual items Forced-choice proportions for all pairings (picture-picture, word-word, and picture-word) were well fit by a one-dimensional scaling solution, suggesting a common basis of recognition and frequency judgments for both pictures and words Both forced-choice and numerical judgment data indicated that familiarities of pictures started lower than those of words but increased more rapidly with repetition Results are discussed in connection with the distinction between familiarity and recall, and the possible role of rescaling in the mirror effect.     

Affordance Judgments and Nonlocomotor Body Movement

In 2 experiments, participants made judgments of their own maximum sitting height. During judgments, participants stood normally or on 10 cm blocks attached to their feet. The blocks increased participants' actual maximum sitting height. For many participants, judgments changed over trials, becoming more accurate, despite the absence of practice at sitting, or feedback about judgment accuracy. Learning was observed not only when participants wore the blocks but also when they stood normally. In Experiment 2, we measured motion of the head and torso. We identified changes in body motion that corresponded to engagement in the judgment task: Across trials, sway variability was stable during judgments but increased during the intervals between judgments. Other changes in sway were limited to participants whose judgments improved over trials; that is, sway was specifically associated with learning about maximum sitting height. We discuss the results in the context of perception–action and the learning of affordances.