Motivated by guilt and low felt trust: The impact of negotiators' anger expressions on the implementation of negotiated agreements

Prior research has identified benefits from certain emotion tactics in negotiation, particularly expressing anger to achieve short‐term gains. We demonstrate that such tactics can be strategically problematic due to their impact on an actor's emotions and felt trust. Through five studies, we find that negotiators' use of anger tactics during a negotiation increased their feelings of guilt and reduced the extent to which they felt trusted by their counterpart following the negotiation. We found this guilt to be the result of their aggressive tone and how they treated their counterpart. The guilt and diminished felt trust in turn motivated negotiators to engage in greater cooperative behaviors during the deal implementation process that benefited their counterpart, even if doing so was costly to the negotiator. Our results demonstrate that negotiator guilt and felt trust resulting from anger tactics influence the dynamic relationship between negotiators and their counterparts. This in turn has strategic implications for negotiators, who attempt to mitigate these negative feelings during the crucial implementation phase of a negotiated agreement.     

Tough guys finish last: the perils of a distributive reputation

Reputations are socially constructed labels that provide representations (or schema), which organize our images of another person. We look at how reputations influence negotiations by examining their impact on negotiator cognitions, behaviors, and subsequent outcomes. We randomly paired relative novices with relative experts to negotiate over email, telling half the novices that their counterparts were experts in distributive negotiation (i.e., the art of claiming value). Findings supported our predictions that novices whose counterparts had a distributive reputation judged these counterparts' intentions in a more negative light and used more distributive and fewer integrative tactics than the control group novices. This resulted in lower joint gains in the distributive reputation condition than in the control condition. Notably, the more experienced negotiators were able to extract more individual value from the deal, but not when they had a reputation for being distributive. In other words, the fictitious distributive reputation prevented participants from capitalizing on their real negotiation expertise advantage.     

I feel,therefore you act: Intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotion on negotiation as a function of social power

We examine how emotion (anger and happiness) affects value claiming and creation in a dyadic negotiation between parties with unequal power. Using a new statistical technique that analyzes individual data while controlling for dyad-level dependence, we demonstrate that anger is helpful for powerful negotiators. They feel more focused and assertive, and claim more value; the effects are intrapersonal, insofar as the powerful negotiator responds to his or her own emotional state and not to the emotional state of the counterpart. On the other hand, effects of emotion are generally not intrapersonal for low-power negotiators: these negotiators do not respond to their own emotions but can be affected by those of a powerful counterpart. They lose focus and yield value. Somewhat surprisingly, the presence of anger in the dyad appears to foster greater value creation, particularly when the powerful party is angry. Implications for the negotiation and power literatures are discussed.     

Implementation intentions and the willful pursuit of prosocial goals in negotiations

Three studies examined whether the self-regulation strategy of forming implementation intentions (i.e., if-then plans) facilitates the attainment of prosocial goals when a limited resource is to be distributed between two parties who hold adverse cognitive orientations. In three experiments, pairs of negotiators were assigned prosocial goals that either had to be supplemented with plans (if-then plans, Gollwitzer, 1999) on how to act on these goals or not. Experiment 1 used a mixed-frames negotiation paradigm in which one negotiation partner operated on a gain-frame, the other on a loss-frame. When participants had the prosocial goal to find fair agreements and furnished it with a respective if-then plan, unfair agreements in favor of the loss-frame negotiator no longer occurred. Experiment 2 used a same-frame negotiation paradigm, where both negotiation partners had either a loss or a gain-frame. When loss-frame pairs had furnished their prosocial goals to cooperate with the negotiation partner with a respective if-then plan, reduced profits as compared to gain-frame pairs of negotiators were no longer observed. In addition, negotiators who had formed implementation intentions were more likely to use the integrative negotiation strategy of logrolling (i.e., making greater concessions on low rather than high priority issues). Experiment 3 used a computer-mediated negotiation task in order to analyze the effects of prosocial goals and respective implementation intentions on the course of the negotiation. Again, implementation intentions facilitated the pursuit of prosocial goals in the face of adversity (i.e., loss frames) by use of the integrative negotiation strategy of logrolling. The present research adds a self-regulation perspective to the research on negotiation by pointing out that the effects of negotiation goals can be enhanced by furnishing them with respective plans (i.e., implementation intentions).     

Time pressure and closing of the mind in negotiation

Research on time pressure (TP) in negotiation has considered strategic choice (demands and concession making) but largely ignored information processing. Based on Lay Epistemic Theory ([Kruglanski, 1989]) it is hypothesized that TP reduces motivation to process information systematically, and the time needed to negotiate an agreement, and that it produces greater reliance on cognitive heuristics when placing demands, and less integrative agreements. Two studies revealed that effects of time constraint on information processing in negotiation were due to higher need for cognitive closure under high TP. Study 1 also showed that negotiators use stereotypes about the opponent as a heuristic cue more under high rather than low TP. Study 2 revealed that negotiators under high TP were less likely to revise their unfounded fixed-pie perceptions during negotiation and, therefore, reached less integrative agreements. Implications for motivated information processing in negotiation are discussed.     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

Unfixing the fixed pie: a motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation

Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountability reduced FPPs during face-to-face negotiation and produced more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 corroborated these results: Accountable negotiators revised their FPPs even when information exchange was experimentally held constant. Experiment 2 also showed that accountability is effective during the encoding of outcome information. Negotiators appear flexible in their reliance on FPPs. which is consistent with a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.     

谈判中的时间因素

研究时间因素对谈判的影响有利于提高人们对时间重要性的认识,有效谈判策略的运用和整合结果的实现。时间因素对谈判者认知、行为和谈判结果的影响具体表现在：时间压力会降低谈判者的认知动机,使谈判者更加依赖认知启发式;暂停和中场休息是否会为谈判带来积极影响应该视不同的谈判事件和不同的心理状态而定;拉大谈判与结果实现之间的时间距离会提高谈判的共同结果,这可以从折扣效应和建构水平理论中得到解释。将来的谈判研究会进一步从时间向空间拓展     

Too much information: the perils of nondiagnostic information in negotiations

Two studies showed that possessing information about a negotiation counterpart that is irrelevant to the negotiation task can impair negotiators' effectiveness because such knowledge impedes effective information exchange. In Study 1, negotiators who possessed diagnostic and nondiagnostic forms of information were each less likely to exchange information about their preferences within the negotiation. However, only those negotiators who possessed nondiagnostic information achieved inferior negotiation outcomes as a result. In Study 2, negotiators possessing nondiagnostic information about their counterparts in electronically mediated negotiations were more likely to terminate the search for mutually beneficial outcomes prematurely and declare impasses. They were also less able to use diagnostic forms of information to make mutually beneficial trade-offs. As a result, negotiators in these dyads achieved inferior outcomes.     

The Impact of Alcohol on Negotiator Behavior: Experimental Evidence1

Business‐related drinking is an important organizational and managerial activity with particular relevance to the negotiation process. This paper investigates the influence of a moderate amount of alcohol on negotiator behavior and negotiated outcomes. We conducted 2 negotiation studies involving inebriated and sober participants, and found that inebriated negotiators used more aggressive tactics, made more mistakes, and reached less integrative agreements than did sober negotiators. Across both studies, we found that inebriated negotiators were unaware that alcohol had affected their negotiations.     

The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations

Three experiments investigated the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. In the course of a computer-mediated negotiation, participants received information about the emotional state (anger, happiness, or none) of their opponent. Consistent with a strategic-choice perspective, Experiment 1 showed that participants conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one. Experiment 2 showed that this effect was caused by tracking--participants used the emotion information to infer the other's limit, and they adjusted their demands accordingly. However, this effect was absent when the other made large concessions. Experiment 3 examined the interplay between experienced and communicated emotion and showed that angry communications (unlike happy ones) induced fear and thereby mitigated the effect of the opponent's experienced emotion. These results suggest that negotiators are especially influenced by their opponent's emotions when they are motivated and able to consider them.     

Longer-term consequences of anger expression in negotiation: Retaliation or spillover?

Negotiators often concede to angry partners. But what happens when they meet again? According to the spillover hypothesis, negotiators demand less from previously angry partners because they perceive them as tough. According to the retaliation hypothesis, negotiators demand more from previously angry partners because of negative impressions and a desire to get even. Experiment 1 showed that participants demanded less in later negotiations when their partner in a previous negotiation had expressed anger (rather than no emotion) and the later negotiation was with the same (rather than a different) partner. Consistent with the spillover hypothesis, this effect was mediated by inferences regarding the partner’s toughness. Experiment 2 showed that apologies reduce the negative effects of anger on impressions and desire for future interaction. Behavioral reactions were moderated by social value orientation: extending the established might/morality effect, prosocial participants responded cooperatively to an apology, whereas proselfs responded competitively.     

Integrative bargaining in a competitive market

The behavioral decision theory literature was used to identify the determinants of negotiation success in an integrative bargaining, free-market exercise. This study provides a novel methodology for studying negotiation. Specifically, buyers and sellers were allowed to engage in negotiations with as many competitors as possible in a fixed time period. The results suggest that integrative bargaining behavior increases and the market converges toward a Nash equilibrium as negotiators gain experience. In addition, the results suggest that (1) positively framed negotiators (“What will be my net profit from the transaction?”) complete more transactions than negatively framed negotiators (“What will be my expenses on this transaction?”), (2) negotiators who are given moderately difficult profit constraints in order to be allowed to complete a transaction achieve more profitable transactions than negotiators without such constraints, and (3) both framing and the existence of constraints affect the total profitability of the negotiator.     

Creative People Create Values: Creativity and Positive Arousal in Negotiations

Most negotiations are ill-structured situations, and the ability to identify novel options is likely to be crucial for success. This study, therefore, examined how creativity impacts negotiation processes and outcomes, and how this effect is moderated by positive arousal. The negotiators’ creative personality and their state of positive arousal were measured before they participated in a simulated negotiation, with the results demonstrating that the level of creativity in negotiation dyads was positively related to the negotiators’ joint outcome. Negotiators in high creativity dyads searched for more information by asking questions about priorities and were less narrowly focused by providing fewer single-issue offers than negotiators in low creativity dyads. Positive arousal did not affect outcome directly, but moderated the effect of creativity on joint outcomes; the effect of creativity was strongest under high levels of positive arousal. The discussion section emphasizes that future research may find creativity to have even more of a positive effect when negotiations become more complex.     

Conflicting social motives in negotiating groups

Negotiators' social motives (cooperative vs. individualistic) influence their strategic behaviors. In this study, the authors used multilevel modeling and analyses of strategy sequences to test hypotheses regarding how negotiators' social motives and the composition of the group influence group members' negotiation strategies. Four-person groups negotiating a 5-issue mixed-motive decision-making task were videotaped, and the tapes were transcribed and coded. Group composition included 2 homogeneous conditions (all cooperators and all individualists) and 3 heterogeneous conditions (3 cooperators and 1 individualist, 2 cooperators and 2 individualists, 1 cooperator and 3 individualists). Results showed that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social-motive composition of the group, but individualistic negotiators did not. Results from analyses of strategy sequences showed that cooperators responded more systematically to others' behaviors than did individualists. They also redirected the negotiation depending on group composition.     

谈判者第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响：角色的调节作用

谈判者在大多数情况下都希望能顺利达成协议,但很多时候多种因素使得谈判进入僵局或者破裂。本研究利用模拟谈判的手段,综合考察了第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响。很多谈判者出于害怕吃亏或者希望获得更多收益,向对手提出较高的第一次开价。研究一证明第一次出价越高,谈判越容易失败。有趣的是,第一次开价的高低与谈判破裂之间的关系会受到谈判角色的影响,谈判者的权力不同会使得他们的第一次开价具有不同的作用。研究二证实,当谈判双方权力不对等时,第一次出价对谈判破裂的负面作用受到了权力的影响。弱者的第一次出价越高,谈判越容易破裂。中介分析表明,当弱者出价较高时,容易让对方感到竞争性过强,因此不愿意达成协议。本研究不仅丰富了谈判破裂和第一次出价的理论研究,而且对于谈判者具有实践意义     

The interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations: a motivated information processing approach

Three experiments tested a motivated information processing account of the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. In Experiment 1, participants received information about the opponent's emotion (anger, happiness, or none) in a computer-mediated negotiation. As predicted, they conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one (controls falling in between), but only when they had a low (rather than a high) need for cognitive closure. Experiment 2 similarly showed that participants were only affected by the other's emotion under low rather than high time pressure, because time pressure reduced their degree of information processing. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that negotiators were only influenced by their opponent's emotion if they had low (rather than high) power. These results support the motivated information processing model by showing that negotiators are only affected by their opponent's emotions if they are motivated to consider them.     

The prospect of negotiating: Stress, cognitive appraisal, and performance

Despite a significant literature on the impact of stress on performance in achievement settings, little is known about whether and how stress might matter for would-be negotiators. In two studies, we investigate how bargainers cognitively appraise a looming negotiation, whether its prospect is stressful and what the consequences are for performance. Individuals who appraised a prospective negotiation as a threat experienced more stress ahead of a negotiation, and reached lower quality deals compared to those who had appraised a challenge. Results from a follow-up experiment showed that would-be negotiators who had appraised a threat behaved more passively and were less likely to use tough tactics compared to those who appraised a challenge. Those who appraised a threat also had relatively inaccurate perceptions of their partners’ priorities and interests, which undermined their outcomes. The outcome advantage for those who appraised a challenge was limited to negotiations that contained integrative potential.     

The importance of who you meet: Effects of self- versus other-concerns among negotiators in the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and Japan

This study examines intracultural negotiation within three different cultures—the United States (US), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Japan. Within these cultures, we focus on the interactive effects of the self-concerns (operationalized as aspiration level) and other-concerns (operationalized as egoistic vs. prosocial motives) of negotiators in a dyadic setting (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). After allowing negotiators to set their own aspiration levels, we predicted that the positive effect on final individual profit of having a higher aspiration than one’s opponent would be stronger among negotiators with an egoistic social motive orientation. We also hypothesized that egoistic negotiators with higher aspiration levels than their opponents would achieve greater profit in the PRC and Japan, relative to their counterparts in the US. We argue that this effect is due to “who you meet” as a negotiation opponent—there is a higher probability of encountering an egoistic negotiation opponent in the US, but a higher probability of encountering a prosocial negotiation opponent in the PRC and Japan. Our results supported these hypotheses. Implications for the literatures on negotiation and cross-cultural research are discussed.