Was Marx an ethical humanist?

Zusammenfassung Während der letzten zehn Jahre wurde viel über den Humanismus des jungen Marx gesprochen. Osteuropäische Marxisten, die bemüht sind, ihren Anti-Stalinismus durch Berufung auf die Autorität von Marx selbst zu untermauern, gebrauchen den Ausdruck Humanismus in einem ungenauen Sinn, etwa gleichbedeutend mit Anthropozentrismus. Aber wenn man sagt, daß Marx Haltung anthropozentrisch sei, so sind damit die Hauptfragen erst gestellt, nicht schon gelöst.Humanismus mag etwa soviel wie Säkularismus bedeuten — der Mensch, nicht Gott, wird als im Mittelpunkt stehend gedacht. Die anthropozentrische Haltung kann verschiedene Formen annehmen, vor allem die Formen, die man als Humanismus der Ideale und als Humanismus der Prinzipien bezeichnen könnte. Der Humanismus der Ideale ist ausdrücklich an derZukunft orientiert, der Humanismus der Prinzipien aber an derGegenwart. Nur ein Humanismus der Prinzipien, dem es darum geht, den Eigenwert existierender Individuen zu behaupten und zu verteidigen, verdient es, ethischer Humanismus genannt zu werden. Marx, sogar der jüngste Marx, war kein ethischer Humanist in diesem Sinn. Und nur ein Humanismus in diesem strengen Sinn würde einen philosophischen Standort bieten, von dem aus man den Stalinismus oder Neo-Stalinismus angreifen könnte.Marx war ein Säkularist, und er entwarf ein humanistisches Ideal für die Zukunft, aber humanistische Prinzipien für die Gegenwart lehnte er ab. Er betonte, daß nur dem nicht entfremdeten, produktiven Individuum der kommunistischen Zukunft ein eigener Wert zukomme. Bis dahin haben Individuen nur einen geschichtlich instrumentalen Wert: jene, die an der Verwirklichung der kommunistischen Gesellschaft arbeiten, sind zu respektieren; diejenigen, welche dabei Widerstand leisten oder versagen, müssen ausschließlich als Hindernisse auf dem Wege des geschichtlichen Fortschritts behandelt werden.In diesem Sinn ist der Leninismus und sogar der Stalinismus und Neo-Stalinismus in dem zukunftsorientierten Humanismus der Ideale des jungen Marx einbegriffen, oder zumindest davon nicht ausgeschlossen. Selbst der jüngste Marx machte sich den Modeirrtum des 19. Jahrhunderts zu eigen — den Irrtum des aufgeschobenen Wertes oder des zeitlich verstellten Wertes und nahm damit eine mit dem ethischen Humanismus grundsätzlich unvereinbare Position ein.

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An earlier, and much shorter, version of this paper was read at a session on Marxism and Humanism at the Fourteenth International Philosophy Congress in Vienna, September 4, 1968, and published in Vol. II of the Congress Proceedings, Vienna, 1968, pp. 69–73.     

A defence of mencius’ ethical naturalism

I argue that Mencius puts forth a defensible form of ethical naturalism, according to which moral properties, moral motivation, and moral deliberation can be accounted for within the parameters of a naturalistic worldview. On this position, moral properties are the subjectively real properties which acts have in virtue of their corresponding to our most coherent set of shared desires. I give a naturalistic definition of ‘right’ which, I argue, is implicit in Mencius’ philosophy. I address the objection that some of the contemporary‐sounding views which I attribute to Mencius are positions which are alien to the ancient thinker, and I argue that the version of Mencius given here is not only quite faithful to Mencius but also a true metaethical theory.     

Male pragmatism in negotiators’ ethical reasoning

Across four studies, we explored why a gender gap emerges in negotiator ethics, such that men set lower ethical standards than women. The male pragmatism hypothesis suggests men, more than women, are motivationally biased in setting ethical standards. Experiment 1 demonstrated how negotiations’ masculinity implications underlie this gender gap in ethics. Experiment 2 demonstrated that, by viewing ethics from a self-interested perspective, men were more egocentric in their ethical reasoning than women. Experiment 3 demonstrated that, by granting themselves more leniency in ethics than others, men exhibited more moral hypocrisy than women. Experiment 4 examined how implicit negotiation beliefs affect the relation between gender and ethical standards. As hypothesized, fixed beliefs predicted lower ethical standards, particularly for men. These findings suggest a robust pattern by which men are more pragmatic in their ethical reasoning at the bargaining table than women.     

Better than ever? Employee reactions to ethical failures in organizations,and the ethical recovery paradox

This research examines organizational attempts to recover internally from ethical failures witnessed by employees. Drawing on research on service failure recovery, relationship repair, and behavioral ethics, we investigate how witnessing unethical acts in an organization impacts employees and their relationship with their organization. In two studies—one in the lab and one in the field—we examine the extent to which it is possible for organizations to recover fully from these ethical lapses. Results reveal an ethical recovery paradox, in which exemplary organizational efforts to recover internally from ethical failure may enhance employee perceptions of the organization to a more positive level than if no ethical failure had occurred.     

Surgical patents and patients — The ethical dilemmas

It is obvious that every inventor should be rewarded for the intellectual effort, and at the same time be encouraged to successively improve his or her discovery and to work on subsequent innovations. Patents also ensure that patent owners are officially protected against intellectual piracy, but protection of intellectual property may be difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, it all comes down to this basic question: Does a contradiction exist between medical ethics and the “Medical and Surgical Procedure Patents” system? It may well turn out that medical-procedure patents can have a negative influence on the standard of medical care. Medical-method patents may also interfere with the physician-patient relationship. At present, physicians do not question the usefulness of patent protection for medicines, biotechnology, equipment and devices, but they strongly oppose it for surgical procedures.     

Can designing and selling low-quality products be ethical?

Whereas previous studies have criticized low-quality products for inadequate safety, this paper considers only safe products, and it examines the ethics of designing and selling low-quality products. Product quality is defined as suitability to a general purpose. The duty that companies owe to consumers is summarized in the Consumer-Oriented Process principle: “to place an increase in the consumer’s quality of life as the primary goal for producing products.” This principle is applied in analyzing the primary ethical justifications for low-quality products: availability and applicability. Finally, a low-quality product should be designed afresh, not by altering an existing high-quality product. Supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant CCR-9315696. The views, opinions, and conclusions of this paper are not necessarily those of the University of Illinois or the National Science Foundation. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, St. Louis, Mo., February 29 to March 2, 1996. Willem Bakker is an undergraduate at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is majoring in computer engineering and philosophy. Michael Loui is professor of electrical and computer engineering and associate dean of the Graduate College at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. From 1990 to 1991, he served at the National Science Foundation in Washington, D.C. His scholarly interests include computational complexity theory, theory of parallel and distributed computation, faulttolerant software, and professional ethics.     

What is the ethical in fear and trembling?

James Bogen misinterprets what Kierkegaard (or more accurately, Johannes de Silentio) meant by the ethical in Fear and Trembling (see Inquiry, 5 [1962], pp. 305–17). Kierkegaard did not intend to depict morality as a system of duties where moral duties derive from the particular position(s) one holds in society. Kierkegaard thought that moral duties were based on universal principles that were divine commands. Although Kierkegaard thought that it was necessary for an action to be moral that it be done in accord with such universal principles, he did not think that this was sufficient. In order to be a moral action, the action must be done not only in accord with certain universal principles but in a certain way. Kierkegaard notes the appropriate way by saying the agent must reveal himself in his action. Thus revelation by the agent and acting in accordance with certain principles are jointly sufficient and singly necessary conditions for an action to be moral.     

Nanotechnology — A new field of ethical inquiry?

Parallel to the public discussion on the benefits and risks of nanotechnology, a debate on the ethics of nanotechnology has begun. It has been postulated that a new “nano-ethics” is necessary. In this debate, the — positive as well as negative — visionary and speculative innovations which are brought into connection with nanotechnology stand in the foreground. In this contribution, an attempt is made to discover new ethical aspects of nanotechnology in a more systematic manner than has been the case. It turns out that there are hardly any completely new ethical aspects raised by nanotechnology. It is much rather primarily a case of gradual shifts of emphasis and of relevance in questions which, in principle, are already known and which give reason for ethical discussions on nanotechnology. In a certain manner, structurally novel ethical aspects arise through the important role played by visions in the public discourse. New questions are also posed by the fact that previously separate lines of ethical reflection converge in the field of nanotechnology. The proposal of an independent “nano-ethics”, however, seems exaggerated.     

What if there is an ethical dimension in psychoanalysis?

The implications of an ethical dimension in psychoanalysis are explored, together with the questions whether and in what sense analysis has anything to contribute to ethical reflection, and whether and in what sense ethical considerations can play a role in analytic theory and process. As regards theory, analytic construction of an ethical agent would require a refocusing of structural and dynamic considerations in order to provide an integrative source of decision-making capacity to serve as the responsible agent in ethical deliberation, choice, and action. Suggestions are made for formulating the nature of the ethical agent in terms of a theory of motivation rather than of drive, and in terms of an integrative theory of the self. To the extent that analysis involves ethical considerations, the way lies open for dialogue and mutually enriching contributions of analysis to ethics and vice versa. Various aspects of the analytic perspective are explored that in themselves carry ethical implications or can be enriched by ethical reflection. Beyond theoretical considerations, the interaction between ethical factors and genetic, structural, and dynamic issues in clinical psychoanalysis loom as matters for future exploration.     

Kierkegaard and the ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’

This article discusses the claim made by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling that the story of Abraham involves a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’. It tries to show that this claim is intelligible and plausible when considered within the context of a philosophical position which views morality as a system of duties.     

Modern medicine and biotechnology: an ethical conflict of interest?

When confronting the issues related to developments in modern medicine and biotechnology, we must repeatedly ask ourselves anew what can and cannot be justified in an ethical sense. For radically new ethical questions seem to arise through innovative techniques such as stem cell research or preimplantation diagnosis — and with them new areas of conflicting interests. If one scrutinizes the previous positions related to this subject, it becomes conspicuous that a multitude of questions has quickly piled up — however, (as in the case of Germany) comprehensive and differentiated views have mostly been lacking. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an International Conference on “Conflict of Interest and its Significance in Science and Medicine” held in Warsaw, Poland on 5–6 April, 2002.     

The ethical implications of Sengzhao’s concept of the Sage

This paper is an exploration of the ethical significance of Sengzhao’s concept of the sage as exhibited through a Buddhist practitioner’s expanded understanding and cognition of reality. From a philosophical point of view, I aim to show that the ethical significance of his concept of the sage comprises a shift first from ontology to epistemology, and then from epistemology to ethics. I firstly define Sengzhao’s concept of the sage and present a preliminary account of this concept before elaborating on its philosophical aspects. Next, I attempt to illustrate how ethical implications can be derived from Sengzhao’s ethical shift, and lastly, I shed light on the value and significance of this philosophical standpoint within Buddhist philosophy.     

Will the new code help researchers to be more ethical?

A code of ethics has 2 largely incompatible objectives: to set forth enforceable minimal standards of conduct and to teach about or invoke ethical conduct. The section of the new American Psychological Association code dealing with research ethics achieves the former to some degree. However, it neither provides needed education in the ethics of research nor states where the reader might turn for such information. The code is particularly deficient in the following areas: privacy and confidentiality; institutional review boards; deception; debriefing; data sharing; and research on marginal populations, on children and adolescents, and in organizational contexts. Suggestions are offered for providing a bibliographic resource, in hard copy and on-line, that would stimulate independent interest, scholarship, education, and research on research ethics.