Morality shifting in the context of intergroup violence

We propose morality shifting as a mechanism through which individuals can maintain a moral image of the ingroup. We argue that a shift from the moral principles of harm and fairness to those of loyalty and authority occurs when assessing a potentially threatening event, particularly among high ingroup glorifiers. Three studies confirmed this hypothesis using three different methodologies. Study 1 compared the use of language related to four moral foundations formulated in moral psychology in response to ingroup‐ and outgroup‐committed wrongdoings. Results showed that loyalty‐ and authority‐related words were used more, whereas harm‐ and fairness‐related words were used less in response to ingroup‐ compared with outgroup‐committed wrongdoings. Study 2 replicated this effect with regards to the cognitive accessibility of these moral principles. Study 3 confirmed that morality shifting is a motivated response to social identity threat, rather than a response to mere activation of social identity. Finally, as predicted, Study 3 demonstrated the effect of morality shifting to be moderated by ingroup glorification but not ingroup attachment. Implications and consequences for intergroup and individual wrongdoings, as well as for intergroup relations, are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of the belief in free market ideology on redressing corporate injustice

Many people in the major Western economies (e.g., United States, UK, and Germany) subscribe to free market ideology (FMI), which claims that institutional oversight of the market is unnecessary for public reaction can force corporations to regulate their own behavior. The question then becomes how people's belief in FMI affects their reactions to corporate transgressions. Given its ingroup‐centered values, we hypothesized that FMI beliefs would bias reactions to corporate transgressions. We report results of a pilot study showing that FMI beliefs are predicted by selfishness, tradition, conformity, and lack of universalism. We then report three experiments, which showed that stronger FMI beliefs predict weaker demands to redress corporate injustices committed by ingroup (but not outgroup) corporations (Studies 1–3), especially when victims of corporate wrongdoings belong to an outgroup (rather than the ingroup; Study 3). The findings inform our conceptual understanding of FMI and give insights about its implications for market justice.     

Perceived discrimination as worldview threat or worldview confirmation: implications for self-esteem

In 3 studies, the authors tested the hypothesis that discrimination targets' worldview moderates the impact of perceived discrimination on self-esteem among devalued groups. In Study 1, perceiving discrimination against the ingroup was negatively associated with self-esteem among Latino Americans who endorsed a meritocracy worldview (e.g., believed that individuals of any group can get ahead in America and that success stems from hard work) but was positively associated with self-esteem among those who rejected this worldview. Study 2 showed that exposure to discrimination against their ingroup (vs. a non-self-relevant group) led to lower self-esteem, greater feelings of personal vulnerability, and ingroup blame among Latino Americans who endorsed a meritocracy worldview but to higher self-esteem and decreased ingroup blame among Latino Americans who rejected it. Study 3 showed that compared with women informed that prejudice against their ingroup is pervasive, women informed that prejudice against their ingroup is rare had higher self-esteem if they endorsed a meritocracy worldview but lower self-esteem if they rejected this worldview. Findings support the idea that perceiving discrimination against one's ingroup threatens the worldview of individuals who believe that status in society is earned but confirms the worldview of individuals who do not.     

Competitive victimhood as a response to accusations of ingroup harm doing

Accusations of unjust harm doing by the ingroup threaten the group's moral identity. One strategy for restoring ingroup moral identity after such a threat is competitive victimhood: claiming the ingroup has suffered compared with the harmed outgroup. Men accused of harming women were more likely to claim that men are discriminated against compared with women (Study 1), and women showed the same effect when accused of discriminating against men (Study 3). Undergraduates engaged in competitive victimhood with university staff after their group was accused of harming staff (Study 2). Study 4 showed that the effect of accusations on competitive victimhood among high-status group members is mediated by perceived stigma reversal: the expectation that one should feel guilty for being in a high-status group. Exposure to a competitive victimhood claim on behalf of one's ingroup reduced stigma reversal and collective guilt after an accusation of ingroup harm doing (Study 5).     

How Do U.S. Christians and Atheists Stereotype One Another’s Moral Values?

Moral conflict between Christians and atheists is becoming increasingly heated amidst the U.S. “culture wars,” yet research has been mostly silent regarding how these groups stereotype one another’s moral values and beliefs. We used moral foundations theory to better understand the nature of such stereotypes. In Study 1, U.S. Christian and atheist participants completed measures of moral values from their own perspective as well as the perspectives of typical atheists and typical Christians. Whereas atheists believed their ingroup endorsed fairness/justice values more than Christians, Christians believed their ingroup endorsed all moral values more than atheists. Moreover, both groups held (often extremely) inaccurate stereotypes about the outgroup’s values. In Study 2, participants wrote explicitly about outgroup morality. Atheists typically described Christians more negatively than Christians described atheists, regardless of the moral foundation of concern. Also, Christians’ negative impressions drew primarily from the Authority foundation, and both groups drew heavily from the Care foundation in both their positive and negative depictions. Implications for addressing the growing conflict between Christians and atheists in the United States are discussed.     

The role of retributive justice and the use of international criminal tribunals in post‐conflict reconciliation

Four experiments examined people's responses to intergroup violence either committed or suffered by their own group. Experiment 1 demonstrated that Serbs who strongly glorified Serbia were more supportive of future violence against, and less willing to reconcile with, Bosniaks after reading about Serbian victimization by Bosniaks rather than Serbian transgressions against Bosniaks. Replicating these effects with Americans in the context of American–Iranian tensions, Experiment 2 further showed that demands for retributive justice explained why high glorifiers showed asymmetrical reactions to ingroup victimization vs. perpetration. Again in the Serb and the American context, respectively, Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that post‐conflict international criminal tribunals can help satisfy victim group members' desire for retributive justice, and thereby reduce their support for future violence and increase their willingness to reconcile with the perpetrator group. The role of retributive justice and the use of international criminal justice in intergroup conflict (reduction) are discussed.     

Are the ethnically tolerant free of discrimination,prejudice and political intolerance?

We hypothesized that the ethnically tolerant (i.e., people who are anti‐ethnocentric and score very low on a measure of ethnocentrism) would perceive people with extremely incompatible values and beliefs as out‐groups and would engage in discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against them. Experiments among Australian citizens in Studies 1 (N = 224) and 2 (N = 283) showed that the ethnically tolerant perceived supporters of a message in favour of mandatory detention of asylum seekers as out‐groups and consequently exhibited discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against them. Study 3 with 265 U.S. citizens showed that, controlling for liberalism, ethnic tolerance led to prejudice against out‐groups. This was replicated with 522 UK citizens in Study 4, which also showed that social identity, and not moral conviction, mediated the link between ethnic tolerance and prejudice. The findings suggest that the ethnically tolerant can be discriminatory, prejudiced and politically intolerant against fellow humans.     

The threat of moral transgression: The impact of group membership and moral opportunity

When other ingroup members behave immorally, people's motivation to maintain a moral group image may cause them to experience increased threat and act defensively in response. In the current research, we investigated people's reactions to others' misconduct and examined the effect of group membership and the possible threat‐reducing function of moral opportunity—the prospect of being able to re‐establish the group's moral image. In Study 1, students who were confronted with fellow students' plagiarism and who received an opportunity to improve their group's morality reported feeling less threatened than students who did not receive such opportunity. In Study 2, students reacted to a recent academic fraud case, which either implicated an ingroup (scholar in their own discipline) or an outgroup member (scholar in another discipline). Results indicated that participants experienced more threat when an ingroup (versus an outgroup) member had committed the moral transgression. However, as hypothesized, this was not the case when moral opportunity was provided. Hence, the threat‐reducing effect of moral opportunity was replicated. Additionally, participants generally were more defensive in response to ingroup (versus outgroup) moral failure and less defensive when moral opportunity was present (versus absent). Together, these findings suggest that the reduction of threat due to moral opportunity may generally help individuals take constructive action when the behavior of fellow group members discredits the group's moral image.     

Social identity and perceptions of torture: It's moral when we do it

Two studies examined the effects of social identity concerns on the moral justification of torture. British and American nationals read a media report concerning the torture of a terrorist suspect that they were led to believe had been perpetrated either by members of their own nation's security services or by another nation's security services. When the torture was perpetrated by the ingroup, participants described it as more morally justified than when the torture was perpetrated by the other nation's security services. This effect was mediated by participants' decreased empathy for the ingroup's torture victim (Study 1), as well as increased victim blame and perceiving the perpetrators as prototypical of their national group (Study 2). We consider how social identity concerns enable moral justification of harm doing.     

When Beliefs Lead to (Im)Moral Action: How Believing in Torture's Effectiveness Shapes the Endorsement of Its Use

Does believing in torture's effectiveness shape the endorsements of its use? Using a multimethod approach across six studies, we provide converging evidence that efficacy beliefs can help increase understanding of individual differences and situational influences on torture support. Studies 1a and 1b found that torture opinions contained more efficacy‐based language than other types of harm and that people relied more on torture efficacy than torture's inherent morality when conveying their views. Study 2 assessed predictors of torture favorability including effectiveness and other key covariates, revealing that efficacy beliefs strongly predicted torture favorability—an association that retained its predictive validity above and beyond individual differences known to influence torture support. Mediation analyses further showed that efficacy beliefs explained key associations with torture support. Studies 3 and 4 used moral dilemmas requiring decisions about torture versus other harm. Results showed that individuals who believed harm would be effective were more likely to endorse its use; this was especially evident for torture judgments. Study 5 replicated the torture‐efficacy effect while also revealing efficacy effects for other interrogation techniques, thus suggesting the effect is driven more by the instrumental objective of torture than harm or moral violations. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

TORTURE AND JUST WAR

I offer an argument for why torture, as an act of state‐sponsored force to gain information crucial to the well‐being of the common good, should be considered as a tactic of war, and therefore scrutinized in terms of just war theory. I argue that, for those committed to the justifiability of the use of force, most of the popular arguments against all acts of torture are unpersuasive because the logic behind them would forbid equally any act of mutilating or killing in battle. I will also argue that looking at torture through the perspective of the just war tradition forces us to place strictures on the practice that make it hard to justify, helps us to see why torture should never be legalized, helps us to clarify when circumstances might justify torture, and suggests what sort of character is required to recognize when those circumstances have occurred.     

The moral contents of anti‐atheist prejudice (and why atheists should care about it)

Anti‐atheist prejudice is pervasive worldwide. Past research indicates that this is driven by perceptions of atheist immorality, yet such perceptions have not been explored in detail. Using Moral Foundations Theory and samples of U.S. Christians, we investigated whether anti‐atheist prejudice is explained by atheists' perceived adherence to certain foundational moral values more than others. Study 1 participants completed measures of moral value endorsements from the perspective of a typical atheist. Study 2 participants read that either atheists or people in general strongly endorse one of five moral foundations. Anti‐atheist prejudice was consistently explained best by perceived atheist concern for values of caring/compassion rather than fairness/justice, loyalty, deferential respect, or purity/decency. Findings suggest that efforts to reduce anti‐atheist prejudice should emphasize atheists' capacity for kindness and caring.     

Why did you choose that person over me? Ingroup rejection and attributions to discrimination

The present research examined the attributions that people make when an individual rejects a member of his or her own group in favor of a member of an outgroup (i.e., ingroup rejection). Study 1 showed that Latinos rejected by an ingroup member (perpetrator) made more attributions to discrimination than Whites under similar circumstances. Study 2 showed that Latinos made more attributions to discrimination for ingroup rejection when the perpetrator was Latino as compared to when the perpetrator was White, whereas Whites' attributions to discrimination were relatively low regardless of perpetrator's ethnicity. Study 3 showed that priming loyalty norms increased attributions to discrimination among Latinos in response to ingroup rejection, but not in response to outgroup rejection. This research brings a new perspective to discrimination research by focusing on intragroup rejection and nonprototypical cases of discrimination.     

The role of lay beliefs about group transgressions in acceptance of responsibility for ingroup harm-doing

Denial of responsibility by perpetrator groups is the most common response to group-based transgressions. Refusal to acknowledge responsibility has dire consequences for intergroup relations. In this research we assessed whether shifting lay beliefs about group-based transgressions in general influences acceptance of responsibility for a specific ingroup transgression. In two experimental studies we manipulated lay beliefs about group transgressions as reflecting either a group's stable character (i.e., a global defect construal) or a specific characteristic (i.e., a specific defect construal). Specific defect construals (compared to global defect construals) increased acceptance of ingroup responsibility by increasing group malleability beliefs, but reduced acceptance of ingroup responsibility by reducing the ingroup's perceived moral failure. These effects were moderated by ingroup superiority in Study 1, but not Study 2. We draw implications for our understanding of mechanisms of denial of responsibility, identity threat, and coping with this threat.     

On‐again/off‐again dating relationships: How are they different from other dating relationships?

This article explores the understudied yet prevalent phenomenon of on‐again/off‐again (on‐off) dating relationships. Study 1 (N= 445 U.S. college students) showed that almost two thirds of participants had experienced an on‐off relationship. Analyses of open‐ended responses about relationship experiences showed on‐off partners were less likely to report positives (e.g., love and understanding from partners) and more likely to report negatives (e.g., communication problems, uncertainty) than partners who had not broken up and renewed. Study 2 (N= 236), employing quantitative measures, substantiated these findings and further showed a greater number of renewals was associated with greater negatives and fewer positives. Results highlight the need for further investigation regarding on‐off relationships, and theories potentially useful in explaining these relationships are discussed.     

Profit maximization versus disadvantageous inequality: the impact of self‐categorization

Choice behavior researchers (e.g., Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992 ) have found that individuals tend to choose a more lucrative but disadvantageously unequal payoff (e.g., self—$600/other—$800) over a less profitable but equal one (e.g., self—$500/other—$500); greater profit trumps interpersonal social comparison concerns in the choice setting. We suggest, however, that self‐categorization (e.g., Hogg, 2000 ) can shift interpersonal social comparison concerns to the intergroup level and make trading disadvantageous inequality for greater profit more difficult. Studies 1–3 show that profit maximization diminishes when recipients belong to different social categories (e.g., genders, universities). Study 2 further implicates self‐categorization, as self‐categorized individuals tend to forgo profit whether making a choice for themselves or another ingroup member. Study 3, moreover, reveals that social categorization alone is not sufficient to diminish profit maximization; individuals must self‐categorize and identify with their categorization. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From species ethics to social concerns: Habermas’s critique of “liberal eugenics” evaluated

Three arguments of Habermas against “liberal eugenics”—the arguments from consent, responsibility, and instrumentalization—are critically evaluated and explicated in the light of his discourse ethics and social theory. It is argued that these arguments move partly at a too deep level and are in part too individualistic and psychological to sufficiently counter the liberal position that he sets out to criticize. This is also due to limitations that prevent discourse ethics from connecting effectively to the moral and political domains, e.g., through a discussion of justice. In spite of these weaknesses, Habermas’s thesis is of major relevance and brings up neglected issues in the discussion about eugenic reproductive practices. This relevance has not been duly recognized in bioethics, largely because of the depth of his speculations of philosophical anthropology. It is argued that Habermas’s notion of the colonization of the lifeworld could provide the analytical tool needed to build that bridge to the moral and political domain.     

A utilitarian argument against torture interrogation of terrorists

Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, much support for torture interrogation of terrorists has emerged in the public forum, largely based on the “ticking bomb” scenario. Although deontological and virtue ethics provide incisive arguments against torture, they do not speak directly to scientists and government officials responsible for national security in a utilitarian framework. Drawing from criminology, organizational theory, social psychology, the historical record, and my interviews with military professionals, I assess the potential of an official U.S. program of torture interrogation from a practical perspective. The central element of program design is a sound causal model relating input to output. I explore three principal models of how torture interrogation leads to truth: the animal instinct model, the cognitive failure model, and the data processing model. These models show why torture interrogation fails overall as a counterterrorist tactic. They also expose the processes that lead from a precision torture interrogation program to breakdowns in key institutions—health care, biomedical research, police, judiciary, and military. The breakdowns evolve from institutional dynamics that are independent of the original moral rationale. The counterargument, of course, is that in a society destroyed by terrorism there will be nothing to repair. That is why the actual causal mechanism of torture interrogation in curtailing terrorism must be elucidated by utilitarians rather than presumed.     

Let me count the ways in which I respect thee: does competence compensate or compromise lack of liking from the group?

Two studies examined the effects of competence‐based respect in relation to liking‐based respect from ingroup members. First, a pilot study confirmed the impact of competence feedback from ingroup members on affective and emotional reactions (membership esteem, feelings of pride and shame). The main studies orthogonally manipulated both liking‐ and competence‐based respect from other ingroup members in order to examine whether (high) competence‐based respect compensates for lack of liking, or compromises the subjective position in the group, on affective and emotional reactions to the feedback. Using a scenario methodology Study 1 produced no evidence for compensation, and indicated that liking was primary in this context. Study 2, using experimental groups, provided further evidence that those who were disliked by their fellow group members felt compromised by a favourable evaluation of their competence, while remaining committed to the group. These effects are related to the different properties and implications of competence and liking dimensions in group interaction. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.