The Epistemic Status of Evolutionary Theory

The theory of evolution continues to be a bone of contention among certain groups of theistic believers. This paper aims to bring some light to the debate about it, by introducing a framework for epistemic appraisal which can provide a realistic and sober assessment of the epistemic credentials of the various parts of evolutionary theory. The upshot is a more nuanced epistemic appraisal of the theory of evolution, which shows that there are significant differences in epistemic standing between its various parts. Any serious conversation about the theory of evolution ought to reflect these facts.     

The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce

Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered much support for this claim, beyond highlighting certain salutary consequences it might have. In this paper, I offer some further support for Foley’s claim by offering an argument and a way to conceive the claim in a way that makes it as plausible as its denial, and thus levelling the playing field. The burden of proof then lies with those who seek to deny Foley’s radical suggestion.     

The Relevance of Decision Theory to Ethical Theory

Morality for the purposes of this paper consists of sets of rules or principles intended for the general regulation of conduct for all. Intuitionist accounts of morality are rejected as making reasoned analysis of morals impossible. In many interactions, there is partial conflict and partial cooperation. From the general social point of view, the rational thing to propose is that we steer clear of conflict and promote cooperation. This is what it is rational to propose to reinforce, and to assist in reinforcing in society; it is not necessarily what it is individually rational to do. Even so, given the general situation, the rationality of its reinforcement will typically support the rationality of individual action as well. Game theory makes it possible to clarify these interactions, and these proposals for social solutions.     

The Effects of Race and Social Dominance Orientation in Simulated Juror Decision Making1

Recent mock‐jury research often has found no evidence that White jurors are more likely to convict and impose harsher sentences on Black compared to White defendants. Drawing on social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), this paper argues that this apparent null effect reflects that different racial biases shown by White jurors varying in social dominance orientation (SDO) cancel each other out. A mock‐jury study (n= 70) found no main effect for defendant race, but evidence for a crossover interaction with high SDO individuals showing an anti‐Black bias and with low SDO individuals showing a pro‐Black bias in their guilty judgments and sentence recommendations. The discussion argues race is still a critical factor in White jurors’ decision making.     

New Horizons for a Theory of Epistemic Modals

Recent debate over the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic modals has focused on intuitions about cross-contextual truth-value assessments. In this paper, we advocate a different approach to evaluating theories of epistemic modals. Our strategy focuses on judgments of the incompatibility of two different epistemic possibility claims, or two different truth value assessments of a single epistemic possibility claim. We subject the predictions of existing theories to empirical scrutiny, and argue that existing contextualist and relativist theories are unable to account for the full pattern of observed judgments. As a way of illustrating the theoretical upshot of these results, we conclude by developing a novel theory of epistemic modals that is able to predict the results.     

Dominance in Marital Decision Making in Women's Liberation and Non-Women's Liberation Families

Fourteen couples of whom the wife was associated with the Women's Liberation Movement (WLM) and 14 “traditional” couples were interviewed using a modified version of the Revealed Differences Technique. The WLM-associated wives differed significantly from the control group in the dominance indices of “Speaks Last” (p < .001) and “Time Spoken” (p < .05) and in the content of responses to two of the ten interview questions. Analysis indicated that the WLM wives were more self-reliant, while the control-group wives were more passive and dependent. The two groups did not differ significantly on the “Speaks First” and “Decisions Won” indices of dominance and the conflict measures.     

The Neglect of Epistemic Considerations in Logic: The Case of Epistemic Assumptions

The two different layers of logical theory—epistemological and ontological—are considered and explained. Special attention is given to epistemic assumptions of the kind that a judgement is granted as known, and their role in validating rules of inference, namely to aid the inferential preservation of epistemic matters from premise judgements to conclusion judgement, while ordinary Natural Deduction assumptions (that propositions are true) serve to establish the holding of consequence from antecedent propositions to succedent proposition.

     

博弈论中重复可允许算法的认知分析

博弈论中重复可允许(Iterated Admissibilty)算法对于快速约简博弈模型、寻找合理置信的纳什均衡具有重要意义,但该算法的认知基础存在悖论。本文构建一个完备的博弈认知逻辑系统EL_G,利用该系统语言描述博弈相关概念和性质,使得我们可以基于EL_G逻辑刻画重复可允许算法,从而达到为该算法提供合理的认知基础,解决算法背后的认知悖论的目的。     

Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle

The likelihood principle (LP) is a core issue in disagreements between Bayesian and frequentist statistical theories. Yet statements of the LP are often ambiguous, while arguments for why a Bayesian must accept it rely upon unexamined implicit premises. I distinguish two propositions associated with the LP, which I label LP1 and LP2. I maintain that there is a compelling Bayesian argument for LP1, based upon strict conditionalization, standard Bayesian decision theory, and a proposition I call the practical relevance principle. In contrast, I argue that there is no similarly compelling argument for or against LP2. I suggest that these conclusions lead to a restrictedly pluralistic view of Bayesian confirmation measures.     

The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X

Consider Phoebe and Daphne. Phoebe has credences in 1 million propositions. Daphne, on the other hand, has credences in all of these propositions, but she's also got credences in 999 million other propositions. Phoebe's credences are all very accurate. Each of Daphne's credences, in contrast, are not very accurate at all; each is a little more accurate than it is inaccurate, but not by much. Whose doxastic state is better, Phoebe's or Daphne's? It is clear that this question is analogous to a question that has exercised ethicists over the past thirty years. How do we weigh a population consisting of some number of exceptionally happy and satisfied individuals against another population consisting of a much greater number of people whose lives are only just worth living? This is the question that occasions population ethics. In this paper, I go in search of the correct population ethics for credal states.