共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Kourken Michaelian 《Erkenntnis》2011,74(3):399-424
The default view in the epistemology of forgetting is that human memory would be epistemically better if we were not so susceptible
to forgetting—that forgetting is in general a cognitive vice. In this paper, I argue for the opposed view: normal human forgetting—the
pattern of forgetting characteristic of cognitively normal adult human beings—approximates a virtue located at the mean between
the opposed cognitive vices of forgetting too much and remembering too much. I argue, first, that, for any finite cognizer,
a certain pattern of forgetting is necessary if her memory is to perform its function well. I argue, second, that, by eliminating
“clutter” from her memory store, this pattern of forgetting improves the overall shape of the subject’s total doxastic state.
I conclude by reviewing work in psychology which suggests that normal human forgetting approximates this virtuous pattern
of forgetting. 相似文献
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Elizabeth Anderson 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2020,58(1):6-29
In arguing about justice, different sides often accept common moral principles, but reach different conclusions about justice because they disagree about facts. I argue that motivated reasoning, epistemic injustice, and ideologies of injustice support unjust institutions by entrenching distorted representations of the world. Working from a naturalistic conception of justice as a kind of social contract, I suggest some strategies for discovering what justice demands by counteracting these biases. Moral sentiments offer vital resources to this end. 相似文献
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Barry Stroud 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(3):495-503
A brief discussion of the ways in which awareness of and sensitivity to the history of philosophy can contribute to epistemology
even if epistemology is understood as a distinctively philosophical and not primarily historical enterprise. 相似文献
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JOEL J. KUPPERMAN 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2005,70(3):659-680
Might there be knowledge of non‐instrumental values? Arguments are give for two principal claims. One is that if there is such knowledge, it typically will have features that do not entirely match those of other kinds of knowledge. It will have a closer relation to the kind of person one is or becomes, and in the way it combines features of knowing‐how with knowing‐that. There also are problems of indeterminacy of non‐instrumental value which are not commonly found in other things that we can know about. The second claim is that there is a strong prima‐facie case for holding that there is such knowledge, and that the usual arguments against this are all faulty. 相似文献
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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Moral epistemology (henceforth ME) has been spoken of as a subject matter in its own right by philosophers in the last few decades and yet the... 相似文献
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Jesper Kallestrup 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2020,101(1):150-174
According to a strong assurance view of testimonial trust, a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p. While the strong view offers a genuinely inter-personal account of testimony, it faces a problem about bootstrapping: how can trust generate epistemic reasons when trust can obtain between unreliable speakers and hearers? In contrast, a weaker assurance view holds that a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p only if the speaker is reliable. While the weaker view offers an epistemic account of testimony, it faces a problem about redundancy: how can trust play any epistemic role when the speaker's reliability seems to pre-empt any contribution that trust may make towards such epistemic reason? This paper argues that neither horn of this dilemma is convincing once proponents of assurance views avail themselves of an epistemic distinction between reasons of rationality as a guide to reasonable belief and reasons of justification as a guide to true belief. Whereas testimonial assurance grounds rational reasons, which need not make probable the beliefs they make reasonable, testimonial reliability grounds justificatory reasons, which need not make reasonable the beliefs they make probable. 相似文献
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This experiment tested the hypothesis that there would be a significant increase in powerlessness scores over a 10 year period. The sample was drawn from a population of college students originally tested in 1964. At the 10 year follow-up, all Ss had graduated from college and were either professionally employed (mostly as teachers) or engaged in child-rearing/home activities. The average age of the 1974 sample was 29 years and consisted of 70 females and 30 males. The test instrument was the adult version of Rotter's Internal-External (I-E) Locus of Control Scale which consists of 23 forced-choice items. There were no significant differences on total I-E scores over the 10 year period. However, with use of the Mirels two-factor scoring system, significant increases in social-political control were found. No significant differences in personal control were found. It was concluded that care should be taken in utilizing cross-sectional findings and that utilizing multidimensional scores suggests different results for previously published reports. 相似文献
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In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge,
developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about
the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge,
the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based
answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), will suffice as an acceptable answer to the psychological question. My
general ambition is thus to establish that more work is needed if we are to have a full account of self-knowledge in both
its epistemological and psychological aspects. I conclude by suggesting how my thesis bears on those who aim to provide an
empirical account of the cognition involved in self-knowledge.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Patrick R. Frierson 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2016,94(1):79-98
This paper shows how Maria Montessori's thought can enrich contemporary virtue epistemology. After a short overview of her ‘interested empiricist’ epistemological framework, I discuss four representative intellectual virtues: sensory acuity, physical dexterity, intellectual love, and intellectual humility. Throughout, I show how Montessori bridges the divide between reliabilist and responsibilist approaches to the virtues and how her particular treatments of virtues offer distinctive and compelling alternatives to contemporary accounts. For instance, she emphasizes how sensory acuity is a virtue for which one can be responsible, highlights the embodied nature of cognition through a focus on physical dexterity, interprets intellectual love as a way of loving the world rather than as a love that takes knowledge as its object, and presents an alternative account of intellectual humility to contemporary emphases on the interpersonal dimensions of this virtue. 相似文献
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Spontaneously broken symmetries are often called hidden or secret symmetries. They are symmetries in the laws of nature that do not show up in observable phenomena. This raises the basic epistemological question: Is there reason to believe that these hidden symmetries are real features of nature rather than artifacts of theorizing. This paper clarifies the epistemic status of spontaneously broken symmetries. It presents the details of an argument by analogy that suggests the spontaneously broken gauge symmetry of electroweak interactions, and the subsequent hypothetico-deductive testing of the hypothesis. It is a story of how dubious means can lead to a credible end. 相似文献
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Jon Kenneth Newton 《Heythrop Journal》2018,59(4):733-746
Recent developments in Christian philosophy, in particular epistemology, need to be enriched by a study of epistemology in the Bible. This article uncovers the epistemological assumptions of the Book of Revelation (specifically related to spiritual experience, revelation, and eschatological vindication) and points out how they may advance the development of a contemporary Christian epistemology. 相似文献
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