Free Will,Foreknowledge, and Future‐Dependent Beliefs

Recently, a time‐honored assumption has resurfaced in some parts of the free will debate: (A) if past divine beliefs or past truths about what we do depend on what we do, then these beliefs and truths are, in a sense, up to us; hence, we are able to act otherwise, despite the existence of past truths or past divine beliefs about our future actions. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a novel incompatibilist argument that rests on (A). This argument is interesting in itself, for it is independent of a number of assumptions about the nature of God that have played an essential role in the classical defense of incompatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human free will. Moreover, the argument enables us to identify a difficulty compatibilists encounter when employing (A) to block incompatibilism.     

The retrieval of ‘liveness’ in William James's Will to Believe

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Evil Deceivers and Make‐Believers: On Transphobic Violence and the Politics of Illusion

This essay examines the stereotype that transgender people are “deceivers” and the stereotype's role in promoting and excusing transphobic violence. The stereotype derives from a contrast between gender presentation (appearance) and sexed body (concealed reality). Because gender presentation represents genital status, Bettcher argues, people who “misalign” the two are viewed as deceivers. The author shows how this system of gender presentation as genital representation is part of larger sexist and racist systems of violence and oppression.     

Attachment Theory, Religious Beliefs, and the Limits of Reason

This paper takes a new look at Freud’s critique of religious beliefs and wishes from the perspective of current attachment theory, particularly with reference to Peter Fonagy. By reconceptualizing Freud’s critique, it can be argued that he anticipated some current empirical studies in religiosity and attachment, and that his critique accurately describes the religiosity of insecurely attached individuals. The paper argues that current social theories, especially as represented in the work of Jürgen Habermas, about religion and its role in politics and the public sphere could benefit from incorporating insights from attachment theory.     

Self–Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe

In the debate over the nature of self–deception, intentionalists argue that self–deception requires an intention to deceive oneself, and motivationists argue that a desire, and not an intention, typically plays a crucial causal role in self–deception. Intentionalists have criticized motivationist views for ignoring what is distinctive about self–deception, and for failing to account for cases of twisted self–deception. I offer a new motivationist account whose distinctive element is the desire to believe. I argue that this account identifies what is common to cases of both twisted and straight self–deception, and that it captures what is distinctive about self–deception.     

The Content and Function of Religious and Spiritual Beliefs

Most work on religious beliefs has used a fixed research method that only allows confirming or disconfirming a priori notions of religious beliefs. This study used a flexible, data-driven research method to derive an inductive theory concerning the content and function of religious beliefs. Data from interviews with 28 undergraduates were content analyzed, yielding 7 distinct belief domains: higher power, creation, soul, life after death, spiritual connection with others, fate, and supernatural occurrences. Function domains for each content domain, and for belief systems as a whole, were preliminarily identified. Implications for future research and therapeutic interventions are discussed.     

Saying and Showing: Art, Literature and Religious Understanding

I argue that works of art and literature can be primary expressions of religious ideas, i.e., ones not dependent on other modes of communication like preaching or theology. This does not mean, however, that such works are independent of criticism, for an artist or writer can show something that is untrue, immoral, crude, and so on. I maintain that art and literature may criticize theology, or vice versa; or, thirdly, the relationship between them may be reciprocal, and I illustrate these three possibilities via Ibsen's Brand, Goethe's Faust, and the film Dead Man Walking.     

Saying and Showing: Art,Literature and Religious Understanding

I argue that works of art and literature can be primary expressions of religious ideas, i.e., ones not dependent on other modes of communication like preaching or theology. This does not mean, however, that such works are independent of criticism, for an artist or writer can show something that is untrue, immoral, crude, and so on. I maintain that art and literature may criticize theology, or vice versa; or, thirdly, the relationship between them may be reciprocal, and I illustrate these three possibilities via Ibsen’s Brand, Goethe’s Faust, and the film Dead Man Walking.     

Engaging the Borders: Empathy,Religious Studies,and Pre‐Professional Fields

This article proposes that religious studies instructors can gain pedagogical insights regarding the value and teaching of empathy from pre‐professional health care and counseling fields. I present research findings from these fields to support claims that empathic skills are teachable. I then show that empathy has been established within the field of religious studies as important in order to understand the beliefs of the religious other. I conclude that religious studies educators should be concerned about how to teach empathy, and suggest that pre‐professional research findings point us in the direction of how to do this. Experiential exercises such as role‐playing and other simulation exercises seem to be most effective in teaching empathic skills. I present examples that demonstrate how listening exercises and the role‐playing of cases can be used in the religious studies classroom and can assist in the development of empathy for the religious other.     

Religious Problem-Solving Styles and Life Satisfaction: Exploring God,the Will and the Way

Journal of Religion and Health - A proliferation of empirical studies over the past few decades has examined the connection between religiosity and health; an extension of this literature has...     

Some Implications of Beliefs in Altruism,Free Will,and Nonreductionism

ABSTRACT

In this research, we explored correlates of individuals’ beliefs in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism, as opposed to contrasting beliefs in psychological egoism, determinism, and biological reductionism. Beliefs in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism were associated with heightened a) senses of meaning in life, b) levels of life satisfaction, c) beliefs in morality as a legitimate and important dimension of life, and d) standards of personal moral conduct; they were not associated with levels of social isolation. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

The Truth Will Set You Free: Towards the Religious Study of Science

This article explores the notion that science can be viewed as a religion and that our understanding of science will be enhanced, if we study it in the same manner that we use to study any other religion. More specifically, it builds on concepts developed by Max Weber in his analysis of salvation religions to describe some ways in which science promises liberation and the institutional conditions under which that liberation will take place. While to a certain extent this exploration might be viewed as an effort to demythologize science, it is not an attack on science, as much as it is an attempt to demonstrate the potential benefits of opening up the scientific enterprise to more thorough and creative external examination.     

The Will to Truth,the Death Drive and the Will to Power

This paper claims that Freud’s idea of the death drive is analogous to the will to truth in traditional philosophy and can be better understood as a truth drive. The argument is based upon Nietzsche’s interpretation of the will to truth as a concealed will to death. This interpretation emphasizes the opposition between truth and life; truth is a concept of constancy while life is a concept of change. Freud’s recognition of the conservative nature of the drives brings him to the paradoxical conclusion of the existence of a death drive. It is paradoxical, for Freud, since it considers death as a fundamental principle of life and as its aim. The paper suggests that by replacing the concept of death by the concept of truth and using Nietzsche’s idea of “the will to power” this paradox can be resolved without losing Freud’s insight of the dialectic nature of psychological life.