The ability of children to delay gratification in an exchange task

The ability to wait for a reward is a necessary capacity for economic transactions. This study is an age-related investigation of children's ability to delay gratification in an exchange task requiring them to wait for a significant reward. We gave 252 children aged 2-4 a small piece of cookie, then offered them an opportunity to wait for a predetermined delay period before exchanging it for a larger one. In a first experiment, the children had to exchange the initial food item for rewards two, four or eight times larger. Results showed that children aged 3-4 years old sustained longer time lags for larger rewards than for smaller rewards. This effect was not found in 2-year-old subjects. In a second experiment, a reward 40 times larger than the initial piece was offered to determine the maximum waiting time that children could sustain. All age groups increased their performances. Older children were more successful at waiting, but some children as young as 2 years old were able to tolerate delays of up to 16 min. Older children who chose to give up waiting earlier than their known capacity demonstrated anticipation skills which had not been seen in younger children, showing that they had anticipated an increase in the time lag, and that they had considered both time and reward value when making their decision. Despite the age effect, we did not establish any limits for delaying gratification in children. This study may have educational implications for dealing with behavioral misconduct, which is known to be related to impulsivity control in young children.     

Reasonable reasons for waiting

Recent decision‐making research claims to establish that, in violation of Savage's normative sure‐thing principle, individuals often wait to acquire noninstrumental information and subsequently base their decisions upon this information. The current research suggests that characterizing individuals as pursuing noninstrumental or useless information may be overstated. Through a series of experiments we establish, first, that many people choose to wait, even when waiting provides no additional information at all. Second, the longer people are allowed to wait before having to decide, the more people prefer to wait rather than decide immediately. Third, those individuals who choose to wait are the ones less confident about committing themselves to a decision. For them, the benefit from waiting may be especially valuable by allowing them to come to terms with a less‐than‐ideal decision. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The lure of choice

We report three studies demonstrating the ‘lure of choice’ people prefer options that allow them to take further choices over those that do not, even when the extra choices cannot improve the ultimate outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, participants chose between two options: one solitary item, and a pair of items between which they would then make a further choice. Consistent with the lure of choice, a given item was more likely to be the ultimate choice when it was initially part of a choice pair than when it was offered on its own. We also demonstrate the lure of choice in a four‐door version of the Monty Hall problem, in which participants could either stick with their original choice or switch to one of two unopened doors. Participants were more likely to switch if they could first ‘choose to choose’ between the two unopened doors (without immediately specifying which) than if they had to choose one door straightaway. We conclude by suggesting that the lure of choice is due to a choice heuristic that is very reliable in the natural world, but much less so in a world created by marketers. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self-Other Discrepancies in Waiting Time Decisions

Both anecdotal evidence and recently reported research suggest that people are risk-averse when faced with waiting time decisions. Four studies investigate whether there is a self-other discrepancy in how people make waiting time decisions themselves and how they predict others will make similar decisions. People are found to believe that others have valuations of time similar to their own. However, when faced with alternatives that involve risk in the duration of the wait, the results point to a self-other discrepancy, in that people report greater risk-aversion themselves than they think others would. Further, when faced with waiting time gains, people are themselves more risk-averse than they think others would be. Conversely, when faced with waiting time losses, people are themselves more risk-seeking than they think others would be. Overall, the results are consistent with the recently proposed risk-as-feelings hypothesis.     

An examination of patience and well-being

Patience is the propensity to wait calmly in the face of frustration or adversity. The new 3-Factor Patience Scale (Study 1) measures three types of patience (interpersonal, life hardship, and daily hassles patience), which differentially relate to well-being and personality. In Study 2, goal pursuit and achievement mediated the relation between patience and well-being. Participants rated 10 personal goals on 15 dimensions of goal pursuit (e.g. patience enacted, difficulty, achievement satisfaction, effort). Patience facilitated goal pursuit and satisfaction especially in the face of obstacles. In Study 3, participants took part in a training program designed to increase trait patience. The program led to increased patience, decreased depression, and increased positive affect relative to a control condition, suggesting that patience may be modifiable.     

Gift Cards and Mental Accounting: Green‐lighting Hedonic Spending

In three studies, we examine the mental accounting rules that govern how gift cards are used. We predicted that their identity as gift cards would shift consumption from utilitarian to hedonic goods even in contexts where both types of goods are available and the consumer's needs are unchanged. In Study 1a, participants were asked to imagine that they had both a gift card and a specified amount of cash and needed to purchase both a hedonic item and a utilitarian item. When asked which currency they would use to buy which item, respondents were significantly more likely to say they would use the gift card to buy the hedonic item. Study 1b replicated this result and found that it was tied to participants' beliefs how different types of money should be used. In Study 2, we found that participants who were required to spend a certain amount of their compensation in a laboratory store spent more on hedonic goods if their payment was in the form of a gift card. In Study 3, we analyzed transactions at a campus bookstore and found that shoppers tended to spend disproportionately on hedonic goods when using their gift cards than when making credit card purchases. Taken together, these studies indicate that people tend to assign the monetary value of a gift card to a hedonic mental account and spend it accordingly. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Compared to Dematerialized Money,Cash Increases Impatience in Intertemporal Choice

When it comes to trading time for money (or vice versa), people tend to be impatient and myopic. Often dramatically so. For illustration, half of people would rather collect $15 now than $30 in 3 months. This willingness to forego 50% of the reward to skip a 3‐month wait corresponds to an annual discount rate of 277%. This article investigates how money's physical form biases intertemporal choice. We ask, what happens to (im)patience (i.e., discount rates) when time is traded against cash rather than against an equivalent sum of dematerialized money? We find that intertemporal decisions pitting time against cash (rather than against dematerialized money) increase impatience. The underlying mechanism relates to the pain of parting from money. Letting go of cash (dematerialized money) we can have now is psychologically more (less) painful, which in turn reduces (increases) our willingness to wait for larger‐later payoffs. Importantly, heightening prevention focus (i.e., concerns for safety and security) moderates this bias. The article concludes by discussing the implications of the research, particularly for the psychology of saving behavior.     

When Intertemporal Rewards Are Hedonic,Larger Units of Wait Time Boost Patience

In intertemporal choices between smaller‐sooner (SS) and larger‐later (LL) rewards, five studies reveal that patience for the LL option is influenced by an interactive effect of the measurement units used to express wait time (large vs. small) and the type of the reward (hedonic vs. utilitarian). Specifically, larger time units boost patience, but more so when rewards are hedonic rather than utilitarian. In line with the numerosity heuristic, the effect of time units on patience is mediated by larger time units shrinking wait time perception. This effect arises because hedonic (vs. utilitarian) rewards promote a reliance on heuristics rather than systematic calculations. Therefore, a more calculative mindset diminishes the effect of units even for hedonic rewards and eliminates the hedonic‐utilitarian asymmetry. These results contribute to research on numerosity, intertemporal choice, and hedonic‐utilitarian differences, and offer a simple tool for practitioners to influence patience.     

Territorial Defense in Parking Lots: Retaliation Against Waiting Drivers

Three studies showed that drivers leaving a public parking space are territorial even when such behavior is contrary to their goal of leaving. In Study 1 (observations of 200 departing cars), intruded-upon drivers took longer to leave than nonintruded-upon drivers. In Study 2, an experiment involving 240 drivers in which level of intrusion and status of intruder were manipulated, drivers took longer to leave when another car was present and when the intruder honked. Males left significantly sooner when intruded upon by a higher rather than lower status car, whereas females' departure times did not differ as a function of the status of the car. There was evidence that distraction might explain some of this effect. In Study 3, individuals who had parked at a mall were asked about how they would react to intruders. Compared to what they believed other people would do, respondents said they would leave faster if the car were just waiting for them to leave but they would take longer to leave if the driver in the car honked at them.     

Children's Moral Emotion Attribution in the Happy Victimizer Task: The Role of Response Format

Previous research in the happy victimizer tradition indicated that preschool and early elementary school children attribute positive emotions to the violator of a moral norm, whereas older children attribute negative (moral) emotions. Cognitive and motivational processes have been suggested to underlie this developmental shift. The current research investigated whether making the happy victimizer task less cognitively demanding by providing children with alternative response formats would increase their attribution of moral emotions and moral motivation. In Study 1, 93 British children aged 4–7 years old responded to the happy victimizer questions either in a normal condition (where they spontaneously pointed with a finger), a wait condition (where they had to wait before giving their answers), or an arrow condition (where they had to point with a paper arrow). In Study 2, 40 Spanish children aged 4 years old responded to the happy victimizer task either in a normal or a wait condition. In both studies, participants' attribution of moral emotions and moral motivation was significantly higher in the conditions with alternative response formats (wait, arrow) than in the normal condition. The role of cognitive abilities for emotion attribution in the happy victimizer task is discussed.     

Think ahead before you regulate: A focus on future consequences predicts choices of and beliefs about strategies for the down-regulation of negative emotions

Considering future consequences predicts many self-regulatory behaviors. Moreover, emotion regulation choices often involve trade-offs between immediate hedonic benefits and future well-being and mental health. We propose that focusing on future consequences may also predict emotion regulation choices. We examined whether people who consider future consequences of their actions are more likely to choose adaptive strategies and less likely to choose maladaptive strategies (Study 1) and whether people believe that adaptive and maladaptive strategies have differential short- and long-term consequences (Study 2). In Study 1, consideration of future consequences was related to choosing more adaptive and fewer maladaptive strategies for regulating negative emotions. In Study 2, participants believed that adaptive strategies are more effective in the short-term than in the long-term and that maladaptive strategies are more effective in the long-term than in the short-term. Moreover, commonalities in favored strategies were observed across the two studies. Taken together, the findings suggest that trait future time focus plays a significant role in emotion regulation preferences and that people have some knowledge about the varied temporal consequences of different strategies.     

Inaccurate self-knowledge formation as a result of automatic behavior

Four studies tested a post-priming misattribution process whereby a primed goal automatically influences people's behavior, but because people are unaware of that influence, they misattribute their behavior to some other internal state. People who were primed with a goal were more likely to choose an activity that was relevant to that goal, but did not recognize that the prime had influenced their choices. Instead, people used more accessible and plausible reasons to explain their behavior. The goals were seeking romantic interaction (Studies 1 and 2), helping (Study 3) and earning money (Study 4). People made choices related to these goals but misattributed the choices to temporary preferences (Studies 1 and 3) and more permanent dispositions (Studies 2 and 4). The misattribution had downstream effects, leading to choice behavior consistent with the erroneous self-knowledge. We suggest that automatic behavior can lead to a confabulated self-knowledge with behavioral consequences.     

Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of discredited evidence

How do people revise their beliefs when evidence is discredited? In three studies, mock jurors read simplified criminal cases and then judged the probability that a suspect was guilty on the basis of sequentially presented evidence. Study 1 showed an extension effect: When two items of incriminating evidence were presented, a subsequent discrediting of the second item also lessened belief in the first item, irrespective of whether it was directly related to the discredited item. Study 2 showed that this effect depended on the order of evidence presentation: When the discrediting evidence was presented early, rather than late, in the sequence, there was no extension to unrelated items. Study 3 showed that the extension effect held only when items of evidence were both incriminating or both exonerating, but not when they were mixed. To explain these findings, we draw on coherence-based models of juror reasoning and propose that people group evidence according to its direction with respect to the guilt hypothesis.     

等待是一种折磨？等待时间知觉及其导致的非理性决策行为

等待时间知觉是指人们在等待过程中对等待时长的主观感受和心理体验, 它对人们的决策行为产生影响。影响等待时间知觉的客观因素包括等待过程的填充物、等待时间的确定性、接受服务的阶段和等待的物理环境等; 主观因素有负性情绪、自我控制和人格因素等。等待时间知觉导致的非理性决策行为包括时间沉没成本效应、“延迟-提前”框架效应、峰-终效应、偏好反转等。未来研究可从三个方面开展：(1) 时间启动和金钱启动下等待时间知觉的差异; (2) 基于时间心理账户视角研究等待时间知觉规律; (3) 借鉴时间知觉理论探讨等待(时间)影响决策行为的心理机制。     

Who cares about demands–abilities fit? Moderating effects of goal orientation on recruitment and organizational entry outcomes

The authors conduct three studies to systematically examine how avoiding and learning goal orientation (AGO and LGO) influence relationships between perceived demands‐abilities (DA) fit and critical outcomes during three organizational entry stages. Study 1, a multilevel study using a series of mock job advertisements, shows that participant likelihood of applying for jobs for which they perceive higher DA fit increases when AGO is stronger. Study 2 finds a stronger positive relationship between perceived DA fit and internship satisfaction among interns with a stronger AGO. Study 3 finds a stronger positive relationship between perceived DA fit and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) among new organizational entrants with a stronger AGO. Implications and future research directions regarding the importance of goal orientation during job search and organizational entry are discussed.     

The impact of self‐confidence on the compromise effect

This research reports an investigation into whether the personality aspect of self‐confidence affects the compromise effect. We hypothesize that highly self‐confident people have greater certainty in making decisions and are more attracted to risk‐taking, which makes them less likely to choose the safe or middle option in a large choice set. The three studies involved are conducted using between‐ and within‐subjects experimental designs. Various product categories are used to generalize the findings. Study 1 looks at purchasing decisions and utilizes three scales of self‐confidence, risk preference, and uncertainty; it demonstrates that consumers with high self‐confidence are less likely to choose a compromise option due to high certainty in their decision‐making. Study 2 discovers that people with low self‐confidence are more likely to choose the middle option in a risky condition than in a nonrisky condition. Study 3 decomposes self‐confidence into general and specific self‐confidence, and reveals that people with low general self‐confidence and low specific self‐confidence are more likely to choose the middle option.     

Numbers or apologies? Customer reactions to telephone waiting time fillers

The authors examined the effect of time perception and sense of progress in telephone queues on caller reactions to 3 telephone waiting time fillers: music, apologies, and information about location in the queue. In Study 1, conducted on 123 real calls, call abandonment was lowest, and call evaluations were most positive with information about location in the queue as the time filler. In Study 2, conducted with 83 participants who experienced a simulated telephone wait experience, sense of progress in the queue rather than perceived waiting time mediated the relationship between telephone waiting time filler and caller reactions. The findings provide insight for the management and design of telephone queues, as well as theoretical insight into critical cognitive processes that underlie telephone waiting, opening up an important new research agenda.     

The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits

This paper re‐examines the commonly observed inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit. We propose that this relationship occurs because people rely on affect when judging the risk and benefit of specific hazards. Evidence supporting this proposal is obtained in two experimental studies. Study 1 investigated the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments under a time‐pressure condition designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance on affect. As expected, the inverse relationship was strengthened when time pressure was introduced. Study 2 tested and confirmed the hypothesis that providing information designed to alter the favorability of one's overall affective evaluation of an item (say nuclear power) would systematically change the risk and benefit judgments for that item. Both studies suggest that people seem prone to using an ‘affect heuristic’ which improves judgmental efficiency by deriving both risk and benefit evaluations from a common source—affective reactions to the stimulus item. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Core self-evaluations as causes of satisfaction: The mediating role of seeking task complexity

This study examined the mediating role of task complexity in the relationship between core self-evaluations (CSE) and satisfaction. In Study 1, eighty three undergraduate business students worked on a strategic decision-making simulation. The simulated environment enabled us to verify the temporal sequence of variables, use an objective measure of task complexity, and control confounding factors. In Study 2, we surveyed 108 full-time employees. In addition to verifying the temporal sequencing of variables in Study 1, both studies demonstrate that people with higher CSE actually choose/seek higher levels of complexity on their tasks, which directly or indirectly increases their task/work satisfaction.