Multi‐Component Theories of Well‐being and Their Structure

The ‘adjustment strategy’ currently seems to be the most common approach to incorporating objective elements into one's theory of well‐being. These theories face a certain problem, however, which can be avoided by a different approach – namely, that employed by ‘partially objective multi‐component theories.’ Several such theories have recently been proposed, but the question of how to understand their mathematical structure has not been adequately addressed. I argue that the most mathematically simple of these multi‐component theories fails, so I proceed to investigate more sophisticated ways to formulate such a theory. I conclude that one of these – the Discount/Inflation Theory – is particularly promising.     

Heidegger on Human Finitude: Beginning at the End

Interpreters generally understand Heidegger's notion of finitude in one of two ways: (1) as our mortality – that, in the end, we are certain to die; or (2) the susceptibility of our self‐ and world‐understanding to collapse – the fragility and vulnerability of human sense‐making. In this paper, I put forward an alternative account of what Heidegger means by ‘finitude’: human self‐ and world‐understanding is non‐transparently grounded in a ‘final end.’ Our self‐ and world‐understanding, that is, begins at the end, and authenticity requires us to interpretively appropriate the full range of this understanding. After laying out this view of finitude, via an analogical appeal to the Socratic account of action and desire in the Gorgias, I discuss its relationship to the two leading views of finitude mentioned above.     

Perceptions of job insecurity and the impact of world market competition as health risks: Results from Belstress

Concern has been raised about the impact of job insecurity and fierce world market competition on the well‐being and health of workers (Marmot, 1999). For that reason, the Job Content Questionnaire was supplemented with items that relate to the wider organization and, especially, global economy level. Two items relate to the ‘perception of job insecurity’ (JIS) and three items relate to the ‘perception of impact of world market competition on one's own job’ (WMC). In the Belstress study, which comprises a sample of 16,335 men and 5084 women aged 35–59 years recruited from 25 companies across Belgium between 1994 and 1998, crosssectional associations of both factors with health status indicators, health behaviour and cardiovascular risk factors were studied. Scores for JIS and WMC were dichotomized yielding high (upper quartile group) and low levels (else). JIS and WMC are independently associated with job strain and with some health status indicators. No clear or consistent associations are found with health‐related behaviours or with cardiovascular risk factors.     

From Freudian narcissism to the Buddhist notion of anatman,via Jung's idea of identity

Starting from the question the youthful Carl Gustav pondered as he sat on ‘his’ stone – ‘Am I he who sits on the stone, or am I the stone on which he sits?’ – the author has attempted to show that, for Jung, the idea of identity is founded on a wilful non‐determination. This stance results in ethical and methodological repercussions that differentiate it both from the Freudian project and from Hindu and Buddhist thought, while at the same time having much in common with them. The paper refers to the notions of emergence and (Varela et al. 1992) enaction 2 2 According to the Wikipedia entry, the introduction of the term ‘enaction’ is attributed to Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (1992), who proposed the name to ‘emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre‐given world by a pre‐given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs’.
and argues that the concept of the archetype, especially in relation to the self, merits a re‐evaluation in light of the new scientific paradigm.     

Waking‐up: A neglected model for the afterlife

An inquiry into the possibility that life‐after‐death be understood as waking from a shared dream into the real world. Attempts to outlaw the possibility that ‘really’ we are, e.g., vat‐brains are shown to lead to unwelcome, anti‐realist conclusions about either the world or consciousness. The unsatisfactory nature of empirically observable (Humean) causal connections suggests that real causes may be found beyond the world of our present experience. Though such a story cannot now be proved to be true, we are entitled to entertain it as a serious possibility. An attempt is made to say what life is like in the ‘Real World’, whether this be a spatial world like our present one or not, and what moral it holds for our present life. I suggest (like Plato) that there are many levels of waking, and that our ‘Real Self should not be identified simply with our present egos.     

If I Only Had a Membrane: A Review of Amoebic Self Theory

Beginning from the premise that organisms must ‘eat, retreat, and excrete’ to survive, Amoebic Self Theory (AST) posits that humans also struggle for survival of the psychological sense of self – engulfing that which is desirable, resisting external threats, and disposing that which is toxic or redundant. These motives manifest across three related but distinct domains – the bodily, the social, and the spatial-symbolic – as facilitated by a boundary that differentiates ‘self’ from ‘not-self’. AST-inspired research has demonstrated both situational and chronic variation in the strength of these motives across domains, as well as their relevance to a breadth of diverse phenomenon, although advocates of other theoretical perspectives have focused primarily on the ‘dust mites experiment’. After considering their interpretations and claims, a case is made for AST as an integrative, generalist theory that generates novel predictions.     

Belonging without commitment: the Christocentric view and the traditionist perspective on modern religion

This essentially theoretical article suggests a novel way to conceptualise the middle spaces of people whose link to religion is perceived as partial and fragmentary – the vast majority of the population in the world of the twenty-first century, who belong to a religious tradition but are quite selective in their observances. We first argue that current conceptualisation of the middle spaces suffers from a predisposition we view as ‘Christocentric’. As the key to an alternative and non-Christocentric approach, we suggest the concept of ‘traditionism’, which permits a new theoretical discussion of the meanings of religion for contemporary individuals who belong to a religious tradition but are not fully committed to its current authorities or affiliated with recognised denominations. As a case study to clarify the new, non-Christocentric conceptualisation, we suggest the religious identity of contemporary ‘Arab Jews’ – Jews whose families originated in the Muslim Middle East – to highlight the potential contribution of a certain Jewish perspective to an understanding of modern religion as tradition and of modern practitioners of religion who belong to no denomination as ‘traditionists’.     

Freedom and the psychoanalytic ontology of quantum physics

Jung's paper ‘Synchronicity – an acausal connecting principle’, defining the phenomenon as a ‘meaningful’ coincidence depending on archetypal activation, was published in 1952, together with a conceptually related piece by physicist and Nobel Laureate Wolfgang Pauli entitled, ‘The influence of archetypal ideas on the scientific theories of Kepler’. Slavoj ?i?ek, in The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters, suggests that, in contrast to any notion of a ‘pre‐modern Jungian harmony’, the main lesson of quantum physics was that not only was the psychoanalytic, empty subject of the signifier constitutively out‐of‐joint with respect to the world, but that the Real in itself was already incomplete, out‐of‐joint, ‘not‐all’. Yet while ?i?ek frequently tries to separate Jung from his own ontology, this paper shows that his ontology is not as different as he suggests. Consistent with our earlier publications on Jung and Zizek, a closer investigation reveals an underlying congruence of both of their approaches. In this paper we show that this affinity lies in the rejection by both Jung and ?i?ek of the ideology of reductive materialism, a rejection that demonstrably draws on quantum physics in similar ways. While Jung posits an inherently meaningful universe, ?i?ek attempts to salvage the freedom of human subjectivity by opposing his Lacanian ‘dialectical materialism’ to reductive materialism.     

Psychiatric diagnoses, ‘thought styles’, and ex post facto fact fallacies

Living in two-way, dialogical relations with our surroundings, rather than in monological, one-way causal relations with them, means that we can no longer treat ourselves as inquiring simply into a world of objective ‘things’ already existing in the world around us. We need to see ourselves instead as always acting ‘from within’ a still-in-process world of flowing streams of intermingling activities affecting us as much, if not more, than we can affect them. In such a world as this, instead of discovering pre-existing things in our inquiries, we continually bring such ‘things’ into existence. So, although we may talk of having discovering certain nameable ‘things’ in our inquiries, the fact is, we can only see such ‘things’ as having been at work in people’s activities after they have performed them. This, I want to argue, is also the case with all our diagnostic categories of mental distress – thus to see the ‘things’ they name as the causes of a person’s distress is to commit an ex post facto fact fallacy. Something else altogether ‘moves’ people in the performance of their actions than the nameable ‘things’ we currently claim to have discovered in our inquiries.     

Alternative Recipes for Life Satisfaction: Evidence from Five World Regions

In most cross-national research on Life Satisfaction (LS) an implicit assumption appears to be that the correlates of LS are the same the world over; ‘one size fits all’. Using data from the World Values Survey (1999–2014), we question this assumption by assessing the effects of differing personal values/life priorities on LS in five world regions: the West, Latin America, the Asian-Confucian region, ex-Communist Eastern Europe, and the Communist countries of China and Vietnam. We indicate that differing values - traditional family values, friendship and leisure values, materialistic values, political values, prosocial and environmental values, and religious values – are endorsed to varying degrees in different parts of the world, and vary in whether they have positive or negative effects on LS. Personal values provide the basis for alternative ‘recipes’ affecting LS. By ‘recipes’ we mean linked set of values, attitudes, behavioural choices and domain satisfactions that have a positive or negative effect on LS. We estimate structural equation models which indicate that differing values-based recipes help to account for large, unexpected differences between mean levels of LS in the five world regions, compared with the levels ‘predicted’ by GDP per capita. In particular, the high priority given to traditional family and religious recipes in Latin America helps to account for unexpectedly high LS in that region. Deficits in prosocial attitudes and behaviours partly account for low LS in ex-Communist Eastern Europe.

     

Teleological principles in science

In the search for elementary particles, such principles are used as Gell‐mann's that ‘anything which is possible is compulsory’. This is an example of a teleological principle according to which the scientist tries to realize in science the kind of world that he desires on prior emotional grounds. Mendeleev's classical discovery of the Periodic Law and Table of Elements was thus guided by his mystical values. A mechanistic anti‐teleologist such as Jacques Loeb was indeed a crypto‐teleologist who wished science to fulfil his radical, socialistic aims. Hoyle's ‘perfect cosmological principle’ projected conservative values, while such conceptions as Oppenheimer's ‘catastrophic collapse’, and Mach's Principle likewise had their teleological bases. Anti‐mystical and individualistic values inspired Bridgman's operationism. A ‘perfect operational principle’ would stipulate that every imaginable state of affairs would be operationally differentiable from others. Teleological principles are essential to the functioning of sciences; in the Theory of Theories, the principle of plenitude may hold: that for every mode of theory, there is some segment of reality for which it provides the best explanation. Naturalistic accounts of basic teleological principles seem inadequate.     

Religion,difference and the promise of liberal political theory: on Abeysekara's The Politics of Postsecular Religion

Ananda Abeysekara's work revolves around the ‘aporia of our democratic existence.’ This review offers a close analysis of this puzzle and then connects it to the historical process whereby the internal dynamics of western Christianity gave shape to normative political theory. Normative political models have a peculiar relation to the empirical world. At any point, one can judge the factual empirical situation in a liberal democracy – no matter what that factual situation is – as deficient vis-à-vis norms like equality, freedom of expression, religious freedom and separation of church and state. The trouble is that we do not know what the ‘complete’ fulfillment of these norms would look like. Still, these norms propel political analysis: as Abeysekara notes, classical and postcolonial studies of conflict in Sri Lanka build on a set of deep-seated norms about ‘difference,’ ‘unity’ and ‘humanism,’ which have emerged from the Christian dynamic of universalization that laid the foundations of liberal political theory.     

The Sporting Exploration of the World; Toward a Fundamental Ontology of the Sporting Human Being

ABSTRACT

My perspective in this paper is to look at sport and other physical activities as a way of exploring and experimenting with the environing world. The human being is basically the homo movens – born to move. Furthermore, the homo movens is the homo ludens – an active and playful being that explores the world in different ways and in a variety of environments. The ludic exploration of the world starts with children’s play and goes all the way up to full-blown versions of rule-based sports, then on to various physical activities into old age. My point of departure is Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world which suggests that humans are never isolated individuals but are always in a deep way connected with a ‘world’. The ‘world’ of sport comes in different versions. By use of a phenomenological approach I try to show that the sporting exploration of the world takes place in four ontologically different dimensions or ‘worlds’. Here I distinguish between individual sports, encounter sports, team sports and nature sports, and I argue that the I-Me, I-You, I-Society and I-Nature relations that are exemplified in these four types of sports have different ontological characteristics. While the discussion is inspired by Heidegger’s ideas I argue that the ways of ‘worldmaking’ in sport are more ontologically diverse than Heidegger opened up for. Heidegger described the relation of Dasein to itself and to other human beings and argued that we deal with the environment in a practical and a theoretical mode. I expand on this and present a more coherent picture of four different dimensions in the human being’s sporting exploration of the world.     

A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre's Theory of Emotions

This paper discusses recent interpretations of Jean‐Paul Sartre's early theory of emotions, in particular his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Despite the great interest that Sartre's approach has generated, most interpretations assume that his approach fails because it appears to be focussed on ‘malformed’, ‘irrational’ or ‘distorted’ emotions. I argue that these criticisms adopt a rationalistic or epistemically biassed perspective on emotions that is wrongly applied to Sartre's text. In my defence of Sartre I show that the directional fit of emotions is not towards an evaluatively loaded world which is independently given and, at best, represented by emotions, but towards a world shaped through the impact of emotions themselves. Sartre's idea of emotions ‘magically transforming’ reality for the subject so that the latter is better able to cope with problematic aspects of practically relevant situations encapsulates the world‐shaping capacities of emotions, which are thus not reserved for a restricted class of emotions. Recognition of the transformative powers of emotions will also direct attention away from their seemingly representative elements to their normative and practical aspects and offer a new basis for delineating the criteria for judging them. The plausibility of this position is discussed with reference to some of Sartre's examples, such as fear, sadness and horror, but also with reference to Joan Didion's account of grief in The Year of Magical Thinking.     

The name of the Piggle: Reconsidering Winnicott's classic case in light of some conversations with the adult ‘Gabrielle’

On the 40th anniversary of its publication, the author re‐reads Winnicott's The Piggle – a case of ‘on demand analysis’ with a child suffering from psychotic night terrors – in light of new information about the patient. Conversations between the author and ‘Gabrielle’ explore two areas not regarded as priorities by Winnicott: the transgenerational transmission of pathology/trauma, and the ways that language, in general – and given names, in particular – organize individual subjectivity. The question raised is to what degree Winnicott – who described the treatment as “psychoanalysis partagé [shared]” due to the parents’ involvement – thought of the pathology itself as ‘shared.’ The goal is not to supplant but to expand Winnicott's understanding of the case, borrowing insights from the work of Lacan and others.     

The experiences of therapists using a new client‐centred psychometric instrument,PSYCHLOPS (Psychological Outcome Profiles)

PSYCHLOPS (‘Psychological Outcome Profiles’) is a newly developed client‐generated psychometric instrument which can be used as an outcome measure. Uniquely, it asks clients to state their own problems, in their own words. As part of its validation, we used it alongside an existing measure, CORE‐OM (‘Clinical Outcomes Routine Evaluation – Outcome Measure’). Based on a qualitative methodology, we report here on the first‐hand experiences of four therapists using both instruments. The key themes that emerged from therapists’ responses were feasibility, validity and usefulness. Both questionnaires were perceived as complementing each other, the qualitative information from PSYCHLOPS balancing the quantitative information from CORE‐OM and that both could contribute to the therapist‐client interaction. The key features of PSYCHLOPS are likely to prove attractive to therapists and should increase acceptance and uptake of outcome measures.     

Contemporary New Age transformation in Taiwan: A sociological study of a new religious movement

This article explores commentary in UK newspapers which, while sympathetic to the notion of Turkish EU membership, still deploys a discourse that remains exclusionary where assumptions of Turkey's intrinsic cultural and civilisational ‘Europeanness’ are concerned. Turkish membership is advocated as a sort of strategic supplement to a historical ontology of ‘Europe’ proceeding from a grand narrative of Latin Christendom – Reformation – Enlightenment – Modernity (adorned with the selective appropriation of Classical antiquity), superimposed upon a wider historico-cultural and religious milieu. Membership is supported on the basis that Turkey is an exceptional case, considered on the instrumental grounds of guaranteeing Turkish secular democracy within the context of EU institutions while presenting an ‘example’ to the wider Islamic ‘world’. Support for membership does not proceed from assumptions that Turkey may possess an existing, intrinsic, historically locatable European ‘right’, implied by the extension of the EU into Ottoman successor states in south-eastern Europe as well as Cyprus. The potential for the deployment of this latter discourse to support Turkish membership from an assumed a priori cultural and historical European belonging is explored.