Affective responses to seeing oneself for the first time on unedited videotape

Despite the growing popularity of watching oneself on videotape, little systematic research has been conducted determine viewers' affective responses to video replay. This study addresses the question: what affective responses do women have when they view themselves for the first time on unedited videotape, in comparison to their responses when they view a peer or nature scenes on videotape? Affective responses were measured in three ways: self-report, physiological, and behavioral. Subjects who viewed themselves reported more negative feelings and anxiety, and smiled more frequently than subjects who watched another person or nature scenes on video. Subjects with high private self-consciousness had higher mean arterial blood pressures when viewing themselves than did subjects with low private self-consciousness. Overall, the implications for seeing oneself on video point to potential embarrassment but generally moderate effects.     

Failures to find suppression of episodic memories in the think/no-think paradigm

Anderson and Green (2001) had subjects learn paired associates and then selectively suppress responses to some of them. They reported a decrease in final cued recall for responses that subjectshad been instructed not to think of and explained their data as resulting from cognitive suppression, a laboratory analog of repression. We report three experiments designed to replicate the suppression/repression results. After subjects learned a series of A-B word pairs (e.g., ordsea-roach), they were then asked to respond to some items and not to think of other items when shown their cues 1, 8, or 16times. During a final recall test, they were cued with either asame (direct)probe (ordeal-__) or a n independent(indirect) probe (insect-r__) . None of our experiments showed reliable suppression effects with either the same or independent-probe tests. Suppression is apparently not a robust experimental phenomenon in the think/no-think paradigm.     

Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.

We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.     

A compromise between self-enhancement and honesty: Chinese self-evaluations on social desirability scales

In this investigation, 202 Chinese college students were asked to complete the 48-item revised Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) which contains 32 items from the original version for the purpose of rating item desirability and estimating the percentage of others in general who would behave in the manner described by these items. Analysis indicated (a) nearly all original items keyed in the original direction, which suggests similar fundamental values are prevalent among American and Chinese college students; (b) the distribution of Chinese scores on the 32 items was somewhat positively skewed rather than negatively skewed as in some Western studies of American and Canadian college students. Also, (c) Chinese subjects perceived that they did significantly more desirable and slightly fewer undesirable things than others from which one may infer that Chinese college students tended to give both self-enhancing and honest responses to present good images; however, their need for self-enhancement may take precedence over the need to be honest. (d) Subjects chose to give more honest responses to undesirable items than to desirable ones because the more undesirable items were rated as approximately more neutral than were more desirable ones. Hence, endorsing such undesirable items would not threaten their self-esteem or face. It can be seen that Chinese subjects made an intelligent compromise between self-enhancement and honesty.     

Judgment of Children's Popularity from Their Human Figure Drawings

The assumption is presented of the test-taker as a hypothesis-generating organism who can become "testwise." Testwiseness is defined as a stable skill, acquired by test-taking experiences, by which an individual can make test responses conform to a desired response pattern. Forty-three college students completed two forms of The Personality Research Form (PRF) and a rank ordering of their predicted personality need pattern. Results show significantly higher correlations of PRF predictions in the second administration. Analyses show PRF profiles, not predictions, to have been modified. Furthermore, high testwise subjects had higher needs for Understanding and Nurturance, and lower needs for Aggression and Defendence than low testwise persons. The importance of considering testwiseness, given trends in society encouraging access to psychological records, is discussed.     

Testwiseness: some evidence for the effect of personality testing on subsequent test results

The assumption is presented of the test-taker as a hypothesis-generating organism who can become "testwise." Testwiseness is defined as a stable skill, acquired by test-taking experiences, by which an individual can make test responses conform to a desired response pattern. Forty-three college students completed two forms of The Personality Research Form (PRF) and a rank ordering of their predicted personality need pattern. Results show significantly higher correlations of PRF predictions in the second administration. Analyses show PRF profiles, not predictions, to have been modified. Furthermore, high testwise subjects had higher needs for Understanding and Nurturance, and lower needs for Aggression and Defendence than low testwise persons. The importance of considering testwiseness, given trends in society encouraging access to psychological records, is discussed.     

Hierarchical organization as a determinant of sequential learning

Subjects learned a set of permutations of a base sequence of letters. A set of permutations either defined a hierarchical organization for the base sequence or did not. Sets that defined organizations led to more correct responses, and the pattern of interitem sequential dependencies revealed that subjects had learned the organization defined by a response set. Differences in learning could not be explained in terms of the frequency with which items occurred adjacently because that frequency was held constant for both organization-defining and organization-free response sets. The difficulty of learning a particular organization was related to the memory load induced by the organization, and those differences were more consistent with a model of sequential learning proposed by Johnson (1970) than they were with a model proposed by Estes (1972).     

Memory and metamemory: a study of the feeling-of-knowing phenomenon in amnesic patients

Accuracy of the feeling of knowing was tested in patients with Korsakoff's syndrome, patients prescribed electroconvulsive therapy, four other cases of amnesia, and control subjects. In Experiment 1, we tested feeling-of-knowing accuracy for the answers to general information questions that could not be recalled. Subjects were asked to rank nonrecalled questions in terms of how likely they thought they would be able to recognize the answers and were then given a recognition test for these items. Only patients with Korsakoff's syndrome were impaired in making feeling-of-knowing predictions. The other amnesic patients were as accurate as control subjects in their feeling-of-knowing predictions. In Experiment 2, we replicated these findings in a sentence memory paradigm that tested newly learned information. The results showed that impaired metamemory is not an obligatory feature of amnesia, because amnesia can occur without detectable metamemory deficits. The impaired metamemory exhibited by patients with Korsakoff's syndrome reflects a cognitive impairment that is not typically observed in other forms of amnesia.     

Cognitive imitation in 2-year-old children (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Homo sapiens</Emphasis>): a comparison with rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>)

Here we compare the performance of 2-year-old human children with that of adult rhesus macaques on a cognitive imitation task. The task was to respond, in a particular order, to arbitrary sets of photographs that were presented simultaneously on a touch sensitive video monitor. Because the spatial position of list items was varied from trial to trial, subjects could not learn this task as a series of specific motor responses. On some lists, subjects with no knowledge of the ordinal position of the items were given the opportunity to learn the order of those items by observing an expert model. Children, like monkeys, learned new lists more rapidly in a social condition where they had the opportunity to observe an experienced model perform the list in question, than under a baseline condition in which they had to learn new lists entirely by trial and error. No differences were observed between the accuracy of each species' responses to individual items or in the frequencies with which they made different types of errors. These results provide clear evidence that monkeys and humans share the ability to imitate novel cognitive rules (cognitive imitation).     

Eyewitness testimony and memory distortion

Abstract: Do memories change as we acquire new information? Recent research on memory distortion using implicit tests along with research using confidence is reviewed and new studies are presented. Two new studies asked misinformed subjects to provide reasons for their answers. In each study 15% to 27% of subjects said they remembered seeing items they had only read about. In another study subjects were asked to identify the source of misleading items they had seen in slides or read in misleading questions. Subjects were more likely to say they had seen in slides something they read about in the questions than they were to confuse information from two nearly identical sets of slides. Recent work shows that, not only is it possible to distort memory for events, it is possible to implant an entire memory for something that never happened. The evidence is now clear that we can become mentally tricked into making large as well as small changes in the way we recall the past.     

Effects of hypnosis and level of processing on repeated recall of line drawings

Moderately susceptible subjects (N = 30) initially judged 30 line drawings of objects for pleasantness (deep processing) and 30 line drawings for visual complexity (shallow processing), after which they were given two immediate recall tests. Following a 48-hr delay, subjects were allocated randomly to hypnosis, simulation, or neutral control conditions and were tested four more times. Subjects produced more correct and incorrect responses over the six trials and gave a higher number of correct responses for deep items than for shallow items. Over the last four trials, hypnosis had no general facilitative effect relative to the other two treatments, but the effect of depth was strongest for hypnotized subjects, who recalled more deep items than did the controls. Finally, both hypnotized and simulating subjects rated their recall as more involuntary and their experimental treatment as more helpful than did the controls. Caution is urged in the forensic use of hypnosis as a retrieval device.     

Representation of serial order in pigeons (Columba livia)

In Experiment 1, 2 groups of pigeons were trained to respond to either a 4-item (A→B→C→D) or 5-item (A→B→C→D→E) list. After learning their respective list, half of the subjects were trained on a positive pair with reinforcement provided when pairs were responded to in the order true to that of the original sequence (4-item: B→C; 5-item: B→D). The remaining subjects were trained on a negative pair with reinforcement provided for responding to the pairs in the order opposite to that learned in the original sequence (4-item: C→B; 5-item: D→B). Subjects in the positive pair condition learned their respective pair faster than did subjects in the negative pair condition. In Experiment 2, after reaching criterion on a 4-item list, subjects received 16 BC probe trials spread across 4 sessions of training. Subjects performed significantly above chance on the probe trials. The performance of our subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrates that, similar to monkeys, pigeons form a representation of the lists that they learn.     

Semantic generation can cause episodic forgetting

The repeated retrieval of a subset of previously learned items can cause forgetting of the nonretrieved items. The study reported here investigated whether retrieval-induced forgetting generalizes to a situation in which the retrieved and nonretrieved items are not part of the same experiential episode and task. Subjects learned an item list that they had to recall later in the experiment. In a separate intermediate phase, they repeatedly generated related items from semantic memory, or were presented the same items intact for study. Only the semantic generation of items, and not their presentation for study, induced forgetting of the initially learned items. This result indicates that, first, semantic generation can cause recall-specific episodic forgetting and, second, retrieval-induced forgetting can occur even if the retrieved and nonretrieved items belong to different experiential episodes and tasks. Connections of the present results to other memory phenomena, such as part-set cuing and the generation effect, social cognition, and eyewitness memory, are discussed.     

Memory after motoric encoding in a generation-recognition model

Summary Two groups of subjects were required to learn taxonomic verb lists without being given explicit information about the categories. Category size was varied. Different categories were represented in the list by 2, 4, 6, or 8 instances per category. One group learned under standard learning instructions, the other learned by performing the denoted actions. We observed higher memory performances for the enacting group in free recall and recognition in comparison with those of the standard learning group. Category size did not interact with encoding condition. Free recall, but not recognition, correlated slightly positively with category size. After the memory tests a generation-recognition procedure was carried out. Subjects were given the category names and had to generate as many items as possible without reference to the learning list. After this, they had to mark the items from the learning list in their own productions. Both groups generated an equal number of items per category, but the proportion of generated old items and of recognized self-generated items was higher for the enacting group than for the standard learning group. The conclusion is discussed that enacting did not change relational information, but made items more accessible in memory.This research was supported by a grant from the German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) to J. Engelkamp and the author under En 124/8-1.     

The role of attention in automatization: Does attention operate at encoding, or retrieval, or both?

In this research, we investigated whether attention operates in the encoding of automatized information, the retrieval of automatized information, or in both cases. Subjects searched two-word displays for members of a target category in focused-attention or divided-attention conditions that were crossed with block (training vs. transfer). To see whether subjects encoded all available items or only attended items, we compared performance for subjects in different training conditions but in the same transfer condition. Subjects encoded attended items. To see whether subjects retrieved all the items they had in memory, or only items associated with that to which they were attending at retrieval, we compared performance for subjects in the same training conditions but in different transfer conditions. Subjects retrieved attended items. Attention was found to operate at both encoding and retrieval. These findings support the instance theory of automaticity, which predicts the role of attention at encoding and retrieval     

Causal attributions for success and failure in relation to expectations of success based upon selective or manipulative control

Subjects worked at a 10-item Anagrams Test. In a manipulative control condition the prior performance of subjects on a set of practice anagrams was controlled so that half of these subjects began the test with high expectations of success and half with low expectations of success As a check on the manipulation, subjects provided ratings of how confident they were that they could pass the test (i e, solve five anagrams or more) In a selective control condition subjects were not given practice items but were subsequently assigned to high versus low expectation groups on the basis of their confidence ratings The difficulty level of the items in the Anagrams Test was manipulated so that half the subjects in each condition passed the test and half failed. Subsequently all subjects were required to rate the degree to which they considered ability (or lack of ability), effort (or lack of effort), task difficulty (easy or hard), and luck (good or bad) were causes of their performance outcome (success or failure). It was found that the expected success was attributed more to ability and less to good luck than was the unexpected success The expected failure was attributed more to lack of ability and less to bad luck than was the unexpected failure There was a greater tendency for subjects to appeal to task difficulty and effort as causes of their performance when they succeeded than when they failed. These results were discussed in terms of a structural balance model of attribution behavior and also in relation to Heider's naive analysis of the causes of action     

BEHAVIORAL MANAGEMENT OF EXERCISE: CONTRACTING FOR AEROBIC POINTS

Behavioral contracting was used to encourage physical exercise among college students in a multiple-baseline design. Subjects deposited items of personal value with the experimenters, which they could earn back on fulfillment of two types of contract contingencies. Subjects selected weekly aerobic point criteria, which they could fulfill by exercising in the presence of other subjects. In addition, subjects contracted to observe and record the exercise of other subjects and to perform an independent reliability observation once each week, with both of these activities monitored by the experimenters. Results indicated that the contract contingencies produced increases in the number of aerobic points earned per week for seven of eight subjects, that the aerobic point system possesses several advantages as a dependent variable for behavioral research on exercise, and that inexperienced observers could be quickly trained to observe exercise behavior and to translate those observations into their aerobic point equivalents. Finally, in a followup questionnaire completed 12 months after the end of the study, seven of the eight subjects reported that they were earning more aerobic points per week than had been the case during the baseline condition of this experiment.     

Part-list cuing in amnesic patients: evidence for a retrieval deficit

Part-list cuing--the detrimental effect of the presentation of a subset of learned items on recall of the remaining items--was examined in amnesic patients and healthy control subjects. Subjects studied two types of categorized item lists: lists in which each category consisted of strong and moderate items and lists in which each category consisted of weak and moderate items. The subjects recalled a category's strong and weak items in either the presence of or absence of the moderate items serving as retrieval cues. In healthy subjects, part-list cuing impaired recall of the strong items but not of the weak items; in amnesics, part-list cuing impaired recall of both types of items. Part-list cuing is often attributed to a change in the retrieval process from a more effective one when cues are absent to a less effective one when they are present. On the basis of this view, our results indicate that part-list cuing causes a stronger retrieval inefficiency in amnesic patients than in healthy people.     

The overconfidence effect in social prediction

In five studies with overlapping designs and intents, subjects predicted a specific peer's responses to a variety of stimulus situations, each of which offered a pair of mutually exclusive and exhaustive response alternatives. Each prediction was accompanied by a subjective probability estimate reflecting the subjects' confidence in its accuracy--a measure validated in Study 5 by having subjects choose whether to "gamble" on the accuracy of their prediction or on the outcome of a simple aleatory event. Our primary finding was that in social prediction, as in other judgmental domains, subjects consistently proved to be highly overconfident. That is, regardless of the type of prediction item (e.g., responses to hypothetical dilemmas, responses to contrived laboratory situations, or self-reports of everyday behaviors) and regardless of the type of information available about the person whose responses they were predicting (e.g., predictions about roommates or predictions based on prior interviews), the levels of accuracy subjects achieved fell considerably below the levels required to justify their confidence levels. Further analysis revealed two specific sources of overconfidence. First, subjects generally were overconfident to the extent they were highly confident. Second, subjects were most likely to be overconfident when they knowingly or unknowingly made predictions that ran counter to the relevant response base rates and, as a consequence, achieved low accuracy rates that their confidence estimates failed to anticipate. Theoretical and normative implications are discussed and proposals for subsequent research offered.     

When experiences of failure promote expectations of success: The impact of attribution failure to ineffective strategies1

This experiment examined the effects of attributing initial failure to ineffective strategies on performance expectancies. Subjects were induced to attribute performance at a persuasion task to either their strategies (a controllable factor) or abilities (an uncontrollable factor). Subjects then failed at their initial persuasion attempt. Following failure, strategy subjects expected more successes in future attempts than did ability subjects. Strategy subjects also expected to improve with practice, while ability subjects did not. Comparisons to control subjects, who received no attribution manipulation prior to success or failure, clarify these results. Findings suggest that subjects attributing task outcomes to strategies monitored the effectiveness of their strategies and concluded that by modifying their strategies they would become more successful. In contrast, subjects attributing task outcome to abilities failed to attend to strategic features and concluded that they could not improve. Implications of this overlooked factor for attribution theory and learned helplessness are discussed.