How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.     

Who is more utilitarian? Negative affect mediates the relation between control deprivation and moral judgment

Current Psychology - This research tried to examine the effect of sense of control on moral judgments and the mediating roles of positive and negative affect. Sixty-one Chinese college students...     

Culture and self: are there within-culture differences in self between metropolitan areas and regional cities?

Although differences in self-conception across cultures have been well researched, regional differences within a culture have escaped attention. The present study examined individual, relational, and collective selves, which capture people's conceptions of themselves in relation to their goals, significant others, and in groups, comparing Australians and Japanese participants living in regional cities and metropolitan areas. Culture, gender, and urbanism were found to be related to individual, relational, and collective selves, respectively. Australians emphasized individual self more than Japanese, women stressed relational self more than men, and residents in regional cities regarded collective self as more important than their counterparts in metropolitan areas. These findings provide support for the tripartite division of the self and suggest a need to construct a culture theory that links self and societal processes.     

For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment

People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment.     

Number and language: how are they related?

Does the ability to develop numerical concepts depend on our ability to use language? We consider the role of the vocabulary of counting words in developing numerical concepts. We challenge the 'bootstrapping' theory which claims that children move from using something like an object-file - an attentional process for responding to small numerosities - to a truly arithmetic one as a result of their learning the counting words. We also question the interpretation of recent findings from Amazonian cultures that have very restricted number vocabularies. Our review of data and theory, along with neuroscientific evidence, imply that numerical concepts have an ontogenetic origin and a neural basis that are independent of language.     

How central are judgment and agency to epistemology?

Ernest Sosa’s Judgment and Agency marks an important change from his earlier work in epistemology. While belief was at the center of his earlier approach to epistemological issues, a far more sophisticated mental state, judgment, plays the central role here. This paper examines the significance of this change in focus, and argues that there is reason to favor the earlier belief-centered approach over this new judgment-centered account.     

Perceptions of social responsibilities in India and in the United States: moral imperatives or personal decisions?

Indian and American adults' and children's (N = 400) moral reasoning about hypothetical situations in which an agent failed to help someone experiencing either life-threatening, moderately serious, or minor need was compared. For 1/3 of Ss, the agent's relationship to the needy other was portrayed as that of parent; for another 1/3, as that of best friend; for the rest, as that of stranger. Indians tended to regard the failure to aid another in moral terms in all conditions. In contrast, Americans tended to view it in moral terms only in life-threatening cases or in cases of parents responding to the moderately serious needs of their children. The results imply that Indian culture forwards a broader and more stringent view of social responsibilities than does American culture. Discussion centers on theoretical implications of the various cultural, need, role, and developmental effects observed.     

Is there a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities?

Samuel Scheffler has recently argued that some relationships are non-instrumentally valuable; that such relationships give rise to “underived” special responsibilities; that there is a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities; and that we must consequently strike a balance between the two. We argue that there is no such tension and propose an alternative approach to the relation between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities. First, while some relationships are non-instrumentally valuable, no relationship is unconditionally valuable. Second, whether such relationships give rise to special responsibilities is conditional on those relationships not violating certain moral constraints. Third, these moral constraints arise from within cosmopolitan egalitarianism itself. Thus the value of relationships and the special responsibilities to which they give rise arise within the parameters of cosmopolitan egalitarianism itself. The real tension is not between cosmopolitan equality and special responsibilities, but between special responsibilities and the various general duties that arise from the recognition, demanded by cosmopolitan egalitarianism, of a multiplicity of other basic goods. Indeed, even the recognition of special relationships itself gives rise to general duties that may condition and/or weigh against putative special responsibilities.

Psychological universals: what are they and how can we know?

Psychological universals, or core mental attributes shared by humans everywhere, are a foundational postulate of psychology, yet explicit analysis of how to identify such universals is lacking. This article offers a conceptual and methodological framework to guide the investigation of genuine universals through empirical analysis of psychological patterns across cultures. Issues of cross-cultural generalizability of psychological processes and 3 cross-cultural research strategies to probe universals are considered. Four distinct levels of hierarchically organized universals are possible: From strongest to weakest claims for universality, they are accessibility universals, functional universals, existential universals, and nonuniversals. Finally, universals are examined in relation to the questions of levels of analysis, evolutionary explanations of psychological processes, and management of cross-cultural relations.     

Semantic and perceptual priming: how similar are the underlying mechanisms?

Both semantic priming and perceptual priming consist of facilitation of the identification of primed stimuli and inhibition of the identification of nonprimed stimuli. The similarities between the two phenomena suggest that a common attentional mechanism underlies both, and this has been explicitly proposed by several attention theorists. In this article it is argued that the phenomena of semantic and perceptual priming are qualitatively different, perceptual priming reflecting a sensitivity change in the recognition process brought about by attention, and semantic priming reflecting a bias change in the recognition process brought about by attention. Because different mechanisms are required to produce sensitivity and bias changes, this implies that the attentional mechanisms responsible for semantic and perceptual priming are distinct. In terms of recent discussions of the modularity versus the unity of cognitive architecture, the present conclusion supports a modular architecture for attentional processes.     

Lexis and Culture: Bound and Determined?

Although never validated by either quantitative or qualitative research, the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis continues to be a dominant position from which to consider the relationship between language and culture. This paper challenges the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, and attempts to show that lexis and culture are not as inextricably bound to each other as is commonly supposed. After considering numerous examples from Spanish, English and Japanese, the model of cultural prototypes is offered as an alternative to the present psycholinguistic paradigm.     

Workaholism and work engagement: how are they similar? How are they different? A systematic review and meta-analysis

Workaholism and work engagement can be depicted, respectively, as the pathological and the healthy form of heavy work investment. In spite of their different definitions and outcomes on individual and organizational life, workaholism and work engagement are not clearly and adequately distinguished by scholars and researchers as they appear to show some overlapping features. The aim of this investigation was to meta-analyze available studies, selected by systematic review, on the relations between subdimensions of workaholism and work engagement. Thirty-five studies were eligible for analysis. Associations emerged between Working Excessively and Absorption (g = .34), Working Compulsively and Absorption (g = .28), and Working Excessively and Dedication (g = .14). Moreover, the results were not influenced by publication bias and showed nationality to be a significant moderator. Overall, these findings suggest that further research is necessary to extend our knowledge of workaholism, work engagement, and the relationship between the two, in order to disentangle commonalities and differences between them.     

Scientific societies and research integrity: What are they doing and how well are they doing it?

Scientific societies can play an important role in promoting ethical research practices among their members, and over the past two decades several studies have addressed how societies perform this role. This survey continues this research by examining current efforts by scientific societies to promote research integrity among their members. The data indicate that although many of the societies are working to promote research integrity through ethics codes and activities, they lack rigorous assessment methods to determine the effectiveness of their efforts. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the AAAS-Office of Research Integrity (ORI) meeting in Washington DC on the theme: “The Role and Activities of Scientific Societies in Promoting Research Integrity” held on April 10–11, 2000.     

Authors’ response: what are emotions and how are they created in the brain?

In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.     

Dementia and agitation in nursing home residents: how are they related?

The link between agitated behaviors and cognitive functioning in 408 nursing home residents was examined. Results showed that cognitively impaired residents manifested aggressive behaviors (e.g., cursing, hitting) and physically nonaggressive behaviors (e.g., pacing). The highest levels of physically nonaggressive behaviors were manifested by those residents who presented intermediate levels of impairment in their performance of activities of daily living. Cognitively intact residents exhibited verbally agitated behaviors (e.g., complaining). These findings have important implications for caregivers of agitated nursing home residents.     

Anxiety and the blues after breast cancer: how common are they?

A number of myths exist concerning the psychological impact of breast cancer. Primary among these is the belief that women with breast cancer have greater emotional disability than individuals with other diseases or the population at large. While research has shown that women cope remarkably well with a diagnosis of breast cancer, an understanding of the key periods of anxiety and primary stressors is crucial to the overall psychological and medical management plan. While psychopharmacologic therapy may be indicated for women with breast cancer, it is rarely sufficient and should be combined with effective psychosocial interventions such as group therapy.     

Haptic object recognition: how important are depth cues and plane orientation?

Raised-line drawings of familiar objects are very difficult to identify with active touch only. In contrast, haptically explored real 3-D objects are usually recognised efficiently, albeit slower and less accurately than with vision. Real 3-D objects have more depth information than outline drawings, but also extra information about identity (eg texture, hardness, temperature). Previous studies have not manipulated the availability of depth information in haptic object recognition whilst controlling for other information sources, so the importance of depth cues has not been assessed. In the present experiments, people named plastic small-scale models of familiar objects. Five versions of bilaterally symmetrical objects were produced. Versions varied only in the amount of depth information: minimal for cookie-cutter and filled-in outlines, partial for squashed and half objects, and full for 3-D models. Recognition was faster and much more accurate when more depth information was available, whether exploration was with both hands or just one finger. Novices found it almost impossible to recognise objects explored with two hand-held probes whereas experts succeeded using probes regardless of the amount of depth information. Surprisingly, plane misorientation did not impair recognition. Unlike with vision, depth information, but not object orientation, is extremely important for haptic object recognition.