Self‐focused attention and social anxiety

Cognitive models propose that self‐focused attention (SFA) interacts with fear of negative evaluation to maintain social anxiety. Thus, the effect of SFA on anxiety would be expected to be specific to those with existing social concerns. However, much research suggests that the effect of SFA on anxiety occurs across anxiety levels. Manipulations of attention focus have been criticised for (1) lack of ecological validity and (2) eliciting fear of negative evaluation directly. The present study examined the role of SFA in social anxiety using an ecologically valid procedure that did not elicit fear of negative evaluation directly. Self‐reported anxiety was assessed among high and low socially anxious individuals under conditions of SFA or external‐focused attention. The manipulation successfully altered focus of attention but did not directly affect fear of negative evaluation or self‐reported anxiety. Taken together with the findings of previous studies, the results suggest that focusing on internal physiological states per se does not increase self‐reported social anxiety, and that self‐focus that does not have an explicitly evaluative dimension does not elicit social anxiety. The findings have implications for approaches to reducing social anxiety through reducing SFA.     

Language Anxiety and Counseling Self‐Efficacy

A total of 120 master's‐level counseling students were given the Foreign Language Classroom Anxiety Scale and the Counselor Self‐Estimate Inventory. Significance was found for all 3 hypotheses: (a) nonnative English‐speaking students have significantly more language anxiety than native English‐speaking students, (b) nonnative English‐speaking students’ language anxiety was negatively correlated with counseling self‐efficacy, and (c) native English‐ and nonnative English‐speaking students significantly differed in their perceptions of counseling self‐efficacy. Se administraron la Escala de Ansiedad en Clase de Lengua Extranjera y el Inventario de Autoestimación de Consejeros a un total de 120 estudiantes de máster en consejería. Se encontró significación para las 3 hipótesis siguientes: (a) los estudiantes cuya lengua nativa no es el inglés sufren un nivel considerablemente más alto de ansiedad a causa del idioma que los hablantes nativos de inglés, (b) la ansiedad a causa del idioma de los estudiantes cuya lengua nativa no es el inglés mostró una correlación negativa con la autoeficacia en consejería y (c) los grupos de estudiantes nativos y no nativos en inglés mostraron diferencias significativas en sus percepciones de autoeficacia en consejería.     

The Role of Cognitive Ability in Self‐Efficacy and Self‐Assessed Test Performance1

Research has shown that test takers are often unable to assess their own test performance accurately. However, the role of cognitive ability in assessing one's test performance has not been explored. We examined whether high cognitive ability participants were better than low cognitive ability participants in assessing their performance on a video‐based situational judgment test (SJT) of customer‐service skills. Results indicated a strong relationship between actual and perceived SJT performance for high cognitive ability participants, but no relationship for those low in cognitive ability. The discussion focuses on implications for metacognitive theory, test perceptions, and providing feedback to applicants.     

The Role of Self‐identity in the Theory of Planned Behavior: A Meta‐Analysis

The present study used meta‐analysis to evaluate the role of self‐identity in the theory of planned behavior (TPB). Altogether, 40 independent tests (N = 11607) could be included in the review. A large, sample‐weighted average correlation between self‐identity and behavioral intention was observed (r₊ = .47). Multiple regression analyses showed that self‐identity explained an increment of 6% of the variance in intention after controlling for the TPB components, and explained an increment of 9% of the variance when past behavior and the TPB components were controlled. The influence of self‐identity on behavior was largely mediated by the strength of behavioral intentions. Theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Identifying Risk for Self‐Harm: Rumination and Negative Affectivity in the Prospective Prediction of Nonsuicidal Self‐Injury

Research suggests nonsuicidal self‐injury (NSSI) may function as a maladaptive strategy to regulate negative emotions, and individuals high in trait negative affectivity (NA) may be particularly at risk. Rumination, a cognitive emotion regulation strategy, may amplify negative affect, increasing the likelihood of NSSI. The current study found that high NA and high rumination interacted to predict both likelihood of engagement in NSSI and frequency of NSSI. This study provides support for the joint contribution of cognitive and temperamental factors impacting the relationship between NA and NSSI and suggests that interventions targeted at maladaptive emotion regulation strategies may help inform individualized treatment.     

The Impact of Trait Anxiety on Self‐frame and Decision Making

The present study investigated how trait anxiety influenced the formation of a self‐frame and decision making. Participants (N = 1044) responded to the Trait Anxiety Inventory. Those with trait anxiety scores ±1 Z score from the sample mean (N = 328) were recalled to respond to the self‐frame questionnaire. The results suggested that trait anxiety differences could result in differences in the editing of decision‐making information, thereby influencing the risky choice. Compared with the low trait anxiety group, participants from the high trait anxiety group showed a greater tendency to use negative vocabulary to construct their self‐frame and tended to choose conservative plans. Self‐frame suppressed the influence of trait anxiety on decision making. These results further confirmed the hypothesis that individual differences in personality traits might influence the processing of information in a framed decision task. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Interrogative Self‐talk Improves Task Performance: The Role of Answers to Self‐posed Questions

Nearly all the self‐talk cues studied so far have been self‐statements. However, the findings of Senay, Albarracin, and Noguchi suggest that interrogative self‐talk produces better task performance than declarative one. Two of the experiments reported here were meant to replicate that study, but the expected differences were not confirmed. Experiment 3 showed that if a self‐posed question about future behavior was answered positively, task performance was better than in groups exposed either to the self‐statement ‘I will do it’ or to a negative answer following the question. However, these differences occurred only in those who self‐reported the awareness of the impact of self‐talk on their thought processes. This effect and the possible reasons why between‐group differences were not found in Experiments 1 and 2 are discussed. An alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 3 is also proposed beside that stressing the impact of internal answer. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intergroup Discrimination Involving Negative Outcomes and Self‐Esteem

Two studies examined the link between intergroup discrimination involving negative outcomes (i.e., removal of positive resources and allocation of noxious resources), global self‐esteem (GSE), and collective self‐esteem (CSE). Study 1 found that New Zealanders who took away more positive resources from out‐group than in‐group members experienced enhanced CSE, but not GSE. These findings were replicated in Study 2, with respect to the allocation of noxious resources (i.e., white noise). New Zealanders' GSE and CSE assessed prior to the allocation of noxious resources were unrelated to the subsequent allocation of white noise. The data are interpreted to indicate that intergroup discrimination involving negative outcomes leads to enhanced CSE. However, neither GSE nor CSE predict such discrimination.     

Nonsuicidal Self‐Injury in College Students: The Role of Perfectionism and Rumination

A paucity of research exists examining personality and cognitive characteristics that may contribute to nonsuicidal self‐injury (NSSI). The purpose of the current study was to clarify the contribution of perfectionism and rumination, along with depression and anxiety, to NSSI within a sample of 170 college students. Group comparisons revealed that participants with a history of NSSI endorsed significantly more rumination and depressive and anxious symptoms then non‐NSSI controls. Results regarding perfectionism were mixed, with NSSI participants differing from controls on select aspects of perfectionism. Results suggest higher levels of depression and anxiety and a ruminative cognitive style may increase vulnerability for NSSI; however, further research is needed to clarify the contribution of perfectionism.     

Reflective Self‐Control in Self‐Control Scholarship: A Peircean Analysis

Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Huh (this issue) present an important critique of much self‐control research, highlighting some of the ways that our customary operationalizations and methods may have created more confusion than clarity. Their insights, rooted in past literature and new data, offer recommendations that will undoubtedly help us improve our research in consumption self‐control. In this commentary, I frame their work using the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, a philosopher, mathematician, and logician whose frustration with the management of the self‐control construct and subsequent revision parallels Vosgerau et al's in many ways. Further, his thought proposes that their thought traces the boundary of another type of self‐control problem, which I'll refer to as “reflective self‐control.” Taking together consumption self‐control and reflective self‐control, we're able to address a wide range of human experiences and connect self‐control to ethics, consistent with a long tradition bridging the two. Perhaps most importantly, though, a Peircean analysis suggests that Vosgerau et al's paper—whether we agree or disagree with its conclusions—exemplifies the kind of scholarly self‐control we need to display to make scientific progress, regardless of our specific domain of study.     

Engagement With Self‐Practice/Self‐Reflection as a Professional Development Activity: The Role of Therapist Beliefs

A number of research studies support self‐practice/self‐reflection (SP/SR) as an experiential learning process that facilitates the acquisition of therapeutic skill in a number of cognitive‐behavioural therapy (CBT) competencies and as showing potential as a valuable professional development activity. Engaging therapists to participate in SP/SR programmes is sometimes difficult, and when they are offered the option to participate in SP/SR programmes as part of professional development, relatively few volunteer. This study investigates the role of therapist beliefs about SP/SR as a potential obstacle to engagement. An online survey was developed to assess the strength of 14 commonly held therapist beliefs concerning the consequences of participating voluntarily in a SP/SR programme. Participants were a combined sample of 44 Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners and high‐intensity CBT therapists employed by an Improving Access to Psychological Therapies service in the United Kingdom. Few negative beliefs about SP/SR emerged. The majority of respondents believed SP/SR programmes were relevant to their work situation, but perceived “lack of time” as a significant barrier to participation. Three factors are considered in relation to introducing SP/SR as a workforce professional development activity: (a) The importance of managing therapist perceptions regarding time; (b) SP/SR as a mechanism to increase self‐care and reduce burnout; and (c) The need to focus mental health services' attention on the potential of SP/SR programmes to increase staff morale and improve service delivery.     

Exaggerated Positivity in Self‐Evaluation: A Social Neuroscience Approach to Reconciling the Role of Self‐esteem Protection and Cognitive Bias

Recent neuroscience research provides new insight into why people tend to view themselves through rose‐colored glasses and suggests a different approach for improving self‐insight. Rose‐colored glasses (sometimes referred to as positive illusions, positivity bias, self‐serving bias, self‐enhancement, or overconfidence) are a pervasive characteristic of self‐evaluation. While it is intuitive to think about rose‐colored glasses as a self‐esteem protection tactic, research has shown that people tend to exaggerate their positive attributes even when self‐esteem is not at stake. This raises questions about the relation of the exaggerated positivity used to protect self‐esteem to the exaggerated positivity seen in other circumstances. Are people using a consistent thought pattern to overemphasize their positive attributes which generalizes across situations regardless of whether self‐esteem is at stake? Or is there something different about the way people go about overemphasizing their positive attributes when coping with a threat to self‐esteem? Recent neuroscience research supports the latter: inducing the need for self‐esteem protection changes the neural profile underlying exaggerated positivity. When self‐esteem is threatened, exaggerated positivity in self‐evaluation engages orbitofrontal cortex and a functional network of increased basal ganglia activation and decreased middle frontal gyrus activation. In contrast, exaggerated positivity arising in the absence of self‐esteem threat tends to reduce orbitofrontal cortex activation and its functional connectivity with the temporal, occipital, and frontal lobes. This discovery suggests that not all rose‐colored glasses are created equally and, therefore, curtailing them may require different interventions depending on whether self‐esteem protection is their underlying driving force.     

Addiction and Self‐Deception: A Method for Self‐Control?

Neil Levy argues that while addicts who believe they are not addicts are self‐deceived, addicts who believe they are addicts are just as self‐deceived. Such persons accept a false belief that their addictive behaviour involves a loss of control. This paper examines two implications of Levy's discussion: that accurate self‐knowledge may be particularly difficult for addicts; and that an addict's self‐deceived belief that they cannot control themselves may aid their attempts at self‐control. I argue that the self‐deceived beliefs of addicts in denial and of self‐described addicts differ in kind. Unlike the self‐deception of an addict in denial, that of the self‐described addict allows them to acknowledge their behaviour. As such, it may aid an addict to develop more self‐control. A paradoxical implication is that this self‐deception may allow an addict more self‐knowledge.     

Relation of Depression and Anxiety to Self‐ and Peer‐Reported Relational Aggression

The primary purpose of this multimethod and multimeasure study was to identify how the peer relationships of Australian adolescents (ages 9–15 years; N = 335) at school, including relational aggression and victimization, correlated with their symptoms of depression and anxiety. Moreover, relational aggression and victimization were measured via both self‐ and peer report, and discrepancies between reports were considered as correlates of symptoms and peer relationship status. Adolescents who reported more symptoms of depression and anxiety also self‐reported more relational victimization and reported their peers as less trustworthy. Adolescents who overreported their own relational victimization and aggression compared with peer report had more symptoms compared with those who agreed with their peers or underreported their aggression and victimization. Adolescents who underreported their own aggression were not only more socially prominent but were also more disliked by their peers. When considered independent of self‐reports, no measure of peer‐reported peer status, aggression, or victimization was associated with depressive symptoms; but adolescents reported as more accepted by their peers had fewer anxiety symptoms. Longitudinal research should be conducted to examine adolescents' increasing socioemotional problems as correlates of discrepancies between self‐ and peer reports of relational aggression and victimization. Aggr. Behav. 38:16‐30, 2012. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Shake and Fake: the Role of Interview Anxiety in Deceptive Impression Management

We investigated whether anxiety about self-presentation concerns during interviews (i.e., interview anxiety) is associated with applicants’ use of deceptive impression management (IM) tactics. We examined the relationship between interview anxiety and deceptive IM, and we examined whether the personality traits of honesty-humility and extraversion would be indirectly related to deceptive IM through interview anxiety. Participants (N?=?202) were recruited after an interview for a research assistant position. Interview anxiety scores were positively related to deceptive IM. Furthermore, there was evidence of a negative indirect effect of honesty-humility on deceptive IM, via overall interview anxiety. Also, extraversion was indirectly associated with deceptive IM through interview anxiety. Results suggest that deceptive IM can be used as a protective mechanism to maintain self-esteem or to avoid the loss of rewards. This paper is the first to examine the role of interview anxiety in interview faking.