Are Events and Affordances Commensurate Terms?

In this article, I argue that the dichotomy between events and affordances as Stoffregen (target article, this issue) devises is unwarranted and potentially misleading. I challenge the notion that the role of the actor distinguishes events from affordances in any useful way. The research labeled event perception is neither less ecological nor qualitatively different from research on affordances. Instead, the main distinction is constituted by affordance being a perceptual property, whereas event pertains to a different semantic category. Nonetheless, the contemplation of these concepts, in particular an elaboration of the concept of affordance, is desperately needed.     

Affordance Types and Affordance Tokens: Are Gibson’s Affordances Trustworthy?†

Late in their paper on hypersets, Chemero and Turvey characterize affordances as “quicksilvery,” prone to rapid appearance and disappearance. We contrast this view with Gibson’s emphasis on the stability of affordances. We argue that this apparent discrepancy can be resolved by appeal to the distinction between affordances as indefinite abstract types and definite affordance tokens (instances of the type that share the resemblance relation). These issues will be discussed in the context of their consistency with ecological realism, where Platonic idealism is eschewed in favor of a more Aristotelian process theory. These ideas will be examined in the broader context of the domain ontology to ensure that Gibson's seminal affordance concept has its greatest theoretical utility. Finally, we develop a process theory of ontological descent by which indefinite affordance possibilities become more definite affordance potentialities and these eventuate in the most definite affordance actualizing actions.     

动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

Influence of Approach Angle on Estimates of Time-To-Contact

What distinguishes affordances from events depends on the capacities of the perceiver, in the sense of distinction between open versus closed behavioral programs (Popper, 1978, p. 353). Recent evolutionary history has rendered human perceptual capacities uniquely open. As well as formalization, deeper consideration of mutuality relations will enrich the concept of affordance and link the ecological approach to recent developments in psychology.     

Social Ecological Context of Conversing

The purpose of this article is to provide some groundwork about ecological social psychology as a starting point for researchers tackling neglected issues of language ecologically. I review basic principles of the ecological approach to perceiving and acting and discuss how the ecological approach has been applied beyond solo actors in an ecological niche to multiple actors acting in a niche explicitly conceptualized as social. In the last decade, researchers were inspired by tool-use research and solo action-based research on affordances (e.g., stair climbing) to take an affordance-based approach to understanding cooperation in a more embodied approach than was previously used in social psychology. Beginning at least a decade prior to that, researchers were inspired to wonder whether the dynamics of the coordinative structures of a solo actor's body movements, spontaneously emerging when different limbs engaged in rhythmic movement, might cross the bodily divide to yield similar collective dynamics when multiple actors are incidentally engaged in rhythmic movement (e.g., different people swinging their legs together). One insight from the affordance research emphasizes the role of meaning as emerging in dynamic interaction between multiple actors confronted by demands and resources of an environment: language's potential contribution to this is discussed in the context of the newest advances in theorizing about values and about the sociocultural grounding of affordances. Finally, the potential role of language for facilitating being pulled into “social eddies” of coordinated orbits of motion, as well as its potential role in joint action, is discussed.     

Processing bias: Individual differences in the cognition of situations

An approach to investigating individual differences in the cognition of situations is presented. Situations are characterized in terms of Gibson's notion of affordances, and it is suggested that individuals differ in the extent to which they differentially process information specifying certain types of affordances rather than others. This differential cognitive processing of a situational affordance is termed a "processing bias." It is proposed that processing biases are manifest in an individual's anticipation, perception, and memory of situations. To illustrate the approach, a processing bias for social vs. nonsocial affordances is investigated within and among these three cognitive domains. The relationship of this processing bias to two facets of the personality trait dimension of sociability--overall level and self-schemata--is also examined. Such research on processing biases may help to clarify the role of cognition in person-situation interactions. The greatest strength of the approach is that its characterization of individual differences in cognition and behavior is complementary to a general approach to describing human environments.     

Perception of Affordances for Striking Regulates Interpersonal Distance Maneuvers of Intermediate and Expert Players in Kendo Matches

In daily life and in many sports, people must adjust interpersonal distance between themselves and others based on task constraints and goals. For example, in martial arts such as boxing and kendo, players must adjust interpersonal distance before starting or defending strikes. However, it is not clear what players perceive and how players use this perceptual information to maneuver interpersonal distance and start strikes during real matches. We investigated players' perception of affordances and the criteria for perception and behaviors, and how these change with expertise, using real kendo matches as a one-on-one opponent task. Players perceived affordances for striking for themselves and for their opponent based on subtle interpersonal distance changes and clearly switched stepping forward and backward. In addition, players perceived affordances for strike success and entered closer interpersonal distance than the possible striking distance to increase their own striking ability and exited the closer distance to decrease their opponent's striking ability, respectively. Furthermore, expert players stayed in and moved into the critical interpersonal distance more frequently than intermediate players did. Our research indicates a relationship between action-scaled affordance perception of and maneuvers associated with interpersonal distance in one-on-one situations that occur in daily life and in many sports.     

社会阶层信号及其对人际水平社会互动的影响

社会阶层信号是指个体据以感知和判断他人社会阶层的一切线索, 人们通过加工这些微妙的线索便能判断出他人的社会阶层, 而他人的社会阶层在很大程度上决定着人们在人际水平的社会互动行为。以穿着打扮、面部特征和说话特点为例, 说明社会阶层信号对个体判断他人阶层的影响, 在此基础上围绕社会交换、社会公平和社会认同这三个动机视角归纳了社会阶层信号对人际水平社会互动的不同影响。针对社会阶层信号本身, 将来有必要探讨社会阶层信号功能弱化的问题; 由于社会阶层信号与社会阶层这一概念的相关度较高, 未来研究有必要阐述二者的联系与区别; 鉴于目前少有研究考察第三方的社会阶层信号如何影响人际水平社会互动的问题, 探索互动中第三方社会阶层信号的影响及其机制将会是对社会阶层心理学研究的一个重要推进。     

Affordances as Properties of the Animal-Environment System

In this article, I argue that affordances are properties of the animal-environment system, that is, that they are emergent properties that do not inhere in either the environment or the animal. I critique and review the formal definition of affordance offered by Turvey (1992). Turvey defined affordances as properties of the environment; I discuss some consequences of this and argue that Turvey's strategy of grounding the definition of affordance in terms of dispositional properties is problematic. I also suggest that Turvey's definition of affordance may lead to problems for the specification and direct perception of affordances. Motivated by these problems, I propose a new definition of affordance, in which affordances are properties of the animal-environment system. This definition does not rely on the concept of dispositional properties and is consistent with direct perception.     

Social Affordances and Interaction I: Introduction

Recent extensions of the affordance concept to fundamental problems in the study of social knowing and interaction were the focus of one of the symposia at the Fifth International Conference on Event Perception and Action, at Miami University, Oxford, OH in July 1989. This article traces the history of ecological social psychology and reviews recent attempts to extend the application of the concept of affordance to the topics of social knowing and social interaction. Themes arising within three domains of contemporary ecological research are examined: (a) social perception research has stressed the direct perception of what other people afford the self and the perception of what other people are afforded in their transactions with the shared environment of surfaces, objects, places, and other persons; (b) in the study of social interaction, the emphasis recently has been on the processes of the perceiving and the assembling of social coordination, and also on the functions of social interaction in the acquisition of knowledge and behavioral competence; and (c) cultural practices, such as those involved in caregiver-infant interactions, appear to play a central role in organizing the shared focus of attention and in revealing and creating affordances for action and interaction. Some of the work described in this article appears in the current and subsequent issues of Ecological Psychology.     

Perceiving and Interacting Affordances: A New Model of Human–Affordance Interactions

This article introduces a new affordance framework for humans and human design. Based on previous important concepts in product design–affordance, signifier, and product semantics, the authors propose three new concepts to illustrate how people perceive affordance. According to the model, perceptual probability of affordance is the probability that the public can perceive a certain affordance; perceptual threshold of affordance is the threshold at which affordance can be perceived by a person and changed by perceptual information; and situations, in which interactions between affordances and people exist, are crucial influences on human–affordance interactions. An illustration of the model and suggestions for further research are provided.     

Effects of Cognitive Load on Affordance‐based Interactions

Affordances are design clues that allow users to effortlessly determine how objects should be used. Since their introduction to the human–computer interaction design community, their use within interfaces has become a staple. But, despite work to understand how affordances make an interface's available actions transparent, few empirical studies have examined the cognitive origins of this interaction type. Therefore, we explored the impact of cognitive load on affordance‐based interactions. Participants were asked to perform a series of affordance‐based interactions while under different types of working memory load (no load, verbal, spatial, and central executive). Affordance‐based interactions were consistently slowed under central executive load, but never when under verbal load. We conclude that affordance‐based interactions do require cognitive resources, but resource costs may only manifest under heavy load. With this knowledge, designers may be able to better predict when an affordance will (or will not) act as if it is resource free. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anorexia nervosa and oversized experiences

In this paper, I discuss what I call the oversized experiences that anorexic patients suffer from. It has been known for some time that anorexic patients mentally picture their bodies as larger than reality. While this constitutes one kind of oversized experience, I claim there is another, less explored kind. This is an experience of the body as oversized in relation to the affordances of its environment. I discuss recent evidence suggesting anorexic patients exhibit distorted affordance perception. I then discuss how this distorted affordance perception also constitutes an oversized experience of the body. Along with sociocultural influences, I claim oversized experiences ground negative propositional attitudes regarding body size.     

The influence of athletic experience and kinematic information on skill-relevant affordance perception

Humans can perceive affordances both for themselves and for others, and affordance perception is a function of perceptual–motor experience involved in playing a sport. Two experiments investigated the enhanced affordance perception of athletes. In Experiment 1, basketball players and nonbasketball players provided perceptual reports for sports-relevant (maximum standing-reach and reach-with-jump heights) and non-sports-relevant (maximum sitting height) affordances for self and other. Basketball players were more accurate at perceiving maximum reach-with-jump for another person than were nonbasketball players, but were no better at perceiving maximum reach or sitting heights. Experiment 2 investigated the informational basis for this enhanced perceptual ability of basketball players by evaluating whether kinematics inform perceivers about action-scaled (e.g., force-production dependent), but not body-scaled (i.e., geometrically determined), affordances for others, and whether basketball experience enhances sensitivity to kinematic information. Only basketball players improved at perceiving an action-scaled affordance (maximum reach-with-jump), but not body-scaled affordances (maximum standing-reach and sit) with exposure to kinematic information, suggesting that action-scaled affordances may be specified by kinematic information to which athletes are already attuned by virtue of their sport experience.     

The influence of athletic experience and kinematic information on skill-relevant affordance perception

Humans can perceive affordances both for themselves and for others, and affordance perception is a function of perceptual-motor experience involved in playing a sport. Two experiments investigated the enhanced affordance perception of athletes. In Experiment 1, basketball players and nonbasketball players provided perceptual reports for sports-relevant (maximum standing-reach and reach-with-jump heights) and non-sports-relevant (maximum sitting height) affordances for self and other. Basketball players were more accurate at perceiving maximum reach-with-jump for another person than were nonbasketball players, but were no better at perceiving maximum reach or sitting heights. Experiment 2 investigated the informational basis for this enhanced perceptual ability of basketball players by evaluating whether kinematics inform perceivers about action-scaled (e.g., force-production dependent), but not body-scaled (i.e., geometrically determined), affordances for others, and whether basketball experience enhances sensitivity to kinematic information. Only basketball players improved at perceiving an action-scaled affordance (maximum reach-with-jump), but not body-scaled affordances (maximum standing-reach and sit) with exposure to kinematic information, suggesting that action-scaled affordances may be specified by kinematic information to which athletes are already attuned by virtue of their sport experience.     

Person–Situation Interaction in Adaptive Emotional Functioning

Two studies applied a person–situation model to examine the effect of emotional affordances of situations. Participants rated their emotional functioning as more extensive in situations classified as being high in emotional affordance than those classified as low in emotional affordance. Participants who scored higher on the individual difference characteristic of emotional intelligence were more interested in entering high emotional affordance situations than were individuals lower in emotional intelligence, and participants who scored higher on emotional intelligence were rated by others as being more successful in high emotional affordance situations than individuals lower in emotional intelligence. These results provide preliminary evidence that the interaction between emotional intelligence and situations may influence emotional functioning.     

The predictive mirror: interactions of mirror and affordance processes during action observation

An important question for the study of social interactions is how the motor actions of others are represented. Research has demonstrated that simply watching someone perform an action activates a similar motor representation in oneself. Key issues include (1) the automaticity of such processes, and (2) the role object affordances play in establishing motor representations of others' actions. Participants were asked to move a lever to the left or right to respond to the grip width of a hand moving across a workspace. Stimulus-response compatibility effects were modulated by two task-irrelevant aspects of the visual stimulus: the observed reach direction and the match between hand-grasp and the affordance evoked by an incidentally presented visual object. These findings demonstrate that the observation of another person's actions automatically evokes sophisticated motor representations that reflect the relationship between actions and objects even when an action is not directed towards an object.     

示能性:基于镜像神经元视角的理解

示能性(affordance)概念解释了人的行为与物体功能之间互动、互补的关系。但是,有关示能性生理基础却很少被提及。镜像神经元的发现为示能性生理基础提供了可能的解释。文章根据研究将示能性分为结构示能性和功能示能性,探讨了不同示能性和镜像神经元之间的关系,并提出不同神经通路中的镜像神经元是示能性生理基础的结论。背-背侧分流中的镜像神经元是结构示能性的神经基础,而腹-背侧分流中的镜像神经元是功能示能性的神经基础。     

Sympathy,Interpersonal Awareness and Acknowledgment

According to a popular thought, sympathy is an epistemic phenomenon: in sympathizing with others we come to be aware of them as fellow sentient beings. This view–which I call the Epistemic View–effectively characterizes sympathy as a form of social cognition. In this paper, I will argue against the Epistemic View. As far as I can see, this view radically misconstrues the way sympathy is directed at others. I will at the same time provide some material for, and motivate, an alternative proposal according to which the primary significance of sympathy is practical rather than epistemic. On this account, sympathy is a form of interpersonal acknowledgment rather than interpersonal awareness.