The Guilty Knowledge Test and the modified Stroop task in detection of deception: an exploratory study

The current study tested whether a simple Stroop paradigm can be used to detect deceptive behavior. 40 university students (34 women), half of whom committed a mock crime, were administered a Guilty Knowledge Test and modified Stroop task to detect guilt or innocence. The Guilty Knowledge Test is a well-known psychophysiological detection method, which consists of multiple-choice questions about details of the crime while skin conductance is recorded. Subjects possessing guilty knowledge are expected to show enhanced differential responses to the relevant stimuli. The modified Stroop task required color-naming of colored words related to the mock crime or an irrelevant crime. Each version of the Stroop task was presented in story form. Subjects possessing guilty knowledge were expected to produce larger reaction times to the relevant version relative to the irrelevant version. The test correctly identified 100% of innocent participants and 78% of guilty participants. In contrast, Stroop interference. i.e., reaction times for irrelevant crime details subtracted from those for mock crime details, did not differentiate between the two groups, suggesting that the story form of the Stroop paradigm is not suitable for lie detection.     

Orienting to guilty knowledge

The Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT; Lykken, 1959) assesses whether suspects conceal information about a crime ( “guilty knowledge”). Previous studies have demonstrated larger physiological reactions to guilty knowledge compared to unknown information. In three experiments, we investigated whether guilty knowledge also demands attention. During an alleged polygraph examination, participants were presented with to‐be‐detected pictures ( “guilty knowledge”), nonsignificant, familiar pictures ( “mere knowledge”), and previously unseen pictures ( “neutral information”) for 250 ms in a modified dot probe task. In all three experiments, probe responses were slower on guilty knowledge trials as compared to the neutral trials. Results are discussed in terms of an information‐processing view on orienting to guilty knowledge.     

The effects of self-monitoring and self-reported consistency on the consistency of personality judgments made by strangers and intimates

How consistent are strangers' and intimates' judgments of stimulus people's personalities, and how is this interjudge consistency affected by stimulus persons' assessed self-monitoring and self-reported behavioral consistency? To answer these questions, 38 stimulus subjects rated themselves on the personality dimensions of extraversion and anxiety and also rated their cross-situational consistency on these dimensions. Strangers, friends, mothers, and fathers of stimulus persons also rated them on extraversion and anxiety. The results indicated that: For judgments of anxiety there was lower interjudge consistency for high than for low self-monitoring stimulus subjects. For judgments of extraversion there was no difference in interjudge consistency for low and high self-monitoring stimulus subjects. The results also showed that anxiety was a more “private” trait in that intimates' but not strangers' judgments correlated with stimulus subjects' self-reported anxiety (r = .50 and r = .11, respectively), while extraversion was a more “public” trait in that both intimates' and strangers' judgments correlated with stimulus subjects' self-reported extraversion (r = .42 and r = .51, respectively). These results suggest that self-monitoring of stimulus persons affects interjudge consistency of peroonality judgments particularly for “private” traits such as anxiety, which are most subject to expressive control and inhibition.     

Use of antianxiety drugs as countermeasures in the detection of guilty knowledge.

To evaluate whether antianxiety drugs enable guilty subjects to appear innocent on polygraph tests, we compared the effects of diazepam, meprobamate, and propranolol on the outcome of a guilty knowledge test (GKT). Seventy-five undergraduate students were evenly divided among one innocent and four guilty groups. Subjects in each of the guilty groups received either one of the drugs or a placebo prior to the administration of the GKT and after viewing a videotape that depicted a burglary as seen from the perspective of the burglar. The results showed that drug status had no influence on the outcome of the GKT. Innocent subjects who coincidentally obtained high scores on a recognition memory test covering details of the mock crime tended to obtain higher guilt scores on the GKT.     

Countermeasures Against the Strategic Use of Evidence Technique: Effects on Suspects' Strategies

As the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique becomes more widely taught to practitioners, it is important to investigate possible countermeasures to the technique. It is possible that guilty suspects who are aware of the SUE technique will employ forthcoming verbal strategies to make themselves appear innocent. Mock suspects committed a richly detailed simulated transgression (or a benign analogue) and were interviewed about their activities. Prior to questioning, some suspects received information about SUE tactics the interviewer was likely to use. Guilty suspects who were informed about the SUE technique employed more verbally forthcoming strategies than their uninformed counterparts. Guilty suspects who were given SUE information also reported planning for the interview in different ways. However, guilty‐informed suspects did not become as forthcoming as innocent suspects overall. In sum, it appears that information about the SUE technique induces guilty suspects to alter their strategies, but only to a relatively small degree.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trait anxiety,stress, and learning a test of Saltz's hypothesis

Behavioral predictions from Saltz's, Spence's, and Spielberger's interpretations of trait anxiety were tested in a complex verbal learning task. Fifty-three high-anxious and 52 low-anxious male college students were randomly distributed to test conditions of failure-stress, pain-stress, or neutral instructions. The learning data revealed that high-anxious-failure and low-anxious-pain Ss were disrupted and supported Saltz's hypothesis; self-reported anxiety (A-State scale, STAI) was observed only in high-anxious-failure Ss and supported Spielberger's theory of the arousal of state anxiety as a function of trait anxiety. However, the contradiction between self-reported anxiety and learning behavior in low-anxious-pain Ss indicated that the verbal report of these Ss was an inaccurate or insensitive index of arousal.     

Audience reaction as a determinant of the speaker's self-persuasion

This paper tests effects of audience feedback on speaker attitudes. One hundred and seven male subjects with initial beliefs on both sides of an issue (women's role) were assigned to speak for or against their own position; then an “audience” provided one of three types of feedback (speaker was sincere, speaker was insincere, no feedback) in a 2 × 2 × 3 design. Subjects who received sincere feedback showed greater change in the direction of their speech than did those who received insincere feedback. No feedback treatments resulted in intermediate change. This sincere > no feedback > insincere ordering of means held for both pro- and counterattitudinal speakers and for both pretest attitudes. A main effect for pretest attitude was also obtained. Two additional control groups allow for a separate analysis of the effects of (1) preparing and delivering the speech, and (2) audience reaction to the speech.     

Mock Juror Attribution of Criminal Responsibility: Effects of Race and the Guilty But Mentally III (GBMI) Verdict Option1

The present study examined three questions relevant to the insanity defense: Does the availability of the alternative verdict “Guilty But Mentally III” affect juror assessment of criminal responsibility? Does race of defendant significantly affect juror decision-making about who should be acquitted under the insanity defense? And does race of victim significantly influence how jurors decide their final insanity defense verdicts? Race of defendant (black or white), race of victim (black or white), and verdict choice set [(Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI), Guilty, and Not Guilty) vs. (Guilty but Mentally III (GBMI), NGRI, Guilty, and Not Guilty)] were systematically varied. The mock-trial was presented to 197 college student subjects by means of an audiotape and slide show. Following the re-enacted trial, subjects answered a series of questions regarding the case. The main dependent variable was the rendered verdict. Both χ²loglinear analyses revealed a significant relationship between race of defendant and verdict such that the defendant, when presented as black, was acquitted NGRI significantly more often than when the defendant was presented as white. No significant effects were found for race of victim. The availability of the GBMI verdict option resulted in a twofold effect: There was a two-thirds reduction in both NGRI and straight guilty verdicts when the GBMI verdict option was made available. The implications for legal policy and future research are discussed.     

Autobiographical memory and clinical anxiety

Abstract

Previous experiments on the recall of threatening and neutral information in clinically anxious subjects have yielded mixed results. The present study assessed autobiographical memory in patients with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), and normal controls. Subjects were first presented with neutral cue words and asked to respond with any personal memory. GAD subjects judged the content of their own memories as more consistent with anxious mood, and less consistent with pleasant mood, than that reported by controls. Subjects were then again presented with neutral cue words, but with instructions to provide either “anxious” or “nonanxious” personal memories, on specified trials. Significant interactions between group and instruction condition indicated that anxious subjects recalled more anxiety-evoking memories, and recalled them more rapidly, relative to controls. Ratings by blind judges did not support the hypothesis that this apparent difference in the content of autobiographical recall was an artefact due to anxious subjects labelling memories as being more anxiety evoking than would controls. Possible explanations of the findings, and reasons for the apparent discrepancy between these and earlier results, are discussed.     

The Influence of Eyewitness Nonidentifications on Mock-Jurors' Judgments of a Court Case1

Two experiments examined the effect of an eyewitness nonidentificution on mock-jurors' verdicts in robbery cases, as well as the effects of number of identifying eyewitnesses and status of the identifying witness (victim or bystander). Subjects read court case summaries that included variable eyewitness evidence and constant alibi, circumstantial, and character evidence. In Experiment 1, frequency of guilty verdicts was significantly less when an eyewitness testified in court that the defendant was not the perpetrator, even when this nonidentification opposed two positive identifications. In Experiment 2, a low guilty rate was again associated with the presence of a nonidentifier, but only when the nonidentifier actually testified in court and stipulated that the defendant is “not the man.” On the average, 70% of the jurors delivered guilty verdicts when both the victim and bystander gave identifying testimony, whereas 12.5% delivered guilty verdicts when the bystander gave opposing nonidentifying testimony. Guilty rates were unaffected by the identifying eyewitness' status and (in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1) were higher when there were two (vs. one) identifying eyewitnesses.     

Alice-in-Wonderland terminological usage in,and communicational concerns about,that peculiarly American flight of technological fancy

Alice-in-Wonderland (AW) terminological usage employs basic terms in a systematically misleading and taxonomically anarchic way. The so-called “control” question “test” (CQT) polygraph procedure, which enjoys a controversial but nevertheless scientific status in North America, involves such AW terminological usage. The basic concepts of “test,” “control,” and “quantification” are loosely employed. There is loose talk about the “detection ofdeception,” which generates the paradox that in the CQT it is in the innocent that deception should be detected. Moreover, deception is not really assessed either in the CQT or in the more scientifically-based Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT). Finally, there is loose practice in evaluating the CQT, which should not be primarily assessed in terms of its overall accuracy, but in terms of its specific effects in improving accuracy through the provision of physiological information to the examiner. Such an assessment has not been carried out even in laboratory analogues of polygraphy. The treatment of the CQT exemplifies most psychophysiologists’ reluctance to treat basic definitional issues seriously, and also means that opponents of the CQT are unable to communicate clearly about it with non-psychophysiologist professionals and with the lay community.     

时间对犯罪隐藏信息记忆的影响

记录模拟犯罪者和阅读报纸后对案件知情的无辜者接受隐藏信息测试时的皮肤电活动,探讨时间对犯罪隐藏信息记忆的影响。结果发现：(1)延迟条件下,模拟犯罪组的再认率和皮肤电活动变化显著高于知情无辜组,但两组在立即条件下无差异;(2)知情无辜组在延迟条件下的甄别率显著低于立即条件下,而模拟犯罪者在两种条件下无差异。结果表明,延迟测试比立即测试更容易区分模拟犯罪组和知情无辜组;犯罪甄别率在延迟条件下减少,但也减少了知情无辜者被判断为犯罪者的风险。     

Interal locus of control as a value

Internal and external subjects, who previously filled out Rotter's (1966) I-E scale, were asked to score the I-E scale of “another student”. Subjects were exposed to “an other's” score of either 0, 5, 10, 16, or 23, and were asked to rate themselves and the “other” on an evaluative questionnaire. It was predicted that ratings of the “other” would increase in positivity to the extent the “other” scored as an internal. A reverse direction was predicted for an index of negative evaluations. The predictions were confirmed. The results suggest that internal locus of control is a societal value. The findings did not support either Hannah's (1973) hypothesis that internals are more responsive to a need for social approval, or Byrne's (1969) similarity hypothesis.     

Self-esteem,anxiety, and the avoidance of self-focused attention

The present study was designed to provide converging support for the hypothesis that individuals with low self-esteem (low SEs) find self-focused attention more anxiety provoking, relative to people with high self-esteem (high SEs). Subjects were premeasured for their self-esteem and given a brief opportunity to “practice” two tasks that they believed they would be required to perform in a later part of the experiment. One task was practiced in front of a self-focusing stimulus—a large mirror (mirror task)—whereas the other was not (no-mirror task). Subjects evaluated the tasks after they had practiced each one. Consistent with the notion that self-focused attention is more anxiety provoking for individuals with lower self-esteem, it was observed that: (1) relative to high SEs, lowmedium SEs rated the mirror, but not the no-mirror, task as less enjoyable, and (b) low-medium, but not high, SEs preferred to avoid the mirror task for the alleged upcoming part of the experiment. Subjects high in dispositional private selfconsciousness also wanted to avoid the mirror task, particularly if they were also low in self-esteem. Contrary to prediction, success-failure feedback from a previous task had no effect on subjects' task preferences. Theoretical explanations and implications are discussed.     

The miscommunication of deception: An adaptive perspective

Undergraduates were videotaped as they told lies and truths about their last job. Later, these undergraduates viewed the videotape and tried to guess which of their fellow subject were lying. Monetary incentives had been offered for successful lying and lie detection. Our subjects showed a “demeanor bias”—some looked honest even when they were lying; others looked dishonest even when they were telling the truth. These differences in apparent honesty were the primary determinant of deception judgments; perceivers' detection skills played a lesser role. Honest-looking subjects were predisposed to perceive others as dishonest. In general, our liars used hand gestures, maintained eye contact, and refrained from smiling. Perceivers misconstrued these behaviors as signs of honesty and could not often detect deceit—unless the lie was being told by a subject who had earlier told the truth. We draw on sociobiological concepts and offer an adaptive perspective on human deceit.     

Defendant characteristics and juridic decisions

Research has demonstrated that attractive defendants receive more preferential treatment than do less attractive defendants. The present study examined two explanations for this finding (liking-leniency and causal inference models). It varied both the attractiveness of the defendant's traits and their relevance to the likelihood of committing a traffic felony. Results indicated that the attractive defendant was found less guilty than the unattractive defendant only when the traits were associated with the likelihood of acting criminally. This suggests that a causal inference model was appropriate when subjects decided guilt. However, a liking-leniency model was supported for decisions on severity of punishment as the attractive defendant was treated more leniently than the unattractive defendant, regardless of the relevancy of the traits to the crime.     

The effect of mood and incentives on helping: Are there some things money can't buy?

Happy, guilty, and neutral mood states were induced in participants who were then provided with an opportunity to donate blood for free, to donate in exchange for $5, or to choose between donating for free or for $5. As expected, there was a significantly higher incidence of helping when subjects felt happy and guilty as opposed to emotively neutral. Contrary to predictions, helping was unaffected by the type of incentive (donate for $5, donate for free, choose $5/free) subjects were offered in interaction with their mood state. However, the type of incentive did seem to influence the postdonation emotions of subjects: Guilty subjects who donated for money felt significantly less guilty following donation than prior to it and happy subjects felt more self-altruistic (kind and generous) following donation when they helped for free. The results are discussed in terms of Cialdini's negative state relief model (for negative moods) and the intrinsic qualities of helping (for positive moods).     

Expressive control,expressive consistency,and the correspondence between expressive behavior and personality1

Does expressive behavior reflect personality? This paper proposes that expressive control is an important “moderating variable” affecting expressive behavior, expressive consistency, and the correspondence between expressive behavior and personality. To demonstrate this, a study was carried out in which 68 subjects were selected, according to a 2×2×2 factorial design, who were low and high on assessed extraversion, neuroticism, and self-monitoring (a measure of expressive control). Subjects were then videotaped as they role-played being teachers. A number of specific expressive behaviors were measured (subjects' stride length, graphic expansiveness, percent of forward eye-contact, and percent of time talking), and also groups of naive judges rated how “extraverted” and “anxious” subjects appeared. The following results supported our hypothesis: (1) Self-monitoring was significantly related to subjects' expressive behaviors and judged personalities, while assessed extraversion and anxiety were not. (2) Expressive control was used to suppress the “accurate” display of anxiety but not extraversion. (3) Bodily expression was less controlled than facial or vocal expression. And (4), persons low and high on self-monitoring showed different patterns of cross-situational and cross-channel (face, body, voice) expressive consistency.