“Pleasure and Joy in the Work”: Using Simone Weil in the Classroom

Richard Rorty once wrote that inspired teaching “is the result of an encounter with an author, character, plot, stanza, line or archaic torso which has made a difference to the [teacher’s] conception of who she is, what she is good for, what she wants to do with herself: an encounter which has rearranged her priorities and purposes.” In a teaching career more than three decades long, no author has influenced me more profoundly as a teacher and as a human being than Simone Weil. She has changed how I think about myself, my relationships, the world around me and ultimately about what transcends me. And this could not help but change how I am in the classroom. This essay is a reflection on how Simone Weil has changed my life, both in and out of the classroom.     

Encounters with raven

I have been visited by Eurydice. She first came to me, unbidden, unexpected, in the way things usually first come to me–in a poem. But there was something different about how this poem happened. On one of my Fridays devoted to writing, I was suddenly hijacked by Eurydice's point of view, her voice, her demand that I speak for her. She was shrill. She was insistent. She gave me no choice but to work on the poem till I had gotten it how she wanted it. She feels she has been much neglected and misunderstood, and she let me know a poem was not enough. It was just the beginning. She wants prose. She wants essays. She wants public presentations. She wants me to tell her version of the story.     

Memoirs of a Mentor: Using Creativity for Counselors in Coping With the Loss of a Mentor

This article was inspired by my (S.S.) own personal loss. My mentor passed away during spring break of my 2nd year postgraduate school after a short battle with systemic lupus. I remember the deep sadness that I felt when it became apparent that she was coming home from the hospital for the last time. No words can describe the emotions; she had helped me through the toughest times in my academic life. How would I ever get the type of mentorship she provided again? She was there when I almost quit as a young student, back when my anger still got the best of me. She talked me down from the edge so many times; I never expected to be on this journey without her.

I dedicate this article to her and mentors like her. Equally, I dedicate this article to mentees who have lost their mentors. I offer my story (in italicized font) in the hopes that it will help others who are dealing with a similar loss. In this article, we attempt to illuminate the true power of mentorship, honor the significance of the relationship between mentor and mentee, and provide a tool useful to anyone who has lost their guide. I share my story in gratitude for my own mentor; I am so thankful that she was a part of my journey and that I can pass on to others the patience she had with me.     

Testimonial Injustice and a Case for Mindful Epistemology

In her 2007 book Epistemic Injustice Miranda Fricker identifies testimonial injustice as a case where a hearer assigns lower credibility to a speaker due to “identity prejudice.” Fricker considers testimonial injustice as a form of epistemic injustice since it wrongs the speaker “in her capacity as a knower.” Fricker recommends developing the virtue of “testimonial justice” to address testimonial injustice. She takes this virtue to involve training in a “distinctly reflexive critical social awareness.” The main goal of this article is to argue that Fricker's proposed training falls short of the target and that a cultivation of the capacity of being present—the ability to be mindful—would be necessary to develop the critical social awareness that Fricker requires. I want to explore the impact of compassion and open-mindedness—virtues cultivated in mindfulness training—on testimonial justice specifically and virtue epistemology generally. In attempting to develop an epistemic account informed by mindfulness—a mindful epistemology—my primary goal is to bring Buddhist insights on how to anchor the mind by training it to be fully present and attentive into the focus of mainstream Western philosophy. More specifically, I argue that doing so allows us to appreciate the crucial role that a prediscursive level of cultivation plays in the development of testimonial justice.     

Psyche and Cinema: “Go Ask Alice (or Neo); I Think They'll Know”

The Walt Disney version of Alice in Wonderland is a musical animation beginning in a semi-pastoral setting with butterflies, birds, and daisies. Alice is bored with the textual reading of classical history being given by her uptight Victorian sister. Instead, she wants images, pictures in a book. She sees image as world. “In my world, books will have nothing but pictures,” she declares. This thought takes her further into her imagination and the deconstructive realm it creates. “Everything will be what it isn't and not be what it is.” Finally, she looks into a pond and the reflection of a white rabbit dressed in a frock coat passes by. The mirror of the water surface has released an image of the “other,” an animal, difficult to catch and associated with luck, fertility, and the underground. Alice follows the rabbit into a hole and takes a fall, a radical descent into the underworld. She speculates about descending through the earth to the other side and walking around upside down. She finally lands in front of a door with a punning knob that takes three linguistic “turns.” For Alice, it is impassible but not impossible. Stuck and distraught, she finally gets caught up in the flow of her tears, and rides through the door on her stream of consciousness.     

Dignity in Context,and Out: Discussion of Lynne Jacobs’ “On Dignity,a Sense of Dignity,and Inspirational Shame”

ABSTRACT

Dr. Lynne Jacobs’ “On Dignity, a Sense of Dignity, and Inspirational Shame” is an interdisciplinary integration of a priori ethics and a phenomenology of dignity. She contends that the human person’s engagement with other people—writ large in the therapeutic encounter—is inherently ethically situated. Moreover, she avers an inherent content to this ethics, namely, mutual respect for distinctively human value—dignity—between and among people. Her ethics of dignity informs her psychoanalytic exploration of experiences of dignity, indignity, and her notion of inspirational shame, among others. I join in Jacobs’ advocacy for therapeutic facilitation of a person’s sense of inherent worth, as well as her opposition to relational contexts of devaluation and degradation. However, the primordiality Jacobs grants to her ethics of dignity often obscures the constitutively cultural, familial, and personal contextuality of, first, her—and in my view, any—ethical conviction; second, what she describes as the experience of being human; third, the alleged indignity of human vulnerability; and finally, the claim that shame is the natural reaction to one’s failure to live up to personal ideals. In the end, and subject to certain clinical concerns, Jacobs’ article integrates into psychoanalysis primordial ethical duties that she and others claim inhere in us as human beings.     

A physically handicapped teenager is helped to own her body

In this paper I am presenting my work with a 15-year-old girl, Nina, who was born premature with congenital feet deformities. Her twin had died at birth, and Nina spent eight weeks in a Special Care Baby unit. She had also suffered from bronchial asthma, which was under control during the months she was in therapy with me.

An attempt to overdose, and a letter she had written to a teacher, brought Nina to our services and to individual psychotherapy. The weekly sessions gave Nina the opportunity to elaborate her mourning for the dead twin and to face her physical problems more realistically. She had coped with these by idealising a beautiful body and giving it, in her phantasy, to her dead sister for whose death she felt responsible. Her identification with characters from horror stories, of which she was an avid reader, was a key to understanding how she felt trapped in her deformed body, to which she would refer in the phrase ‘It doesn't bother me.’ The working through of her feelings of guilt, anger, and envy enabled her to lessen the split and to own her body.     

A Single Intervention: A Visit to the Family

The following letter is reported unchanged except for disguised names. Concern with repairing disrupted relationships of adult members of a family with their own parents has been a matter of growing interest to a number of family therapists; Bowen (1), Boszormenyi-Nagy (2), and Framo (3), among others have stressed the importance of sending family members back to their families of origin. This report makes no effort to formulate the process in any particular theoretical framework (i.e., as reestablishing connectedness after an “emotional cut-off” or rebalancing a ledger of fairness, or whatever) but is intended only to illustrate the kind of outcome one may hope for in prescribing such a maneuver. It is offered simply as a clinical note. The letter needs little prefatory explication. Mr. Jack Newburgher had been a patient in psychoanalytic treatment for four years, with a quite successful outcome. On two occasions in the course of his therapy a joint session had been held with Mr. Newburgher and his wife, Muriel, when changes in his behavior had precipitated crises in the marital relationship. His therapy had terminated about two years before the visit referred to in the letter. Mr. Newburgher had called and asked for a joint consultation with Muriel about an acute family problem they were experiencing. Some — not all — of the background material was described, not nearly as coherently as it is reported in Muriel's letter, but in sufficient detail to make it plain that she was in distress about having to withdraw completely from her parents and that their family was in disarray as a consequence of her distress. The acuteness of the emotional disturbance, against a background of a lifelong adversary relationship between Muriel and her father and a history of ten years of illness on her fathers' part, suggested that the distress was the product of Muriel's anxiety and guilt over a decision to cut herself off completely from her parents. As a consequence, Muriel was urged to visit her family of origin, with the caveat that she might indeed discover them to be malignantly self-centered people indifferent to their effect on her and her family, but that she would at least have the gratification of having tried. The reference to “speaking French” was to the therapist having suggested that, on the other hand, she might find that her parents expressed their feelings in a different modality from her definitions of how feelings should be expressed, much as though their native tongue were French and she were insisting that they must speak to her in English.     

Mentally ill or mentally handicapped? A longitudinal study of severe learning disorder

SUMMARY

In the course of some eighteen months of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, a young woman of twenty-seven once deemed braindamaged at the age of seven years, has shown herself capable of sustaining once weekly psychotherapy. Against all expectations she has taken responsibility for her own attendance, travelling by public transport alone to her sessions. She has also taken initiatives in relation to finding work for herself.

Psychotherapy has disclosed a significant component of autism in the personality which is resorted to regularly and which seems to drag the patient into a passive acceptance of half-life which she tries not to mind. In the course of her sessions the patient has come to take more notice of her predicament and to mind more about the dissatisfactions which she experiences.

The case presented here is considered to have the characteristics of a particular group of adolescents. These are often described as “just slow” and are brought for psychiatric or psychological attention by desperate parents urgently concerned about the working future of their children.

These are individuals of whom the original definition of mental handicap contained in the Mental Health Act 1913 “a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind” would seem to offer as honest, appropriate and meaningful an assessment as the formal I.Q. score introduced in 1959. Unlike the latter, it is an assessment based on a concept of mental development. Assessment by I.Q. score has led to emphasis on training to compensate for the supposed loss of functioning and also to notions like “training for development” and “education from birth”.

In the case described here it was the abandonment of training aims and approaches which produced a dramatic improvement in the well-being of the patient and her family. Treatment is now fostering the potential in this woman to bring her own mind into action and to support in her, her own wish for personal development.     

Abracadabra Tongue: Poetry Magic

The author has known that poetry is magic since she was a child. However when she sat down to write about it she went blank, confronted by the taboo against magic in our rationalistic culture. In the way of Jungian magic she is helped by dream figures. The Muslim Solomon takes her on a flying carpet journey which reveals the magic of poetic influence: how Hafiz influenced Goethe influenced Lorca influenced her, which is how Persian mysticism found its way into her poetry. She tells the story of her development as a poet, how she learned fermentation magic—the difficult and often painful process required by poetic vision and revision in which grapes must be crushed, favorite phrases and metaphors must be ruthlessly smashed. The Queen of Sheba, another dream figure, shows up to tell her version of the story of her relationship with Solomon. She reveals the dark, fierce, and lusty lineage of her “old black magic” and how it has made its way into the author's poetry.     

Countertransference revisited

A female patient of mine recounts her week. I listen with interest, waiting for her to arrive at particular conclusions. She has suffered a great deal and still does, but prefers not to dwell on it. My interest turns into patience as she continues to talk but circumvents her discontent. She is adroit at avoidance, but easily offended when I point such things out. "I'd better wait" I think. I grow more aware that I must encourage her digressions. I feel frustrated. Getting further and further away, she skirts the issue with supple grace, then strays off into tangentiality. I forget her point and lose my focus, then get down on myself. The opportunity is soon gone. I glance at the clock as her monologue drones on into banality. I grow more uninterested and distant. There is a subtle irritation to her voice; a whiney indecisive ring begins to pervade my consciousness. I home in on her mouth with aversion, watching apprehensively as this disgusting hole flaps tirelessly but says nothing. It looks carnivorous, voracious. Now she is unattractive, something I have noticed before. I forget who my next patient is. I think about the meal I will prepare for my wife this evening, then glance at the time once more. Then I am struck: Why am I looking at the clock? So soon? The session has just begun. I catch myself. What is going on in me, between us? I am detached, but why? Is she too feeling unattuned, disconnected? I am failing my patient. What is her experience of me? I lamentingly confess that I do not feel I have been listening to her, and wonder what has gone wrong between us. I ask her if she has noticed. We talk about our feelings, our impact on one another, why we had lost our sense of connection, what it means to us. I instantly feel more involved, rejuvenated, and she continues, this time with me present. Her mouth is no longer odious, but sincere and articulate. She is attractive and tender; I suddenly feel empathy and warmth toward her. We are now very close. I am moved. Time flies, the session is soon over; we do not want it to end.     

Science and Morality: Mind the Gap, Use Happiness as a Safe Bridge!

In 2002 Sissela Bok re-published her book “Common Values”, first published in 1995, about her search for a minimal set of values to be respected all over the world. In her view such a set of values is needed to facilitate international communication and cooperation. Values already recognized in every society can be included as a starting point. In her book “Exploring happiness”, published in 2010, she explains why she finds happiness unfit to be included. She observes that there are discordant claims about what happiness is. Any particular vision can lead to practical choices that either adhere or violate the values she prefers. In my view subjective happiness should be included, because there are no discordant claims about the meaning of subjective happiness, and subjective happiness is simultaneously attractive as a moral value and as an object of scientific research. Subjective happiness can function as a bridge between science and morality. The only discordant claims are about ‘objective’ happiness, as a wider interpretation of well-being in the context of some specific morality or ideology.     

A Procedural,Contextual, Action-Focused Understanding: Response to Renn and Westerman

In this reply to comments by Paul Renn and Michael Westerman, I discuss the nature of relational discourse and the various meanings of multiplicity in the relational literature. In further discussing Mitchell’s (2000) case of Connie, cited also by Renn, I highlight the ways in which Mitchell understood that Connie’s sadness was perpetuated by the ways she communicated her feelings and needs in the present. I discuss Westerman’s participatory perspective in relation to Schafer’s action language, Shapiro’s emphasis on action and responsibility, and Dollard and Miller’s conceptualizations of repression as the active behavior of not-thinking certain thoughts. I examine as well Westerman’s distinction between “self and context” and “self-in-context” formulations in relation both to the cyclical psychodynamic point of view and his own case example.     

The Question of a Jungian Community

The author describes her relationship with the reality of Parkinson's disease—how she twists and turns and pivots and falls with this rapacious intrusion, and how a new, hitherto unknown space opens between Parkinson's and herself. This new space claims its own dynamic, objective reality. In attempts to consciously access the reality of this third space, the author faces paradox, “plays” with metaphor, and tries to recognize the right “reality.” She considers Freud's reality and pleasure principles, Winnicott's iconoclastic declaration of “health being the ability to play with psychosis,” and Jung's transcendent function. She also calls on Hermes with his wings to fly through otherwise impenetrable borders. As an incantation, an evocation or a pathway, she implores Hermes to breathe in flight. In the midst of this inner work, the dragonfly literally appears, emanating transformation.     

Final Insults & Other Family Matters

We didn't want to put her in a nursing home. Until the last minute, and even after that, we believed it could be otherwise. I'd plan to fly Mom down to stay with me. I painted the guest room and made lace curtains. My sister mentally arranged and rearranged the furniture in her apartment, converting the livingroorn into a bedroom for Mom. But in the end, our mother's dying overwhelmed us. She was so difficult, so unhappy to be dying, and not about to impart: words of wisdom and comfort from her deathbed. The medication, Dilaudid, made her very dark, like she used to get on alcohol. Mean things bubbled out of her mouth. When I came to take her home after her second stay in the hospital, she frowned at me and said, “You're not even the person I want to see.” I found it hard to believe it was just the drugs speaking.     

A Book to Think With: Margaret Miles’ Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter

Margaret Miles’ work with Augustine’s Confessions offers a model for a “philosophical life,” a term used in an earlier century for a life focused on seeking wisdom. As Miles reviews her life, she traces how she has come to see in all the particularity of her experience “what really exists.” She shares many scenes from her life, but most striking is her frank exploration of sexual experience in its complexities as a doorway to the kind of knowing that leads us to gratitude. She found Plotinus’ understanding of what really exists as the “surround-love of the All” most useful. This review describes how her autobiography permits fresh thinking and talking about God among those of us with a modern worldview.     

Dreaming of spiders: Abuse,economics, and theological insecurity in pastoral counseling

... This hope in no hope is clearly demonstrated in the following dream of a young adult woman who had been severely hurt emotionally in her relationships in her family of origin and again in her failing marriage. In this dream, which was presented in a group and dealt with mainly by my co-therapist, the woman placed herself in a glass room like a shower, with the handle to the room's only door on the outside. There was a crack in the glass of one of the room's corners, and through this crack came some spiders. She was lying on the floor and the spiders began to crawl over her. Though she screamed for help, no one would come to open the door. As one approach (among many) to the interpretation of this dream my colleague utilized the manipulation of the dream symbols to ask her to imagine that the spiders had changed into kittens. She resisted this suggestion intensely, saying that she could not allow such an imaginary change. Besides, the spiders weren't too bad to endure, for if she changed the spiders into kittens and the kittens turned out to be evil, then she would be at her rope's end. She preferred to live with her perspective that the world is hostile rather than risk the possibility of another hope being shattered. (Jordan, 1986, pp. 98–99)     

In the Midst of Multiplicity: How to Stay in the Saddle

The author asks the question, how is the human psyche impacted by the current rapid cultural change, globalization, etc., that is presently occurring in our world. She describes the relationship between the horse and the rider as an amplification of the relationship between the psyche and the ego in coping with change. How does one build a good relationship? In times of confusion and rapid change, the horse will likely panic and throw the rider if there is a poor relationship between them. She describes some of the clients in therapeutic riding centers, particularly the more vulnerable teenage clients, as being “unhorsed”—disconnected from their positive instincts—and how this form of therapy is particularly helpful because it reconnects them with their “inner horse.” She describes how she learned to develop a bonded relationship with her own horse and how that kind of relationship can operate within a context of the cutting horse competition.     

Briggs on antirealist accounts of scientific law

Rachel Briggs’ critique of “antirealist” accounts of scientific law— including my own perspectivalist best-system account—is part of a project meant to show that Humean conceptions of scientific law are more problematic than has been commonly realized. Indeed, her argument provides a new challenge to the Humean, a thoroughly epistemic version of David Lewis’ “big, bad bug” for Humeanism. Still, I will argue, the antirealist (perspectivalist and expressivist) accounts she criticizes have the resources to withstand the challenge and come out stronger for it. Attention to epistemic possibilities, I argue, shows a number of advantages to a perspectivalist account of scientific law.     

Reply to Janine de Peyer’s “Traversing the Ineffable: Commentary on Sharon Farber’s ‘Becoming a Telepathic Tuning Fork’”

Janine de Peyer’s thoughtful and stimulating response to my paper evoked a good deal of thinking about playfulness and creativity in doing psychotherapy, what part intuition and empathy play in promoting telepathic communication, the distinction between thoughts and feelings unconsciously transmitted between people within close proximity and those transmitted across geographical distance, where there is no reliance on sensory clues involving sight, sound, smell, touch, and taste. De Peyer’s summary of research on telepathy tells us that most of the research tries to rule out the variable of unconscious sensory exchange by physically separating the “sender” from the “receiver.”

In her discussion of my paper, Janine de Peyer raises some very interesting questions about how telepathy is to be defined. I recall reading years ago about someone who had gone to a medium and heard some startling information about herself and those in her circle. As I wondered how the medium could know so much about someone she had never before met, it occurred to me that there was a lot of knowledge about a person conveyed by the brain-to-brain sensory cues, and this was not telepathic but more a function of intuition and empathy. I think that was true about the relationship I had with my patient. but as with the medium there was a lot of other information I received about her that did not depend on sensory cues, and that information was, I believe, conveyed telepathically. So yes, I say, to de Peyer’s (this issue) question, “Is it not worth differentiating between in-session heightened intuitive receptiveness, and unexplainable transmissions of affect/thoughts/information that traverse time and geographical space?” (p. 736, italics in the original). In considering the time spent in my patient’s physical presence, much of my empathic attunement originated from the intuitive response that was induced in me by her physical presence. I think the increasing empathic attunement laid the foundation for subsequent telepathic communication.