Bocheński on divine providence and human freedom

Prior to his ‘naturalistic turn’, Bocheński was a Thomist and defended the Thomist doctrine as a logically consistent and attractive philosophical system. Some opponents of Thomism interpreted this doctrine, Aquinas’s conception of divine providence included, as a kind of theological fatalism (or theological determinism) incompatible with human freedom. Bocheński dismissed such interpretations as based on “a superficial misunderstanding.” I will try to demonstrate that his criticism of deterministic interpretations of Thomism was not quite justified. The article will present, first, Bocheński’s account of the Thomist doctrine of divine providence, next, the arguments for theological fatalism leading to the conclusion that there is no freedom if Aquinas’s conception of divine nature is assumed. Finally, I will try to show how the dispute between Thomism and its opponents is rooted in some fundamental differences concerning the very concept of human freedom.     

Soft facts and ontological dependence

In the literature on free will, fatalism, and determinism, a distinction is commonly made between temporally intrinsic (‘hard’) and temporally relational (‘soft’) facts at times; determinism, for instance, is the thesis that the temporally intrinsic state of the world at some given past time, together with the laws, entails a unique future (relative to that time). Further, it is commonly supposed by incompatibilists that only the ‘hard facts’ about the past are fixed and beyond our control, whereas the ‘soft facts’ about the past needn’t be. A substantial literature arose in connection with this distinction, though no consensus emerged as to the proper way to analyze it. It is time, I believe, to revisit these issues. The central claim of this paper is that the attempts to analyze the hard/soft fact distinction got off on fundamentally the wrong track. The crucial feature of soft facts is that they (in some sense) depend on the future. Following recent work on the notion of dependence, however, I argue that the literature on the soft/hard distinction has failed to capture the sense of dependence at stake. This is because such attempts have tried to capture softness in terms of purely modal notions like entailment and necessitation. As I hope to show, however, such notions cannot capture the sort of asymmetrical dependence relevant to soft facthood. Arguing for this claim is the first goal of this paper. My second goal is to gesture towards what an adequate account of soft facthood will really look like.     

Causation,randomness, and pseudo-randomness in John Venn's logic of chance

In 1866, the young John Venn published The Logic of Chance, motivated largely by the desire to correct what he saw as deep fallacies in the reasoning of historical determinists such as Henry Buckle and in the optimistic heralding of a true social science by Adolphe Quetelet. Venn accepted the inevitable determinism implied by the physical sciences, but denied that the stable social statistics cited by Buckle and Quetelet implied a similar determinism in human actions. Venn maintained that probability statements were intelligible solely as projections of the ultimate frequency of an outcome in an unlimited series of trials and therefore led to no inferences about free will. An issue here was Venn's claim that although the aggregate probability may be stable, the individual events were completely irregular and, in fact, displayed randomness. Venn's concept of randomness was really apparent, or pseudo-, randomness, which could be totally determined. Ironically, Venn's frequentist position was very useful to the growing field of statistics, which could develop correlations and predictive models empirically without having to address implications for personal freedom or fatalism.     

It is our destiny to die: The effects of mortality salience and culture‐priming on fatalism and karma belief

The current study explores whether Asians use culture‐specific belief systems to defend against their death anxiety. The effects of mortality salience (MS) and cultural priming on Taiwanese beliefs in fatalism and karma were investigated. Study 1 showed that people believe in fatalism and karma more following MS compared with the control condition. Study 2 found that the effect of MS on fatalism belief was stronger when Taiwanese were exposed to an Eastern cultural context than to a Western cultural context. However, a matched sample of Western participants did not show increased fatalism belief after either a West‐ or East‐prime task. The present research provides evidence that Asians may use some culture‐specific beliefs, particularly fatalism belief, to cope with their death awareness.     

Reductivism, Fatalism and Sociobiology

ABSTRACT When does ‘reduction’ in the harmless sense of relating one science to another involve a sinister devaluing of the valuable? Only when the ‘reductive’ explanation is (1) treated as excluding others, and (2) so chosen as to make a moral point by illicit means. (1) is never legitimate; different kinds of explanation all have their place and do not compete. It is made to look plausible by (2), which can occur in many situations, but is usually called reduction only when it involves the physical sciences. Two different dangers follow—reduction to the unknown entities of physics is chilling, but fortunately seems to have no particular moral consequences. Biological reductions often sound less remote; e.g. when sociobiologists talk of people as ‘survival machines’ for genes. The trouble here is not ‘biological determinism’ but fatalism, with apparent moral consequences, namely, the endorsement of universal competition. This idea is bad biology, compounded by illicit rhetoric. Biology itself cannot be a threat. The biological causes of human behaviour, including those found by sociobiologists in their calmer moments, are perfectly proper material for the social sciences.     

The Prevalence of Spirituality, Optimism, Depression, and Fatalism in a Bi-ethnic Stroke Population

To provide insight into the reduced post-stroke all-cause mortality among Mexican Americans, we explored ethnic differences in the pre-stroke prevalence of (1) spirituality, (2) optimism, (3) depression, and (4) fatalism in a Mexican American and non-Hispanic white stroke population. The Brain Attack Surveillance in Corpus Christi (BASIC) project is a population-based stroke surveillance study in Nueces County, Texas. Seven hundred ten stroke patients were queried. For fatalism, optimism, and depression scales, unadjusted ethnic comparisons were made using linear regression models. Regression models were also used to explore how age and gender modify the ethnic associations after adjustment for education. For the categorical spirituality variables, ethnic comparisons were made using Fisher's exact tests. Mexican Americans reported significantly more spirituality than non-Hispanic whites. Among women, age modified the ethnic associations with pre-stroke depression and fatalism but not optimism. Mexican American women had more optimism than non-Hispanic white women. With age, Mexican American women had less depression and fatalism, while non-Hispanic white women had more fatalism and similar depression. Among men, after adjustment for education and age, there was no ethnic association with fatalism, depression, and optimism. Spirituality requires further study as a potential mediator of increased survival following stroke among Mexican Americans. Among women, evaluation of the role of optimism, depression, and fatalism as they relate to ethnic differences in post-stroke mortality should be explored.     

The Obligation Dilemma

I motivate a dilemma to show that nothing can be obligatory for anyone regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism (the falsity of determinism) is true. The deterministic horn, to which prime attention is directed, exploits the thesis that obligation requires freedom to do otherwise. Since determinism precludes such freedom, it precludes obligation too. The indeterministic horn allows for freedom to do otherwise but assumes the burden of addressing whether indeterministically caused choices or actions are too much of a matter of luck to be obligatory for anyone. I critically discuss a response to the deterministic horn that invokes the distinction between alternatives compatible with determinism (weak alternatives) and those incompatible with determinism (strong alternatives).     

Cancer Fatalism—Spiritual Perspectives

Cancer fatalism is a deterrent to participation in cancer screening. Cancer fatalism represents a surrender of the human spirit to perceptions of hopelessness, powerlessness, worthlessness, and social despair. In contrast, spirituality enhances hope and coping abilities. This correlational pilot study investigated the relationship between cancer fatalism and spirituality among rural, elderly individuals. This knowledge may provide insight into ways to negate the influence of cancer fatalism. The majority of the sample were African-American and female. A prevailing sense of fatalism and spirituality existed. However, the relationship was not statistically significant. Philosophical implications and areas for future research are explored.     

Anvil or Onion? Determinism as a Layered Concept

Kellert (In the Wake of Chars, University of Chicago press, Chicago, 1993) has argued that Laplacean determinism in classical physics is actually a layered concept, where various properties or layers composing this form of determinism can be peeled away. Here, I argue that a layered conception of determinism is inappropriate and that we should think in terms of different deterministic models applicable to different kinds of systems. The upshot of this analysis is that the notion of state is more closely tied to the kind of system being investigated than is usually considered in discussions of determinism. So when investigating determinism corresponding changes to the appropriate notion of state – and, perhaps, the state space itself – also need to be considered.     

Fatalism as a barrier to cancer screening among African-Americans: Philosophical perspectives

Fatalism has been identified as a crucial barrier to participation in cancer screening among African Americans. The essence of fatalism is woven throughout the lived experience for some African Americans. Therefore, to fully understand its impact, fatalism must be viewed within its broadest historical and sociocultural context. This article explores the philosophical origins and the practical significance of fatalism with regard to cancer screening among this population. Health care professionals must position themselves to promptly identify fatalistic persons. Interventions to successfully negate the influence of fatalism are needed.     

“Big Momma Had Sugar,Imma Have It Too” Medical Fatalism and the Language of Faith Among African–American Women in Memphis

This essay offers a theological exploration of the relationship between medical fatalism and religious belonging among African–American women in Memphis. Drawing on the work of black and womanist theologians and on conversations with participants in a diabetes intervention program administered by a faith-based community health provider, I argue that how we narrate the meanings of our bodies is irreducibly religious. The language we use to interpret and communicate the meaning of our bodily existence emerges from a set of assumptions, often unarticulated, about what is of ultimate value to us. The essay focuses on three interlocking features that link faith with fatalism or hope: (1) The idea that if “I don’t claim that” disease cannot enter my body; (2) the role of faith-based clinics in re-establishing trust with marginalized communities; and (3) how nuanced attention to the social location of health seekers can re-frame our understanding of patient compliance. Disrupting fatalism can only be done from within a health seeker’s own narrative, and therefore, healthcare providers who learn these narratives and respect their holiness will develop more effective interventions.     

The twofold face of fatalism: collectivist fatalism and individualist fatalism

Fatalism has been a central framework for understanding the psychological processes in cultures with pronounced collectivism that are economically poorly developed. In this context, fatalism emerges as cognitive schema defined by passive and submissive acceptance of an irremediable destiny, governed by some natural force or the will of some God. This image has now lost such a clear profile. But currently, fatalism also accompanies the life of people from individualist cultures, who live in a highly developed, or even opulent, economic context. In this case, fatalism is like some mood of uncertainty, insecurity, and helplessness following the events that characterize the society of global risk. In this paper, we propose a theory to develop the two faces of fatalism.     

Twenty‐First‐Century Counseling Theory Development in Relation to Definitions of Free Will and Determinism

This article is a continuation of Wilks's ( 2003 ) review of the development of counseling theory in relation to definitions of free will and determinism. The original review showed that theoretical synthesis was in part achieved when causal events inherent in absolute determinism were incorporated into a soft self‐determinist process. This review traces three 21st‐century challenges to self‐determinism and provides evidence supporting the inclusion of both self‐determinism and indeterminate free will in a single but asymmetrical causal model.     

Branching and (In)determinism

Abstract

It might seem, and it has been argued, that if time is linear the threat of determinism is more severe than if time is branching, since in the latter case the future is open in a way it is not in the former one where, so to speak, there exists only one branch—one future. In this paper, I want to resist this claim. I shall first concentrate on what ‘branching’ is or could be, and I shall discuss various versions and interpretations of this view. I shall then (more quickly) turn my attention to what determinism is or could be, and I will distinguish three (well-known) kinds of it—focusing mainly on ‘metaphysical determinism’. I will then ask (and answer) the question whether branching time helps with avoiding determinism or not. As we shall see, it is incorrect to think that under the branching hypothesis the threat of determinism is any smaller.     

Freedom and Determinism: The Importance of Method

The question of the relation between freedom and determinism elicits contrasting intuitions. It is clear to incompatibilists that freedom requires the falsity of determinism. And it is clear to compatibilists that freedom is compatible with (certain) forms of determinism. Compatibilists and incompatibilists differ not only with respect to the content of their accounts, but also with respect to their “method”. Whereas, compatibilists could be represented as (typically) elucidating our ordinary notion of freedom, incompatibilists could be represented as (typically) offering a revision of that notion. I argue that if we get the methodological point right, we can be free and determined.     

Sunday School Student and Theological Fatalism

I will briefly argue that theological fatalism is not a genuine ‘theological’ problem, for it can be reduced to another alleged incompatibility that arises independently of the existence or non-existence of God. I will conclude that the way of arguing against the existence of God or His omniscience by appealing to theological fatalism is blocked for libertarian atheists.     

Testing Kohn's self-reliance hypothesis among high school adolescents

Melvin Kohn and his associates have established that self-reliance promotes a sense of well-being (lower levels of fatalism) among adults. The present study attempts to test this proposition among adolescents. Instead of the usual job-related activities, however, it incorporates an alternative measure of self-reliance--high school curriculum assignment. Consistent with previous findings among adults, the results of this study show that self-reliance among adolescents also promotes a sense of well-being: students enrolled in tracks where close supervision is kept to a minimum and the exercise of initiative is emphasized tended to exhibit lower levels of fatalism. The implications of this finding for adolescents are discussed.     

Understanding academic attitudes and achievement in mexican-origin youths: ethnic identity, other-group orientation, and fatalism

This study tested the relationships among ethnic identity, other-group orientation, fatalism, and 2 dependent variables: attitude toward education and school, and grade point average (GPA). Mexican-origin adolescents (N = 222) completed the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (J. S. Phinney, 1992), the fatalism scale of the Multiphasic Assessment of Cultural Constructs-Short Form (I. Cuellar, B. Arnold, & G. Gonzalez, 1995), and the attitude scale of the Learning and Study Strategies Inventory-High School (C. E. Weinstein & D. R. Palmer, 1990a). Other-group orientation was positively related to attitude and GPA, and a negative relationship between fatalism and attitude was demonstrated. No relationship emerged between ethnic identity and the dependent variables.     

On Separating Predictability and Determinism

There has been a long-standing debate about the relationshipof predictability and determinism. Some have maintained that determinism impliespredictability while others have maintained that predictability implies determinism. Manyhave maintained that there are no implication relations between determinism andpredictability. This summary is, of course, somewhat oversimplified and quick at least in thesense that there are various notions of determinism and predictability at work in thephilosophical literature. In this essay I will focus on what I take to be the Laplacean visionfor determinism and predictability. While many forms of predictability areinconsistent with this vision, I argue that a suitably restricted notion of predictability,consistent with the practice of physicists, is implied by the Laplacean notion of determinism.It is argued that limitations on predictability are of an in principle nature in the Appendix.     

Betting Against Hard Determinism

The perennial fear associated with the free will problem is the prospect of hard determinism being true. Unlike prevalent attempts to reject hard determinism by defending compatibilist analyses of freedom and responsibility, this article outlines a pragmatic argument to the effect that we are justified in betting that determinism is false even though we may retain the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. The basic argument is that as long as we accept that libertarian free will is worth wanting, there is a defensible rationale, given the uncertainty which remains as to whether determinism is true or false, to refrain from acting on hard determinism, and thus to bet that libertarian free will exists. The article closes by discussing two potentially decisive objections to this pragmatic argument.