The persuasiveness puzzle about bootstrapping

This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method of settling questions about the reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method for coming to believe that the source is reliable. However, when being initially unaware of a source and its reliability, as in the case of forming beliefs about our sense apparatus, bootstrapping can be eventually persuasive.     

The Influence of Paratext on Narrative Persuasion: Fact,Fiction, or Fake?

The present research examined the role of personality factors and paratextual information about the reliability of a story on its persuasiveness. Study 1 (N = 135) was focused on recipients' explicit expectations about the trustworthiness/usefulness and the immersiveness/entertainment value of stories introduced as nonfiction, fiction, or fake. Study 2 (experimental, N = 186) demonstrated that a story was persuasive in all three paratext conditions (nonfiction, fiction, or fake versus belief‐unrelated control story) and that its influence increased with the recipients' need for affect. Participants' need for cognition increased the difference in persuasiveness of a nonfictional versus a fake story. Additional mediation analyses suggest that fiction is more persuasive than fake because readers of fiction get more deeply transported into the story world.     

Source Personality and Persuasiveness: Big Five Predispositions to Being Persuasive and the Role of Message Involvement

In the present studies we incorporate a Person × Situation perspective into the study of the persuasion source. Specifically, we aimed to identify the personality characteristics of the persuasive individual and test the moderating role of target and source involvement. In three studies we found support for hypothesized relationships between source persuasiveness and Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience, and evidence for a moderating effect of involvement. In a preliminary study (N = 66, M_age = 22.7, 64% female), we demonstrated expected differences in the personality ratings assigned to a hypothetical persuasive versus nonpersuasive individual. In Study 1 (N = 95, M_age = 24.1, 62% female), through sets of two‐person debates, we showed that source Extraversion and Openness to Experience were positively, and Neuroticism negatively, associated with source persuasiveness. In Study 2 (N = 148, M_age = 24.3, 61% female), we manipulated the level of involvement and mostly replicated the results from Study 1, but, corresponding with our predictions, only when involvement was low. Our findings demonstrate the relevance of an interactionist approach to the study of persuasion, highlighting the role of personality in the study of the persuasion source.     

Is the Medium the Message? A Study of the Effects of Media,Communicator, and Message Characteristics on Attitude Change1

The present study examined the interactive effects of type of media, communicator, and position of message on persuasiveness of the communication. Subjects received a communication over television, radio (audio tape), or written medium, which either agreed with a position they held or strongly disagreed with it. The communicator was either a newscaster or a candidate for political office. The results indicated that subjects felt the newscaster to be more trustworthy than the candidate. In line with previous research, there was no main effect of media on persuasiveness. However, media interacted with the other variables so that when the communication disagreed with the audience, television was the most persuasive medium with the newscaster but the least persuasive with the untrusted candidate. There was no effect for media when the message agreed with the audience. Further, the candidate taking a position congruent with the audience's was rated as more attractive but less trustworthy than a candidate taking the opposite position. It was suggested that television may be the most involving medium and that either a counterargument theory or reactance theory could explain why it was not effective with the candidate.     

An affirmed self and an open mind: Self-affirmation and sensitivity to argument strength

Self-affirmation seems to enable an individual to objectively evaluate information that would otherwise evoke a defensive reaction. If this objectivity reflects freedom from self-evaluative concerns, affirmation should sensitize people to central cues of a persuasive message, like argument strength. If affirmation simply induces agreeableness or trivializes the issue, affirmed participants should not particularly heed argument strength. Affirmed and non-affirmed participants rated the persuasiveness of pro- and counterattitudinal arguments that varied in strength. Among participants who rated their attitudes as personally important, self-affirmation decreased bias and increased sensitivity to argument strength, as predicted by self-affirmation theory.     

Regulatory fit and persuasion: transfer from "Feeling Right."

The authors propose that when a message recipient "feels right" from regulatory fit (E. T. Higgins, 2000), this subjective experience transfers to the persuasion context and serves as information for relevant evaluations, including perceived message persuasiveness and opinions of the topic. Fit was induced either by strategic framing of message arguments in a way that fit/did not fit with the recipient's regulatory state or by a source unrelated to the message itself. Across 4 studies, regulatory fit enhanced perceived persuasiveness and opinion ratings. These effects were eliminated when the correct source of feeling right was made salient before message exposure, supporting the misattribution account. These effects reversed when message-related thoughts were negative, supporting the claim that fit provides information about the "rightness" of one's (positive or negative) evaluations.     

Social Distance,Framing, and Judgment: A Construal Level Perspective

Drawing upon construal level theory, this research investigates the influence of social distance on individuals’ responses to persuasive messages. Experiment 1 (N= 133) demonstrates that the persuasive impact of a gain frame becomes stronger when people make judgments for socially distant (e.g., others) versus proximal entities (e.g., selves). On the other hand, the persuasive impact of a loss frame remains the same across different levels of social distance. Experiment 2 (N= 135) shows that the persuasiveness of a societal frame becomes stronger when people make judgments for socially distant versus proximal entities, whereas the persuasiveness of an individual frame is unaffected by social distance. Experiment 3 (N= 80) provides evidence that mental salience of positive and societal outcomes of an action increases as social distance increases, whereas mental salience of negative and individual outcomes remains the same across different levels of social distance.     

Modes of Thinking and Classroom Adjustments

Abstract

A shift in preference of issues used in resolving moral dilemmas was considered to be a specific instance of the choice shift phenomenon. The present study tested a hypothesis formulated from persuasive arguments theory—that shifts in preference for the use of issues in resolving a moral dilemma would be influenced by the persuasiveness of arguments made available between ratings. To test this hypothesis, two conditions were devised: The first allowed 20 undergraduates to consider available arguments before the first of two preference ratings, and the second prevented 20 other undergraduates from giving initial, careful consideration. As predicted, persuasiveness of intervening arguments was found to correlate with the direction and degree of shift in the second condition but not the first.     

The Argumentative Structure of Persuasive Definitions

In this paper we present an analysis of persuasive definition based on argumentation schemes. Using the medieval notion of differentia and the traditional approach to topics, we explain the persuasiveness of emotive terms in persuasive definitions by applying the argumentation schemes for argument from classification and argument from values. Persuasive definitions, we hold, are persuasive because their goal is to modify the emotive meaning denotation of a persuasive term in a way that contains an implicit argument from values. However, our theory is different from Stevenson’s, a positivistic view that sees emotive meaning as subjective, and defines it as a behavioral effect. Our proposal is to treat the persuasiveness produced by the use of emotive words and persuasive definitions as due to implicit arguments that an interlocutor may not be aware of. We use congruence theory to provide the linguistic framework for connecting a term with the function it is supposed to play in a text. Our account allows us to distinguish between conflicts of values and conflicts of classifications.

Confidence via correction: The effect of judgment correction on consumer confidence

At times, consumers are motivated to reduce the influence of a product recommendation on their judgments. Based on previous research, it is unclear whether this correction process will increase or decrease consumers' confidence in their judgments. We find that source credibility moderates the effect of correction on confidence: correction decreases confidence when a product recommendation comes from a high credibility source but increases confidence when the same message comes from a low credibility source. As a result, correction increases the effectiveness of recommendations from low credibility sources on purchase intentions. Notably, this “confidence via correction” effect is further moderated by elaboration, such that the effect is attenuated for high elaboration consumers. Our results have implications for understanding consumers' reactions to persuasive messages and for both marketing practitioners and consumer protection agencies using correction cues to influence message persuasiveness.     

Comparing the Actual and Expected Persuasiveness of Evidence Types: How Good are Lay People at Selecting Persuasive Evidence?

Whereas there are many publications in which argumentation quality has been defined by argumentation theorists, considerably less research attention has been paid to lay people’s considerations regarding argument quality. Considerations about strong and weak argumentation are relevant because they can be compared with actual persuasive success. Argumentation theorists’ conceptions have to some extent been shown to be compatible with actual effectiveness, but for lay people such compatibility has yet to be determined. This study experimentally investigated lay people’s expectations about the persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence, and compared these expectations with the actual persuasiveness of these evidence types. Dutch and French participants (N = 174) ranked four types of evidence in terms of their expected persuasiveness for eight different claims. Both cultural groups expected statistical evidence to be the most persuasive type of evidence to other people, followed by expert, causal, and, finally, anecdotal evidence. A comparison of these rankings with the results of Hornikx and Hoeken (Communication Monographs 74, 443–463, 2007, Study 1) on the actual persuasiveness of the same evidence types reveals that people’s expectations are generally accurate: How relatively persuasive they expect evidence types to be often corresponded with their actual persuasiveness.

The effectiveness of humor in persuasion: the case of business ethics training

In this study, persuasion theory was used to develop the following predictions about use of humor in persuasive messages for business ethics training: (a) cartoon drawings will enhance persuasion by creating liking for the source, (b) ironic wisecracks will enhance persuasion by serving as a distraction from counterarguments, and (c) self-effacing humor will enhance persuasion by improving source credibility. Canadian business students (N = 148) participated in 1 of 4 versions of "The Ethics Challenge," a training exercise used by the Lockheed Martin Corporation. Three versions were modified by adding or removing cartoon drawings (of cartoon characters Dilbert and Dogbert) and humorous responses (Dogbert's wisecracks). Removing the cartoon drawings had little effect on persuasiveness. Removing ironic wisecracks had more effect, and interfering with the self-effacing combination of cartoons and wisecracks had the strongest effect. The results suggest that researchers should ground their predictions in existing theory and that practitioners should differentiate among humor types.     

Persuasiveness of Nationalistic Advertisements

A series of three experiments aimed to test persuasiveness of corporate image advertisements that appeal to nationalistic Australian symbols. In Experiment 1, 59 Psychology 1 students were shown two nationalistic advertisements and 32 students were shown two nonnationalistic advertisements from the same corporations. Only one nationalistic advertisement proved more persuasive than its non-nationalistic counterpart, and this effect was unrelated to the patriotism of subjects. In Experiment 2, the persuasive nationalistic advertisement from Experiment 1 proved more persuasive than its nonnationalistic counterpart but only for subjects that felt'Australian' ( n = 50), not for those who felt'Un-Australian' ( n = 50). To generalize beyond a single advertisement and beyond a college sample, Experiment 3 exposed a group low on Australian nationalism ( n = 32) and a group high on nationalism ( n = 32) to 15 advertisements varying in nationalistic content. "High nationalism" subjects judged highly nationalistic advertisements as most convincing in persuading them to'like the company and cosmopolitan advertisements as least convincing. The opposite was true for'low nationalism" subjects. Nationalistic corporate image advertisements are therefore only effective with highly nationalistic subjects.     

Anecdotal, Statistical, and Causal Evidence: Their Perceived and Actual Persuasiveness

Claims about the occurrence of future events play an important role in pragmatic argumentation. Such claims can be supported by inductive arguments employing anecdotal, statistical, or causal evidence. In an experiment, the actual and perceived persuasiveness of these three types of evidence were assessed. A total of 324 participants read a newspaper article in which it was claimed that the building of a cultural centre would be profitable. This claim was supported by either anecdotal, statistical or causal evidence. The statistical evidence proved to be more convincing than the anecdotal and causal evidence. Although the latter two evidence types were equally unconvincing, the anecdotal evidence was perceived as less persuasive than the causal evidence. Therefore, the actual and perceived persuasiveness of the evidence did not correspond. These results partly replicate the results obtained in previous experiments. They also underscore the need to distinguish between the perceived and the actual persuasiveness of an argument.     

The persuasive effects of framing messages on fruit and vegetable consumption according to regulatory focus theory

According to Regulatory Focus theory (RFT), outcomes in persuasive messages can be framed in four different ways, as gains, non-gains, losses or non-losses. In study 1, the persuasiveness of all four frames was compared and the presence/absence effect that was expected on the basis of the feature-positive effect was verified: Statements about present outcomes (gain, loss) were more persuasive than those about absent outcomes (non-gain, non-loss). However, this study failed to support the prediction that a gain-framed message would be more persuasive than a loss-framed message when promoting a prevention behaviour. Study 2 was designed to examine the latter finding. It was hypothesised that the threat posed by the loss-framed message in study 1 was too low to elicit a defensive reaction. Therefore, in study 2, the personal relevance of the gain and the loss framed message was manipulated. Consistent with predictions, the gain-framed message was more persuasive than the loss-framed message, but only when the message was personalised to increase self-relevance. Moreover, the effect was due to a significant drop in persuasion in the loss condition, probably caused by a defensive reaction. These data shed a new light on the findings of past framing studies.     

The effectiveness of personalized e-mail newsletters and the role of personal characteristics

Personalizing communication means creating persuasive messages that refer to aspects of a person's self. Although the use of personalization is increasing, research on its effectiveness is limited and the results are mixed. This study examined the persuasiveness of personalized e-mail newsletters in terms of increased attention, cognitive activity, evaluation, attitude, intention, and behavior by means of an experiment (n=109). Participants randomly received either a personalized or a generic newsletter advertising a sports center. Personalization triggered a more positive evaluation of the message; however, it did not influence the other effect variables. The effects were moderated by consumers' need for uniqueness, trust, and privacy concerns, suggesting that personalization is a good strategy to increase message evaluation only among individuals who have a high need for uniqueness.     

Patient preferences for physician persuasion strategies

This study investigated patient preferences for various types of physician persuasion strategies. Four types of persuasion strategies were utilized which involved combination of high and low levels of affectivity and information. In addition, patient variables, receiver apprehension and health beliefs were introduced to predict preference choices by patients. Results indicated that patients are influenced in their decision-making (preferences) by the type of persuasive strategy employed. Further, patients with different characteristics and predispositions prefer different persuasive strategies. The results of this study suggest that the success of physician persuasiveness is dependent upon the type of strategy used and the type of patient being persuaded.     

The persuasive effects of framing messages on fruit and vegetable consumption according to regulatory focus theory

According to Regulatory Focus theory (RFT), outcomes in persuasive messages can be framed in four different ways, as gains, non-gains, losses or non-losses. In study 1, the persuasiveness of all four frames was compared and the presence/absence effect that was expected on the basis of the feature-positive effect was verified: Statements about present outcomes (gain, loss) were more persuasive than those about absent outcomes (non-gain, non-loss). However, this study failed to support the prediction that a gain-framed message would be more persuasive than a loss-framed message when promoting a prevention behaviour. Study 2 was designed to examine the latter finding. It was hypothesised that the threat posed by the loss-framed message in study 1 was too low to elicit a defensive reaction. Therefore, in study 2, the personal relevance of the gain and the loss framed message was manipulated. Consistent with predictions, the gain-framed message was more persuasive than the loss-framed message, but only when the message was personalised to increase self-relevance. Moreover, the effect was due to a significant drop in persuasion in the loss condition, probably caused by a defensive reaction. These data shed a new light on the findings of past framing studies.     

Lies and bullshit: The negative effects of misinformation grow stronger over time

In a world where exposure to untrustworthy communicators is common, trust has become more important than ever for effective marketing. Nevertheless, we know very little about the long-term consequences of exposure to untrustworthy sources, such bullshitters. This research examines how untrustworthy sources—liars and bullshitters—influence consumer attitudes toward a product. Frankfurt's (1986) insidious bullshit hypothesis (i.e., bullshitting is evaluated less negatively than lying but bullshit can be more harmful than are lies) is examined within a traditional sleeper effect—a persuasive influence that increases, rather than decays over time. We obtained a sleeper effect after participants learned that the source of the message was either a liar or a bullshitter. However, compared to the liar source condition, the same message from a bullshitter resulted in more extreme immediate and delayed attitudes that were in line with an otherwise discounted persuasive message (i.e., an advertisement). Interestingly, attitudes returned to control condition levels when a bullshitter was the source of the message, suggesting that knowing an initially discounted message may be potentially accurate/inaccurate (as is true with bullshit, but not lies) does not result in the long-term discounting of that message. We discuss implications for marketing and other contexts of persuasion.     

目标设置对写作困难儿童议论文说服力的促进效应研究

将写作困难儿童随机分入三个不同的目标设置组,总目标设置条件要求儿童根据话题写议论文,目标为文章应能说服读者赞同他们的观点;分目标设置条件对儿童有同样的要求,但给儿童提供了以议论文的基本构成为基础的分目标;辩论加分目标设置除了与分目标设置组相同的条件外,还要求儿童在写作前进行辩论。研究结果表明,分目标设置组儿童的议论文比总目标设置组和辩论加分目标设置组儿童的议论文更具说服力度。在文章构成成分上,分目标设置组和辩论加分目标设置组要好于总目标设置组。这三种目标设置中,分目标对写作困难儿童的议论文说服力有很大的促进作用。