The basis of shared intentions in human and robot cognition

There is a fundamental difference between robots that are equipped with sensory, motor and cognitive capabilities, vs. simulations or non-embodied cognitive systems. Via their perceptual and motor capabilities, these robotic systems can interact with humans in an increasingly more “natural” way, physically interacting with shared objects in cooperative action settings. Indeed, such cognitive robotic systems provide a unique opportunity to developmental psychologists for implementing their theories and testing their hypotheses on systems that are becoming increasingly “at home” in the sensory--motor and social worlds, where such hypotheses are relevant. The current research is the result of interaction between research in computational neuroscience and robotics on the one hand, and developmental psychology on the other. One of the key findings in the developmental psychology context is that with respect to other primates, humans appear to have a unique ability and motivation to share goals and intentions with others. This ability is expressed in cooperative behavior very early in life, and appears to be the basis for subsequent development of social cognition. Here we attempt to identify a set of core functional elements of cooperative behavior and the corresponding shared intentional representations. We then begin to specify how these capabilities can be implemented in a robotic system, the Cooperator, and tested in human–robot interaction experiments. Based on the results of these experiments we discuss the mutual benefit for both fields of the interaction between robotics and developmental psychology.     

The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.     

The dynamic lift of developmental process

What are the essential properties of human intelligence, currently unparalleled in its power relative to other biological forms and relative to artificial forms of intelligence? We suggest that answering this question depends critically on understanding developmental process. This paper considers three principles potentially essential to building human‐like intelligence: the heterogeneity of the component processes, the embedding of development in a social world, and developmental processes that change the cognitive system as a function of the history of soft‐assemblies of these heterogeneous processes in specific tasks. The paper uses examples from human development and from developmental robotics to show how these processes also may underlie biological intelligence and enable us to generate more advanced forms of artificial intelligence.     

The Center for Lifespan Psychology at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development: Overview of conceptual agenda and illustration of research activities

Founded in 1981 by the late Paul B. Baltes, the Center for Lifespan Psychology at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development has helped to establish lifespan psychology as a distinct conceptual approach within developmental psychology. Recently, the Center has extended its research programme into developmental behavioural neuroscience. Here, we provide an overview of the Center's conceptual agenda, and present two of its seven research projects in greater detail. Work at the Center is guided by three propositions: (1) to study lifespan changes in behaviour as interactions among maturation, learning, and senescence; (2) to develop theories and methods that integrate empirical evidence across domains of functioning, timescales, as well as behavioural and neuronal levels of analysis; (3) to identify mechanisms of development by exploring age-graded differences in plasticity. The Intra-Person Dynamics Project studies the organization of cognitive abilities within individuals of different ages, and investigates lifespan age differences in the plasticity and components of episodic memory performance. The Sensorimotor–Cognitive Couplings Project examines lifespan differences in dynamic dependencies between sensorimotor and cognitive performance. Both projects combine behavioural assessments with methods from developmental neuroscience to delineate age-graded changes in brain–behaviour mappings. Current research in other projects includes: (1) behavioural development in very old age, as assessed in the Berlin Aging Study; (2) the interplay of motivation, affect, and cognition in developmental regulation; (3) behavioural and electrophysiological mechanisms of social interaction from infancy to adulthood; and (4) formal and statistical issues in structural equation modelling, with an emphasis on latent growth curve modelling. Graduate education and research at the Center profit greatly from cooperation with other institutions in Berlin and Potsdam as well as from national and international collaboration.     

Computational modeling/cognitive robotics complements functional modeling/experimental psychology

This position paper explores the possible contributions to the science of psychology from insights obtained by building and experimenting with cognitive robots. First, the functional modeling characteristic of experimental psychology is discussed. Second, the computational modeling required for cognitive robotics is described, and possible experiments with them are illustrated. Next, we argue that cognitive developmental robots, robots that “live” through a development phase where they learn about their environments in several different modes, can provide additional benefits to the science of psychology. Finally, the reciprocal interactions between computational modeling/cognitive robotics and functional modeling/experimental psychology are explored. We conclude that each can contribute significantly to the other.     

Direct perception in the intersubjective context

This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to “mindread” or “mentalize.” In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and the idea that we have a direct perceptual grasp of the other person’s intentions, feelings, etc. This paper explains precisely what the notion of direct perception means, offers evidence from developmental studies, and proposes a non-simulationist interpretation of the neuroscience of mirror systems.     

Concepts,Constructs, Cognitive Psychology,and Personal Construct Theory

In this article, I have addressed the efforts to locate and integrate personal construct psychology with other perspectives in psychology (Neimeyer, 1985). The general domain is cognitive psychology, but with a focus on the basic building block of the cognitive perspective, the concept. Personal construct psychology is particularly interesting in this regard at this time because Kelly (1955) was adamant that his construct encompassed more than concept. Now, 36 years after his deliberations, a discussion of concepts and constructs contributes to an ongoing theoretical debate in psychology that can only serve to better reinforce the discipline.     

ORGANISMIC PROCESSES FOR NEO-PIAGETIAN THEORIES: A DIALECTICAL CAUSAL ACCOUNT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

The paper criticizes some epistemological presuppositions of Piaget's and of neo-Piagetian's work, in particular, the psycho-Logical principle. This principle is contrasted with a more valid psycho-dialectical one. It is suggested that a dialectical-constructivist (i.e., causal-dynamic) perspective offers a causal theoretical framework for cognitive development that is superior to that of Piaget and many neo-Piagetians. I outline criteria for evaluating causal developmental theories, and point out deficiencies in Piaget's and neo-Piagetian's stage theories vis-à-vis the criteria. An organismic theory of constructive operators - a dialectical/causal theory - is introduced as a remedy for these deficiencies. I focus on a modular model of mental attention that is constituted by four dynamically interacting functional systems. These systems together explain the ‘beam’ of mental attention and its phenomenological/behavioural effects. I claim that the stages of cognitive development are caused by growth of mental attention. The validity of this model is supported by data on a motor performance task (Rho task). The Rho data show: (a) the existence of stage-wise plateaus in children's performance at ages congruent with the redefined Piagetian stages; (b) the psychological structures which, driven by mental attention (M-capacity), are responsible for performance on the task, appear to be located in the left hemisphere of the brain. These findings, predicted by the dialectical theory of mental attention, highlight its causal-predictive power.     

The role of beliefs in goal dynamics: prolegomena to a constructive theory of intentions

In this article we strive to provide a detailed and principled analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing—that is, the cognitive transition that leads from a mere desire to a proper intention. The resulting model of belief-based goal processing has also relevant consequences for the analysis of intentions, and constitutes the necessary core of a constructive theory of intentions, i.e. a framework that not only analyzes what an intention is, but also explains how it becomes what it is. We discuss similarities and differences between our approach and other standard accounts of intention, in particular Bratman’s planning theory. The aim here is to question and refine the conceptual foundations of many theories of intentional action: as a consequence, although our analysis is not formal in itself, it is ultimately meant to have deep consequences for formal models of intentional agency.     

Computational models of the “active self” and its disturbances in schizophrenia

The notion that self-disorders are at the root of the emergence of schizophrenia rather than a symptom of the disease, is getting more traction in the cognitive sciences. This is in line with philosophical approaches that consider an enactive self, constituted through action and interaction with the environment. We thereby analyze different definitions of the self and evaluate various computational theories lending to these ideas. Bayesian and predictive processing are promising approaches for computational modeling of the “active self”. We evaluate their implementation and challenges in computational psychiatry and cognitive developmental robotics. We describe how and why embodied robotic systems provide a valuable tool in psychiatry to assess, validate, and simulate mechanisms of self-disorders. Specifically, mechanisms involving sensorimotor learning, prediction, and self-other distinction, can be assessed with artificial agents. This link can provide essential insights to the formation of the self and new avenues in the treatment of psychiatric disorders.     

The Essential Elements of an Evolutionary Theory of Perception

ABSTRACT

Traditional theories of perception developed for centuries before Darwin conceived his theory of evolution by means of natural selection. Although many areas of psychological theory and research now have mainstream approaches strongly influenced by evolutionary thinking, mainstream perceptual theory remains close to its pre-Darwinian roots. This paper draws on insights from ecological psychology, especially as represented in J. J. Gibson's The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966), to identify 4 elements that any future evolutionary approach to perception should be expected to include: (a) an ecological analysis of ambient energy, (b) a comparative understanding of the perceptual abilities of different species, (c) a dynamic understanding of organism–environment interaction as essential for perception, and (d) an understanding of perceptual attunement based on the concept of affordances. Each of these elements serves an essential theoretical role while also pointing toward lines of research where much work remains to be done. The presence of these elements explains, in part, the affinity between ecological psychology and other evolutionarily grounded approaches to psychology, including the emerging fields of enactivism and embodied cognition.     

Interfaces of social psychology with situated and embodied cognition

The recent rise of interest in situated and embodied cognition has a strong interdisciplinary flavor, with contributions from robotics, cognitive anthropology, cognitive psychology, and developmental psychology, among other disciplines. However, social psychology has been almost completely unrepresented. Social psychologists investigate the ways people perceive, interact with, and influence each other, and this field therefore offers an ideal standpoint for the investigation of many of the most central aspects and themes of the situated cognition approach—because the relevant ‘situation’ in which cognition takes place is, almost always, a social situation defined by an individual’s group memberships, personal relationships, and social and communicative goals. This paper briefly reviews social psychological research and theory related to five major themes of situated and embodied cognition. The themes are: cognition is for action; cognition is situated (radically affected by situations, and makes use of situations as resources); artifacts and situations effectively extend cognitive processes out beyond the individual; cognition is embodied; and situated cognition affects and interacts with symbolically based thought.     

A Blueprint for Social Cognitive Development

ABSTRACT— The field of social cognitive development (SCD) has historically failed to emerge as a dominant approach in developmental psychology. We take this opportunity to articulate the assumptions, goals, and contributions of SCD with the aim of invigorating research from this perspective. We begin by describing the current landscape of social and cognitive development, suggesting what they have and have not given us. We then outline major goals of the social cognitive developmental approach and walk through examples of successful SCD research. Finally, we examine the unique potential of the social cognitive approach to cross-fertilize social and cognitive development (as well as related fields such as social psychology and neuroscience) and to answer new questions about development.     

Multidisciplinary creativity: the case of Herbert A. Simon

In the twentieth century, no person epitomized more dramatically the “Renaissance mind” than Herbert A. Simon (1916–2001). In aworking life spanning over 60 years, Simon made seminal contributions to administrative theory, axiomatic foundations of physics, economics, sociology, econometrics, cognitive psychology, logic of scientific discovery, and artificial intelligence. Simon's life of the mind, thus, affords nothing less than a “laboratory” in which to observe and examine at close quarters the phenomenon of multidisciplinary creativity. In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on the nature of Simon's creativity and the nature of his particular Renaissance mind. In particular, we have attempted here to articulate the cognitive style underlying Simon's multidisciplinary creativity.     

Mechanisms for Robust Cognition

To function well in an unpredictable environment using unreliable components, a system must have a high degree of robustness. Robustness is fundamental to biological systems and is an objective in the design of engineered systems such as airplane engines and buildings. Cognitive systems, like biological and engineered systems, exist within variable environments. This raises the question, how do cognitive systems achieve similarly high degrees of robustness? The aim of this study was to identify a set of mechanisms that enhance robustness in cognitive systems. We identify three mechanisms that enhance robustness in biological and engineered systems: system control, redundancy, and adaptability. After surveying the psychological literature for evidence of these mechanisms, we provide simulations illustrating how each contributes to robust cognition in a different psychological domain: psychomotor vigilance, semantic memory, and strategy selection. These simulations highlight features of a mathematical approach for quantifying robustness, and they provide concrete examples of mechanisms for robust cognition.     

Standing on shaky ground and living in the now: How resource amount and stability influence time perspectives

Time perspective predicts multiple health, antisocial, and prosocial outcomes, but the factors that explain it are rarely examined. Two studies examined the unique influences of resource amount and stability on time perspective. In both studies, participants (n = 300 college students for Study 1, 167 working adults for Study 2) reported the amount and stability of their income, and their time perspectives. The instability of financial and social resources was associated with present‐fatalistic perspective. The stability of personal resources was associated with future‐planful perspective. Implications for developmental and cognitive theories of risky behavior are discussed.     

Social interaction and cognitive growth: Possible causal mechanisms

The causal role of social interaction in the promotion of cognitive development has recently emerged as an important issue in developmental psychology. Two dominant theoretical orientations are currently guiding the empirical studies. The Piagetian perspective has influenced studies conducted to measure operational advances in cognitive functioning as a result of conflict between children. Vygotsky's developmental framework has provoked interest in the ontogenesis of self-regulatory abilities in children through an analysis of social problem solving. Both seek to explain cognitive development through social processes. Theoretical and empirical links between the two approaches are explored, and the possible role of linguistic processes as causal mechanisms examined.