“以人为本”不是“以政为本”——《关于深化医药卫生体制改革的意见》的儒家意见

试从儒家的观点出发评价《深化医药卫生体制改革的意见（征求意见稿）》,论证其建议没有真正遵循“以人为本”的原则。具体说来,其建议未能贯彻“藏富于民”的精神,没有实行“家庭决策”的方式,未能充分致力于建设一个人性化的公立医院制度和医疗保健市场。     

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

Book reviewed:
M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Reviewed by David Cockburn Department of Philosophy University of Wales Lampeter Lampeter Ceredigion SA48 7ED     

The Foundations of Literacy

Learning to read and write in English requires children to master the alphabetic principle, the idea that the letters in printed words represent the sounds in spoken words in a more or less regular manner. Children need at least two skills in order to grasp the alphabetic principle. The first is phonological awareness, or a sensitivity to the sound structure of spoken words. The second is knowledge about letters, including knowledge of letter names and knowledge of letter sounds. Recent research sheds light on these foundational skills, documenting the linguistic factors that affect children's performance and how children put their phonological skills and knowledge of letters to use in learning to read and spell.     

Psychological Foundations of Trust

ABSTRACT— Trust lies at the foundation of nearly all major theories of interpersonal relationships. Despite its great theoretical importance, a limited amount of research has examined how and why trust develops, is maintained, and occasionally unravels in relationships. Following a brief overview of theoretical and empirical milestones in the interpersonal-trust literature, an integrative process model of trust in dyadic relationships is presented.     

Fundamentality without Foundations

A commonly held view is that a central aim of metaphysics is to give a fundamental account of reality which refers only to the fundamental entities. But a puzzle arises. It is at least a working hypothesis for those pursuing the aim that, first, there must be fundamental entities. But, second, it also seems possible that the world has no foundation, with each entity depending on others. These two claims are inconsistent with the widely held third claim that the fundamental just is the foundational. It is tempting to resolve the puzzle by rejecting the first or second claim, perhaps because it is obscure how the third claim might plausibly be challenged. But I develop a new analysis of fundamentality which challenges the third claim by allowing for an entity to be fundamental without being foundational. The analysis, roughly, is that an entity is fundamental (or ineliminable, as I call it) just in case not all facts about it are grounded in facts about other entities. The possibility of fundamentality without foundations not only provides for a novel resolution to the puzzle, but has applications to some live debates: for example, it undermines Jonathan Schaffer's modal argument for priority monism.     

Probability Theory and Probability Semantics

Book Information Probability Theory and Probability Semantics. By P. Roeper and H. Leblanc. University of Toronto Press. Toronto. 1999. Pp. xii + 240. Hardback, US$65.00.     

Foundations of psychoanalysis reconsidered

Grünbaum's approach to psychoanalysis suffers from several difficulties. It imposes a standard of logical reductionism and methodological purity that not only violates the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge, but imposes an invalid standard of verification and scientific confirmation. It utilizes a brand of dichotomous reasoning that forces psychoanalytic propositions into artificial positions that do not reflect the actuality of analytic practice. It imposes a standard of verification that is impossible for psychoanalysis, along with all forms of psychological knowledge, to reach. It visualizes psychoanalysis as encompassing only one form of knowledge of human psychic life, forcing it into a model that eliminates other aspects of the psychoanalytic process, so that psychoanalysis is subjected to criticism only on one dimension among several--a kind of psychoanalytic straw man. The psychoanalysis that is so impaled often is difficult for the psychoanalytic practitioner to recognize. To the extent that Grünbaum's skillful and highly informed criticism of the philosophical bases of psychoanalysis encounters these difficulties, the value of his argument falls short of providing a useful basis for advancing psychoanalytic knowledge and particularly for promoting the quest for pertinent standards of validation within psychoanalysis.     

Foundations of Wildlife protection attitudes

The history of ideas normally invoked by animal liberationists and their opponents cannot account for our basic wildlife protection attitudes, which actually developed out of the worldwide species‐classification project begun by Linnaeus in the eighteenth century. These attitudes, formed in terms of a pre‐evolutionary and pre‐ecological belief in fixed and immutable species, were weakened to some degree by the rise of evolutionary theory and ecological science, since evolution provides a mechanism for the replacement of extinct species and depicts extinction as natural, and ecology teaches that ecosystems naturally adjust when species are lost. Wildlife protection attitudes are preservationist in so far as they are concerned with the preservation of species and conservationist in so far as they are concerned with the lives of individual animals and populations. From all perspectives except that of animal liberation, wild animals are predominantly viewed in terms of instrumental value: as a means to the continuation of species, the maintenance of healthy ecosystems, and for various other anthropocentric purposes. These various perspectives fit together within an aesthetic conception of wildlife which is strongly Platonic. From an aesthetic standpoint, wild animals, as exemplications of various species, are more analogous to mass‐produced toys, admired for their design or structure, than the natural equivalent of original works of art admired for their own sakes.     

Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning

“Since today is Saturday, the grocery store is open today and will be closed tomorrow; so let’s go today”. That is an example of everyday practical reasoning—reasoning directly with the propositions that one believes but may not be fully certain of. Everyday practical reasoning is one of our most familiar kinds of decisions but, unfortunately, some foundational questions about it are largely ignored in the standard decision theory: (Q1) What are the decision rules in everyday practical reasoning that connect qualitative belief and desire to preference over acts? (Q2) What sort of logic should govern qualitative beliefs in everyday practical reasoning, and to what extent is that logic necessary for the purposes of qualitative decisions? (Q3) What kinds of qualitative decisions are always representable as results of everyday practical reasoning? (Q4) Under what circumstances do the results of everyday practical reasoning agree with the Bayesian ideal of expected utility maximization? This paper proposes a rigorous decision theory for answering all of those questions, which is developed in parallel to Savage’s (1954) foundation of expected utility maximization. In light of a new representation result, everyday practical reasoning provides a sound and complete method for a very wide class of qualitative decisions; and, to that end, qualitative beliefs must be allowed to be closed under classical logic plus a well-known nonmonotonic logic—the so-called system ?.