Imagination equally influences false memories of high and low plausibility events

To examine the effects of event plausibility on people's false beliefs and memories for imagined childhood events, subjects took part in a three‐stage procedure. First, subjects rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events. They also rated their memories of the events. Second, 1 week later, subjects imagined one high, one moderate and one low plausibility event. Third, 1 week later (and 2 weeks after their initial ratings), subjects rated their confidence and memory a second time. Imagining the events made subjects more confident that they were genuine experiences and gave subjects clearer and more complete memories. Plausibility did not affect subjects' confidence but it did affect their memories. Subjects developed clearer and more complete memories for high, followed by moderate, followed by low plausibility events regardless of whether those events were imagined. We use a nested model of plausibility, belief and memory to discuss our findings. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories and imagined events in sub‐clinical obsessive‐compulsive checkers

Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories and imagined experiences were examined in checking‐ and non‐checking‐prone individuals. Participants were asked to retrieve a positive, a negative and a neutral memory, and to imagine a positive, a negative and a neutral experience. They were then requested to evaluate each event according to characteristics such as sensory and contextual details. The main results revealed that non‐checking‐prone participants reported more general vividness than checking‐prone individuals for real events. In addition, non‐checking‐prone individuals reported more visual details and vividness for real than imagined experiences, while no difference between real and imagined events was found for checking‐prone participants. These results suggest that checking‐prone participants report poor memories of real events, which could in turn explain their difficulties distinguishing between real and imagined events. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Characteristics of memories for near-death experiences

Near-death experiences are vivid, life-changing experiences occurring to people who come close to death. Because some of their features, such as enhanced cognition despite compromised brain function, challenge our understanding of the mind-brain relationship, the question arises whether near-death experiences are imagined rather than real events. We administered the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire to 122 survivors of a close brush with death who reported near-death experiences. Participants completed Memory Characteristics Questionnaires for three different memories: that of their near-death experience, that of a real event around the same time, and that of an event they had imagined around the same time. The Memory Characteristics Questionnaire score was higher for the memory of the near-death experience than for that of the real event, which in turn was higher than that of the imagined event. These data suggest that memories of near-death experiences are recalled as “realer” than real events or imagined events.     

Cross-modal source monitoring confusions between perceived and imagined events

Two experiments tested the prediction based on the source monitoring framework that imagination is most likely to lead to false memories when related perceived events have occurred. Consistent with this, people were more likely to falsely remember seeing events when the events had been both imagined as seen and actually heard than when they were just heard, just visually imagined, or imagined both visually and auditorily. Furthermore, when people considered potential sources for memories or more carefully evaluated features of remembered events, source errors were reduced. On average, misattributed ("false") memories differed in phenomenal qualities from true memories. Taken together, these findings show that as different qualities of mental experience flexibly enter into source attributions, qualities derived from related perceptual events are particularly likely to lead to false claims that imagined events were seen, even when the event involves a primary modality (auditory) different from the target event (visual).     

Reality Monitoring for Sexual Abuse Memories

The reality monitoring model of Johnson and Raye proposes that the phenomenal characteristics of memories for real and imagined events are utilized in reality monitoring judgements. This study examined the reality monitoring strategies utilized by subjects when remembering sexual abuse, and compared them with the strategies utilized for other types of events. Thirty-one subjects described how they knew that four different autobiographical events (a sexual abuse experience, another unrelated trauma experience, a social occasion, and an imagined event) had, or had not, happened. Sexual abuse experiences were found to elicit a unique reality monitoring response profile. This profile suggests that the characteristics of memory for sexual abuse may be more vivid than other memories. In addition, the profile for sexual abuse shows fewer contextual supporting memories than other real memories, and more psychological reasoning responses. The finding that emotional rehearsal can cause fading of perceptual detail was not found to hold for the long-term autobiographical memories that were the object of this study. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Accessibility and characteristics of memories of the future

Recent research suggests that some imagined future events are encoded in memory, leading to the formation of “memories of the future”. However, questions remain regarding the exact components of future event simulations that are encoded and the factors that determine their accessibility. To address these questions, the present study investigated memory for previously imagined future events using both free and cued recall tasks. The results showed that most future event simulations were successfully encoded and remained available in memory after a one week delay, but only some of them were readily accessible, whereas others could only be accessed when relevant cues were provided. Persons and locations were particularly well remembered, suggesting that these components are central to the simulation and memorisation of future events. We also found that memory for future event simulations was related to the clarity and familiarity of represented persons, the subjective feelings of pre-experience and mental time travel, the importance of imagined events to personal goals, and their emotional intensity during the initial simulation phase. Taken together, these findings expand our understanding of the formation, accessibility, and characteristics of memories of the future.     

Cognitive resources, valence, and memory retrieval of emotional events in older adults

In 2 studies with older adults, the authors investigated the effect of executive attention resources on the retrieval of emotional public events. Participants completed a battery of working memory tasks, as a measure of executive attention, and a battery of tasks assessing memory, as well as subjective experiences associated with the retrieval of remote public events. Participants also rated the valence of each public event story. The group-rated valence of the public event stories predicted retrieval and the quality of experiences associated with them, such that emotionally arousing events elicited the highest memory rates and the richest experiences. Furthermore, positive public events elicited the highest memory rates. Executive attention moderated only the relationship between event valence and how participants' associated memories are experienced at retrieval, such that superior executive attention resources predicted richer experiences associated with positive relative to neutral and negative stories. The current results extend previous findings on the effects of aging on emotion regulation, suggesting that cognitive control resources modulate subjective experiences associated with retrieved memories for remote real life events, but not memory retrieval itself. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).     

Monitoring the future: object and source memory for real and imagined events

In these experiments a memory‐monitoring decision is made, whereby subjects must decide not only whether or not to‐be‐learned stimuli will be remembered—the focus of all of the past research into the Judgement of Learning (JOL)—but also whether they will be able to assess the source of those stimuli, as assessed by a new measure, Judgement of Source (JOS). In Experiment 1 subjects had to judge whether they would remember the occurrence and the source of items that were either seen or imagined. Although seen items were better remembered and sourced than imagined, subjects were unable to predict this outcome: they underestimated their ability to recall seen items and overestimated their ability to recall imagined items. In Experiment 2 subjects had to discriminate between self‐performed or other‐performed enacted or imagined events. We expected that the motor cues associated with overt performance should provide more sensory information than had the visual input in Experiment 1, and this should help subjects to discriminate between real and imagined items. As predicted, JOL magnitude showed that subjects were now able to predict accurately that they would recall more enacted events than imagined events. JOS magnitude showed that subjects incorrectly predicted that self‐enactment would assist source memory compared to imagination. However, it was the source of other‐focused events which was more accurately remembered. The results are discussed in terms of Koriat's (1997) view about cue utility in making JOLs. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imagination can create false autobiographical memories

Previous studies have shown that imagining an event can alter autobiographical beliefs. The current study examined whether it can also create false memories. One group of participants imagined a relatively frequent event and received information about an event that never occurs. A second group imagined the nonoccurring event and received information about the frequent event. One week before and again 1 week immediately after the manipulation, participants rated the likelihood that they had experienced each of the two critical events and a series of noncritical events, using the Life Events Inventory. During the last phase, participants were also asked to describe any memories they had for the events. For both events, imagination increased the number of memories reported, as well as beliefs about experiencing the event. These results indicate that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories.     

Metamemory and reality monitoring

Metamemory judgements and reality monitoring judgements were compared for real and imagined stimuli. Line drawings of everyday items were either perceived or imagined in differing ratios, to (a) investigate people's ability to predict the class of item that would be better recalled (Judgements of Learning, JOL), and the class of item which would be better sourced (Judgements of Source, JOS) in a future recall test, and (b) test the hypothesis that participants would show a bias towards calling remembered items real when the source had been forgotten. Although participants' JOLs indicated that they believed real items would be more memorable than imagined, in both experiments a larger proportion of items from either class (real or imagined) was only recalled when presentation modality was less frequent for that class. By contrast, JOSs were no different for real or imagined items, even though source attribution was more accurate for real than imagined items. An attribution of memories to real rather than to imagined events that often occurs when participants are unsure about the source (labelled a ‘bias towards the real’) was due to phenomenological qualities of the memories. The results are discussed in terms of Johnson and Raye's ( 1981 ) reality‐monitoring model. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Separating past and future autobiographical events in memory: Evidence for a reality monitoring asymmetry

After thinking about the past and imagining the future, how do people separate these real and imagined events in memory? We had subjects engage in past and future autobiographical elaboration, then later take memory tests that required them to recollect these earlier generated events. In Experiment 1, testing memory for previously generated past or future autobiographical events led to fewer source memory confusions than did an elaborative control task, suggesting that the distinctive features of autobiographical elaboration improved subsequent retrieval monitoring accuracy. In Experiment 2, we directly compared retrieval monitoring accuracy for previously generated past and future autobiographical events and found that subjects made fewer source confusions when searching memory for future events. This asymmetry suggests that the features characterizing future elaborations (e.g., cognitive operations) were used more effectively during reality monitoring than were the features characterizing past elaborations (e.g., perceptual details), and has implications for future-oriented theories of memory.     

Imagining nice and nasty events in childhood or adulthood: recent positive events show the most imagination inflation

We explored whether event recency and valence affect people’s susceptibility to imagination inflation. Using a three-stage procedure, subjects imagined positive and negative events happening in their distant or recent past. First, subjects rated how confident they were that they had experienced particular positive and negative events in childhood or adulthood using a Life Events Inventory (LEI). Two weeks later, they imagined two positive and two negative events from the LEI. Finally, they rated their confidence on the LEI a second time. For positive events, subjects showed more imagination inflation for adulthood than childhood events. For negative events, they showed no difference in imagination inflation for adulthood and childhood events. We discuss factors that may influence source confusions for memories of the past and highlight directions for future research.     

Directed forgetting of autobiographical events

Two diary experiments demonstrated directed forgetting (DF) of autobiographical events, previously observed only for less complex memory items. Using a 2-week diary paradigm, we compared recall between a group of participants who were directed to forget Week 1 memories (forget group) and a group who did not receive a forget instruction (remember group). In Experiment 1, the forget group remembered fewer items from Week 1 than did the remember group. The effect was observed for negative and positive valence events, as well as for high and low emotional intensity events. The effect was replicated in Experiment 2 despite a memorable holiday (Valentine's Day) that occurred during the manipulation week. Forget participants remembered fewer low emotional intensity items in Experiment 2. We conclude that intentional forgetting is a plausible explanation for the loss of some autobiographical memories.     

Reality monitoring of performed and imagined interactive events: developmental and contextual effects

Age differences in reality monitoring of interactive events were examined among 4-year-olds, 8-year-olds, 12-year-olds, and adults. Participants engaged in some interactions and imagined others. Afterward, they were asked to determine whether each action was performed, imagined, or new. This memory test was repeated 1 week later. The 4-year-olds had more difficulty discriminating imagined actions than the two oldest age groups. Imagined actions were more often confused with performed ones than the reverse, though this bias was significant only for the two younger age groups. Reality monitoring decreased over time, especially for imagined items. Activities in which the participant was the agent of action were discriminated better than those in which someone else was the agent of action. Object use during the activity increased the discrimination of imagined actions, especially after the delay. Similarity among actions had no effect. Implications for child eyewitness testimony are discussed.     

Temporal compression in episodic memory for real-life events

Remembering an event typically takes less time than experiencing it, suggesting that episodic memory represents past experience in a temporally compressed way. Little is known, however, about how the continuous flow of real-life events is summarised in memory. Here we investigated the nature and determinants of temporal compression by directly comparing memory contents with the objective timing of events as measured by a wearable camera. We found that episodic memories consist of a succession of moments of prior experience that represent events with varying compression rates, such that the density of retrieved information is modulated by goal processing and perceptual changes. Furthermore, the results showed that temporal compression rates remain relatively stable over one week and increase after a one-month delay, particularly for goal-related events. These data shed new light on temporal compression in episodic memory and suggest that compression rates are adaptively modulated to maintain current goal-relevant information.     

Source misattributions may increase the accuracy of source judgments

Misattribution of remembered information from one source to another is commonly associated with false memories, but we demonstrate that it also may underlie memories that accord with past events. Participants imagined drawings of objects in four different locations. For each, a drawing of a similarly shaped object was seen in the same location, a different location, or not seen. When tested on memory for objects' origin (seen/imagined) and location, more false "seen" responses, but also more correct location responses, were given to imagined objects if a similar object had been seen, versus not seen, in the same location. We argue that misattribution of feature information (e.g., shape, location) from seen objects to similar imagined ones increased false memories of seeing objects but also increased correct location memories, provided the misattributed location matched the imagined objects' location. Thus, consistent with the source-monitoring framework, imperfect source-attribution processes underlie false and true memories.     

Phenomenal characteristics associated with real and imagined events: the effects of event valence and absorption

This study examined the effects of emotional valence of an event and individual differences in absorption on the phenomenal characteristics associated with real and imagined events. Each participant described four events. Two of these were real and two were imagined, with one pleasant and stressful event being generated for each category. Pleasant events (both real and imagined) contained more detail (visual detail, smell, and taste, and more information regarding location, time, etc.) than stressful events. In addition, higher levels of absorption were related to higher ratings for both real and imagined events (for both pleasant and stressful events). Discussion focused on implications for further research in source monitoring and other relevant domains. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Psychopathic personality traits are linked to reduced false memories for negative events

Individuals scoring high on psychopathic personality traits process emotional material to a different extent than individuals with few psychopathic traits. Evidence exists that these individuals have impaired emotional memory. The question arises whether this emotional memory impairment has ramifications for the production of emotional false memories. In the present study, we investigated the production of false and true memories for emotional events in a community sample (N = 120) of individuals varying in psychopathic traits (evaluated with the Psychopathic Personality Inventory–Revised [PPI-R] questionnaire). The fearless dominance (FD) component of psychopathy interacted with the emotional impact of to-be-remembered events in the production of false memories, showing fewer negative false memories with increasing levels of FD. At the subjective level, negative false memories were not perceived as vivid memory experiences in high FD individuals. Concerning true memories, higher scores in cold-heartedness were related to fewer true memories for neutral and negative (but not positive) events. These results show that individuals with high psychopathy traits – in particular, FD – do not have a general emotional memory impairment but they process negative material in a different way than individuals with low psychopathic traits and thus are less susceptible to producing false memories for negative events.