IN DEFENCE OF THE AGENT-CENTRED PERSPECTIVE

Abstract: This article explores certain issues that arise at the borderline between conceptual analysis and metaphysics, where answers to questions of a conceptual nature compete with answers to questions of an ontological or metaphysical nature. I focus on the way in which three philosophers, Kant, Collingwood and Davidson, articulate the relationship between the conceptual question “What are actions?” and the metaphysical question “How is agency possible?” I argue that the way in which one handles the relationship between the conceptual and the ontological question has important implications for one's conception of the nature of philosophy, and that thinking hard about what it takes to defend the autonomy of the mental and of the agent‐centred perspective should force us to think about our underlying conception of philosophy and to choose between one that understands it as first science and one that understands it as the under‐labourer of science.     

Understanding Fallible Warrant and Fallible Knowledge: Three Proposals

One of contemporary epistemology's more important conceptual challenges is that of understanding the nature of fallibility. Part of why this matters is that it would contribute to our understanding the natures of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. This article evaluates two candidates – and describes a shared form of failing. Each is concealedly infallibilist. This failing is all‐too‐representative of the difficulty of doing justice to the notion of fallibility within the notions of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. The article ends with a proposal for an improved (even if schematic) form of conception of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge.     

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS:

Abstract: This article argues that teachers of environmental ethics must more aggressively entertain questions of private property in their work and in their teaching. To make this case, it first introduces the three primary positions on property: occupation arguments, labor theory of value arguments, and efficiency arguments. It then contextualizes these arguments in light of the contemporary U.S. wise‐use movement, in an attempt to make sense of the concerns that motivate wise‐use activists, and also to demonstrate how intrinsic value arguments miss the mark. Finally, it offers some suggestions about further directions for environmental ethics, reasoning that there is a good deal of headway to be gained for environmental ethics by accepting that nature can be owned as property, but nevertheless engaging the idea of private property critically.     

Towards a ‘Non‐Ideal’ Non‐Ideal Theory

This article explores the role that considerations about the feasibility of a political proposal should play at the levels of both ideal and non‐ideal theory. Drawing on recent work in the literature on political feasibility, I begin by describing a ‘constraint‐based’ view of ideal and non‐ideal theory, with feasibility considerations serving different functions depending on whether they are operating at the ideal or non‐ideal level. Taking feasibility seriously at either level presents us with at least two important challenges. Firstly, we need principles which enable us to weigh the value of a proposal's feasibility against its other normatively significant properties, and against those of alternative proposals. Secondly, we need the capacity to gauge the nature of the epistemic constraints which apply to our feasibility assessments themselves. In response to these problems, I propose a ‘narrowing‐down’ approach, focused on developing our capacities to make accurate and reliable judgements about the feasibility of political proposals.     

Getting ‘Lucky’ with Gettier

Abstract: In this paper I add credence to Linda Zagzebski's (1994) diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the current trend to abandon the standard analysis) by analyzing the nature of luck. It is widely accepted that the lesson to be learned from Gettier problems is that knowledge is incompatible with luck or at least a certain species thereof. As such, understanding the nature of luck is central to understanding the Gettier problem. Thanks by and large to Duncan Pritchard's seminal work, Epistemic Luck, a great deal of literature has been developed recently concerning the nature of luck and anti‐luck epistemology. The literature, however, has yet to explore the very intuitive idea that luck comes in degrees. I propose that once luck is recognized to admit degrees even the slightest non‐zero degree (of the relevant sort) precludes knowledge. Connecting this to Zagzebski's thesis, I propose that a given theory of warrant must guarantee truth in order to avoid Gettier counterexamples (or subsequently deny that warrant bears any relationship to the truth whatsoever), simply because a sufficient standard analysis of knowledge cannot allow for knowledge that is even marginally lucky.     

Five Key Topics on the Frontier of Theology and Science Today

Abstract : This article explores the creative mutual interaction between Christian theology and the natural sciences through five key issues: (1) the relation between creation ex nihilo and Big Bang cosmology; (2) biological evolution and continuous creation; (3) the search for non‐interventionist objective divine action in light of physics and biology; (4) the problem of suffering in nature and with it the turn to redemption theology via the bodily Resurrection of Jesus; and (5) the challenge raised for its eschatological implications by scientific predictions for the future of the universe. The article concludes with a brief suggestion for the ways Christian theology, reformulated in light of these sciences, might offer creative suggestions for future scientific research, and, in doing so, complete the loop promised by the phrase “mutual creative interaction.”     

Continuity, Naturalism, and Contingency: A Theology of Evolution Drawing on the Semiotics of C. S. Peirce and Trinitarian Thought

The starting point for this article is the question of the relationship between Darwinism and Christian theology. I suggest that evolutionary theory presents three broad issues of relevance to theology: the phenomena of continuity, naturalism, and contingency. In order to formulate a theological response to these issues I draw on the semiotics (theory of signs) and cosmology of the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce developed a triadic theory of signs, underpinned by a threefold system of metaphysical categories. I propose a semiotic model of the Trinity based on Peirce's semiotics and categories. According to this model the sign‐processes (such as the genetic “code”) that are fundamental to life may be understood as vestiges of the Trinity in creation. I use the semiotic model to develop a theology of nature that addresses the issues raised by evolutionary theory. The semiotic model amounts to a proposal for a new metaphysical framework within which to understand the relationship between God and creation and between theology and science.     

Good Work

Work is on one side a central arena of self‐making, self‐understanding, and self‐development, and on the other a deep threat to our flourishing. My question is: what kind of work is good for human beings, and what kind bad? I first characterise work as necessary productive activity. My answer to my question then develops a perfectionist account of the human good: (1) the good is the full development and expression of human potentials and capacities; (2) this development and expression happens over a lifetime through appropriate practice. Work is thus a problem of human development, and I address that problem by considering three central human capacities: that we are passionate choosers, skilled makers, and social negotiators. For each, I ask: what does this capacity need from our work if it is to develop towards full and flourishing expression? Answering that question leads to a three‐part account of good work as requiring: (1) a distinctive kind of pleasure, involving both unselfconscious flow and supervisory self‐attention; (2) skill, which I describe via the ideal of craft; and (3) democracy, which I define as a form of life in which each is able to develop and use both expressive and receptive capacities.     

Narrative vignettes and online enquiry in researching therapist accounts of practice with children in schools: An analysis of the methodology

Aims: This article reviews a research methodology that uses an Internet mediated qualitative, narrative approach to provide in‐depth analysis of vignettes. The research sought to investigate the ways in which dramatherapists, based in different countries, understood the nature of therapeutic change in their work with children. Method: The article describes a qualitative approach to the generation of data by a combination of therapist‐authored vignettes, live, synchronous Internet mediated communication (aMSN Messenger) and email. Participants kept a diary of their response to the research and the article draws on this data within its analysis of the methodology. Findings: Samples of the data are used to analyse how such innovative, online methodology can develop effective access and relationships with geographically dispersed participants and as an effective way of investigating therapist practitioners' understanding of their practice.     

中国经济伦理学研究中的若干问题——兼论经济伦理学的学科性质

中国经济伦理学的研究虽然成果显著,但还存在着需要进一步澄清的三个相互关联的重要问题,即“理论性”与“应用性”问题、“伦理学”与“经济学”问题、以及“理想性”与“现实性”问题。这三个问题的正确理解有助于关于经济伦理学学科性质的合理界定,也有助于中国经济伦理学研究的继续深入。     

PHILOSOPHERS,THEIR CONTEXT,AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES

Abstract: It has at various times been said, both before and since the fall of apartheid, that philosophers in South Africa are neglecting to do certain sorts of work. Behind this accusation lies a general claim that philosophers have responsibilities to their contexts. This essay is dedicated to (i) defending this claim against objections, and (ii) offering a positive argument for there being moral pressure on philosophers to increase understanding. My aim is not to accuse any philosopher or community of philosophers of neglect. It is rather to defend an understanding of both philosophy and ethical responsibilities that makes room for philosophers to have moral responsibilities. Whether or not it has ever in fact been appropriate to accuse philosophers in South Africa, or indeed anywhere else, of neglect, philosophers do indeed have responsibilities to their contexts.     

Three Pervasive Presuppositions about Human Life and Ethics Strongly Warrant Analysis

Common philosophical discussions concerning the ethics of human interaction with the biosphere and universe have been significantly informed by certain presuppositions: (1) nature is conquerable; (2) human cultural and social (contrasted with moral) progress is somewhat like a thing, beyond human control, and is inevitable and benevolent; and (3) Homo sapiens is the superior life‐form. Although arguments, such as whether humans should conquer nature, founded upon these presuppositions have sometimes been challenged, each of these three presuppositions wants direct analysis. The three have become so ingrained in professional and everyday discourse that they have mythic proportions, as though beyond question. Because of the weightiness of the relevant philosophical issues, they merit overt analysis. Although they are independent and may be analyzed separately, this article treats them as whole, as they often work together in arguments. After finding substantial problems, the article suggests alternative ways of building sustainable presuppositions in similar territory.     

KNOWING OURSELVES AS EMBODIED,EMBEDDED, AND RELATIONALLY EXTENDED

What does it mean to know oneself, and what is the self that one hopes to know? This article outlines the implications of an embodied understanding of persons and some aspects of the “self” that are generally ignored when thinking about our selves. The Cartesian model of body–soul (or body–mind) dualism reinforces the idea that there is within us a soul, or self, or mind that is our hidden, inner, and real self. Thus, the path to self‐knowledge is introspection. The alternative view is that persons are embodied (entirely physical creatures), embedded (formed by our physical and social environment), and at times extended (cognitively soft‐coupled to artifacts or other persons). This article emphasizes the bodily, active, contextual, relational, often simulated, and sometimes extended nature of the selves that we are, and that we hope to know.     

Defining and Assessing Problem‐Solving Style: Design and Development of a New Tool

VIEW: An Assessment of Problem Solving Style (Selby, Treffinger, & Isaksen, 2002) is a new instrument for assessing problem‐solving style, for use with individuals from ages 12 through adult. It measures three dimensions of style relating to creative problem solving and change management. In this article, we discuss the construction of the instrument, the initial evidence supporting the instrument's reliability and validity, and a very brief overview of the instrument's foundations. Our reliability data involve both stability and internal consistency. We report evidence for the criterion‐related validity, based on correlational studies with relevant measures of learning style, cognitive style, and psychological type. We also conducted principal components factor analyses that support our three‐factor structure. Researchers and practitioners studying and applying Creative Problem Solving and change management methods can use VIEW in several ways. Finally, we identify several research directions that will contribute to the refinement and development of the instrument as well as to a better understanding of the “problem‐solving style” construct.     

中国古典美学中的身体及其映像

Richard Shusterman’s Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art was published in China in 2002. In the preface of the Chinese edition, the author claimed that his tentative idea of soma esthetics was encouraged by Chinese philosophy and other ancient Asian philosophy. Shusterman’s background in pragmatist philosophy greatly constrains his understanding of the body in classical Chinese aesthetics in that he only pays attention to the technical aspects of physical training while neglecting the philosophical basis of this training. In Chinese philosophy the orientation of the body, the relationship between the body and the universe, the body characteristic of the beauty of nature and the beauty of art, etc., is a theoretical response to Shusterman’s oriental misreading. Translated by Lei Yongqiang from Wenyi Yanjiu 컄틕퇐뺿 (Literature & Art Studies), 2007, (4): 23–31     

On Kant's Idea of Humanity as an End in Itself

Writers like Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood understand Kant's idea of rational nature as an end in itself as a commitment to a substantive value. This makes it hard for them to explain the supposed equivalence between the universal law and humanity formulations of the categorical imperative, since the former does not appear to assert any substantive value. Nor is it easy for defenders of value‐based readings to explain Kant's claim that the law‐giving nature of practical reason makes all beings with practical reason regard the idea of a rational nature as an end in itself. This article seeks to replace these value‐based readings with a reading of the idea of rational nature as an end that fits better with the overall argument of the Groundwork.     

Assembling the Whale: Parliaments in the Politics of Nature

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In the field of science and technology studies (STS), much research has been concerned with politics. Nevertheless STS research tends to disregard the work of conventional political institutions such as parliaments, especially in the politics of nature, which is often seen as delegating ‘nature’ to science. Parliaments work on nature-objects through documents; paperwork is crucial in its procedures for delegating an issue to be further worked upon at other sites, for securing the issue's return and for enabling a decision. This mode of circulating an issue amounts to a central infrastructure for taking nature into account in politics; this infrastructure enables ‘assembling work’ as a specific mode of parliamentary practice. In the late nineteenth century the Norwegian parliament handled a controversy over whaling. New species, questions and publics were entangled with the whale issue through the parliament's work, its tools and procedures. As such, parliament enabled, worked upon and modified the issue. By assembling the whale issue it performed a politics of nature in rich, complex ways. Hence, understanding the specific site where an issue is taken up is necessary in order to grasp its trajectory and to understand how conventional political sites do politics of nature in practice     

Education and Psycho-Utopianism—Comenius,Skinner, and Beyond

In the history of ideas some researchers have recently coined the term psycho-utopianism, denoting the notion that the ideal society presupposes a “new man,” that is, the psychological nature of man must change before society can change. Cultural studies have noted this line of thinking also within the so-called New Age movement. However, the notion of a New Age is not really new; it occurred already at the beginning of the Modern Epoch; in seventeenth-century Europe. At that time, the educational philosopher J. A. Comenius was writing his canonical work Didactica Magna and other texts on education, science, and philosophy, with the ultimate aim of contributing to a new world order. Comenius was one of the first modern educators to argue for a general education of both boys and girls irrespective of social class. Three hundred years later, B. F. Skinner suggested psychological methods of education and upbringing, also with the ultimate aim to transform society. In this article I will look closer at the similarities and differences between these two thinkers regarding their psycho-utopian notions. I will conclude with similar reflections on psycho-utopian tendencies in present discourses on information and communication technology (ICT) and education.     

BETWEEN THE OLD METAPHYSICS AND THE NEW EMPIRICISM: COLLINGWOOD'S DEFENCE OF THE AUTONOMY OF PHILOSOPHY

Collingwood has failed to make a significant impact in the history of twentieth century philosophy either because he has been dismissed as a dusty old idealist committed to the very metaphysics the analytical school was trying to leave behind, or because his later work has been interpreted as advocating the dissolution of philosophy into history. I argue that Collingwood's key philosophical works are a sustained attempt to defend the view that philosophy is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive domain of inquiry and that Collingwood's attempt to defend the autonomy of philosophy is intimately connected to his defence of intensional notions against the kind of meaning scepticism which came to prevail from the 1920s. I defend the philosophical claim that there is a third way between the idealist metaphysics with which Collingwood is often associated and the neo‐empiricist agenda which characterised analytic philosophy in mid‐century by defending the hermeneutic thesis that Collingwood's work is a sustained attempt to articulate a conception of philosophy as an epistemologically first science. Since there is a via media between the old metaphysics and the new empiricism there is no need to choose between a certain kind of armchair metaphysics and a scientifically informed ontology.