The Unconscious Feeling of Knowing: A Commentary on Koriat's Paper

In Koriat's paper “The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control,” he asserts that the feeling of knowing straddles the implicit and explicit, and that these conscious feelings enter into a conscious control process that is necessary for controlled behavior. This assertion allows him to make many speculations on the nature of consciousness itself. We agree that feelings of knowing are produced through a monitoring of one's knowledge, and that this monitoring can affect the control of behavior such as whether or not to search memory for an answer. Further, we believe that monitoring of performance with a strategy can also affect cognition control and strategy selection; however, we also believe that frequently this monitoring and control occurs without conscious awareness. Feeling of knowing has received an inordinate amount of attention because it lies behind the highly recognizable tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon that represents one of the rare cases of conscious monitoring. There are other feelings of knowing which are much more common and are not accompanied by conscious awareness. These are evident in the early selection of a strategy for answering a problem. In our view, the research on feeling of knowing will not resolve the question of whether consciousness is merely epiphenomenal.     

The Feeling of Not Knowing It All

How do consumers assess their mastery of knowledge they have learned? We explore this question by investigating a common knowledge consumption situation: encountering opportunities for further learning. We argue and show that such opportunities can trigger a feeling‐of‐not‐knowing‐it‐all (FONKIA), which lowers consumers’ confidence in their mastery of the knowledge they already possess. Specifically, listing optional follow‐up readings at the conclusion of a course lowered students’ confidence in their mastery of the course material they had already learned (Study 1). Encountering an optional learning opportunity increased the FONKIA, which mediated the decreased confidence (Studies 2 and 3). We also document two moderators consistent with our conceptualization. First, participants primed with mastery (vs. instrumental) motivation were more negatively impacted when they encountered optional learning opportunities. Second, the more related the optional opportunities were to the target topic, the lower participants’ confidence in their mastery of what they had already learned. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings, such as encouraging further learning or harming teaching evaluations.     

FOK产生机制的实验研究

采用Hart提出的RJR(回忆-FOK判断-再认)研究范式,通过两个实验对FOK产生机制的两种假说--线索熟悉性假说和靶项目提取可能性假说进行验证.实验一采用单因素被试内设计,即通过中、英文词对不同组合形成四种材料类型(中-中、英-中、中-英、英-英);实验二采用二因素被试内设计,即控制实验材料和呈现方式两个变量(2×2).结果表明,被试所做的FOK判断既不完全取决于线索熟悉.也不完全取决于靶项目的可提取性,而是取决于线索与靶子之间的联结强度.     

The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control

The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (“noetic feeling”) occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noetic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled action, but they are also informed by feedback from the outcome of that action.     

知晓感和学习判断产生机制的实验研究

以汉语配对词为实验材料,在已有实验研究的基础上,采用干扰模式进一步探讨了关于知晓感(Feeling of knowing)和学习判断(Judgment of learning)产生机制的四种理论假说,即线索熟悉性假说、目标提取假说、可接近性假说和竞争性假说。实验结果表明:在干扰条件下,知晓感和学习判断符合竞争性假说。     

Comment on Wagner,Elejabarrieta and Lahnsteiner (1995): From sperm and ovum to gender stereotypes

Wagner, Elejabarrieta and Lahnsteiner (1995) conclude that people use gender-stereotypic attributes and sexual metaphors in describing the sperm and the ovum. The conclusion is criticized on the basis of two arguments: (1) the sperm is, in actuality, more active than the ovum and this difference is reflected in subjects' judgements; (2) in their study, the researchers themselves induced (a) the person metaphor and (b) gender categories. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Religion and Spirituality in Variously Accredited Counselor Training Programs: A Comment on Pate and High (1995)

Accreditation standards for counselor preparation have the potential for bringing appropriate consideration of religious and spiritual issues into the training of counselors. This article extends Pate and High's (1995) study of CACREP-accredited programs and includes data comparing the attention given to religion and spirituality in programs accredited by several different counselor and therapist-training accrediting bodies.     

“知道自己知道”与“知道自己不知道”——一项有关知道感（FOK）的脑成像研究

采用事件相关功能性磁共振成像技术（event-related fMRI）以及在FOK（feeling-of-knowing）研究中常用的“线索回忆-FOK判断-再认测验”（Recall-Judgment-Recognition,RJR）程序,以汉字词对为识记材料,研究了FOK判断中的大脑活动区域。根据FOK判断的正负以及其后的再认测验的对错,实验将FOK判断的项目分为四类：PP项目（正性FOK判断,正确再认）,NN（负性FOK判断,错误再认）,NP（负性FOK判断,正确再认）以及PN（正性FOK判断,错误再认）。脑成像的分析结果显示：准确的FOK预测（即PP与NN项目）与不准确的FOK预测（即NP与NP项目）在脑活动上没有显著的差异。而进一步分析表明,这种“无差异”的现象可能是由于PP项目与NN项目激活了不同的脑活动模式所造成的。具体地讲,相对于NN项目而言,PP项目伴随有明显的左侧前额叶（BA 8区）的活动。这一观察提示我们：知道感（PP）与不知道感（NN）可能是由不同的脑神经网络所支持、并通过不同的认知过程来实现的。     

Displaced Feeling: A (Partial) Phenomenological Study

This is a partial phenomenological study of a phenomenon that I call “displaced feeling”, which is best illustrated through a concrete example. I am overcome by a strong desire to stop writing. For one reason or another, I reject the possibility of pursuing this desire. Instead of giving up the desire altogether, however, I may “speak to myself” as follows: “I feel like having a coffee” and, the chatter goes on in the background “of course to make coffee means to stop writing”. I endorse the desire to get a cup of coffee. But the action through which I pursue this desire is coloured not by the feeling that anticipates the value associated with drinking coffee but by a feeling that anticipates the value associated with stopping writing. The latter feeling has displaced the former: I am in a state of displaced feeling. Here, I will elucidate two invariant structures of displaced feeling. First, I will show that displaced feeling involves the realisation of an endorsed state of affairs, the bringing about of a rejected state of affairs, and the belief that the former will determine the latter. Next, I will show that the endorsed state of affairs appears prominently as the end of an intention (or projection), that the rejected state of affairs appears inconspicuously in the horizon of the same intention, and that the belief appears twice: (1) as a motive for this intention and (2) as the “glue” that keeps its prominent and inconspicuous zones together.     

Gamma is a Measure of the Accuracy of Predicting Performance on One Item Relative to Another Item,not of the Absolute Performance on an Individual Item Comments on Schraw (1995)

The recent paper by Schraw ( Measures of feeling-of-knowing accuracy: a new look at an old problem , Applied Cognitive Psychology, 1995, 9, 321—332) is flawed by several inaccuracies and by Schraw's failure to distinguish between two fundamentally different aspects of the accuracy of metacognitive predictions: (1) calibration (aka absolute accuracy, defined in terms of whether the predicted value assigned to a single item is followed by the occurrence of that value on the criterion test), and (2) resolution (aka relative accuracy, defined in terms of whether the predicted performance on one item relative to another item is followed by the occurrence of that ordering of the two items on the criterion test). Because of these (and other) problems, his recommendations seem misleading and counterproductive.     

知道感与不知道感：两种不同的认知加工过程——一项来自行为实验的证据

脑成像研究表明,准确的知晓感（FOK）可以分为知道感和不知道感,两者可能依赖不同的大脑机制实现。该研究通过两个实验,检验了线索和靶子的频率对FOK判断准确性的影响,并在行为水平上考察了“知道感和不知道感可能通过不同的认知过程来实现”的假设。实验一表明：靶子字的频率对FOK判断的准确性有影响,即靶子为低频字时,FOK判断的准确性降低;同时,线索和靶子的字频对知道感和不知道感判断的等级没有影响。实验二显示：线索熟悉性只影响准确的不知道感判断等级,而靶项目强度只影响准确的知道感判断等级,即产生了非交叉的双重分离。综上,我们发现了靶子的字频对FOK判断准确性的影响,并从行为实验的角度证实,知道感和不知道感依赖不同的认知加工过程。     

Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas (and Ourselves)

Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas are complex mental states that convey propositional knowledge due to agreeing elements therein.     

Predictive Feeling of Knowing Judgements and Postdictive Confidence Judgements in Eyewitness Memory and General Knowledge

Recent accounts of feeling of knowing (FOK) judgements assume that they arise from an assessment of cue familiarity, whilst retrospective confidence judgements arise from an assessment of the retrieval process. An experiment was conducted to extend this laboratory work to the area of eyewitness memory, in order to examine whether subjects are able to make accurate feeling of knowing judgements and retrospective confidence judgements for eyewitness memory (EM), in contrast to general knowledge (GK). For confidence judgements there was a reliable within-subject assessment of confidence for both GK and EM, but reliable between-subjects confidence—accuracy correlations for general knowledge only. For FOK a different pattern emerged, with no evidence of FOK accuracy for eyewitness memory at all. The theoretical implications of this pattern are discussed.     

强迫倾向、内心体验的信心水平与知道感缺乏的关系

为探讨强迫倾向、内心体验的信心水平与知道感缺乏的关系,采用虚假生物反馈为内在状态的外部线索,以指导语操控被试内心体验的信心水平,考察高、低强迫倾向（high/low obsessive-compulsive tendencies, HOC/LOC）组在不同信心水平下依赖外部线索评价内在状态的情况。结果：(1)HOC组的知道感存在缺陷,表现为比LOC组更依赖外部线索评价内在状态;(2)HOC组的知道感缺乏受其信心水平的影响,低信心会加剧HOC组的知道感缺乏。本研究结果能为缓解HOC个体的怀疑及相关强迫症状提供帮助,并或许能为OCD认知和元认知治疗提供思路。     

Causal and conditional inferences: A comment on Cummins (1995)

Cummins (1995) offers an analysis of causal and truthfunctional sufficiency and necessity to predict and explain the effects on conditional inferences of two pragmatic factors: alternative causes and disabling conditions. However, the justification of these predictions is inconsistent. This note offers a modified analysis which puts her predictions on a sounder base: it is proposed that alternative causes and disabling conditions affect judgments of argument validity under three different models for the causal conditional.     

Non-monotonicity and Informal Reasoning: Comment on Ferguson (2003)

In this paper, it is argued that Ferguson’s (2003, Argumentation 17, 335–346) recent proposal to reconcile monotonic logic with defeasibility has three counterintuitive consequences. First, the conclusions that can be derived from his new rule of inference are vacuous, a point that as already made against default logics when there are conflicting defaults. Second, his proposal requires a procedural “hack” to the break the symmetry between the disjuncts of the tautological conclusions to which his proposal leads. Third, Ferguson’s proposal amounts to arguing that all everyday inferences are sound by definition. It is concluded that the informal logic response to defeasibility, that an account of the context in which inferences are sound or unsound is required, still stands. It is also observed that another possible response is given by Bayesian probability theory (Oaksford and Chater, in press, Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK; Hahn and Oaksford, in press, Synthese).