Over-valued ideas: a conceptual analysis

Over-valued ideas are truly a neglected area of psychopathology with few experimental studies published. There is a different emphasis in the USA and Europe regarding their definition. For authors in the USA an over-valued idea has become shorthand for 'poor insight' in the middle of a continuum of obsessional doubts to delusional certainty. Compared to negative thoughts, obsessions and delusions, they are often more resistant to any treatment. A better understanding of over-valued ideas is required if advances are to be made in therapy and for the development of appropriate measures to evaluate the efficacy of novel treatments. A cognitive behavioural model of over-valued ideas is presented which draws upon the philosophical distinction between beliefs and values. It is argued that over-valued ideas are associated with idealised values, which have developed into such an over-riding importance, that they totally define the 'self' or identity of the individual. Idealised values are also characterised by the rigidity with which they are held. Such patients are unable to adapt to different circumstances and ignore the consequences of acting on their value. This analysis leads to a discussion of predictions that can be tested and various strategies that can be used in cognitive behaviour therapy.     

Dissociation of two kinds of source attributions

We examined the relationship between two different source attribution errors. One error found primarily in the cognitive psychology literature is the belief that one is an author of an idea when one is not. The other error, reported in the social psychology literature, occurs when people overestimate how long they have known an idea. Although somewhat different, both errors are a form of misappropriation of ideas to oneself. We investigated both attributions and found that when participants performed a more elaborate encoding task, erroneous claims of authorship were reduced but length-of-knowing judgments increased. The results are discussed in terms of the cognitive processing that is likely to give rise to each source attribution.     

Explaining delusions: a cognitive perspective

There is now considerable evidence for reasoning, attention, metacognition and attribution biases in delusional patients. Recently, these findings have been incorporated into a number of cognitive models that aim to explain delusion formation, maintenance and content. Although delusions are commonly conceptualized as beliefs, not all models make reference to models of normal belief formation. This review considers those models that explain delusions as a breakdown of normal belief formation (belief-positive models), approaches that explain the pathology only (belief-negative models) and approaches that view delusions as one end of a distribution of anomalous mental phenomena (the continuum view). A cognitive theory that includes the 'pragmatic pathology' of delusions will be able to address both the phenomenology and the treatment of delusion-related distress.     

The Effect of Cognitive Load on Intent-Based Moral Judgment

When making a moral judgment, people largely care about two factors: Who did it (causal responsibility), and did they intend to (intention)? Since Piaget's seminal studies, we have known that as children mature, they gradually place greater emphasis on intention, and less on mere bad outcomes, when making moral judgments. Today, we know that this developmental shift has several signature properties. Recently, it has been shown that when adults make moral judgments under cognitive load, they exhibit a pattern similar to young children; that is, their judgments become notably more outcome based. Here, we show that all of the same signature properties that accompany the outcome-to-intent shift in childhood characterize the “intent-to-outcome” shift obtained under cognitive load in adults. These findings hold important implications for current theories of moral judgment.     

The Mutual Development of Intersubjectivity and Metacognitive Capacity in the Psychotherapy for Persons with Schizophrenia

While cognitive behavioral approaches have been shown to help some individuals with schizophrenia, these approaches may be limited when working with patients with impairments in the metacognitive abilities required to form complex and integrated representations of themselves and others. In response, this paper explores the possibility that a key to working with patients with relatively impaired self-reflectivity lies in explicitly focusing on a patient’s intersubjective experience within psychotherapy. We offer theoretical and empirical support for the assertion that the tolerance and capacity for intersubjectivity is a basis for the development of self-reflectivity in general. We also explore how the fostering of intersubjective processes in psychotherapy might enable some patients to form more complex ideas about themselves and so better ward off delusions in the face of the challenges of daily life. To illustrate these principles we present the case of a patient with tenaciously held delusions and limited capacity for self-reflection. We discuss when and how the therapist’s awareness and verbalization of intersubjective processes within session allowed her and the patient to develop more complex and consensually valid ideas about him as a being in the world, which then assisted the patient to achieve improvements in a number of domains in his life.     

Delusional disorder and delusions: is there a risk of violence in social interactions about the core symptom?

Delusional disorders are rare, but psychoses with prominent and persistent delusions are less so. A small but significant association between psychosis and violence is often mediated by delusions in such illnesses. Traditionally, delusions have been viewed as “incorrigible”, but there is evidence that they change over time. During development of a scale for measuring delusions, it was found that people who acted violently on their “most important” delusion were more likely to have modified that belief after a mild form of challenge to it. When cognitive–behaviour therapy (CBT) is used for schizophrenia, attempts to modify psychotic symptoms are generally included. Could studies of CBT provide further information about possible risks of social interactions about delusions? In the UK, 2000 people with schizophrenia have been in randomized controlled trials of CBT with a goal of symptom modification. These studies were examined for evidence of violence during the treatment. There was none. Given the period prevalence of violence among people with psychosis, this is surprising. In these studies, however, both challenge to delusions and change in them was minimal and in the context of a safe clinical relationship. Challenge to delusions may, however, occur in a variety of social situations. There are no systematic data on lay challenge to them, but it seems likely that some in the sufferer's social circle will do so vigorously. Relatives, friends, and acquaintances are the people most vulnerable to the most serious violence by someone with psychosis. Study of how people interact in these circumstances and whether their interactions are relevant to modification of delusions would be worthwhile. Could those close to a sufferer learn skills for responding to such pathological beliefs that could be protective against violence, perhaps derived from the principles of CBT?. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cognitive complexity and the validity of clinicians' judgments

Efforts to explain why some neuropsychologists are more accurate than others have been unsuccessful. In the present study, the relation between the cognitive complexity of clinicians and the validity of their judgments was investigated. Forty-two neuropsychologists completed a measure of cognitive complexity. The hypothesis that neuropsychologists who are high in cognitive complexity will be more accurate than those who are low in cognitive complexity was not supported. It is not clear why cognitive complexity was not significantly related to the validity of diagnostic ratings: One explanation is that the measure of cognitive complexity used in this study was inadequate but another possibility is that neuropsychologists who are low in cognitive complexity may still be able to achieve high levels of accuracy if they attend to normative data when they interpret test results.     

Prospective and retrospective duration judgments: A meta-analytic review

A meta-analytic review compared prospective and retrospective judgments of duration, or duration judgment paradigm. Some theorists have concluded that the two paradigms involve similar cognitive processes, whereas others have found that they involve different processes. A review of 20 experiments revealed that prospective judgments are longer and less variable than are retrospective judgments. Several theoretically important variables moderate these effects, especially those concerned with information processing activities. Therefore, somewhat different cognitive processes subserve experienced and remembered duration. Attentional models are needed to explain prospective judgments, and memory-based models are needed to explain retrospective judgments. These findings clarify models of human duration judgment and suggest directions for future research. Evidence on duration judgments may also influence models of attention and memory.     

认知信息的详尽度与锚定对决策策略的影响

以191名大学生为被试,采用2×3的完全组间设计,探讨不同认知信息详尽度和有无锚定材料条件下大学生决策策略类型的选择。结果发现:(1)认知信息详尽度对被试的决策策略选择的影响显著,被试在低认知信息详尽度水平下倾向于选择采用维度比较策略,而在高认知信息详尽度水平下倾向于选择采用综合比较策略,并且倾向程度差异显著。(2)锚定效应对决策策略选择的影响不显著,认知信息详尽度与锚定的交互作用也不显著。     

A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination

In a recent issue of this journal, Björkman, Juslin, and Winman (1993) presented a model of the calibration of subjective confidence judgments for sensory discrimination which they called “subjective distance theory.” They proposed that there was a robust underconfidence bias in such judgments, that the model predicted such a bias, and that two different models were needed for the calibration of subjective confidence for cognitive judgments and for sensory ones. This paper addresses issues they raised. It points out that they have not presented a new model, but rather a portion of a more general one, the “decision-variable partition model” originally proposed in Ferrell and McGoey (1980). This paper explores properties of the model and shows, contrary to Björkman, Juslin, and Winman’s hypotheses, that the model does not predict under-confidence, that the “hard-easy effect” can be observed with sensory discriminations, and that the model fits not only sensory, but also cognitive judgments.     

Hypnosis and belief: A review of hypnotic delusions

Hypnosis can create temporary, but highly compelling alterations in belief. As such, it can be used to model many aspects of clinical delusions in the laboratory. This approach allows researchers to recreate features of delusions on demand and examine underlying processes with a high level of experimental control. This paper reviews studies that have used hypnosis to model delusions in this way. First, the paper reviews studies that have focused on reproducing the surface features of delusions, such as their high levels of subjective conviction and strong resistance to counter-evidence. Second, the paper reviews studies that have focused on modelling underlying processes of delusions, including anomalous experiences or cognitive deficits that underpin specific delusional beliefs. Finally, the paper evaluates this body of research as a whole. The paper discusses advantages and limitations of using hypnotic models to study delusions and suggests some directions for future research.     

Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the ‘alien’ in alien control?

Although current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusions are based on unusual experiences, they differ in the role that they accord experience in the formation of delusions. On some accounts, the experience comprises the very content of the delusion, whereas on other accounts the delusion is adopted in an attempt to explain an unusual experience. We call these the endorsement and explanationist models, respectively. We examine the debate between endorsement and explanationist models with respect to the 'alien control' delusion. People with delusions of alien control believe that their actions and/or thoughts are being controlled by an external agent. Some accounts of alien control (e.g., ) are best thought of in explanationist terms; other accounts (e.g., ) seem more suited to an endorsement approach. We argue that recent cognitive and neurophysiological evidence favours an endorsement model of the delusion of alien control.     

Explicit and implicit processes in multicue judgment

In two experiments, a multicue probability learning task was used to train participants in relating judgments to a criterion, on the basis of several cues that could or could not be relevant. The outcome feedback had 25% added noise to simulate real-world experience-based learning. Judgmental strategies acquired were measured by individual multiple linear regression analyses of a test phase (with no feedback) and were compared with self-ratings of cue relevance. In a third experiment, participants were instructed explicitly on cue relevance, with no training phase. The pattern of results suggested that both implicit and explicit cognitive processes influenced judgments and that they may have been sensitive to different task manipulations in the learning phase. On more complex tasks, despite weak explicit learning, explicit processes continued to influence judgments, producing a decrement in performance. These findings explain why studies of expert judgment often show only moderate levels of self-insight, since people have only partial access to the processes determining their judgments.     

A Multistage,Multiprocess Analysis of Consumer Judgment: A Selective Review and Conceptual Framework

Although numerous dual‐process models have been brought to bear on the cognitive operations that underlie consumer judgment, they are typically limited in their ability to capture the processes that occur at different stages of cognitive activity and to specify how these processes interface. In many (if not most) cases, a mix of both automatic and controlled processes underlies judgments and decisions. We suggest a theoretical framework that potentially provides an integration of these processes and review representative research and theory that might be conceptualized in terms of this framework.     

The Dutch curve: The introduction and reception of intelligence testing in the Netherlands, 1908–1940

In the Netherlands, intelligence testing has been pragmatic and has not generated the heated controversies found in other cultures. Four historical reasons are presented for this paradoxical development. First, the Binet test was used mainly as a diagnostic instrument for professional judgments about admission to special education. Second, the eugenic use of IQ tests was moderated by the marginal position of eugenics in Dutch society. Third, the process of “pillarization” gave considerable power to denominational groups in Dutch society, and they strongly criticized deterministic ideas about the heredity of intelligence. Fourth, the educational scientist, cognitive psychologist, philosopher, and government adviser, Philip Kohnstamm, was very influential in Dutch science and politics. He rejected intelligence testing and its deterministic connotations in favor of the idea of the educability of cognitive capacities. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Transfer of metacognitive skills and hint seeking in monkeys

Metacognition is knowledge that can be expressed as confidence judgments about what one knows (monitoring) and by strategies for learning what one does not know (control). Although there is a substantial literature on cognitive processes in animals, little is known about their metacognitive abilities. Here we show that rhesus macaques, trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments about their performance on perceptual tasks, transferred that ability immediately to a new perceptual task and to a working memory task. We also show that monkeys can learn to request "hints" when they are given problems that they would otherwise have to solve by trial and error. This study demonstrates, for the first time, that nonhuman primates share with humans the ability to monitor and transfer their metacognitive ability both within and between different cognitive tasks, and to seek new knowledge on a need-to-know basis.     

Improving the Accuracy of Group Judgment: A Process Intervention Combining Group Facilitation,Social Judgment Analysis,and Information Technology

Interacting groups fail to make judgments as accurate as those of their most capable members due to problems associated with both interaction processes and cognitive processing. Group process techniques and decision analytic tools have been used with groups to combat these problems. While such techniques and tools do improve the quality of group judgment, they have not enabled groups to make judgments more accurate than those of their most capable members on tasks that evoke a great deal of systematic bias. A new intervention procedure that integrates group facilitation, social judgment analysis, and information technology was developed to overcome more fully the problems typically associated with interaction processes and cognitive processing. The intervention was evaluated by testing the hypothesis that groups using this new procedure can establish judgment policies for cognitive conflict tasks that are more accurate than the ones produced by any of their members. An experiment involving 16 four- and five-member groups was conducted to compare the accuracy of group judgments with the accuracy of the judgments of the most capable group member. A total of 96 participants (48 males and 48 females) completed the individual part of the task; 71 of these participants worked in groups. Results indicated that the process intervention enabled small, interacting groups to perform significantly better than their most capable members on two cognitive conflict tasks (p < .05). The findings suggest that Group Decision Support Systems that integrate facilitation, social judgment analysis, and information technology should be used to improve the accuracy of group judgment.     

Alexithymia tendencies and mere exposure alter social approachability judgments

ABSTRACT People have a fundamental motivation for social connection and social engagement, but how do they decide whom to approach in ambiguous social situations? Subjective feelings often influence such decisions, but people vary in awareness of their feelings. We evaluated two opposing hypotheses based on visual familiarity effects and emotional awareness on social approachability judgments. These hypotheses differ in their interpretation of the familiarity or mere exposure effect with either an affective or cognitive interpretation. The responses of our 128‐student sample supported the cognitive interpretation. Lower emotional awareness or higher alexithymia was associated with higher approachability judgments to familiarized faces and lower approachability judgments to novel faces. These findings were independent of the Big Five personality factors. The results indicate that individual differences in emotional awareness should be integrated into social decision‐making models. The results also suggest that cognitive‐perceptual alterations may underlie the poorer social outcomes associated with alexithymia.     

Delusions,Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings

Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their “delusional reality.” To explain these features, I offer a model according to which, contrary to appearances, delusions are not beliefs at all. Delusions are acceptances that are generated by pathologically powerful cognitive feelings. This model has implications for the way that we should think about non‐pathological doxastic states and emotions.