Stereotype strength and attentional bias: Preference for confirming versus disconfirming information depends on processing capacity

In two experiments, we investigated the relationships among stereotype strength, processing capacity, and the allocation of attention to stereotype-consistent versus stereotype-inconsistent information describing a target person. The results of both experiments showed that, with full capacity, greater stereotype strength was associated with increased attention toward stereotype-consistent versus stereotype-inconsistent information. However, when capacity was diminished, greater stereotype strength was associated with increased attention toward inconsistent versus consistent information. Thus, strong stereotypes may act as self-confirming filters when processing capacity is plentiful, but as efficient information gathering devices that maximize the acquisition of novel (disconfirming) information when capacity is depleted. Implications for models of stereotyping and stereotype change are discussed.     

Determinants of confirming and disconfirming responses to negative social labels

Two experiments explored the question of when people will respond to negative labels by confirming them and when they will respond by disconfirming them. In a field experiment subjects were accused of not taking advantage of the opportunities available in a nearby city, and in a laboratory experiment they were accused of having low self-confidence. After these accusations, subjects were given an opportunity to behave in ways that varied in the degree to which they were consistent with the experimenter's labels. For some subjects the experimenter's accusations included mention of the fact that the negative label also applied to many other members of their group, while for other subjects this group factor was not mentioned. The reference to the group either increased or decreased subjects' label-confirming behavior, depeding on whether the subject had provided the experimenter with evidence consistent with the label before the accusations were made. When the experimenter had this evidence, subjects subsequently confirmed the label more if the fact that the negative label applied to many group members was mentioned than if it was not mentioned. When the experimenter accused the subject without having any evidence, subjects disconfirmed the label more if the group was mentioned than if it was not.     

Cortical potentials evoked by confirming and disconfirming feedback following an auditory discrimination

Vertex potentials elicited by visual feedback (signals following an auditory intensity discrimination have been studied with eight Ss. Feedback signals which confirmed the prior sensory decision elicited small P3s, while disconfirming, feedback elicited P3s that were larger. On the average, the latency of P3 was also found to increase with increasing disparity between the judgment and. the feedback information. These effects were part bf an overall dichotomy in waveshape following confirming vs disconforming feedback. These findings are incorporated in a general model of the role of P3 in perceptual decision making.     

Children''s understanding of belief and disconfirming visual evidence

Data from 3- to 5-year-old children show that even the youngest have an understanding that a story character cannot think an object is in a box when the character looks into the empty box. This understanding is, however, limited to the case where children share the same visual perspective with the character. When visual perspectives are different the relevant knowledge develops shortly after 4 years at about the time that children master the false belief task. These results are interpreted as young children using an implicit constraint that “think” cannot be applied in view of disconfirming visual evidence. This implicit knowledge becomes explicit and, thus, perspective independent with some delay.     

Making the illusory correlation effect appear and then disappear: The effects of increased learning

The acquisition of a negative evaluation of a fictitious minority social group in spite of the absence of any objective correlation between group membership and negative behaviours was described by Hamilton and Gifford (1976) Hamilton, D. L. and Gifford, R. K. 1976. Illusory correlation in intergroup perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12: 392–407. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] as an instance of an illusory correlation. We studied the acquisition and attenuation through time of this correlation learning effect. In two experiments we asked for participants’ judgements of two fictitious groups using an online version of a group membership belief paradigm. We tested how judgements of the two groups changed as a function of the amount of training they received. Results suggest that the perception of the illusory correlation effect is initially absent, emerges with intermediate amounts of absolute experience, but diminishes and is eliminated with increased experience. This illusory correlation effect can be considered to reflect incomplete learning rather than a bias due to information loss in judgements or distinctiveness.     

Countering conspiracy theory beliefs: Understanding the conjunction fallacy and considering disconfirming evidence

Research suggests that a number of cognitive processes—including pattern perception, intentionality bias, proportionality bias, and confirmation bias—may underlie belief in a conspiracy theory. However, there are reasons to believe that conspiracy theory beliefs also depend in part on a failure to understand the probability of actual events allegedly supporting those conspiracy theories as well as a failure to entertain disconfirming evidence that may contradict those beliefs. Study 1 examines the relationships between general beliefs in conspiracy theories, belief in a novel conspiracy theory, conjunctive error propensity, and the propensity to consider disconfirming evidence. Study 2 investigates the roles of confronting both the propensity to make conjunctive errors and the failure to consider disconfirming evidence in changing conspiracy theory beliefs as well as attitudes associated with those beliefs. The results of both studies suggest that corrections to one's propensity to make conjunctive errors and mindful consideration of disconfirming evidence may serve as viable methods of self-persuasion pertaining to conspiracy theory beliefs.     

Literalism as a marker of hypnotic "trance": disconfirming evidence

The responses given by highly hypnotizable, hypnotic subjects and those of unhypnotizable subjects who simulated hypnosis to questions of the type, "Do you mind telling me your name?" and "Do you mind standing up?" were contrasted. The purpose was to examine Erickson's (1980) assertion that literalism (answering "yes" or "no" verbally or nonverbally without any cognitive elaboration) is a marker of hypnotic "trance." Simulators exhibited a greater rate of literalism than hypnotic "virtuosos" (i.e., extreme scorers on both group and individual hypnotizability measures). Hypnotized subjects and nonhypnotized subjects approached in the campus library responded comparably. Because less than a third of hypnotic virtuosos responded literally, our results strongly refuted Erickson's assertion that literalism is a cognitive feature of hypnosis.     

Intuitive covariation assessment of the illusory correlation

Most of the research concerned with the illusory correlation is modeled after the seminal work of D. L. Hamilton and R. K. Gifford (1976). However, S. A. Haslam and C. McGarty (1994) have voiced concerns over the dependent measures used within this paradigm. Therefore, in this study, the authors tested a new dependent variable that has high face validity. This measure was modeled after the work of J. R. McGahan and R. Wight (1989) and consisted of a set of propositional statements representing either the illusory correlation, the contingency opposite the illusory correlation, or the noncontingency. A second purpose of this study was to validate other studies that have used dependent measures modeled after the work of J. R. McGahan and R. Wight (1989). Demonstrating that this measure can be used to detect a well-documented phenomenon (i.e., the illusory correlation) would strengthen the results and conclusions from other studies. To this end, results from 2 experiments indicate that this measure does provide a valid alternative to those measures that are commonly used in illusory correlation studies. The results thereby give credence to other studies that have used similar dependent measures.     

Problems with the measurement of illusory correlation

The illusory correlation eflect (ICE) refers to a tendency for people to over-represent rare behaviours performed by members of an infrequently encountered (minority) group. On the basis of an empirtcal study ( N = 245) this paper examines three procedural features that are common to studies in this field: (a) excluding subjects who assign too many behaviours to the minority group, (b) asking subjects to estimate the incidence of distinctive behaviours, and (c) submitting phi coefficients to Z transformation. Results show that the ICE is significantly lower amongst subjects who (a) are excluded and (b) estimate non-distinctive behaviours and (c) that Z transformation applied to phi coefficients renders the distribution of responses non-normal and does not provide a more linear index of efect strength. Implications for future research are discussed.     

Experience and validity of clinical judgment: The illusory correlation

Mental health experts often justify diagnostic and predictive judgments on the basis of “years of experience” with a particular type of person. Justification by experience is common in legal settings, and can have profound consequences for the person about whom such judgments are made. However, research shows that the validity of clinical judgment and amount of clinical experience are unrelated. The role of experience in learning varies as a function of what is to be learned. Experiments show that learning conceptual categories depends upon: (1) the learner's having clear hypotheses about the possible rule for category membership prior to receiving feedback about which instances belong to the category, and, (2) the systematic nature of such feedback, especially about erroneous categorizations. Since neither of these conditions is satisfied in clinical contexts in psychology, the subsequent failure of experience per se to enhance diagnostic or predictive validity is unsurprising. Claims that “I can tell on the basis of my experience with people of a particular type (e.g., child abusers) that this person is of that type (e.g., a child abuser)” are simply invalid.     

Schizotypy and sustained attention: confirming evidence from an adult community sample

Sustained attention deficits represent one of the most robust findings in the study of schizophrenia and schizotypy. However, very little is known about the nature of sustained attention performance and schizotypy in the general adult population. The present study assessed sustained attention performance in a large, normative adult community sample (N = 305) with no history of psychosis using the Continuous Performance Test-identical pairs version (CPT-IP). Associations between overall CPT-IP performance and schizotypal personality disorder features, controlling for the effects of age, sex, and educational level, revealed diminished sensitivity (d', discriminability), and increased random errors were related to increased reality distortion features. These data, drawn from a general population sample, provided support for overall sustained attention deficits as an endophenotype for schizophrenia liability.     

Study effort versus distinctiveness in the recollection of veridical and illusory memories

In past research, stimulus distinctiveness and study effort have been claimed to promote the development of distinctive memories, which in turn have been considered critical for enhancing veridical recollection and reducing illusory memory experiences. In the present investigation, stimulus distinctiveness, obtained by displaying text-redundant pictorial information at study, was pitted against study effort to determine whether either factor would be more beneficial to veridical recall and more detrimental to illusory recall than the other. Subjects first completed word fragments with or without the aid of an image of each word’s referent and then performed a recall test. It was found that when images were useful to the encoding task (fragment completion), their presence at study enhanced veridical recall and reduced illusory memories more than any additional encoding effort.     

The effects of existential threat on reading comprehension of worldview affirming and disconfirming information

Terror management theory posits that cultural worldviews buffer people from thoughts and concerns about death. In support of this claim, numerous studies have shown that mortality salience (MS) increases an individual's motivation to uphold and defend important cultural worldviews. We hypothesized that the motivation to defend cultural worldviews following MS would also enhance people's ability to comprehend worldview affirming (vs. disconfirming) information. Three studies investigated this possibility. Study 1 showed that MS (vs. control) increased reading comprehension of a pro‐evolution essay among participants with a strongly evolutionist worldview, but decreased reading comprehension among participants with a strongly creationist worldview. With the use of a pro‐creation essay, Study 2 conceptually replicated these effects and demonstrated that the interactive effect of worldview and death anxiety on reading comprehension was mediated by defensive motivation. Study 3 replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2 among participants with a strongly evolutionist worldview, but only when the information in the essay was perceived as veridical. Discussion focused on the specific process through which MS affects reading comprehension of worldview relevant ideas. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children correlate infrequent behaviors with minority groups: a case of illusory correlation

Adults perceive an illusory correlation between negative social behaviors and membership in the smaller of two groups — the minority group (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). Two experiments investigated the development of this illusory correlation. We created pictorial stimuli showing children performing good or bad behaviors. In Experiment 1 we told participants (children in grades 1, 3, 5, and 7 and adults) that each picture depicted a child from one of two groups. Group membership and behavior were uncorrelated, but, like adults, children perceived a correlation between the smaller group and negative behaviors. Children’s attributions of good and bad behaviors to the two groups showed a weak but significant bias. Their estimations of the number of children in each group who behaved badly showed a stronger bias. Children also rated the smaller group more negatively on many dimensions. Experiment 2 showed that the illusory correlation is not dependent on social stimuli. Children performed essentially the same tasks, but good and bad behaviors were replaced by the colors red and green, and the group members were represented as squares and triangles. The results were strikingly similar to those obtained with social stimuli. In both experiments, the strength of the illusory correlation did not vary significantly with age. The results are discussed from the perspective of theories that have been proposed to account for adult behavior and the implications of no developmental trend.     

Crossed categorization effects on the formation of illusory correlations

This study investigates how stereotypes are formed and whether stereotype formation is reduced by the prevalence of multiple categorizations. Illusory correlations between the desirability of behaviours and two dimensions of social categorization, both containing a majority and a minority category, were assessed in single categorization and crossed categorization conditions. In the single categorization conditions, the usual illusory correlation in favour of the majority category was obtained. In the crossed condition, the combination of the two majority categories was positively discriminated from the remaining three combinations, while no differences were found among the latter. A source‐monitoring analysis of assignment frequencies replicated earlier findings that illusory correlations are due to an evaluative guessing bias, rather than to enhanced memory for individual instances of behaviour. The results show inconsistencies with a distinctiveness‐based and a social categorization account of illusory correlations, but they can be explained in terms of information loss. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.