‘Perceived ownership’ or cognitive dissonance?

In 1992 a study by Beggan claimed it had confirmed the existence of Nuttin's ‘mere ownership effect’. This study examined an alternative mechanism for Beggan's findings in the form of forced compliance cognitive dissonance. Seventy‐three participants volunteered for the study (66 females and seven males). Results support the view that cognitive dissonance, accepting ownership of a target that was earlier perceived with negative affectivity, is a sufficient condition to enhance estimates of a target object. Ownership per se was not found to be a sufficient condition to enhance owner's estimates of an owned object. In light of this finding cognitive dissonance is offered as a possible mechanism for explaining the previous reports of a perceived ownership effect. This mechanism may also be applicable to instant endowment and mere ownership phenomena. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Prefrontal cortex dysfunction and ‘Jumping to Conclusions’: Bias or deficit?

The 'beads task' is used to measure the cognitive basis of delusions, namely the 'Jumping to Conclusions' (JTC) reasoning bias. However, it is not clear whether the task merely taps executive dysfunction - known to be impaired in patients with schizophrenia - such as planning and resistance to impulse. To study this, 19 individuals with neurosurgical excisions to the prefrontal cortex, 21 unmedicated adults with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and 25 healthy controls completed two conditions of the beads task, in addition to tests of memory and executive function as well as control tests of probabilistic reasoning ability. The results indicated that the prefrontal lobe group (in particular, those with left-sided lesions) demonstrated a JTC bias relative to the ADHD and control groups. Further exploratory analyses indicated that JTC on the beads task was associated with poorer performance in certain executive domains. The results are discussed in terms of the executive demands of the beads task and possible implications for the model of psychotic delusions based on the JTC bias.     

‘Who am I?’

The dreams and existential questions of those, who came into being in order to replace a dead person, pivot around a central cry: ‘Who am I?’ If conceived, born or designated as a replacement child, such an individual may suffer—even as an adult—from a rarely recognized unconscious confusion of identity, compounded by grief and survivors’ guilt. From before the child is born, the archetypal forces of death and life are joined in a fateful constellation; the soul of the replacement child bears the shadow of death from the very beginning of life. Hope for the replacement child lies in an emergence of true self as soul recreates original life. Analysis can help the replacement child experience a ‘rebirth into true life’, not as ‘the one who returned’, but as a psychologically newborn individual; the path of individuation countering the replacement child‘s identification with the dead. Jungian analysis offers unique concepts for understanding and healing the replacement child; C.G. Jung himself was born after two stillborn babies and an infant that lived only five days.     

‘What works?’ Therapeutic experience with grieving clients

This paper poses questions about the nature of the therapeutic process in general. Using a holistic and integrative perspective, the author argues that therapy has been influenced by considerations of therapist expertise, techniques aimed at solving problems, and a paternalistic model of doing things to the client. The paper proposes a contrasting approach involving a shared, conversational experience with clients which respects personal autonomy and encourages creative solutions. Throughout the whole paper weaves the underlying theme of unresolved grief, reflecting the author's philosophy that loss is a covert agenda for many people seeking therapeutic help. The author's thesis is that in defining the emotions associated with unresolved grief, exploring the contexts in which the losses occurred, and investigating future options and directions, therapeutic change can be effected. Finally, a quandary that therapy as conversation presents is addressed: how can we research our dialogue to ensure effective outcomes?     

Why ‘spiritism’?

Some of the early representatives of psychoanalysis had a lifelong interest in certain ‘occult’ phenomena. Although several theories were born for the purpose of understanding the interest of Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung or Sándor Ferenczi in spiritualism and related phenomena, interpreters usually ignore the changing cultural meaning and significance of modern occult practices like spiritualism. The aim of the present essay is to outline the cultural and historical aspects of spiritualism and spiritism in Hungary, and thus to shed new light on the involvement of Ferenczi – and other Hungarian psychoanalysts like Géza Róheim, István Hollós, and Mihály Bálint – in spiritualism and spiritism. The connections between spiritualism and the Budapest School of Psychoanalysis will be discussed, highlighting the cultural and scientific significance of Hungarian spiritualism and spiritism in the evolution of psychoanalysis. Taking into account the relative lack of the scientific research in the field of spiritism in Hungary, it can be pointed out that Ferenczi undertook a pioneering role in Hungarian psychical research.     

The Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian Communion: ‘Love’ and ‘Gift'?

Christians in the West often have become so accustomed to naming the Holy Spirit ‘Love’ and ‘Gift’ – or at least to associating the Holy Spirit particularly with these two dynamisms – that it can come as a surprise that Scripture nowhere explicitly names the Holy Spirit either ‘love’ or ‘gift’. Indeed, as Hans Urs von Balthasar points out, the Spirit is much more clearly associated with truth, knowledge and power. How then does Augustine arrive at the view that the Holy Spirit should be named ‘Love’ and ‘Gift'? I examine and evaluate the complex exegetical steps by which Augustine draws out these names.     

Whither ‘TRS’?

Books reviewed in this article:
Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon (eds), Guide to the Study of Religion
J'annine Jobling and Ian Markham (eds), Theological Liberalism, Creative and Critical     

‘Does class count?’ Social class and counselling

This article explores the importance attached to social class by experienced practitioners taking part in a co‐operative inquiry group. A review of the literature from the last thirty years indicates that there is very little research on class in relation to counselling and psychotherapy reported in the UK. Both authors position themselves as coming from working class origins. Nine co‐researchers from both middle and working class origins joined the group. Eight meetings took place over a period of nine months. Extracts from the group's discussions are represented and integrated with ‘presentational knowing’ drawn from contemporary culture, including poetry and popular music. This study suggests that social class is a neglected aspect of diversity in the counselling field. Implications of the study have relevance for the language of counselling and psychotherapy and class based values; social class and its impact on initial education; and ongoing counselling practice and access to therapy for working class people.     

‘Kierkegaard’: A Reasonable Fideist?

The task I set myself is to identify whether Climacus is an extreme or moderate fideist, and to go on to evaluate how convincing or persuasive I find Climacus' position. Separating metaphysical and epistemological fideism, I spend the first section of the article denying that Climacus is a 'metaphysical fideist'. This involves looking at the notion of 'truth as subjectivity'. I will claim that in expounding this notorious maxim Climacus can be seen as expressing something almost trivially obvious and/or something substantially wrong. I will further argue that even the obvious version of the maxim needs to be heavily qualified before it can be a sufficient account of 'religious truth'.
In the second section of the article I argue that Climacus should be understood as a moderate fideist, who considers that reason should assent to its own limitations. Although I will approve of reason-exhausting projects, I will complain that the paradox which is supposed to so exhaust my reason does not perplex me in the relevant sense.     

HOMOSEXUALITY OR HOMOEROTICISM?: ‘NARCISSISTIC EROTICISM’

It may be dangerous for a psychoanalyst to let him/herself be influenced by the social and media pressure that proposes the use of the term 'homosexual' to describe the affective functioning of a homophile, for this assumes—from the outset—that it is of a truly sexual nature. However, following certain Freudian writings and the works of Férenczi in 1911, we know the different mechanisms of the narcissistic register that come into play in the quite particular relational behaviour that should more relevantly be called 'homoeroticism'. On the other hand, our diagnostic and therapeutic approach will benefit from not considering, at the outset, all the economically and psychogenetically very different varieties of homoeroticism, male or female, latent or manifest, in too global a fashion, with reference also to the Freudian concept of psychic bisexuality. The French psychoanalytical research team working with the author has focused on these important issues for a number of years now. This article aims to give a fairly brief account of its work, with the objective of opening up a discussion amongst psychoanalysts, within the framework of Freudian thought.     

Internal objects' or ‘chimerical monsters’?: the demonic ‘third forms’ of the internal world

The concept of 'object' whether internal or external, is a hold-over from the Enlightenment and from the positivistic certainty of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century science, Its use in current psychoanalytic theory and practice is now obsolete because of the contributions of post-modernism and their emphasis on subjectivity and relativity. In plate of the word 'object', the author favors a return to pre-Enlightenment psychology in order to address the presence and clinical manifestation of what the term 'object' screened, i.e., demons, monsters, chimerae, ghosts, spirits, etc. In terms of external 'objects', he favors such terms as 'persons' or 'subjects', which also reflects an adjustment to the post-modem emphasis on the ineffability of the Other.     

Ethnic and gender differences in the labour market perceptions of post‐higher education job seekers: ‘Double jeopardy’ or ‘ethnic prominence’?

Ethnic and gender differences in perceptions of graduate job acquisition difficulty among U.K. post‐higher education job seekers were investigated. Two main hypotheses were compared: the double jeopardy hypothesis (DJH), suggesting an additive or interactive increase in perceived difficulty associated with membership of different disadvantaged demographic categories; and the ethnic prominence hypothesis, arguing for the salience of ethnicity over gender in perceptions. Graduates and final year students (N= 800) from Black, Indian, Pakistani/Bangladeshi, and White ethnic backgrounds rated the level of difficulty that a suitably qualified man and woman from their own ethnic background would encounter in attaining 10 graduate jobs. Interactions between participant ethnic background and gender of job seeker rated were examined in the context of the competing hypotheses. The perceptions of men, and Indian and Pakistani/Bangladeshi women, were consistent with the additive DJH, whereas Black women's perceptions were not. It is concluded that: (1) the perceptions of the latter group may reflect knowledge of Black male disadvantage, or negative stereotyping with respect to employment in the U.K. graduate labour market; and (2) perceptions of double jeopardy by some female graduates may have negative effects on their job seeking endeavours.     

What are ‘Universalizable Interests’?

Many of Habermas's critical commentators agree that Discourse Ethics fails as a theory of the validity of moral norms and only succeeds as a theory of the democratic legitimacy of socio-political norms. The reason they give is that the moral principle (U) is too restrictive to count as a necessary condition of the validity of norms. Other commentators more sympathetic to his project want to abandon principle (U) and remodel Discourse Ethics without it. Still others want to downplay the role of universalizing moral discourse and to make more of Habermas's less demanding, though still somewhat vague, conception of ethical discourse. Against this chorus of critical voices Habermas maintains that his conception of moral discourse and the moral principle (U) are central to Discourse Ethics in general, and to the normative heart of his political theory in particular. The conflict may have arisen in part because the concept of a 'universalizable interest' which is central to Habermas's understanding of moral discourse and of the moral principle (U) remains opaque even after nearly two decades of critical debate. Actually Habermas's concept of interest is pretty obscure too. But the obscurity surrounding the concept of interest is not the source of the confusion. For our present purposes we can simply stipulate that an interest is a reason to want. The notion of reason rests loosely on the notion of a need, and the concepts of need and desire are take left deliberately vague. The source of the current confusion lies in the notion of universalizability that is in play. Once we pay due attention to the conditions of the universalizability of interests contained in Habermas's formulation of the moral principle (U), we can distinguish between a weaker and a stronger version of the principle. I argue that only the weaker version is defensible. But I also want to show that Habermas is tempted into defending the stronger version, and to explain why he does so.     

Can ‘Intrinsic’ Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions?1

An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.     

Disorganized families and the helping professions: ‘who's in charge of what?’

Disorganized families fail to define their executive and caretaking structure, resulting in multiple social and emotional problems. They tend to be referred to a Child and Family Psychiatric Clinic in crisis and with a wide network of professional workers already involved. The professionals' rôle often can be seen as 'supplementing' apparent functional deficiencies in the family. Work with disorganized families can be very demanding on professional time and emotional energy but is facilitated by everyone knowing 'who's in charge of what' decisions in the family's professional network. A case is presented to suggest that the Clinic's initial aim should be to clarify the responsibilities and role of each member of the professional network, and then of the structure and organization in the family. Joint family-professional network meetings can help to achieve these aims.