Linking Disjoint Supermatrices and Criteria Clusters

An axiom of the Analytic Network Process (ANP) requires the elements being considered to be strongly connected in order to obtain a meaningful priority vector. A simple example demonstrates the issues that can arise when a decision contains disjoint clusters within the Supermatrix. From the example it can be observed that the necessary information to complete additional linking pin comparisons would have already been collected; and by performing linking pin comparisons a decision maker can convert a disjoint Supermatrix into a strongly connected Supermatrix. The linking process is summarized in five steps and provided in the general form. This linking comparison methodology exploits the fundamental advantages of pairwise comparisons and can also be used to weight the criteria clusters within a decision network. Linking pin comparisons performed at the level of a criterion of a single alternative with respect to another criterion of that same alternative can be used to obtain the criteria cluster weights. Linking pin comparisons at this level can reduce the decision maker's cognitive burden in comparison to totality comparisons. The ability to strongly connect an otherwise disjoint Supermatrix and reduce the decision maker's cognitive burden demonstrates the usefulness of linking pin comparisons in ANP decision models. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The nature of the language faculty and its implications for evolution of language (Reply to Fitch, Hauser, and Chomsky)

In a continuation of the conversation with Fitch, Chomsky, and Hauser on the evolution of language, we examine their defense of the claim that the uniquely human, language-specific part of the language faculty (the “narrow language faculty”) consists only of recursion, and that this part cannot be considered an adaptation to communication. We argue that their characterization of the narrow language faculty is problematic for many reasons, including its dichotomization of cognitive capacities into those that are utterly unique and those that are identical to nonlinguistic or nonhuman capacities, omitting capacities that may have been substantially modified during human evolution. We also question their dichotomy of the current utility versus original function of a trait, which omits traits that are adaptations for current use, and their dichotomy of humans and animals, which conflates similarity due to common function and similarity due to inheritance from a recent common ancestor. We show that recursion, though absent from other animals' communications systems, is found in visual cognition, hence cannot be the sole evolutionary development that granted language to humans. Finally, we note that despite Fitch et al.'s denial, their view of language evolution is tied to Chomsky's conception of language itself, which identifies combinatorial productivity with a core of “narrow syntax.” An alternative conception, in which combinatoriality is spread across words and constructions, has both empirical advantages and greater evolutionary plausibility.     

Reply to Dews,and a plea for Schelling

The discussion is a response to Dews on the question of how Schelling's Freiheitsschrift should be interpreted. It falls into two halves, the first defending my interpretation, and the second expanding on the case that Dews makes for the unavoidability of metaphysics in the theory of human freedom, with which I am in full agreement. The main criticism that Dews makes of my reading is that the argument I attribute to Schelling concerning the metaphysical significance of evil rests on Kantian assumptions regarding the existence of pure practical reason, which Schelling rejects. I argue that, though certainly matters are more complicated than my earlier discussion made them seem, Schelling remains sufficiently close to Kant for the argument I attribute to avoid inconsistency. In the second half I raise what I claim to be a neglected but important question: Why is the legacy of classical German philosophy not regarded as significant for contemporary discussion of human freedom? My answer in brief is that the concept of freedom has undergone a profound contraction. In this context I also try to define more precisely what is distinctive of Schelling's view of human freedom.     

Reply to Downing,Jacobs, and Schneider

We thank our reviewers for their discussions and we appreciate the opportunity to dialogue about our work with Sandra. Some responses express our shared point of view, others our individual reflections. For clarity, we indicate the point of view at the beginning of each section.