Two Faces of Representativeness: The Effects of Response Format on Beliefs about Random Sampling

Two beliefs that act in concert have been proposed as the basis for the representativeness heuristic in general, and judgments about random sampling in particular: samples resemble their parent populations (resemblance), and random sampling is a self-correcting process (balancing). Based on the results of a preliminary experiment, we proposed the ‘rule-cuing’ hypothesis, which is that different aspects of sampling problems can invoke these two beliefs separately. We found that when response formats required subjects to estimate themean of a sample, subjects’ responses reflected resemblance beliefs, whereas when subjects estimated the total score in a sample, balancing beliefs were elicited. In additional experiments we eliminated two rival hypotheses: theproblem difficulty hypothesis, and thearithmetic inconsistency hypothesis. Results suggest that beliefs, as well as preferences, may be constructed on-line in response to task characteristics.     

Linda versus World Cup: Conjunctive Probabilities in Three-event Fictional and Real-life Predictions

Conjunction errors in probability judgments have been explained in terms of representatives, non-normative combination procedures, and linguistic, conversational, or conceptual misunderstandings. In two studies, a three-event variant of the classical Linda scenario (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) was contrasted with estimates of Norway’s chances in three coming World Cup soccer matches. Conjunction errors occurred even in the latter, real-life prediction task, but much less frequently than in the fictional Linda case. Magnitude of the conjunction effect was found to be dependent upon type of constituent (fictional versus dispositional), unequal versus equal probabilities of constituent events, prediction of positive versus negative outcomes, and, for real-life predictions only, umber of constitutent events. Fictional probability ratings were close to but lower than representativenss ratings, giving evidence for a representativeness and adjustment-for-uncertainty strategy, whereas probabilities of real-life events were given a causal model interpretation.     

Intuitive prediction: ecological validity versus representativeness

Insufficiently regressive intuitive predictions have been attributed to mistaken reliance on the representativeness heuristic. In contrast, we suggest that intuitive predictions stem from a conceptualization of ‘goodness of prediction’ that differs from the accepted statistical definition in terms of error minimization, namely, ecological validity—that is, representation of the substantive characteristics of the predicted variable Y and its distribution as well as of the relationship between Y and the predictor X—rather than minimization of prediction errors. Simultaneous satisfaction of the above representation requirements is achieved by multivalued prediction: The prediction of different Y′ values for the same X value, resulting in conditional distributions Y′|X for at least some X values. Empirical results supporting this hypothesis are presented and discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

快速节俭启发式——相关争议与简短评论

在有限理性和生态理性假设基础上,Gigerenzer教授和在他指导下的“ABC研究组”发现并提出了再认启发式、采纳最佳启发式、优先启发式、道德启发式等一系列“快速节俭启发式”。大量研究表明这些简单决策规则是节省信息的合理而高效的认知策略,但也有一些研究者对它们表示怀疑。在本文中,作者对近期关于快速节俭启发式的一般争议及围绕采纳最佳启发式、优先启发式、道德启发式展开的具体争议进行了回顾与总结,给出了简短的评论。快速节俭启发式是一个富有前景、却又布满荆棘的研究领域。要想实现宏伟的研究目标,ABC研究组尚需做出更多、更大的努力。     

Undecidable Decisions: Rationality Limits and Decision-making Heuristics

In this article the theoretic evolution and the empirical-experimental efforts that have led to the affirmation of the bounded/procedural rationality paradigm are discussed. Moreover, the debate on supporters of the “optimization” approach and supporters of the “bounded/procedural rationality” approach is traced, highlighting the irreconcilability of these two approaches and, in retort, a solid defense against a merely “reductionist” attempt of the innovative context of the Simonian theory. Critically going over the debate on decision dynamics, it becomes clear how, due to the uncertain nature of rational processes, it is impossible to establish the decision-making best way. The imperfect character of individual choice is explained by how the decider identifies a solution that appears satisfying in that moment due to cognitive and temporal limits.     

Upward versus Downward Anchoring in Frequency Judgments of Social Facts

Frequency estimation of social facts in two methods of judgment elicitation was investigated. In the “narrow-range” condition, subjects answered questions in the format: “Out of 100 incidents, how many belong to category X?” In the “wide-range” condition, the frequency for the same event was assessed with respect to “Out of 10,000”. Judged frequencies in the wide-range condition were divided by 100, and were compared with the corresponding judgments in the narrow-range condition. Such comparisons were made for low-frequency and high-frequency events. Previous research has shown that, for low-frequency events, judged frequencies are proportionally greater in the narrow-range than in the wide-range condition. These results reflect cognitive processes of implicit anchoring, whereby judged frequencies lie close to small numbers within the response ranges provided. I call this process “downward anchoring,” and predicted that this tendency would be replicated in the present study. Moreover, I predicted that assessments about high-frequency events would evoke similar cognitive processes operating in the opposite direction. By such “upward anchoring,” judged frequencies would lie close to relatively larger numbers within the given response ranges. Consequently, I predicted that judged frequencies for high-frequency events would be proportionally greater in the wide-range condition than in the narrow-range condition. These predictions were confirmed.     

Prediction in infants and adults: A pupillometry study

Adults use both bottom‐up sensory inputs and top‐down signals to generate predictions about future sensory inputs. Infants have also been shown to make predictions with simple stimuli and recent work has suggested top‐down processing is available early in infancy. However, it is unknown whether this indicates that top‐down prediction is an ability that is continuous across the lifespan or whether an infant's ability to predict is different from an adult's, qualitatively or quantitatively. We employed pupillometry to provide a direct comparison of prediction abilities across these disparate age groups. Pupil dilation response (PDR) was measured in 6‐month olds and adults as they completed an identical implicit learning task designed to help learn associations between sounds and pictures. We found significantly larger PDR for visual omission trials (i.e. trials that violated participants’ predictions without the presentation of new stimuli to control for bottom‐up signals) compared to visual present trials (i.e. trials that confirmed participants’ predictions) in both age groups. Furthermore, a computational learning model that is closely linked to prediction error (Rescorla‐Wagner model) demonstrated similar learning trajectories suggesting a continuity of predictive capacity and learning across the two age groups.     

Exemplars in the mist: the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic

The idea that people often make probability judgments by a heuristic short-cut, the representativeness heuristic, has been widely influential, but also criticized for being vague. The empirical trademark of the heuristic is characteristic deviations between normative probabilities and judgments (e.g., the conjunction fallacy, base-rate neglect). In this article the authors contrast two hypotheses concerning the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic, the prototype hypothesis (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and the exemplar hypothesis (Juslin & Persson, 2002), in a task especially designed to elicit representativeness effects. Computational modelling and an experiment reveal that representativeness effects are evident early in training and persist longer in a more complex task environment and that the data are best accounted for by a model implementing the exemplar hypothesis.     

锚测验难度水平代表性对垂直量尺化的影响研究

考察了锚测验难度水平对其来源测验水平的代表性对垂直量尺化的影响。采用模拟研究的方法,比较了锚测验难度等于来源测验、位于高低年级测验水平难度区间的第25百分位处及区间第50百分位处时,年级能力分布和垂直量尺特性上的参数返真结果,发现锚题难度水平高于其来源测验非但不会导致垂直量尺化结果变差,在有的情境下反而可能会提高其准确性。研究揭示人们构建垂直量尺时,可以根据内容和其他统计特征的需要对锚测验的难度水平做出适当调整     

How to Make Decisions in An Uncertain World: Heuristics,Biases, and Risk Perception

From the seventies onward a large quantity of theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the heuristic principles and cognitive strategies that individuals use to deal with risky and uncertain situations. This research has shown how the explicative and predictive shortcomings of normative risk analysis depend in many respects on undervaluing the continuous interaction between the individual and the environment. There are factors that, day by day, represent significant obstacles to decision making.     

被洞悉错觉中的锚定及其调节效应

根据锚定及其调节效应的理论解释,通过两个情境实验对被洞悉错觉产生过程中的锚定及其调节效应进行研究。研究表明,在紧张、愉快情绪状态下个体均倾向高估他人对自己内部状态的洞悉水平,即产生被洞悉错觉。内心感受强度,即锚定值对被洞悉错觉的产生有重要影响;而有无认知负荷,即认知状态在被洞悉错觉产生过程中与锚定值的调节水平无关,对被洞悉错觉是否发生亦没有明显作用。     

Concepts of God and Germs: Social Mechanisms and Cognitive Heuristics

Previous research has shown that the more individuals view observable entities as animate, the more those entities are associated with having psychological and physiological experiences. This study examined the relationship between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for concepts of unobservable scientific (i.e., germ) and religious (i.e., God) entities. This study further explored how children's conceptions vary according to the social learning opportunities (i.e., discourse, rituals) parents reportedly create. Parent–child dyads with young children from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds participated. Three central findings emerged. First, children readily associated God with psychobiological characteristics but did not do so to the same extent for germs. Second, children applied more psychobiological properties to both entity types when they believed that the entity was animate. Third, engaging in rituals and discourse with parents was indirectly related to children's concepts of God but not related to their concepts of germs. Overall, this study presented support for a connection between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for unobservable entities, and an indirect effect of cultural input on this reasoning. The implications of these findings will be discussed.     

The alternative explanation to the alternative‐outcome effect and the detection of the focal outcome effect

Abstract: Previous studies on subjective probability judgment indicate that pair‐wise comparison between the focal and the strongest alternative outcome plays an important role in probability judgment. This study, however, found that the randomness of alternative outcomes affected probability judgment for focal outcome. In the present study, 182 participants provided probability estimates for winning on hypothetical slot machines where both successes and losses were composed of multiple outcomes. The randomness of both the focal and alternative outcomes were defined by the expression used in Rappoport and Budescu (1997 ). The analysis indicated that the more random the distributions of both focal and alternative outcomes, the higher the estimated probability for focal outcome. Some theoretical suggestions are discussed.     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Integrating Fast and Frugal Heuristics with a Model of Memory‐based Cue Generation

Although the fast and frugal heuristics have been studied extensively, relatively little attention has been paid to how cues are generated to be used within the heuristics. The goal of this paper is to propose and test a memory‐based model of how cues are generated and used in cue‐based inferences. The current study advances theory by integrating the fast and frugal heuristics with HyGene, a memory‐based model of how decision makers generate and evaluate hypotheses. Using archival data in which memory retrieval variables were not directly manipulated, we demonstrate that participants' cue selection behavior is consistent with memory‐based retrieval. Further, by directly manipulating memory retrieval within a cue‐based stock‐forecasting task, we demonstrate that memory processes underlie cue use. Participants' cue use varied depending on the relationship between cue validity and the frequency with which the cues were seen during learning. The HyGene model provided the best account of the empirical data, providing further evidence for the critical role of memory in judgment and decision making. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Prediction Errors and Attention in the Presence and Absence of Feedback

ABSTRACT— Contemporary theories of learning typically assume that learning is driven by prediction errors—in other words, that we learn more when our predictions turn out to be incorrect than we do when our predictions are correct. Results from the recording of electrical brain activity suggest one mechanism by which this might happen; we seem to direct visual attention toward the likely causes of previous prediction errors. This can happen very rapidly—within less than 200 milliseconds of the error-causing object being presented. It is tempting to infer that if learning is driven by prediction errors, then little can be learned in the absence of feedback. Such a conclusion is unwarranted. In fact, the substantial learning that is sometimes the result of simple exposure to objects can also be explained by processes of directing attention toward the likely causes of previous prediction errors.     

Selection of Decision Strategies After Conscious and Unconscious Thought

It is commonly assumed that the use of simple, non‐compensatory strategies is especially pronounced in memory‐based decisions, where information costs are high. At the same time, there is evidence that in memory‐based decisions, a compensatory processing of attributes is facilitated when the processing occurs unconsciously rather than consciously. We applied a strategy classification approach—developed in research on non‐compensatory heuristics—to test two key tenets of unconscious thought theory: the capacity principle and the weighting principle. Participants memorized attribute information about cars and were subsequently either directed to or diverted from thinking consciously about their preferences between the cars (conscious versus unconscious thought). Then, participants indicated in pair‐wise choices which car they would prefer and were classified (based on their choices) as using either one of two compensatory strategies (equal weight or weighted additive) or a non‐compensatory strategy (lexicographic heuristic). In line with the capacity principle, the number of participants best described by a compensatory strategy (the equal‐weight strategy) tended to be higher after unconscious thought than after conscious thought, whereas the number of participants best described by the lexicographic heuristic tended to be lower. Inconsistent with the weighting principle, participants in the unconscious thought condition were better described by the equal‐weight strategy than by the weighted‐additive strategy. In Experiment 2, in which participants were not instructed to form an impression while learning the attribute information, the use of the equal‐weight strategy was not more prevalent after unconscious thought. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Probability Biases in Genetic Problem Solving: A Comparison of Undergraduates, Genetic Counseling Graduate Students, and Genetic Counselors

Heuristics are mental shortcuts that aid people in everyday problem-solving and decision-making. Although numerous studies have demonstrated their use in contexts ranging from consumers’ shopping decisions to experts’ estimations of experimental validity, virtually no published research has addressed heuristics use in problems involving genetic conditions and associated risk probabilities. The present research consists of two studies. In the first study, 220 undergraduates attempted to solve four genetic problems—two common heuristic problems modified to focus on genetic likelihood, and two created to study heuristics and probability rule application. Results revealed that the vast majority of undergraduates used heuristics and also demonstrated a complete misuse of probability rules. In the second study, 156 practicing genetic counselors and 89 genetic counseling students solved slightly modified versions of the genetic problems used in Study 1. Results indicated that a large percentage of both genetic counselors and students used heuristics, but the counselors demonstrated superior problem-solving performance compared to both the genetic counseling students and the undergraduates from Study 1. Research, training, and practice recommendations are presented.     

调整与通达:锚定效应心理机制的研究进展

调整和通达是锚定效应心理机制的两种代表性观点,近年来,关于这两种机制的研究不断推进,产生了有限理性观、社会认知理论、双加工理论、态度改变理论等研究视角。从调整或通达单一解释模型发展到对复合机制的检验;从单锚效应机制的阐释发展到对双锚效应心理过程的探讨。未来研究应在选择通达加工过程的思维层面和内涵、不同性质问题下锚定效应机制的差异性、锚定效应内外部影响因素及神经心理机制研究等方面进一步深化。