偏好反转的兼容性假设的实验研究

本文采用一种新的偏好诱导方法——实物交换方法 ,对偏好反转中的兼容性假设进行实验验证。实验结果支持兼容性假设 ,并发现了一种新的现象 ,即偏好反转的倒置现象。偏好反转与偏好反转的倒置相映成趣 ,为解释风险决策中偏好反转的兼容性假设提供了充足的证据 ,也对风险决策中的纯粹理性提出了更多的挑战。     

Whiteness Revisited: Reply to Commentary

In reply to Altman's discussion, the author explores in more depth the topic of whiteness, both her South African and American whiteness. She situates American whiteness in the history of slavery, Jim Crow, and the ongoing racial discrimination of the present. When Altman points to the author's unconscious submission to the regulatory power of the larger society, she postulates that her submission is to American whiteness. She notes that, in finding a new home, that which she wished to discard—a white racist identity synonymous with the oppressor—has reappeared, to be confronted once again.     

Pure Time Preference: Reply to Johansson and Rosenqvist

Johansson and Rosenqvist reject our argument for the rational permissibility of pure time preferences (PTP). Johansson and Rosenqvist's main objection is that where two options, X and Y, have equal intrinsic value, there will be a reason to be indifferent between X and Y, and therefore a reason to not hold a PTP for X or Y. In this reply, we argue that if two options have equal intrinsic value, it does not follow that you have a reason to be indifferent. Rather, the two equally large intrinsic values cancel each other out, like two equal weights on kitchen scales.     

Scientific Progress,Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park

Dellsén (2016) has recently argued for an understanding-based account of scientific progress, the noetic account, according to which science (or a particular scientific discipline) makes cognitive progress precisely when it increases our understanding of some aspect of the world. I contrast this account with Bird’s (2007, 2015); epistemic account, according to which such progress is made precisely when our knowledge of the world is increased or accumulated. In a recent paper, Park (2017) criticizes various aspects of my account and his arguments in favor of the noetic account as against Bird’s epistemic account. This paper responds to Park’s objections. An important upshot of the paper is that we should distinguish between episodes that constitute and promote scientific progress, and evaluate account of scientific progress in terms of how they classify different episodes with respect to these categories.     

Sociorelational Psychoanalysis and Agency: Reply to Commentary

The author notes that, overall, he and White seem to agree on many important issues that she writes about in her commentary, such as the necessity of recognizing both our shared humanity and the agency of separate, subjective selves. He argues, however, that White mischaracterizes what it means to think of the self as socially constructed, and he clarifies his views of how the concept of a socially constructed self may be related to individual differences in the same culture, and to personal agency. He responds to White's imputation that his paper implicitly prescribes a type of intervention or mandates some particular view of the Truth as a new theology, substituting a concrete environmental or social determinism for the abstract (intrapsychic) determinism that he criticizes. Finally, he responds to some interesting and insightful questions White raises about the case vignette of Mr. J that was presented in his essay.     

Of Coals and Eskimos: Reply to Commentary

I first point out that there are similarities between the Fiscalini and me, and then I try to clarify some differences. Fiscalini suggests that I may be “inadvertently taking coals to Newcastle,” in arguing in favor of a well-known concept. Coming from a Freudian orthodox background, I have learned to substantiate every step of my reasoning on nonorthodox concepts. This sort of clarification may be useful, even for those who share my point of view.

One misunderstanding is that Fiscalini classifies me as an advocate of participant observation, whereas I identify with coparticipation. After suggesting some possible explanation for this difference, I develop some of my own ideas about psychoanalysis considered in terms of analogical hermeneutics, the paradox of being both individual and communal at the same time, and the need to include the social and political context in the analytic inquiry, and transcend the pseudo-opposition between interpretation and experience.     

The Whole of the No-thing: Reply to Commentary

We attempt to apply our conceptualization of the absence–presence dialectic and the capacity to disappear to our understanding of the experience and the treatment of trauma. Francisco Gonzalez challenges us to encounter the place of destruction and void where the absence is simply uncontainable. We suggest that the transformational meeting place between patient and therapist entails a reawakening of the movement between absence and presence, being and not-being, some-thing and no-thing, which were previously a frozen or derailed dialectic. The therapist's capacity to surrender to the temporary nihilation of the self within the therapeutic relationship is seen as the turning point in the reestablishment of movement and the creation of meaning.     

Hume's Preference for the Enquiry: A Reply to Miller

Jon Charles Miller argues that the ‘New Humeans’ stress the primacy of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding over A Treatise of Human Nature, and that this is indefensible because it relies on omitting and distorting negative aspects surrounding Hume's statements of this preference. Miller's argument is not successful: first, the battle lines between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Humeans are not reducible to the primacy of either text; nor are his specific objections to the letters convincing. Moreover, the Enquiry is not, as Miller supposes, softer than the Treatise on controversial religious questions. In fact, his particular focus on religious questions provides a plausible explanation for Hume's preference.     

The Particularities of Form: Reply to Commentary

In this brief reply to Bollas's commentary on our paper about his work, the cycles of intersubjective dialogue endlessly sustaining should be apparent. We begin with an example of the form—content distinction and attempt to use it as a springboard for further disentangling some of the nuances of Bollas's intersubjective theorizing. Bollas's emphasis on form over content as a means of conceptualizing the analyst's contribution to the analytic process is indeed compelling. We all know from both sides of the couch the profoundly different meanings and messages that an analyst's mien invites: whether she's abrupt, verbose, meditative, tranquil. Yes, the medium is the message, and, thus, whether the analyst conveys a message through the effects of form that Bollas points out, such as “We have all the time you need for the nuances of unconscious figuring” versus “This is hot—we hafta figure it out now” surely does have an effect on the psychic material produced in the analytic process. We go on to add to Bollas's discussion of form by considering the particularities of form and how these too affect the analytic process.     

Dual Visions,Dual Voices Reply to Commentary

An overarching thematic implication of both Grand's discussion of my article and my reply to her discussion is the need for sharing and integration of knowledge and concepts belonging to the separate fields of psychoanalysis and the trauma/dissociation. Grand and I have different expressive voices, both singular and plural, which, I conjecture, are in part reflective of different traditions. Grand's response demonstrates eloquently a problem facing both psychoanalysis and the field of trauma treatment: the tendency of fields, like individuals, to proceed in isolation deprives all from the benefit of shared information. Procrustean beds cannot be shared.     

Hidden in Plain Sight: Reply to Commentary

Drawing on anecdotes that illustrate some European fantasies about the U.S.A. and its citizens, this paper suggests that what's American about American psychoanalysis has to do with differing cultural perspectives on human nature and on the relation of self to other. Via the European prejudices and stereotypes conveyed in the anecdotes, the essay delineates certain enviable things about what the U.S. stands for, such as persistent demands for equality and relatively greater possibilities for social mobility, as well as certain unenviable things, such as a superficial niceness and a tendency to deny the individual's embeddedness in social contexts. The paper puts relational analytic theory in its socio-historic context, praising its deconstruction of analytic authority while questioning the way it for the most part maintains the analytic tradition of grounding the individual in no larger social context than that of the family.     

被洞悉错觉中的锚定及其调节效应

根据锚定及其调节效应的理论解释,通过两个情境实验对被洞悉错觉产生过程中的锚定及其调节效应进行研究。研究表明,在紧张、愉快情绪状态下个体均倾向高估他人对自己内部状态的洞悉水平,即产生被洞悉错觉。内心感受强度,即锚定值对被洞悉错觉的产生有重要影响;而有无认知负荷,即认知状态在被洞悉错觉产生过程中与锚定值的调节水平无关,对被洞悉错觉是否发生亦没有明显作用。     

Understanding and Semantic Strucure: Reply to Timothy Williamson

In his essay '"Conceptual Truth"', Timothy Williamson (2006) argues that there are no truths or entailments that are constitutive of understanding the sentences involved. In this reply I provide several examples of entailment patterns that are intuitively constitutive of understanding in just the way that Williamson rejects, and I argue that Williamson's argument does nothing to show otherwise. Williamson bolsters his conclusion by appeal to a certain theory about the nature of understanding. I argue that his theory fails to consider the role that the structure of a sentence plays in determining its meaning. The cases I present suggest that this role imposes greater cognitive requirements on understanding than Williamson can acknowledge.     

Decisions Under Distress: Stress Profiles Influence Anchoring and Adjustment

ABSTRACT— People frequently make decisions under stress. Understanding how stress affects decision making is complicated by the fact that not all stress responses are created equal. Challenge states, for example, occur when individuals appraise a stressful situation as demanding, but believe they have the personal resources to cope, and are characterized by efficient cardiovascular reactivity and approach motivation. Threat states, in contrast, occur when situational demands are perceived to outweigh resources and are characterized by less efficient cardiovascular reactivity and withdrawal motivation. We randomly assigned participants to social-feedback conditions (i.e., positive or negative feedback) designed to engender challenge or threat, or a no-stress condition. Participants then completed an anchoring-and-adjustment questionnaire. Those assigned to the challenge condition adjusted more from self-generated anchors than those assigned to the threat condition. Cardiovascular responses mediated the relationship between condition and adjustment. This study demonstrates the importance of considering profiles of cardiovascular reactivity when examining the influence of stress on decision making.     

Making Better Sense of Animal Disenhancement: A Reply to Henschke

In "Making Sense of Animal Disenhancement" Adam Henschke provides a framework for fully understanding and evaluating animal disenhancement. His conclusion is that animal disenhancement is neither morally nor pragmatically justified. In this paper I argue that Henschke misapplies his own framework for understanding disenhancement, resulting in a stronger conclusion than is justified. In diagnosing his misstep, I argue that the resources he has provided us, combined with my refinements, result in two new avenues for inquiry: an application of concepts from political theory to disenhancement, and an inquiry in to the mode of valuation that underlies industrial animal agriculture and disenhancement proposals.     

The Analyst as Comic and the Comic in Analysis: Reply to Commentary

This discussion elaborates aspects of the use of humor and jokes in clinical psychoanalysis. The use of humor, like dreams or other symmetrical processes, facilitates the patient's development of the capacity to symbolize unconscious experience and mitigates the need to evacuate unconscious experiences and fantasies into the external world. In focusing on specific clinical interventions I highlight three dimensions of the process: the concept of coconstruction in the emergence of humor in the psychoanalytic relationship, the authority of the patient's psychopathology and affective and cognitive development, and the analyst's willingness to take the risks of self-exposure and possibly hurting the patient implicit in the use of humor and jokes in the analytic relationship. Different forms of humor are described in relation to the different clinical situations, including mutually created jokes, caricatured enactments, cartoonlike images, and self-depreciating commentary on the analytic process. In using jokes and humor in psychoanalysis we introduce the possibility of pleasure within an intense, intimate moment which allows for the transformation of unacceptable aspects of both patient and analyst as they become joined within a broader human experience.     

The Analyst's Uses of Theory and the Theory the Analyst Uses: Reply to Commentary

Where Slochower focuses her discussion on the analyst's multiform uses of theory, I focus my response on how the theory we each use informs a quite different way of understanding what is at issue for my patient in the apparent disengagement that marks her quest for help. More broadly, I consider how the theoretical perspective Slochower brings to her rendering of my clinical understanding and position makes for a reading that diverges significantly from my own view of what transpired in the treatment process I present.