Citizenship Education and Liberalism: A State of the Debate Analysis 1990–2010

What kind of citizenship education, if any, should schools in liberal societies promote? And what ends is such education supposed to serve? Over the last decades a respectable body of literature has emerged to address these and related issues. In this state of the debate analysis we examine a sample of journal articles dealing with these very issues spanning a twenty-year period with the aim to analyse debate patterns and developments in the research field. We first carry out a qualitative analysis where we design a two-dimensional theoretical framework in order to systematise the various liberal debate positions, and make us able to study their justifications, internal tensions and engagements with other positions. In the ensuing quantitative leg of the study we carry out a quantitative bibliometric analysis where we weigh the importance of specific scholars. We finally discuss possible merits and flaws in the research field, as evidenced in and by the analysis.     

From Intentions to Neurons: Social and Neural Consequences of Disbelieving in Free Will

The problem of free will is among the most fascinating and disputed questions throughout the history of philosophy and psychology. Traditionally limited to philosophical and theological debate, in the last decades it has become a matter of scientific investigation. The theoretical and methodological advances in neuroscience allowed very complex psychological functions related to free will (conscious intentions, decision-making, and agency) to be investigated. In parallel, neuroscience is gaining momentum in the media, and various scientific findings are claimed to provide evidence that free will is nothing more than an illusion. Why do neuroscientific findings have such a strong impact on our notion of free will? Does it really matter what neuroscience tells us about free will? Here we critically examine studies in experimental philosophy, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience that attempt to provide an empirical answer to these questions. This overview of the literature demonstrates that inducing disbelief in free will has an impact on folk psychology, social behavior and intentional action.     

First-Order Logic Formalisation of Impossibility Theorems in Preference Aggregation

In preference aggregation a set of individuals express preferences over a set of alternatives, and these preferences have to be aggregated into a collective preference. When preferences are represented as orders, aggregation procedures are called social welfare functions. Classical results in social choice theory state that it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a set of individuals under different natural sets of axiomatic conditions. We define a first-order language for social welfare functions and we give a complete axiomatisation for this class, without having the number of individuals or alternatives specified in the language. We are able to express classical axiomatic requirements in our first-order language, giving formal axioms for three classical theorems of preference aggregation by Arrow, by Sen, and by Kirman and Sondermann. We explore to what extent such theorems can be formally derived from our axiomatisations, obtaining positive results for Sen’s Theorem and the Kirman-Sondermann Theorem. For the case of Arrow’s Theorem, which does not apply in the case of infinite societies, we have to resort to fixing the number of individuals with an additional axiom. In the long run, we hope that our approach to formalisation can serve as the basis for a fully automated proof of classical and new theorems in social choice theory.     

Protecting Human Dignity in Research Involving Humans

Human dignity is the supreme criterion for protecting research participants, and likewise for numerous ethical matters of ultimate importance. But what is meant by “human dignity”? Isn’t this some vague criterion, some sort of lip service of questionable relevance and application? We shall see that it is nothing of the sort, that to the contrary, it is a very definite and very accessible criterion. However, how is this criterion applied in protecting research participants? These are the matters that we will examine now. My presentation is divided into four parts. 1/Recognizing Human Dignity; 2/Practical Definition of Human Dignity; 3/The Human Being in a Weakened State; 4/ Conclusion.     

Default values,criteria and constructivism

Wittgenstein, in his later writings, gave an account of the meaning of expressions in terms of criteria for their application. As with many of Wittgenstein's later ideas the notion of a criterion has proved difficult to explicate. A recent account, which ties criteria to the philosophical doctrine of constructivism, provides a link between the concept of a criterion and a series of ideas about language understanding which have emerged in the past few years. It is shown that these ideas can be made to cohere within a general constructivist framework, and that an alternative realist framework is inadequate in this respect.     

Multidimensional Adaptive Testing with Optimal Design Criteria for Item Selection

Several criteria from the optimal design literature are examined for use with item selection in multidimensional adaptive testing. In particular, it is examined what criteria are appropriate for adaptive testing in which all abilities are intentional, some should be considered as a nuisance, or the interest is in the testing of a composite of the abilities. Both the theoretical analyses and the studies of simulated data in this paper suggest that the criteria of A-optimality and D-optimality lead to the most accurate estimates when all abilities are intentional, with the former slightly outperforming the latter. The criterion of E-optimality showed occasional erratic behavior for this case of adaptive testing, and its use is not recommended. If some of the abilities are nuisances, application of the criterion of A _s -optimality (or D _s -optimality), which focuses on the subset of intentional abilities is recommended. For the measurement of a linear combination of abilities, the criterion of c-optimality yielded the best results. The preferences of each of these criteria for items with specific patterns of parameter values was also assessed. It was found that the criteria differed mainly in their preferences of items with different patterns of values for their discrimination parameters. The first author is now at the Department of Methodology and Statistics, Statistics, Faculty of Social Sciences, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 1, 3854 Utrecht, The Netherlands. The second author is now at Research Department, CTB/McGraw-Hill, Monterey, CA, USA.     

Towards a General Model of Applying Science

How is scientific knowledge used, adapted, and extended in deriving phenomena and real‐world systems? This paper aims at developing a general account of ‘applying science’ within the exemplar‐based framework of Data‐Oriented Processing (DOP), which is also known as Exemplar‐Based Explanation (EBE). According to the exemplar‐based paradigm, phenomena are explained not by deriving them all the way down from theoretical laws and boundary conditions but by modelling them on previously derived phenomena that function as exemplars. To accomplish this, DOP proposes to maintain a corpus of derivation trees of previous phenomena together with a matching algorithm that combines subtrees from the corpus to derive new phenomena. By using a notion of derivational similarity, a new phenomenon can be modelled as closely as possible on previously explained phenomena. I will propose an instantiation of DOP which integrates theoretical and phenomenological modelling and which generalises over various disciplines, from fluid mechanics to language technology. I argue that DOP provides a solution for what I call Kuhn’s problem and that it redresses Kitcher’s account of explanation.     

The Reconstruction of Criterion A in DSM-5: Is it a True Incorporation of Secondary Traumatization into the PTSD Diagnosis?

In DSM-5, the event criterion (criterion A) for PTSD includes indirect exposure as a potential source of PTSD. In light of the revised criterion A, it is now important to reevaluate the concept of “secondary traumatization” vis-á-vis the PTSD diagnosis. I argue that, while including indirect exposure in DSM-5 was an important step forward, there is still a considerable gap between what DSM views as indirect trauma exposure and what research has taught us about the underlying mechanisms of secondary traumatization. Thus, while DSM-5 certainly moved in the right direction, researchers are encouraged to explore new avenues of research in order to bridge the gap between the existing empirical and theoretical knowledge about secondary traumatization and the diagnostic criteria for PTSD.     

What Is Trust?

Trust is difficult to define. Instead of doing so, I propose that the best way to understand the concept is through a genealogical account. I show how a root notion of trust arises out of some basic features of what it is for humans to live socially, in which we rely on others to act cooperatively. I explore how this concept acquires resonances of hope and threat, and how we analogically apply this in related but different contexts. The genealogical account explains both why the notion has such value for us and why it is difficult to define.     

Construct validation of scales derived from the Rorschach method: a review of issues and introduction to the Rorschach rating scale

I suggest the main goal of Rorschach validation should be a refined understanding of what each score means. Toward this end, I review general issues in construct validity, hurdles unique to the Rorschach, and general limitations with validation criteria. I then recommend two approaches for improving criteria so they can begin approximating the gold standards that are necessary for a refined understanding of what scores actually measure. The first is a method for improving expert clinical judgment, and the second is a method for aggregating data across diverse judges. Finally, the Rorschach Rating Scale (RRS) is presented as a criterion tool to be used with either of these approaches to validation. The RRS is a fairly comprehensive summary of the constructs thought to be measured by various Rorschach scoring systems. The utility of the RRS for research and training are discussed, as are other practical, theoretical, and psychometric issues in its application.     

Construct Validation of Scales Derived From the Rorschach Method: A Review of issues and Introduction to the Rorschach Rating Scale

I suggest the main goal of Rorschach validation should be a refined understanding of what each score means. Toward this end, I review general issues in construct validity, hurdles unique to the Rorschach, and general limitations with validation criteria. I then recommend two approaches for improving criteria so they can begin approximating the gold standards that are necessary for a refined understanding of what scores actually measure. The first is a method for improving expert clinical judgment, and the second is a method for aggregating data across diverse judges. Finally, the Rorschach Rating Scale (RRS) is presented as a criterion tool to be used with either of these approaches to validation. The RRS is a fairly comprehensive summary of the constructs thought to be measured by various Rorschach scoring systems. The utility of the RRS for research and training are discussed, as are other practical, theoretical, and psychometric issues in its application.     

Rethinking Accountability in the Context of Human Rights

Within liberal democratic theory, ‘democratic accountability’ denotes an aggregative method for linking political decisions to citizens’ preferences through representative institutions. Could such a notion be transferred to the global context of human rights? Various obstacles seem to block such a transfer: there are no ‘world citizens’ as such; many people in need of human rights are not citizens of constitutional democratic states; and the aggregative methods that are supposed to sustain the link are often used in favour of nation-state strategic action rather than human rights. So what could accountability mean in relation to human rights? This article argues that discourse theory offers resources for approaching these problems and for rethinking a normative notion of accountability in relation to human rights. It is suggested that accountability should link political decisions to universal agreements through global rights institutions and that the link should be sustained by deliberative rather than aggregative procedures.     

WITTGENSTEIN AND DEFINING CRITERIA

Let us introduce two antithetical terms in order to avoid certain elementary confusions: To the question “How do you know that so-and-so is the case?”, we sometimes answer by giving ‘criteria’ and sometimes by giving ‘symptoms. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case “Why do you say this man has got angina?” then the answer “I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood” gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, “His throat is inflamed”, this might give us a symptom of angina, I call “sympton” a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion, Then to say “A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him” is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of “angina”. But to say, “A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat” is to make a hypothesis. (BB, pp. 24–25)¹     

Scientific Facts and Methods in Public Reason

Should scientific facts and methods have an epistemically privileged status in public reason? In Rawls’s public reason account he asserts what we will label the Scientific Standard Stricture: citizens engaged in public reason must be guided by non-controversial scientific methods, and public reason must be in line with non-controversial scientific conclusions. The Scientific Standard Stricture is meant to fulfill important tasks such as enabling the determinateness and publicity of the public reason framework. However, Rawls leaves us without elucidation with regard to when science is and is not ‘non-controversial’ and more importantly, we are left without a justification for a stricture which excludes certain controversial beliefs and methods of inquiry from the realm of political justification. In this article, we offer what we deem to be the most plausible interpretation of Rawls’s Scientific Standards Stricture. We then use Rawls’s general theoretical framework to examine various potential justifications for privileging these ‘non-controversial’ scientific methods and conclusions. We conclude that no viable justification is available to Rawls.     

Scientific styles,plain truth,and truthfulness

Ian Hacking loosely defines a “style of scientific thinking” as a “way to find things out about the world” characterised by five hallmark features of a number of scientific template styles. Most prominently, these are autonomy and “self-authentication”: a scientific style of thinking, according to Hacking, is not good because it helps us find out the truth in some domain, it itself defines the criteria for truth-telling in its domain. I argue that Renaissance medicine, Mediaeval “demonology”, and magical thinking pass muster as scientific according to Hacking’s criteria. However, application of these thought styles to the entities they introduce generates statements that logically imply a set of “ordinary” statements – or what Bernard Williams calls “plain truths” – which, contra the claims of autonomy and self-authentication, allows styles to be assessed from a style-independent perspective. Using Williams’ notion of plain truth, I show that Renaissance medicine, demonology, and magical thinking, in reality issue in many plain falsehoods. This confronts us with what I call Hacking’s dilemma: either define stricter necessary conditions on being a style of scientific thinking, or concede that some styles albeit scientific are not as good at finding things out about the world as others. I make three suggestions to deal with the dilemma.     

Conceivability,Imagination and Modal Knowledge*

The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal insightfulness of the imagination must broaden the idea of what it is to be imaginable. I argue that this required broadening renders the imagination idle (in this context). Consequently, I distinguish two different accounts of the evidential basis of modal knowledge and present a more general argument that concludes that the very notion of conceivability should be eschewed in modal epistemology.     

Failure of Engineering Artifacts: A Life Cycle Approach

Failure is a central notion both in ethics of engineering and in engineering practice. Engineers devote considerable resources to assure their products will not fail and considerable progress has been made in the development of tools and methods for understanding and avoiding failure. Engineering ethics, on the other hand, is concerned with the moral and social aspects related to the causes and consequences of technological failures. But what is meant by failure, and what does it mean that a failure has occurred? The subject of this paper is how engineers use and define this notion. Although a traditional definition of failure can be identified that is shared by a large part of the engineering community, the literature shows that engineers are willing to consider as failures also events and circumstance that are at odds with this traditional definition. These cases violate one or more of three assumptions made by the traditional approach to failure. An alternative approach, inspired by the notion of product life cycle, is proposed which dispenses with these assumptions. Besides being able to address the traditional cases of failure, it can deal successfully with the problematic cases. The adoption of a life cycle perspective allows the introduction of a clearer notion of failure and allows a classification of failure phenomena that takes into account the roles of stakeholders involved in the various stages of a product life cycle.     

Implicit commitment in theory choice

The proper evaluation of a theory’s virtues seems to require taking into account what the theory is indirectly or implicitly committed to, in addition to what it explicitly says. Most extant proposals for criteria of theory choice in the literature spell out the relevant notion of implicit commitment via some notion of entailment. I show that such criteria behave implausibly in application to theories that differ over matters of entailment. A recent defence by Howard Peacock of such a criterion against this objection is examined and rejected. I go on to a develop a better proposal on which, roughly speaking, a theory is counted committed to a claim if and only if its best fully explicit extension is explicitly committed to the claim. Such extensions in turn are evaluated by ordinary standards of theory choice adapted to the case of theories assumed to articulate their intended content in a fully explicit fashion.