Egocentrism and focalism in unrealistic optimism (and pessimism)

People tend to overestimate their comparative likelihood of experiencing a rosy future. The present research suggests that one reason for this error is that when people compare their likelihood of experiencing an event with that of the average person, they focus on their own chances of experiencing the event and insufficiently consider the likelihood of the average person experiencing the event. As a consequence, people tend to think that they are more likely than the average person to experience common events and less likely than the average person to experience rare events. This causes unrealistic optimism in the case of common desirable events and rare undesirable events, but unrealistic pessimism in the case of rare desirable events and common undesirable events (Studies 1 and 2). Study 2 further suggests that both egocentrism and focalism underlie these biases. These results suggest that unrealistic optimism is not as ubiquitous as once thought.     

Biases in social comparisons: Optimism or pessimism?

Social comparisons typically lead to two kinds of biases: A comparative optimism bias (i.e., a tendency for people to view themselves as more likely than others to be the beneficiaries of positive outcomes) or a comparative pessimism bias (i.e., a tendency for people to view themselves as less likely than others to be such beneficiaries); rarely are people fully calibrated in terms of how they compare to others. However, there is little systematic research on the factors that determine when a comparative optimism versus pessimism bias will occur, how they can be attenuated and whether such attenuation is always desirable. In this paper, we report four studies which demonstrate the following key results: First, we show that perceived level of control over the outcome drives whether a comparative optimism or pessimism bias will occur (Study 1). Second, an increase in perceived similarity between self and a comparison target person attenuates the comparative optimism bias in domains that people view as highly controllable (Study 2a) and attenuates the comparative pessimism bias in domains that people view as less controllable (Study 2b). Finally, we show that people are willing to work harder when they experience more comparative optimism in higher control scenarios and when they experience less comparative pessimism in lower control scenarios, illustrating that motivating people to strive harder for positive outcomes can result from exacerbated or attenuated bias, depending on the context (Study 3).     

Interhemispheric interaction and egocentrism: the role of handedness in social comparative judgement

Previous research has shown that people are egocentrically biased when making judgements that require a self-to-peer comparison - leading to above-/below-average effects and comparative optimism/pessimism. Two experiments examined whether interhemispheric brain connectivity (assessed via strength of handedness) is associated with egocentrism in the comparative judgement process. In Experiment 1, strong handers (SH) and mixed handers (MH) made percentile rank judgements about their abilities in easy and hard domains. In Experiment 2, SH and MH judged their likelihoods of outperforming a co-participant in easy and hard tasks. Both experiments showed that SH were more egocentric than MH and thus showed (a) more above- and below-average effects when estimating their abilities (Experiment 1) and (b) generally larger optimism biases when predicting performances in a competition (Experiment 2). Taken together, these experiments provide evidence that underlying interhemispheric connectivity shapes egocentrism in comparative judgement.     

Coping with disappointing outcomes: Retroactive pessimism and motivated inhibition of counterfactuals

Having failed to achieve a desired goal, people may use retroactive pessimism as a defense mechanism, concluding that chances of success were not too good to begin with. To make this judgment, one must block counterfactual alternatives suggesting that success was, in fact, quite likely. Facing a bitter disappointment, the perceiver is highly motivated to inhibit upward counterfactuals, thus increasing the perceived inevitability of failure and finding solace in the acceptance of inescapable fate. Two experiments explored the hypothesized link between counterfactuals inhibition and retroactive pessimism. In the first experiment, it was found that participants experiencing grave disappointment, following a near miss, judged their chances of achieving their goal less favorably, compared to participants who had missed their goal by far. An analysis on participants’ counterfactual judgments suggested that this effect was mediated by participants’ perceptions of counterfactual events. The second experiment demonstrated that retroactive pessimism and counterfactual inhibition seem to be unique to situations in which the negative outcome resulted from uncontrollable rather than controllable events, thus corroborating the functional characterization of counterfactual thinking as well as the link between retroactive pessimism and disappointment.     

Later life health optimism,pessimism and realism: Psychosocial contributors and health correlates

Prior research has established positive outcomes of health optimism (appraising one's health as good despite poor objective health (OH)) and negative outcomes of health pessimism (appraising health as poor despite good OH), yet little is known about their contributors. We examined the role of psychosocial factors (life event stress, depression, dispositional optimism, perceived social support) in health realism (appraising health in accordance with OH), optimism and pessimism among 489 older men and women. We then accounted for the psychosocial factors when examining multiple health correlates of health realism, optimism and pessimism. Controlling for age, gender and income, regression results indicate that depression and social support were associated with less health optimism, while dispositional optimism was associated with greater health optimism among those in poor OH. Dispositional optimism was associated with less health pessimism and life event stress was associated with greater pessimism among those in good OH. Beyond the effects of the psychosocial factors, structural equation model results indicate that health optimism was positively associated with healthy behaviours and perceived control over one's health; health pessimism was associated with poorer perceived health care management. Health optimism and pessimism have different psychosocial contributors and health correlates, validating the health congruence approach to later life well-being, health and survival.     

Later life health optimism, pessimism and realism: psychosocial contributors and health correlates

Prior research has established positive outcomes of health optimism (appraising one's health as good despite poor objective health (OH)) and negative outcomes of health pessimism (appraising health as poor despite good OH), yet little is known about their contributors. We examined the role of psychosocial factors (life event stress, depression, dispositional optimism, perceived social support) in health realism (appraising health in accordance with OH), optimism and pessimism among 489 older men and women. We then accounted for the psychosocial factors when examining multiple health correlates of health realism, optimism and pessimism. Controlling for age, gender and income, regression results indicate that depression and social support were associated with less health optimism, while dispositional optimism was associated with greater health optimism among those in poor OH. Dispositional optimism was associated with less health pessimism and life event stress was associated with greater pessimism among those in good OH. Beyond the effects of the psychosocial factors, structural equation model results indicate that health optimism was positively associated with healthy behaviours and perceived control over one's health; health pessimism was associated with poorer perceived health care management. Health optimism and pessimism have different psychosocial contributors and health correlates, validating the health congruence approach to later life well-being, health and survival.     

Event frequency and comparative optimism: Another look at the indirect elicitation method of self-others risks

Price, Pentecost, and Voth (2002) argue that common rather than rare negative future life events elicit greater indirect self-others comparative optimism. We argue that this finding may reflect a measurement effect: Rare events generate small differences (but large ratios), whereas common events produce larger differences (but smaller ratios). In Study 1, we show that the greater is event's perceived frequency, the greater is the numerical value assigned to express a given degree of risk discrepancy. In Study 2, we found weak negative rather than positive relations between perceived event frequency and the sense of risk discrepancy. Thus, it is crucial to understand how participants relate the two risk probabilities to each other to estimate their indirect comparative optimism.     

A multimethod investigation of depressive symptoms,perceived understanding,and relationship quality

This research examines whether people who are experiencing more depressive symptoms perceive their partners as less able to understand their thoughts and feelings. Results showed that depressive symptoms (Studies 1 and 3) and depressive mood (Study 2) were negatively associated with perceived understanding in general (Study 1), in daily life (Study 2), and during a conflict conversation (Study 3). Partners of people who were more depressed actually were less empathically accurate during the conflict conversation in Study 3, although they did not recognize that they were being less understanding. Moreover, perceived understanding helped explain the link between depressive symptoms and relationship quality in all three studies, and these effects held when controlling for self‐reported understanding and perceived partner hostility.     

Why It Can't Happen to Me: The Base Rate Matters,But Overestimating Skill Leads to Underestimating Risk1

Undergraduates (N = 330) estimated their risk for aversive events (e.g., motor vehicle accident), in which we varied personal control (e.g., driver = self or other) and bogus base rates (high vs. low). Base rate data influenced risk estimates, but people underestimated their risk if they were the agent (e.g., the driver) rather than if another person was the agent. Justifications for estimates suggested that the base rate was perceived to be the risk for the average person. Most people then adjusted their estimates for a negative outcome downward because they believed that they were better than average on a skill (e.g., driving skill) that was perceived to be causally related to the event.     

Are Women Perceived as Engaging in More Maladaptive Worry Than Men? A Status Interpretation

Studies 1 and 2 addressed people's perceptions of women's and men's overall maladaptive worry. In Study 1, participants rated how they perceive women's and men's worry in general. In Study 2, participants rated the worry of either a woman or a man whom they know well. As expected in both studies, participants perceived women as experiencing more maladaptive worry than men. A second objective was to compare people's perceptions of women's and men's worry to their perceptions of low- and high-status individuals' worry to determine if a status model can account for the perception that women worry more than men. In Study 3, participants were presented a minimal instantiation of status (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996). As expected, participants perceived low-status individuals as experiencing more maladaptive worry than high-status individuals. Findings are discussed in terms of gender stereotypes and theoretical models of gender.     

Ambiguity of acceptance,social desirability,and dating choice

Male subjects differing in social desirability (likableness, physical attractiveness) chose a date from an array of females of three levels of physical attractiveness. Choices were made under two conditions: one where acceptance was assured regardless of whom subject chose; the other where acceptance was left ambiguous. The findings were as follows: (a) subjects selected a more physically attractive female when assured of acceptance than when acceptance was left ambiguous; (b) subjects estimated that highly physically attractive females were less likely to accept them as a date than were either moderately physically attractive or physically unattractive females; (c) subjects' self-ratings of their likableness were not related to the physical attractiveness of their choices under either choice condition nor to their estimates of their chances that the females would accept them as a date; and (d) subjects' self-evaluated physical attractiveness, although unrelated to the physical attractiveness of the subjects' choices, did relate to subjects' estimates of their chances of acceptance. Highly physically attractive subjects estimated their chances of acceptance as better than did subjects who considered themselves low in physical attractiveness. The implications of the findings for the “matching hypothesis” are discussed.     

女大学生中共情对自我中心和利他行为关系的调节作用

目的：考察在女大学生中特质与状态共情对个体自我中心特质与利他行为之间的关系。方法：研究一采用问卷调查考察特质共情对自我中心特质与利他行为倾向的调节作用; 研究二采用行为实验 (自我中心特质高或低的女大学生) 来考察启动的状态共情对真实利他行为的影响。结果：共情特质/状态会与自我中心特质交互作用来影响个体的利他行为/倾向。结论：高共情状态/特质的被试其自我中心会降低利他行为/倾向, 而低共情状态或特质的被试无此倾向。     

Cognitive Biases in Playing the Lottery: Estimating the Odds and Choosing the Numbers

Three experiments were conducted to examine the operation of the representativeness and anchoring and adjustment heuristics in lottery play. Subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 indicated their chances of winning a lottery with an objective probability of 1 in 10. Consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, subjects (in both experiments) perceived their chances of winning to be greater when the lottery was based on a single event than when it was based on a disjunctive event. Subjects in these two experiments also selected numbers to play in a pick-3 (Experiment 1) or pick-4 (Experiment 2) lottery. Consistent with the representativeness heuristic, subjects in Experiment 2 demonstrated a preference for numbers without repeating digits. This also occurred in Experiment 3 wherein the numbers actually played in the Indiana daily Pick-3 lottery were examined.     

Perceived Event Frequency and the Optimistic Bias: Evidence for a Two-Process Model of Personal Risk Judgments

People often judge themselves to be at lower risk for various negative life events than are their peers. The two empirical studies presented here show that the magnitude of this optimistic bias can be either negatively or positively related to the perceived frequency of the event, depending on whether people judge their own risk relative to that of an average peer (make comparative risk judgments) or judge their own and an average peer's risk separately (make absolute risk judgments). A new two-process model is presented to account for these results. The model combines a better-than-average heuristic with elements of the singular target-focused and singular- distributional models of Klar and colleagues (Klar & Giladi, 1997, 1999; Klar, Medding, & Sarel, 1996). The empirical results and model have many implications for the study of personal risk judgments, the optimistic bias, and risk-taking behavior.     

Are people excessive or judicious in their egocentrism? A modeling approach to understanding bias and accuracy in people's optimism

People are often egocentric when judging their likelihood of success in competitions, leading to overoptimism about winning when circumstances are generally easy and to overpessimism when the circumstances are difficult. Yet, egocentrism might be grounded in a rational tendency to favor highly reliable information (about the self) more so than less reliable information (about others). A general theory of probability called extended support theory was used to conceptualize and assess the role of egocentrism and its consequences for the accuracy of people's optimism in 3 competitions (Studies 1-3, respectively). Also, instructions were manipulated to test whether people who were urged to avoid egocentrism would show improved or worsened accuracy in their likelihood judgments. Egocentrism was found to have a potentially helpful effect on one form of accuracy, but people generally showed too much egocentrism. Debias instructions improved one form of accuracy but had no impact on another. The advantages of using the EST framework for studying optimism and other types of judgments (e.g., comparative ability judgments) are discussed.     

Optimism, pessimism, and change of psychological well-being in cancer patients

Whereas most previous studies have assessed optimism/pessimism as a unidimensional construct, there is increasing awareness that optimism and pessimism may represent two partially independent dimensions. In this study, the role of optimism and pessimism for the maintenance of psychological well-being was assessed in 161 newly diagnosed cancer patients. Before the start of chemotherapy, more positive affect balance was associated with higher optimism and lower pessimism. Over the course of 9 months following diagnosis, pessimism predicted negative change in affect balance, whereas no effect of optimism appeared. Higher levels of perceived side-effects of chemotherapy were associated with negative change in affect balance. However, an interaction effect of perceived side-effects with pessimism indicated that this was only the case in patients with above-median levels of pessimism. The conclusion is drawn that it may be more important to be less pessimistic than to be optimistic when diagnosed with cancer.     

Humanizing the self: moderators of the attribution of lesser humanness to others

Three studies investigated moderators of the tendency to attribute greater humanness to the self than to others, an interpersonal counterpart of outgroup infra-humanization. Study 1 demonstrated that this self-humanizing effect is reduced when the other is the focus of comparison. Study 2 showed that the effect is reduced when the other is individuated. Study 3 indicated that empathy does not moderate self-humanizing: Self-humanizing failed to correlate negatively with dispositional empathy or perspective-taking. Study 3 also indicated that abstract construal moderates the self-humanizing effect using a temporal comparison. Participants rated their future self, but not their past self, as less human than their present self. Studies 1 and 3 also showed that self-humanizing is greater for undesirable traits: People may view their failings as "only human." All findings were distinct from those attributable to self-enhancement. Self-humanizing may reflect a combination of egocentrism, focalism, abstract representation of others, and motivated processes.     

Maintaining Positive Self-Evaluations: Reducing Attention to Diagnostic but Unfavorable Social Comparison Information When General Self-Regard Is Salient

We predicted that when (1) people are faced with diagnostic but personally challenging social comparison information in a domain, and (2) their self-regard is salient, they will be less likely to use the comparison information when judging their standing in the domain (making the judgment less inductive). Participants in Study 1 estimated their standing on risk factors for two health problems, and some did so after their self-regard was made salient. Moreover, some received information (about their peers' standing on these risk factors) that challenged participants' self-serving comparative beliefs. As expected, estimates of personal risk factor standing among high self-regard salience/comparison information participants were less correlated with similar estimates collected 2 months earlier, suggesting the estimates had become less inductive. There was also tentative evidence that, in this condition, self-esteem played a greater role in constructing these estimates. In Study 2, participants were led to believe that their comparative standing on risk factors was better than it actually was, and in this case, they were more likely to use this information when making self-judgments about their personal risk. Evidently, the extent to which people use diagnostic comparison information inductively when making self-inferences depends on the favorability of that information.     

Bracing for loss

People find unexpected bad news aversive and often brace themselves by predicting the worst. Three experiments examined whether the pessimism is influenced by personal need. Students who differed in financial need learned that a billing error meant that some students would receive an additional bill from their university. Financially needy students were consistently pessimistic in predicting their likelihood of receiving a bill, whereas non-needy students were not. In addition, the experiments reveal that (a) the pessimism occurred for potential losses but not potential gains, (b) needy students were pessimistic about their own chances but not the chances of a friend, (c) the pessimism was not attributable to needy students' being more readily primed by the news of a possible bill or to needy students' having more experience with billing errors, and (d) the pessimism was specific to monetary losses and did not generalize to other events.