When the "I" looks at the "Me": autobiographical memory, visual perspective, and the self

This article presents a theoretical model of the self processes involved in autobiographical memories and proposes competing hypotheses for the role of visual perspective in autobiographical memory retrieval. Autobiographical memories can be retrieved from either the 1st person perspective, in which individuals see the event through their own eyes, or from the 3rd person perspective, in which individuals see themselves and the event from the perspective of an external observer. A growing body of research suggests that the visual perspective from which a memory is retrieved has important implications for a person’s thoughts, feelings, and goals, and is integrally related to a host of self-evaluative processes. We review the relevant research literature, present our theoretical model, and outline directions for future research.     

Compulsive "helpfulness": or, how I learned to stop working so hard and love the group

Compulsive helpfulness, an anxiety-laden need by the therapist to feel helpful, akin to the notion of rescuing others, is a potential pitfall in developing an effective psychotherapy group. It can be regarded variously: (1) as a reaction formation against feelings of boredom and frustration stimulated by such phenomena as group resistance or the enactment of inauthentic relationships in the group; (2) as a therapist style driven by a transferential reaction to be regarded as competent and worthy; (3) as an induced countertransference enactment tied to group members' frustration and passivity about their own interpersonal inadequacies; (4) and as a manic defense against despair over the feeling that one's loving has not done any good. In this essay, the author explores his struggle to identify and come to terms with compulsive helpfulness as a dominant theme in the early stages of his tenure as leader of a psychotherapy group.     

When simplifying life is not so bad: the link between rigidity, stressful life events, and mental health in an undergraduate population

Decades of research have generally shown that being more rigid is associated with poorer mental health. We investigated whether all aspects of what has been termed “rigidity” are harmful. In particular, we hypothesized that the desire for simple structure (DSS) will not be associated with poor mental health, and in some cases might be associated with better mental health. In contrast, the intolerance of uncertainty (IU) was hypothesized to be associated with a wide range of indices of poor mental health. We also hypothesized that people high in IU would be less resilient in the face of stressful life events. Results across two cross-sectional surveys (N=240; N=331) supported our hypotheses. DSS was associated with less hopelessness, whereas IU was associated with more depression, anxiety, stress, suicidal ideation, and hopelessness. In addition, moderational analysis supported the hypothesis that IU magnifies the adversive effect of stressful life events on depression, anxiety and hopelessness. IU was more strongly related to the negative indices of well-being than to the positive index of life satisfaction. The implications of these findings for cognitive behavioural therapy practice are discussed.     

When the Evidence Says, "Yes, No, and Maybe So": Attending to and Interpreting Inconsistent Findings Among Evidence-Based Interventions

ABSTRACT— An international, multidisciplinary effort aims to identify evidence-based treatments (EBTs) or interventions. The goal of this effort is to identify specific techniques or programs that successfully target and change specific behaviors. In clinical psychology, EBTs are identified based on the outcomes of randomized controlled trials examining whether treatments outperform control or alternative treatment conditions. Treatment outcomes are measured in multiple ways. Consistently, different ways of gauging outcomes yield inconsistent conclusions. Historically, EBT research has not accounted for these inconsistencies. In this paper we highlight the implications of inconsistencies, describe a framework for redressing inconsistent findings, and illustrate how the framework can guide future research on how to administer and combine treatments to maximize treatment effects and how to study treatments via quantitative review.     

When sentimental rules collide: "norms with feelings" in the dilemmatic context

According to a recently prominent account of moral judgment, genuine moral disapprobation is a product of two convergent vectors of normative influence: a strong negative affect that arises from the mere consideration of a given piece of human conduct and a (socially acquired) belief that this conduct is wrong (Nichols, 2002). The existing evidence in favor of this “norms with feelings” proposal is rather mixed, with no obvious route to an empirical resolution. To help shed further light on the situation, we test a previously unexamined prediction that this account logically yields in a novel dilemmatic context: when individuals are faced with a moral dilemma that pits two or more “affectively-charged” moral norms against each other, the norm underwritten by the strongest feeling ought to determine the content of dilemmatic resolution. Across three studies, we find evidence that directly challenges this prediction, offering support for a Kolhberg-style “rationalist” alternative instead. More specifically, we find that it is not the participants’ degree of norm-congruent emotion (whether situationally or dispositionally assessed) or its correlates, but rather their appraisal of the relative costs associated with various alternative courses of action that appears to be most predictive of how they resolve the experimentally induced moral conflict. We conclude by situating our studies within an overarching typology of moral encounters, which, we believe, can help guide future research as well as shed light on some current controversies within this literature.     

Gesturing towards the future: cognition,big data,and the future of comparative gesture research

Animal Cognition - The field of ape gesture research has grown significantly in the past two decades, but progress on the question of gesture development has been limited by methodological and...     

When clinical care is like research: the need for review and consent

The prevailing “segregated model” for understanding clinical research sharply separates it from clinical care and subjects it to extensive regulations and guidelines. This approach is based on the fact that clinical research relies on procedures and methods—research biopsies, blinding, randomization, fixed treatment protocols, placebos—that pose risks and burdens to participants in order to collect data that might benefit all patients. Reliance on these methods raises the potential for exploitation and unfairness, and thus points to the need for independent ethical review and more extensive informed consent. In contrast, it is widely assumed that clinical care does not raise these ethical concerns because it is designed to promote the best interests of individual patients. The segregation of clinical research from clinical care has been largely effective at protecting research participants. At the same time, this approach ignores the fact that several aspects of standard clinical care, such as clinician training and scheduling, also pose some risks and burdens to present patients for the benefit of all patients. We argue that recently proposed learning health care systems offer a way to address this concern, and better protect patients, by developing integrated review and consent procedures. Specifically, current approaches base the need for independent ethical review and more extensive informed consent on whether an activity is categorized as clinical research or clinical care. An ethically sounder approach, which could be incorporated into learning health care systems, would be to base the need for independent ethical review and more extensive informed consent on the extent to which an activity poses risks to present patients for the benefit of all patients.     

When representations conflict with reality: the preschooler's problem with false beliefs and "false" photographs

It has been argued that young preschoolers cannot correctly attribute a false belief to a deceived actor (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Some researchers claim that the problem lies in the child's inadequate epistemology (Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Wellman, 1988); as such, it is specific to the child's theory of mind and no such problem should appear in reasoning about nonmental representations. This prediction is tested below in the "false photograph" task: here an actor takes a photograph of an object in location X; the object is then moved to location Y. Preschool subjects are asked: "In the picture, where is the object?" Results indicate that photographs are no easier to reason about than are beliefs. Manipulations to boost performance on the photograph task proved ineffective. Further, an explanation of the failure as a processing limitation having nothing to do with the representational nature of beliefs or photographs was ruled out. It is argued that young children's failure on the false belief task is not due to an inadequate epistemology (though they may have one) and is symptomatic of a larger problem with representations.     

When the risks are low: the impact of absolute and comparative information on disturbance and understanding in US and UK samples

When Klein, W. M. gave participants absolute and comparative risk information (crossed experimentally) they were more disturbed by being above than below average, but not by being at higher rather than lower risk. The current experiment tests whether Klein's findings extend to situations involving lower risk figures more typical of genuine health risks, assesses participants’ understanding of the information, and directly compares responses of US and UK samples. Participants were presented with hypothetical information about comparative and absolute risks of deep vein thrombosis. There was a main effect of absolute risk information on disturbance and precaution intentions in the US sample, but no effects of comparative information on these measures in either sample. Understanding was poor among participants receiving both pieces of risk information. Future studies should include measures of understanding to establish whether people are failing to understand what they are told or failing to respond systematically to what they understand. Practically, the findings caution against providing comparative risk information when communicating low risk figures.     

Rats' preferences for an analgesic compared to water: an alternative to "killing the rat so it does not suffer"

A common policy in research institutions is to kill rats when they display chronic disabilities or recurrent injuries. These guidelines appear to be derived from an oxymoron that "it's better for a rat to be killed so it does not suffer pain" and from untested assumptions that rats cannot control "pain." In a two-bottle paradigm, 10 rats with a history of brain damage following status epilepticus from a single systemic injection of lithium and pilocarpine were given options to consume freely either tap water or 1 mg/cc of acetaminophen in tap water. During periods of fresh lesions due to persistent gnawing or acute injuries associated with tonic-clonic convulsions, the rats consumed 3 to 10 times the fluid from the bottles containing acetaminophen (equivalent to 5 to 10 extra-strength Tylenol tablets per day for a 70-kg person) relative to periods when no lesions or old lesions were present. These results suggest that rats with chronic injuries sufficient to be terminated according to Animal Care guidelines may be capable of reducing the aversive physiological conditions associated with tissue damage by selecting analgesic treatments.     

Orangutans (Pongo abelii) "play the odds": information-seeking strategies in relation to cost, risk, and benefit

Recent research has examined whether animals possess metacognition, or the ability to monitor their knowledge states. However, the extent to which animals actively control their knowledge states is still not well delineated. Although organisms might be capable of seeking information when it is lacking, it does not mean that it is always adaptive to do so. In the present set of experiments, we examined the flexibility of this behavior in captive orangutans (Pongo abelii; two adults and one juvenile) in a foraging task, by varying the necessity of information-seeking, the cost associated with it, the likelihood of error, and the value of the reward. In Experiment 1, subjects searched for information most often when it was "cheapest" energetically. In Experiment 2, subjects searched for information most often when the odds of making an error were the greatest. In Experiment 3, subjects searched for information more when the reward was doubled in value. In Experiment 4, adult subjects adapted to risk/benefit trade-offs in their searching behavior. In every experiment, subjects sought information more often when they needed it than when they already knew the solution to the problem. Therefore, the current research suggests that information-seeking behavior in orangutans shows a sophisticated level of flexibility, comparable to that seen in human children, as they appear to "play the odds" when making the decision to seek information or not.