Expectation of outgroup behaviour: can you trust the outgroup?

Outgroups are usually viewed with suspicion and expected to discriminate against the ingroup. The present study demonstrated that ingroup members attributed past discriminatory behaviour committed by individuals of unknown group membership more to outgroup members than to either ingroup members or members of a neutral group. In contrast, past egalitarian behaviour was attributed less to outgroup members than to members of a neutral group. Ingroup members also expected more discrimination from a future outgroup allocator than from a future neutral group allocator. Finally, the study showed that ingroup members' own behaviour in allocating money became more biased in favour of ingroup members vis-á-vis outgroup members when the future allocator was from an outgroup rather than from a neutral group and when they had witnessed the discriminatory behaviour of an allocator in the past.     

Open or close the door to the outgroup? Diversity beliefs moderate the impact of group boundary permeability on attitudes toward the outgroup

The present research investigated the moderating role of diversity beliefs with the aim of reconciling inconsistent findings regarding the impact of group boundary permeability on attitudes toward outgroup. In Study 1, all variables were measured with self‐report scales completed by Chinese participants. In Study 2, diversity beliefs were manipulated by randomly assigning Chinese participants to a high or low diversity belief condition. In Study 3, we replicated the moderating model with American participants. Results of all three studies indicated that diversity beliefs moderated the relationship between group boundary permeability and attitudes toward outgroup. Individuals with high diversity beliefs held more positive attitudes toward the outgroup when the group boundary was permeable (vs. impermeable). Conversely, individuals with low diversity beliefs held more negative attitudes toward the outgroup when the group boundary was permeable (vs. impermeable). These findings suggest that when the inflow of the outgroup members is inevitable, attitudes toward the outgroup may be effectively improved by increasing diversity beliefs.     

When is the infrahumanization to a threatening outgroup higher? Effects of the ambiguity of situation and the empathy with ingroup

Infrahumanization researchs have shown that people attribute their ingroup exclusively human features, for example, the ability to experience secondary emotions. This bias lead people to deny this ability to outgroup and, consequently, to infrahumanize them. However, it would have conditions in which the infrahumanization is intensified. The aim of this study is to determine if there are characteristics in a threatening situation that influence in the level in which ingroup infrahumanize the outgroup. Two histories were constructed; in them, the outgroup committed a violent action against the ingroup, and as the degree of certainty about the perpetration, so the level of empathy with the victim were manipulated. The results show that when there are empathy with the victim and ambiguity about the perpetration, the infrahumanization to outgroup is higher.     

Infrahumanization or familiarity? Attribution of uniquely human emotions to the self, the ingroup, and the outgroup

People attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups. This effect is interpreted in terms of infrahumanization theory. Familiarity also could explain this differential attribution because secondary emotions are thought to be less visible and intense than primary ones. This alternative explanation to infrahumanization was tested in three studies. In Study 1, participants attributed, in a between-participants design, primary and secondary emotions to themselves, to their ingroup, or to an outgroup. In Study 2, participants answered for themselves and their ingroup or for themselves and an outgroup. In Study 3, participants made attributions to the ingroup or a series of outgroups varying in terms of familiarity. The data do not support an explanation in terms of familiarity. The discussion centers on conditions not conducting to infrahumanization.     

The impact of implicitly and explicitly primed ingroup–outgroup categorization on the evaluation of others pain: The case of the Jewish–Arab conflict

Despite the automaticity of affective sharing, many studies have documented the role of top-down effects, such as social categorization, on people’s empathic responses. An important question, largely ignored in previous research, concerns empathy to ingroup and outgroup members’ pain in the contexts of ongoing intergroup conflict. In the present study we examined how implicit and explicit ethnic social categorization of others affects empathy to pain in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. To meet this aim, we assessed the evaluation of pain by Jewish and Arab participants who viewed a series of visual stimuli depicting painful and non-painful familiar situations. The stimuli were associated with explicitly or implicitly primed typical names depicting ingroup, neutral outgroup, and adversary outgroup members. Results demonstrate that pain ratings in the explicit priming condition provide support for the ingroup empathy hypothesis, positing that empathy is higher for ingroup than for outgroup members for both Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Conversely, when the targets’ categories are primed implicitly, results revealed difference in empathy by the two ethnic groups where an ingroup bias was detected only for Palestinian Arabs. This suggests that the activation of ingroup bias on the subliminal implicit level among Palestinian Arab participants might be mediated by the amount of conflict permeating in their daily lives and by deeply rooted cultural values and behavioural patterns.     

Who drives divergence? Identity signaling, outgroup dissimilarity, and the abandonment of cultural tastes

People often diverge from members of other social groups: They select cultural tastes (e.g., possessions, attitudes, or behaviors) that distinguish them from outsiders and abandon tastes when outsiders adopt them. But while divergence is pervasive, most research on the propagation of culture is based on conformity. Consequently, it is less useful in explaining why people might abandon tastes when others adopt them. The 7 studies described in this article showed that people diverge to avoid signaling undesired identities. A field study, for example, found that undergraduates stopped wearing a particular wristband when members of the "geeky" academically focused dormitory next door started wearing them. Consistent with an identity-signaling perspective, the studies further showed that people often diverge from dissimilar outgroups to avoid the costs of misidentification. Implications for social influence, identity signaling, and the popularity and diffusion of culture are discussed.     

Impact of gendered ingroup/outgroup ostracism on women’s academic performances

This study investigated the impact of ostracism (vs. inclusion) for women in a same-sex vs. opposite-sex group on their cognitive performances. Female participants played Cyberball with other women or men and were either included or excluded. Participants then had to engage in the performance tasks. Results showed that women’s performance was decreased by ostracism in a math task (but not a verbal task) yet only in the same-sex condition. Furthermore, this result was obtained only among participants who did the numeric task first. No effect was observed in the verbal task. Two replications of the initial study were conducted using the math task. The result of the first study has been replicated one time. A meta-analysis revealed a small effect of ostracism on performance in the ingroup condition, whereas the effect seems to be non-existent in the outgroup condition. Results are discussed and future perspectives are proposed.     

Why do people perceive ingroup homogeneity on ingroup traits and outgroup homogeneity on outgroup traits?

People tend to perceive ingroup homogeneity on ingroup stereotypical traits and outgroup homogeneity on outgroup stereotypical traits (e.g., Kelly, 1989; Simon, 1992a; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990). If it is assumed that people use homogeneity ratings to indicate the extent to which groups possess traits, then this stereotype effect may be interpreted as an expression of perceived trait possession (i.e., ingroups possess ingroup stereotypical traits and outgroups possess outgroup stereotypical traits). If it is further assumed that research participants abide by the conversational norm of appropriate quantity (e.g., Bless, Strack, & Schwarz, 1993), then this stereotype effect should be significantly reduced following prior expressions of perceived trait possession. A literature review and two minimal group experiments (Ns = 75, 104) supported this prediction. This evidence is discussed in relation to the outgroup homogeneity effect and self-categorization theory.     

How context-independent is the outgroup homogeneity effect? A response to Bartsch and Judd

Bartsch and Judd (1993) argue that outgroup homogeneity effects occur independently of any tendency for members of minority groups to see their ingroup as more homogeneous than the majority outgroup. This argument is based on evidence of an underlying outgroup homogeneity effect in a study which purports to unconfound the roles of judged group size and ingroup–outgroup judgement by presenting subjects first with a small or large ingroup (or outgroup) and then a small comparison outgroup (or ingroup). However, from the perspective of self-categorization theory (SCT), such a procedure actually introduces a confound as SCT predicts that when an ingroup is judged first it should be perceived as relatively heterogeneous due to the intragroup nature of this judgemental context. Close examination of Bartsch and Judd's data bears this point out: the tendency to see the ingroup as less homogeneous than the outgroup when the ingroup was judged first was extinguished when the ingroup was judged second even when the judged groups were of equal size. Consistent with SCT, this re-analysis suggests that manifestations of outgroup homogeneity are not independent of contextual factors which determine the relative appropriateness of category-based perception of ingroup and outgroup.     

Can ingroup affirmation relieve outgroup derogation?

Intergroup hostilities are an important social concern in multicultural societies and the global community. Individuals with dispositionally high Personal Need for Structure (PNS) are particularly inclined toward outgroup derogation [Schaller, M., Boyd, C., Yohannes, J., O’Brien, M. (1995). The prejudiced personality revisited: Personal need for structure and formation of erroneous group stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 544-555]. The present research demonstrates that ingroup affirmation can eliminate high PNS individuals’ tendency toward outgroup derogation. Spontaneous (Study 1) and experimentally manipulated affirmations (Study 2) of consensual, positive ingroups eliminated the high PNS tendency to derogate outgroup targets. Study 3 experimentally manipulated the two key elements that are presumably bolstered by ingroup affirmations—self-certainty and self-worth—independent of the group context. The high PNS tendency to derogate outgroups was relieved only in the combined certainty and worth affirmation condition, just as it had been relieved in Study 2 by the ingroup affirmation. Results suggest a paradoxical strategy for relieving derogation of outgroups by affirming ingroups.     

Are emotionally intelligent people less prejudiced? The importance of emotion management skills for outgroup attitudes

People vary in their ability to understand, process, and manage information about one's own and others’ emotions, a construct known as Emotional Intelligence (EI). Past research highlighted the importance of EI in interpersonal relations as well as the key role of emotions underlying outgroup prejudice. Remarkably, hardly any research has investigated the associations between EI and outgroup prejudice. In three studies (total N = 922) conducted in Spain and the United Kingdom, we measured emotional intelligence using self-report and performance tests and prejudice toward a variety of outgroups. Results showed that those with stronger performance-based emotion management skills expressed lower generalized ethnic prejudice (Studies 1–3), more positive attitudes toward immigrants (Study 2a) and refugees (Study 2b), and less homophobic attitudes (Study 3). This negative association between emotion management and prejudice was found with different performance-based EI measures and held after controlling for self-perceived EI (Study 1) and self-reported abilities to regulate emotions (Study 3). Study 3 further demonstrated that higher empathy partly accounted for the association between emotion management and prejudice. The findings suggest that emotion management abilities play an important, but so far largely neglected role in generalized prejudice.     

The Return of the Myth of the Mental∗

McDowell's claim that “in mature human beings, embodied coping is permeated with mindedness”,1 1. “What Myth?”, this issue, p. 339. suggests a new version of the mentalist myth which, like the others, is untrue to the phenomenon. The phenomena show that embodied skills, when we are fully absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of non‐mental content that is non‐conceptual, non‐propositional, non‐rational and non‐linguistic.

This is not to deny that we can monitor our activity while performing it. For solving problems, learning a new skill, receiving coaching, and so forth, such monitoring is invaluable. But monitoring what we are doing as we are doing it degrades performance to at best competence. On McDowell's view, there is no way to account for such a degradation in performance since the same sort of content would be involved whether we were fully absorbed in or paying attention to what we were doing.

McDowell claims that it is an advantage of his conceptualism that it avoids any foundationalist attempt to build up the objective world on the basis of an indubitable Given or any other ground‐floor experience. And, indeed, if the world is all that is the case and our minds are unproblematically open to it, all experience is on the same footing. But one must distinguish motor intentionality, and the interrelated solicitations our coping body is intertwined with, from conceptual intentionality and the world of propositional structures it opens onto. The existential phenomenologist can then agree with McDowell in rejecting traditional foundationalisms, while yet affirming and describing the ground‐floor role of motor intentionality in providing the support on which all forms of conceptual intentionality are based.     

To be at the tail of the lions or the head of the foxes?

Agents seeking an opportunity for profit often have to compete with others who pursue the same opportunity. When having to choose between a number of opportunities differing in their value and if individuals differ in their chances of outperforming others, the choice can be cognitively and emotionally demanding. We explore choice between opportunities using stylized Lions–Foxes games. In such a game, each of three players, with different odds of beating others, has to choose one of two contests that offer different rewards. After game theoretically analyzing the games, which we have experimentally employed, we report four experiments that vary in choice elicitation (repeated play or strategy method), in players' matching (random strangers or partners) and in rewards. Regarding contest choices, we found the choice of the higher value (and seemingly more prestigious) contest to be positively related to winning odds, contrary to what four out of the five (mixed, partially mixed, or pure) equilibria predict. Participants started out rather optimistic, with a large majority choosing the higher value option, but with experience, they approached the only viable of two pure strategy equilibria. Still, mixing continued via reacting to past play and outcome, apparently balancing dissatisfaction from choosing either contest.     

What is the Good/ Good of the FORM of the GOOD?

‘Good’ is nothing specific but is transcendentally or generally applied over specific, and specified, ‘categories’. These ‘categories’ may be seen—at least for the purposes of this note—as under Platonic Forms. The rule that instances under a category or form need a Form to be under is valid. It may be tautological: but this is OK for rules. Not being specific, however, ‘good’ neither needs nor can have a specifying Form. So, on these grounds, the Form of the Good is otious. Any rule of the kind, ‘Everything needs a Form, so good needs a Form of the Good’ is mistaken, in that good is not a kind, but a transcendental. To give a Form to the transcendental ‘good’ is a mistake: it is a Rylian category mistake. And the Form of the Good either does no work, or works unprofitably in any but an aesthetic sense.     

Is the loss of diagnosticity of the eye region of the face a common aspect of acquired prosopagnosia?

A recent study published in this journal has shown an abnormal performance at discriminating differences with respect to the eyes of unfamiliar faces in two acquired prosopagnosic patients, but preserved processing of the mouth region. Here we extend these findings by showing a similar lack of sensitivity to the eyes in the very same face matching experiment for the prosopagnosic patient PS, who also showed normal performance for detecting differences in the mouth region. These results complement previously published evidence that the patient PS presents a lack of sensitivity to diagnostic information located on the eyes of familiar faces during individual face recognition tasks. More generally, they indicate that the impaired processing of the eyes of faces is a fundamental aspect of acquired prosopagnosia that can arise following damage to different brain localizations.     

From the Characterization of ‘European Philosophy of Science’ to the Case of Philosophy of the Social Sciences

How distinct is European philosophy of science? The first step is to characterize what is or might be considered as ‘European philosophy of science’. The second is to analyse philosophy of the social sciences as a relevant case in the European contribution to philosophy of science. (1) ‘European perspective’ requires some clarification, which can be done from two main angles: the historical approach and the thematic view. Thus, there are several structural and dynamic things to be considered in European philosophy of science and compare with other conceptions: (i) the topics discussed; (ii) the contents proposed; and (iii) the style of thought used. (2) The case of philosophy of the social sciences is relevant for the historical approach and for the thematic view. Historically, the Erklären–Verstehen methodological controversy arose in this continent, where the main authors and most of the influential approaches are located. Thematically, we can consider the contributions made by these European approaches to philosophy of the social sciences. They give us some distinctive features of European philosophy of science.     

Al-Ghazali’s Position on the ‘Second Proof’ of the ‘Philosophers’ for the Eternity of the World,in the First Discussion of the Incoherence of the Philosophers

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) raised objections against the doctrine of the ‘philosophers’ (represented chiefly by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina) on 20 specific points. In the first, and longest discussion, he examines and rebuts four of their proofs of the pre-eternity of the world—that is, that the universe as a whole had no beginning but extends perpetually into the past. Al-Ghazali rejects that doctrine. But his own position on the issue does not become clear until he discusses the philosophers’ ‘second proof.’ In this paper, I will examine the relevant text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in order to clarify the nature of Al-Ghazali’s position in relation to the second proof. I will explain why Al-Ghazali cannot adopt what I refer to as the ‘naïve’ theological position, according to which God temporally preceded the world. Instead, Al-Ghazali concurs with the philosophers that time is the measure of motion, but he asserts that time was created with the world, both having a beginning before which there was no time. God, on the other hand, is not temporally prior to the world, but neither is he simultaneous, as the second proof supposes. As timelessly eternal, God bears no temporal relation to the world at all. In conclusion, I describe what I refer to as a naïve philosophical position, which is entailed by the second proof, but distinct from both Al-Ghazali’s position and that adopted by Ibn Rushd in his critique of Al-Ghazali in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. I argue that this naïve philosophical position (and thus, the second proof) is incoherent.     

How should the History of Education be Written? Some Reflections about the Nature of the Discipline from the Perspective of the Reception of our Work

How should history of education be written? To put the question is far more easier than to provide a concrete answer. In contemporary research, there continue to be pedagogistic complaints about finding answers to present-day educational problems via history. In our view, such an ahistorical utilitarianism as well as the legitimizing and/or mythologizing belief in a particular pedagogical system, in which the history of this field is so rich since the institutionalization of the discipline at the end of the nineteenth century, should be avoided at all costs. But the danger of presentism lurks around the corner as a sine qua non condition in any form of historical research. As can be found out via the comments on our own work, much of the criticism goes back to old conceptions of the discipline, conceived as historical pedagogy rather than as history of education. Apparently, in the field of pedagogy people are still convinced that the history of education, even if it does not provide edifying examples and useful lessons, must in any case have a training value for professionals – which in the light of modern, advanced research is rather a difficult idea to defend.