What lies beneath: Reframing framing effects

Decision framing concerns how individuals build internal representations of problems and how these determine the choices that they make. Research in this area has been dominated by studies of the framing effect, showing reversals in preference associated with the form in which a decision problem is presented. While there are studies that fail to reveal this effect, there is at present no theory that can explain why and when the effect occurs. The purpose of this article is to present a selective review of research and use this to argue for a new framework for considering decision framing, to interpret past studies, and to set an agenda for future research. A simple information-processing model is developed. The model provides the basis for arguing that previous research has taken too narrow a view of how decision problems are internally represented and how these representations are transformed into choice behaviour. In addition, the model is used to highlight the importance of decision content and context.     

What lies beneath: Parenting style and implicit self-esteem

The current studies extend previous research on self-esteem by examining one of the likely origins of implicit self-esteem. Three studies showed that young adult children who reported that their parents were more nurturing reported higher implicit self-esteem compared with those whose parents were less nurturing. Studies 2 and 3 added a measure of overprotectiveness and revealed that children who reported that their parents were overprotective also reported lower implicit self-esteem. Moreover, Study 3 revealed that mothers’ independent reports of their early interactions with their children were also related to children’s level of implicit self-esteem. In all three studies, these findings remained reliable when we controlled statistically for participants’ explicit self-esteem. These findings contribute to a growing body of literature validating the construct of implicit self-esteem.     

Too tired to tell the truth: Self-control resource depletion and dishonesty

The opportunity to profit from dishonesty evokes a motivational conflict between the temptation to cheat for selfish gain and the desire to act in a socially appropriate manner. Honesty may depend on self-control given that self-control is the capacity that enables people to override antisocial selfish responses in favor of socially desirable responses. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that dishonesty would increase when people’s self-control resources were depleted by an initial act of self-control. Depleted participants misrepresented their performance for monetary gain to a greater extent than did non-depleted participants (Experiment 1). Perhaps more troubling, depleted participants were more likely than non-depleted participants to expose themselves to the temptation to cheat, thereby aggravating the effects of depletion on cheating (Experiment 2). Results indicate that dishonesty increases when people’s capacity to exert self-control is impaired, and that people may be particularly vulnerable to this effect because they do not predict it.     

A measure for the distance between an interval hypothesis and the truth

The problem of distance from the truth, and more generally distance between hypotheses, is considered here with respect to the case of quantitative hypotheses concerning the value of a given scientific quantity.Our main goal consists in the explication of the concept of distance D(I, ) between an interval hypothesis I and a point hypothesis . In particular, we attempt to give an axiomatic foundation of this notion on the basis of a small number of adequacy conditions.Moreover, the distance function introduced here is employed for the reformulation of the approach to scientific inference — developed by Hintikka, Levi and other scholars — labelled cognitive decision theory. In this connection, we supply a concrete illustration of the rules for inductive acceptance of interval hypotheses that can be obtained on the basis of D(I, ).Lastly, our approach is compared with other proposals made in literature about verisimilitude and distance from the truth.I am grateful for the possibility of spending a period of some months at the Department of Philosophy of University of Gröningen. I profited there a lot from the supervision by Dr. Theo Kuipers. I am also grateful to Prof. Ilkka Niiniluoto who gave rise to my interest in this kind of research during a period spent at Department of Philosophy of University of Helsinki, and who made a number of useful suggestions in the final stage of this paper. Moreover, I would like to thank Dr. Carlo Buttasi for suggesting a better formulation of the proof of (T.24).     

Sex and personality traits influence the difference between time taken to tell the truth or lie

A necessary component of lying is the withholding of a truthful response. Hence, lying may be conceptualised as involving the inhibition of an initial, automatic response (the truth) while an alternative response (the lie) is generated. We investigated response times to visually and auditorially presented questions probing recent episodic memory, when subjects answered questions truthfully or with lies. We also investigated whether the absolute response times or difference between time taken to tell the truth or lie was affected by participants' sex or correlated with personality scores on the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised-Short Scale. 61 subjects answered the same 36 questions five times. The first time involved answering all questions truthfully, which allowed post hoc analysis of whether subjects had been consistent in their lying and truth-telling on the following four occasions. These latter four occasions involved answering all questions (one each with 'truth' or 'lie') for both types of presentation. Regardless of type of presentation or subjects' sex, subjects took approximately 200 msec. longer to lie than to tell the truth in response to each question (p<.001). There were significant correlations between truthful response times to auditorially presented questions and Eysenck 'Neuroticism' scores. There was also a significant correlation for women between mean individual lie-minus-truth time to auditorially presented questions and Eysenck 'Lie' scores. These preliminary data suggest that response time is systematically longer when telling a lie and that personality variables may play a part in this process.     

A 'quantum' of truth in a field of lies: the investigation of emotional truth in a child analysis

Following Bion’s ideas of analytical research the author intends to consider the need to pursue emotional truth between patient and psychotherapist in order to produce a psychological development. It is shown through the analysis of a child how emotional falsification can distort first of all the definition of the child identity. Successively the attention is focused on how lies, as an unconscious element that twist the research of the truth, obstruct the development of thoughts able to transform emotions.Using a quantisation physical model of space, the author hypothesises that the transformation of β elements in α elements is always in an unstable equilibrium. The distortion of emotional truth co‐produced by lies affects the oscillation β?α at a primitive level of transformation, changing the “physical” state of the analytical field from conductor to insulator. The most important consequence of the particular point of view suggested by the quantistic model is that in the third analytical space the same definition of α elements or β elements depends on the analyst’s point of view. This change of perspective can vitalise the analytical thinking of patient and analyst during an impasse.     

Processes underlying deception: an empirical analysis of truth and lies when manipulating the stakes

The aim of the present experiment was to examine to what extent participants experience attempted control, cognitive load and arousal when they lie and tell the truth under lower‐stakes and higher‐stakes conditions. We expected both differences and similarities between truth tellers and liars. We expected that participants would experience these processes to a higher degree when they lied compared to when they told the truth (differences), but we also expected that both liars and truth tellers would be keen to make a convincing impression; and that raising the stakes would affect liars and truth tellers in a similar way (similarities). A total of 128 participants lied and told the truth during an interview (lying and truth telling was counterbalanced). Stakes were manipulated by informing half of the participants that their interviews would be recorded on videotape and would be analysed and evaluated by police officers. The predictions were supported. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Too tired to taint the truth: Ego‐depletion reduces other‐benefiting dishonesty

Numerous studies indicate that ego‐depletion increases the occurrence of self‐benefiting dishonest behavior by undermining resistance to short‐term temptations associated with dishonesty. Turning this phenomenon around, we examined whether ego‐depletion can, counterintuitively, reduce dishonest behavior in a context where dishonesty serves to benefit others. Specifically, based on the notion that ego‐depletion reduces commitment to long‐term/abstract goals and interferes with self‐control, we proposed and found in an experiment that ego‐depleted people are less likely to display dishonest behavior that spares another person from an unpleasant truth. These findings have implications for the study of dishonesty and moral dilemmas in interpersonal settings. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How surveillance begets perceptions of dishonesty: the case of the counterfactual sinner

Three studies support the hypothesis that observers' impressions of actors reflect not only what actors do but also what they can easily be imagined doing. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 observed a 10-year-old boy take a math test in a context in which the incentive to cheat and the constraints against cheating varied. When the incentive to cheat was high but the likelihood of getting caught was also high, observers perceived a target who resisted the temptation to cheat as less honest than the average boy. This effect was not found when the incentive to cheat was low, which suggests that its occurrence under high temptation resulted from observers in that condition generating the counterfactual thought that the target would have cheated had the likelihood of detection been low. Study 3 further supported the link between spontaneous counterfactual thought and inferences of dishonesty. The implications of the counterfactual correspondence bias are discussed.     

Lie,truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.     

Mock juror's perceptions of a child witness passing or failing a truth and lies discussion or promising to tell the truth

This study examined the effect of a child passing or failing the UK truth and lies discussion (TLD) compared with the Canadian promise to tell the truth on mock jurors' decisions regarding witness credibility and truthfulness and defendant guilt. Ninety-two participants read a vignette that described a child witnessing his father physically attacking his mother. The vignette was manipulated for witness age (age 4 years and age 8 years) and TLD performance/promise. Supporting the hypotheses, participants rated the witness's credibility and truthfulness significantly higher after a witness passed a TLD and after promising to tell the truth. The age of the child witness did not significantly affect jurors' decision making. The results are discussed in relation to arguments regarding the abolition of the UK's TLD in favour of introducing a promise to tell the truth.     

Vicarious dishonesty: When psychological closeness creates distance from one’s moral compass

In four studies employing multiple manipulations of psychological closeness, we found that feeling connected to another individual who engages in selfish or dishonest behavior leads people to behave more selfishly and less ethically themselves. In addition, psychologically connecting with a scoundrel led to greater moral disengagement. We also establish that vicarious justification is the mechanism explaining this effect: When participants felt psychologically close to someone who had behaved selfishly, they were more likely to consider the behavior to be less shame-worthy and less unethical; it was these lenient judgments that then led them to act more unethically themselves. These vicarious effects were moderated by whether the miscreant was identified with a photograph and by the type of behavior. Importantly, we establish a general process of vicariousness: psychological closeness produced both vicarious generosity and selfishness depending on the behavior of the person one feels psychologically connected to. These findings suggest an irony of psychological closeness: it can create distance from one’s own moral compass.     

Eliciting cues to deception and truth: What matters are the questions asked

In this paper we argue that there is little need for more of the traditional deception detection research in which observers assess short video clips in which there are few (if any) cues to deception and truth. We argue that a change in direction is needed and that researchers should focus on the questions the interviewer needs to ask in order to elicit and enhance cues to deception. We discuss three strands of research into this new ‘interviewing to detect deception’ approach. We encourage practitioners to use the proposed techniques and encourage other researchers to join us in conducting more research in this area. We offer some guidelines for what researchers need to keep in mind when carrying out research in this new paradigm.     

Effect of lie labelling on children's evaluation of selfish,polite, and altruistic lies

This study investigates how 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds' evaluations of selfish, polite, and altruistic lies change as a result of whether these false statements are explicitly labelled as lies. We are also interested in how interpretive theory of mind may correlate with such evaluations with and without a lie label. Our results showed that labelling lowered children's evaluations for the polite and altruistic lies, but not for the selfish lies. Interpretive theory of mind correlated positively with the evaluation difference between the polite and altruistic lies and that between the selfish and altruistic lies in the label, but not in the non‐label condition. Correlation between the selfish and altruistic lies and that between the polite and altruistic lies were stronger with than without labelling, after controlling for age, and verbal and non‐verbal intelligence. We conclude that lie labelling biases children towards more negative evaluations for non‐selfish lies and makes them see lies of different motives as more similar. If a lie label is applied, whether lies of different motives are still evaluated differently depends on interpretive theory of mind, which reflects the child's ability to represent and allow different interpretations of an ambiguous reality.     

Incorrect estimates and false reports: How framing modifies truth

Nearly all framing studies to date presuppose unbiased estimates. If an expert says that “programme A will save 200 people”, it is tacitly assumed that this prediction is correct. In real life this is rarely the case. In the present study people were asked to evaluate such claims that eventually turned out to be incorrect. Participants in five experiments were asked to rate how correct, and how true, are predictions and reports that either overstate or understate the facts. Overall, understatements were considered more accurate than overstatements, and pessimistic statements were better than overly optimistic ones. Thus predictions of an outcome that turns out better than expected should preferably have been presented in a positive frame (e.g., money saved), whereas outcomes that turn out worse than expected will appear less “wrong” if predictions were presented in a negative frame (e.g., money lost). Parallel studies were performed with wrong predictions and incorrect factual claims (lies). In all studies, correctness ratings were affected by the way the statements were framed.     

Examining the efficacy of truth/lie discussions in predicting and increasing the veracity of children's reports

This study investigated whether children's ability to reason about truths and lies influenced their truth-telling behavior. Four-six-year-old children (n=118) played a game that was intended to motivate children to use deception to hide a minor transgression. Next, an interviewer gave children one of four preliminary discussions. Children received a typical forensic truth/lie discussion (TLD), a developmentally appropriate and more elaborate TLD, or one of two discussions that controlled for the time spent conversing with children. Children were interviewed about the event. The results revealed that children's performance on the truth/lie questions did not predict their truth-telling behavior. Regardless of their performance on truth/lie questions, children who received TLD's gave more honest reports than children who did not receive TLD's. These results suggest that discussing truths and lies with children may promote truth-telling behavior. However, the results cast doubt on the validity of using children's performance on truth/lie questions as a measure of competency.