Losses Induce Consistency in Risk Taking Even Without Loss Aversion

It is posited that because of the attentional effect of losses, individuals would show more behavioral consistency in risk‐taking tasks with losses, even in the absence of loss aversion. In two studies, the consistency of risky choices across different experience‐based tasks was evaluated for gain, loss, and mixed (gain loss) tasks. In both studies, losses facilitated the consistency across tasks: the correlation between risk‐taking choices in different tasks increased when the tasks involved frequent losses. Study 2 also showed a positive effect of losses on temporal consistency. Losses increased the correlation between risk‐taking levels across two sessions that were 45 days apart. Also in Study 2, losses induced consistency between experiential risk‐taking choices and self‐reported ratings of risky behavior. In both studies, the positive effect of losses on consistency was observed even when the average participant did not exhibit loss aversion. Taken together, the results indicate that losses increase the consistency of risk‐taking behavior and suggest that this is due to the effect of losses on attention. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

得失程数的变化: 损失规避现象的新视点

损失规避是预期理论的核心部分之一, 指等量的损失和获得产生的心理效用并不相同, 前者大于后者。大量研究从生理、认知、情感等角度探讨损失规避的内在机制和规律, 以期认识、预测并控制损失规避导致的偏差。本研究假设损失规避与获得或损失的“程数”(route)有关, 以往研究发现了损失规避现象, 是由于其采用的“双程损失-单程获得”典型情境中, 损失程数多于获得程数。为检验该假设, 本研究设计了不同于传统范式的“获得和损失程数相等”的镜像情境、“单程损失－双程获得”及“三程获得”三种不同的得失情境。研究结果支持本假设: 当损失的程数等于或少于获得的程数时, 损失规避现象消失; 获得或损失的程数越多, 个体对其的心理感受强度趋于越高。建议未来研究进一步检验心理感受强度在程数和损失规避行为之间的中介作用。     

行为经济学中的损失规避

损失规避是指,人们总是强烈倾向于规避损失：一定数额的损失所引起的心理感受,其强烈程度约相当于两倍数额的获益感受。这种强烈的心理与行为倾向广泛存在于风险与非风险领域,在该两个领域中损失规避的研究范式也不同。损失规避常见于经济和消费等领域,可用于解释行为决策中有悖于规范化理论的诸多现象,如禀赋效应、现状偏差、股权溢价之迷和赢者的诅咒等。然而,损失规避的机制研究还存在许多尚未解决的问题,如损失规避的本质以及适用条件。今后的研究不仅要注重认知角度和情感依恋,还要结合认知过程来研究损失规避的性质和内在机制,以期帮助人们认识、预测及干预由损失规避造成的经济损失和非理性决策。     

Similarity and reluctance to trade

Previous research has shown that after decision makers are endowed with an object, they are reluctant to trade it for an alternative item. This endowment effect can be explained by loss aversion, the tendency to weight losses more heavily than gains. Consequently, there is no reluctance to trade when no true loss is involved. Four studies investigated whether reluctance to trade declines when the trade involves less of a loss—specifically, when one item is traded for another very similar item. Three experiments did not reveal a relation between willingness to trade and the similarity between the two items being traded. A fourth experiment, however, indicated that subjects were quite willing to trade for an identical item, less willing to trade for a similar item, and even less willing to trade for a dissimilar item. Thus, reluctance to trade decreased as the similarity between the endowment and the alternative increased. This result suggests that loss aversion is a function not only of the item being lost but also of the trade itself—that is, of the relation between the two items being traded. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choice by value encoding and value construction: processes of loss aversion

Loss aversion and reference dependence are 2 keystones of behavioral theories of choice, but little is known about their underlying cognitive processes. We suggest an additional account for loss aversion that supplements the current account of the value encoding of attributes as gains or losses relative to a reference point, introducing a value construction account. Value construction suggests that loss aversion results from biased evaluations during information search and comparison processes. We develop hypotheses that identify the influence of both accounts and examine process-tracing data for evidence. Our data suggest that loss aversion is the result of the initial direct encoding of losses that leads to the subsequent process of directional comparisons distorting attribute valuations and the final choice.     

Hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation for cumulative prospect theory

Cumulative prospect theory (CPT Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) has provided one of the most influential accounts of how people make decisions under risk. CPT is a formal model with parameters that quantify psychological processes such as loss aversion, subjective values of gains and losses, and subjective probabilities. In practical applications of CPT, the model’s parameters are usually estimated using a single-participant maximum likelihood approach. The present study shows the advantages of an alternative, hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation procedure. Performance of the procedure is illustrated with a parameter recovery study and application to a real data set. The work reveals that without particular constraints on the parameter space, CPT can produce loss aversion without the parameter that has traditionally been associated with loss aversion. In general, the results illustrate that inferences about people’s decision processes can crucially depend on the method used to estimate model parameters.     

The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain?

Loss aversion, the principle that losses loom larger than gains, is among the most widely accepted ideas in the social sciences. The first part of this article introduces and discusses the construct of loss aversion. The second part of this article reviews evidence in support of loss aversion. The upshot of this review is that current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains. The third part of this article aims to address the question of why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists, including consumer psychologists, despite evidence to the contrary. This analysis aims to connect the persistence of a belief in loss aversion to more general ideas about belief acceptance and persistence in science. The final part of the article discusses how a more contextualized perspective of the relative impact of losses versus gains can open new areas of inquiry that are squarely in the domain of consumer psychology.     

Power and loss aversion

Four experiments tested the prediction that power reduces loss aversion by increasing the anticipated value of gains and shrinking the negative anticipated value of losses. Experiment 1 provided initial support for the prediction that those in power are less loss averse by replicating a classic paradigm of loss aversion in riskless choice and demonstrating moderation by power. Experiments 2 and 3 expanded on this finding by breaking apart the components of loss aversion to determine how power may reduce it: via gains, losses, or both. Across two scenarios and two different measures of anticipated value, power reduced the anticipated threat associated with a loss. However, the prediction that power increases the anticipated value of gains was not supported. Finally, Experiment 4 replicated the results of Experiments 2 and 3 in the context of a choice with real consequences for the participants. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Positive and Negative Affect in Loss Aversion: Additive or Subtractive Logic?

Previous studies explain loss aversion as the result of a situation in which the expected negative emotions derived from a potential loss exceed the expected positive emotions derived from a potential gain (subtractive logic). We questioned this view and proposed additive logic, in which a linear combination between negative and positive emotions can be used as summed anticipatory affect intensity (SAAI) to explain loss aversion. By disproving two implicit hypotheses of subtractive logic, Study 1 showed that the additive logic of expected positive and negative affect was more effective than the subtractive logic in predicting loss aversion. Study 2 used real monetary gains and losses to verify the conclusion in Study 1. Using state‐trait theory to comprehensively consider the state and trait aspects of affect intensity, we further deduced that the immediate expected affect intensity might originate from the difference of an individual trait in affect intensity. Study 3 proved this hypothesis and showed that SAAI plays an intermediary role between affect intensity and loss aversion. Furthermore, Study 4 used real gamblers in casinos in Macau as its sample and obtained the same conclusion regarding loss aversion in real life as was found in the laboratory. Finally, we explained the effect of SAAI on loss aversion and indicated the contribution and significance of this study. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于预期理论的风险决策的神经机制

预期理论基于对期望效用理论的批判与发展,提出了价值函数与权重函数,对以往风险决策研究中所发现的现象进行了很好的预测与解释。预期理论的核心概念包括参照依赖、损失规避与权重函数。基于预期理论的一些决策偏差包括框架效应、禀赋效应和默认偏差也部分揭示了与人们风险决策有关的脑区。近年来,通过采用功能性核磁共振等脑成像手段对预期理论的一些核心成分进行的研究表明,涉及到人们风险决策的脑区主要有前额叶、纹状体、脑岛与杏仁核。未来的研究可以从预期理论的产生根源、个体发展以及遗传基因等角度进行进一步的探讨。     

Sensitivity of the brain to loss aversion during risky gambles

Little is known about the neural systems that subserve human loss aversion. A recent neuroimaging study by Tom, Poldrack and colleagues reports that this pattern of behaviour is directly tied to the greater sensitivity of the brain to potential losses compared with potential gains and uncovers a brain network whose activity increases with potential gains and decreases with potential losses. These results challenge the common view that loss aversion engages a distinct emotion-related brain network (e.g. amygdala and insula).     

Predicting the intensity of losses vs. non-gains and non-losses vs. gains in judging fairness and value: A test of the loss aversion explanation

Three studies examined the predictions that in the context of evaluation of fairness and concessions in negotiations, losses would be perceived as more intensely negative than non-gains, and that non-losses would be perceived as more positive than gains. Extant studies tested only the first of these predictions. These predictions derive from the principle of loss aversion (LA), according to which losses are experienced more intensely than gains of similar objective magnitude. In this view, losses and non-losses are measured against the steep loss part of the value curve, whereas gains and non-gains are measured against the shallow part of the value curve. Our studies replicated extant studies in confirming the first prediction but failed to confirm the second prediction. Specifically, opposite to the prediction of LA, gains were perceived as more intensely positive than non-losses. It seems, therefore, that LA is not a sufficient explanation of why losses are perceived as more averse than gains. Feature positive and regulatory focus effects are discussed as additional potential contributors to the phenomenon.     

受助者结果类型对亲社会表现的影响:成人与儿童的对比研究

亲社会表现是指人们在社会交往中表现出来的谦让、帮助、合作、分享等行为,其影响机制受到广泛关注。本文通过两个研究（分别以大学生和二、四、六年级小学生为研究对象）探讨了受助者结果类型（受助者获得积极结果vs.受助者避免消极结果）对亲社会表现的影响。结果显示：（1）受助者避免消极结果条件比受助者获得积极结果条件诱发成人更高的亲社会意愿和行为;（2）六年级儿童帮助他人避免消极结果的亲社会意愿更强、情绪更积极;（3）相对于帮助他人避免消极结果,二年级儿童更倾向于帮助他人获得积极结果。这些结果说明受助者结果类型影响个体的亲社会表现（包括亲社会行为、亲社会意愿、亲社会情绪）,并且这种影响因成人和儿童有所不同：成人和年长儿童表现出亲社会损失规避现象,年幼儿童则表现出相反效应。     

The Seller's Sense: Buying–Selling Perspective Affects the Sensitivity to Expected Value Differences

Previous work comparing pricing decisions by buyers and sellers has primarily focused on the endowment effect, the phenomenon that selling prices exceed buying prices. Here, we examine whether pricing decisions by buyers and sellers also vary in sensitivity to differences between objects' expected values (EVs). Both a loss‐aversion account (which posits that losses are weighted more heavily than gains) and a loss‐attention account (which posits increased attention to a task when it involves possible losses) predict that pricing decisions by sellers should exhibit higher sensitivity. The latter, however, additionally predicts that this pattern should only emerge under certain conditions. In studies 1 and 2, we reanalyzed two published datasets in which participants priced monetary lotteries as sellers or buyers. It emerged that sellers showed greater EV sensitivity (defined as the rank correlation between the set price for each lottery and its EV) except in a condition with an extended deliberation time of 15 seconds. In study 3, the buyer–seller difference in EV sensitivity was replicated even when the pricing task was presented repeatedly, while in study 4, it was eliminated when buying and selling trials were randomly mixed. The reduction of the “seller's sense” in long deliberation and mixed trials settings supports an attentional resource‐based account of the differences between sellers and buyers in their EV sensitivity. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How beliefs influence the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain

Loss aversion is an economic assumption about utility—people value giving up a good more than they value getting it. It also has hedonic meaning—the pain of a loss is greater in magnitude than the pleasure of a comparable gain. But value and pleasure are not necessarily identical. We test the hedonic interpretation of loss aversion in experimental markets. With hedonic forecasts, sellers imagine the pain of losing their endowment, and buyers imagine the pleasure of being endowed. With hedonic experiences, sellers rate the pleasure of having the endowment, and buyers rate the pain of being without it. Contrary to loss aversion, predicted pleasure is greater in magnitude than predicted pain, and experienced pleasure surpasses experienced pain. We show that the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain depends on beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes, as well as utilities. Surprise makes gains more pleasurable and losses more painful. With surprising gains and expected losses, pleasure can surpass pain. But when gains and losses are equally likely (or losses are surprising and gains are expected), the opposite pattern can occur. Finally, within‐group and between‐group prices are significantly correlated with hedonic experiences. Sellers who feel better with their endowments assign higher selling prices, and buyers who feel worse about the absence of endowment assign higher buying prices. Despite the fact that hedonic experiences deviate from loss aversion, these emotions predict the endowment effect. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Loss aversion in the eye and in the heart: The autonomic nervous system's responses to losses

The common view in psychology and neuroscience is that losses loom larger than gains, leading to a negativity bias in behavioral responses and Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) activation. However, evidence has accumulated that in decisions under risk and uncertainty individuals often impart similar weights to negative and positive outcomes. We examine the role of the ANS in decisions under uncertainty, and its consistency with the behavioral responses. In three studies, we show that losses lead to heightened autonomic responses, compared to equivalent gains (as indicated by pupil dilation and increased heart rate) even in situations where the average decision maker exhibits no loss aversion. Moreover, in the studied tasks autonomic responses were not associated with risk taking propensities. These results are interpreted by the hypothesis that losses signal the subjective importance of global outcome patterns. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

个体权力高低对其损失规避的影响

摘 要 以中国大学生为被试,采用问卷的方式,探讨权力对损失规避倾向的影响。实验一发现,与低权力被试相比,高权力被试具有较少的损失规避。实验二进一步考察权力影响损失规避的原因机制,结果发现,权力对收益的价值估计没有影响,但降低了个体对损失的价值估计,从而导致损失规避的减少。结果表明,权力除了激活个体对收益的趋近,还可能抑制个体对损失的感知,权力也是影响决策的因素之一。 关键词 权力 损失规避 估计价值     

Dissociable effects of basolateral amygdala lesions on decision making biases in rats when loss or gain is emphasized

Individuals switch from risk seeking to risk aversion when mathematically identical options are described in terms of loss versus gains, as exemplified in the reflection and framing effects. Determining the neurobiology underlying such cognitive biases could inform our understanding of decision making in health and disease. Although reports vary, data using human subjects have implicated the amygdala in such biases. Animal models enable more detailed investigation of neurobiological mechanisms. We therefore tested whether basolateral amygdala (BLA) lesions would affect risk preference for gains or losses in rats. Choices in both paradigms were always between options of equal expected value—a guaranteed outcome, or the 50:50 chance of double or nothing. In the loss-chasing task, most rats exhibited strong risk seeking preferences, gambling at the risk of incurring double the penalty, regardless of the size of the guaranteed loss. In the betting task, the majority of animals were equivocal in their choice, irrespective of bet size; however, a wager-sensitive subgroup progressively shifted away from the uncertain option as the bet size increased, which is reminiscent of risk aversion. BLA lesions increased preference for the smaller guaranteed loss in the loss-chasing task, without affecting choice on the betting task, which is indicative of reduced risk seeking for losses, but intact risk aversion for gains. These data support the hypothesis that the amygdala plays a more prominent role in choice biases related to losses. Given the importance of the amygdala in representing negative affect, the aversive emotional reaction to loss, rather than aberrant estimations of probability or loss magnitude, may underlie risk seeking for losses.     

Economic decision biases and fundamental motivations: how mating and self-protection alter loss aversion

Much research shows that people are loss averse, meaning that they weigh losses more heavily than gains. Drawing on an evolutionary perspective, we propose that although loss aversion might have been adaptive for solving challenges in the domain of self-protection, this may not be true for men in the domain of mating. Three experiments examine how loss aversion is influenced by mating and self-protection motives. Findings reveal that mating motives selectively erased loss aversion in men. In contrast, self-protective motives led both men and women to become more loss averse. Overall, loss aversion appears to be sensitive to evolutionarily important motives, suggesting that it may be a domain-specific bias operating according to an adaptive logic of recurring threats and opportunities in different evolutionary domains.