Hot as hell! The self-conscious nature of action regrets

Gilovich, Medvec, and Kahneman (1998) have shown that real-life regrets for actions and inactions correspond to different emotional states. When people regret something they have done they experience painful “hot” emotions such as disgust or guilt, whereas when the regret is about a failure to act they rather experience wistful emotions. In four questionnaire studies, we have tested the hypothesis that regrettable actions elicit a particular subcategory of these hot emotions: the self-conscious emotions (i.e., guilt, shame, embarrassment, remorse, and anger toward oneself). These studies used different methodologies and all converged to show that self-conscious emotions were the only hot emotions to be systematically greater for action regrets than for inaction regrets. A similar pattern was observed for judgments of responsibility and morality. We emphasize the theoretical and methodological implications of these results in the discussion.     

Small or Big in the Eyes of the Other: On the Developmental Psychopathology of Self-Conscious Emotions as Shame,Guilt, and Pride

The self-conscious emotions of guilt, shame, and pride typically occur when people evaluate their own self through the eyes of another person. This article will first of all discuss the nature and function of self-conscious emotions, and describe their developmental course in children and adolescents. Then, a number of variables are discussed that are thought to increase young people’s proneness to experience self-conscious emotions. Following this, the empirical evidence on the relationships between guilt, shame, and pride and various types of psychopathology in children and adolescents will be summarized. A model is presented to explain why these self-conscious emotions are associated with a diversity of psychopathological outcomes. Finally, recommendations for clinical practice are made in terms of assessment and interventions targeting the origins and sequelae of self-conscious emotions.     

补偿他人还是保护自己?内疚与羞耻情绪对合作行为的影响差异

作为两种常见且易被混淆的自我意识情绪, 诸多研究者对内疚和羞耻的产生前因及影响后效进行研究, 尤其是近年来的研究逐渐关注两者对合作行为的影响。我们通过对已有研究进行梳理发现, 内疚和羞耻对合作行为的影响及其机制存在差异, 内疚的影响更为稳定及具有普适性, 羞耻的影响具有复杂性和多样性, 更容易受到其他因素的影响。内疚和羞耻对合作行为的不同影响可从动机机制和调节机制两方面进行解释。首先, 动机机制包括内疚对他人的补偿、修复动机以及羞耻对自我的保护、修复动机。内疚对他人的补偿、修复动机主要体现在维护社会互动中的公平; 弥补对他人造成的伤害, 降低自己和他人的痛苦; 修复人际关系, 重新获得他人或自己的接纳与认同。羞耻对自我的保护、修复动机主要体现在释放消极的情绪状态; 维护积极的自我形象和声誉, 修复自我; 保护自我, 防止后续伤害及不良后果。总体而言, 内疚者关注过失行为及后果, 侧重于对受害他人的补偿或对与他人关系的修复, 而羞耻者关注整体自我的受损, 侧重于对自我的保护和对自己社会形象的修复, 基于此, 我们在前人研究的基础上构建了内疚与羞耻影响合作行为的动机机制对比模型图。其次, 调节机制涉及到个体因素和情境因素的调节作用, 其中个体因素包括认知因素、社会价值取向、自我控制能力、情绪特质和情绪状态, 情境因素包括暴露情境和掩蔽情境、实验情境和日常情境、相关情境和不相关情境。具体而言, 内疚对合作行为的影响的较少受情境的限制, 而羞耻受情境因素限制较多, 在暴露情境、相关情境中更能促进合作行为的产生, 而在掩蔽情境、不相关情境中, 羞耻较难影响个体的合作抉择, 且无论是实验室情境还是日常情境, 内疚似乎都比羞耻更易影响合作。最后, 鉴于内疚与羞耻的诱发和测量方法的有效性仍需检验, 两种情绪对合作行为影响的过程机制和生理机制仍不明晰, 个体因素影响的研究尚不充足以及跨文化研究较为缺乏, 未来研究可以从内疚和羞耻诱发与测量方法的有效性, 情绪作用发生的内在过程和生理机制, 情绪影响的个体和文化差异这几方面进行扩展和深挖。     

What does it mean to be angry at yourself? Categories, appraisals, and the problem of language

According to appraisal theorists, anger involves a negative event, usually blocking a goal, caused by another person. Critics argue that other-agency is unnecessary, since people can be angry at themselves, and thus that appraisal theory is wrong about anger. In two studies, we compared anger, self-anger, shame, and guilt, and found that self-anger shared some appraisals, action tendencies, and associated emotions with anger, others with shame and guilt. Self-anger was not simply anger with a different agency appraisal. Anger, shame, and guilt almost always involved other people, but almost half of the occurrences of self-anger were solitary. We discuss the incompatibility of appraisal theories with any strict categorical view of emotions, and the inadequacy of emotion words to capture emotional experience.     

Changes in Emotions Over the Course of Dialectical Behavior Therapy and the Moderating Role of Depression,Anxiety, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

Evidence-based borderline personality disorder (BPD) treatments such as dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) emphasize the acquisition and use of strategies to down regulate negative emotion. However, little research examines whether specific emotions change during DBT. Further, it is unclear if BPD-relevant comorbidities that involve heightened emotion—namely, depression, anxiety disorders, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—moderate these outcomes. This study investigated which specific emotions (hostility/anger, fear, shame/guilt, and sadness) decrease during DBT, and whether comorbid depression, anxiety disorders, and PTSD moderate these outcomes. Individuals with BPD (N = 101) completed 6 months of standard DBT and provided measurements of specific emotions at every session and at pre-, mid-, and posttreatment. Generalized estimating equations revealed moderate effect-sized reductions in anger at major assessment time points. Anxiety disorders and PTSD moderated the effect of time on fear, shame, and guilt. PTSD also moderated the effect of time on sadness. For all moderating effects, individuals with the comorbidity exhibited greater reductions than those without. These findings corroborate that DBT reduces several specific emotions, and comorbid PTSD and anxiety disorders may facilitate this effect for fear, shame/guilt, and sadness (clinical trial registration number = NCT03123198).     

Shame,guilt, and facial emotion processing: initial evidence for a positive relationship between guilt-proneness and facial emotion recognition ability

Shame and guilt are closely related self-conscious emotions of negative affect that give rise to divergent self-regulatory and motivational behaviours. While guilt-proneness has demonstrated positive relationships with self-report measures of empathy and adaptive interpersonal functioning, shame-proneness tends to be unrelated or inversely related to empathy and is associated with interpersonal difficulties. At present, no research has examined relationships between shame and guilt-proneness with facial emotion recognition ability. Participants (N?=?363) completed measures of shame and guilt-proneness along with a facial emotion recognition task which assessed the ability to identify displays of anger, sadness, happiness, fear, disgust, and shame. Guilt-proneness was consistently positively associated with facial emotion recognition ability. In contrast, shame-proneness was unrelated to capacity for facial emotion recognition. Findings provide support for theory arguing that guilt and empathy operate synergistically and may also help explain the inverse relationship between guilt-proneness and propensity for aggressive behaviour.     

Appraisal antecedents of shame and guilt: support for a theoretical model

Four studies used experimental and correlational methods to test predictions about the antecedents of shame and guilt derived from an appraisal-based model of self-conscious emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Results were consistent with the predicted relations between appraisals (i.e., causal attributions) and emotions. Specifically, (a) internal attributions were positively related to both shame and guilt; (b) the chronic tendency to make external attributions was positively related to the tendency to experience shame; and (c) internal, stable, uncontrollable attributions for failure were positively related to shame, whereas internal, unstable, controllable attributions for failure were positively related to guilt. Emotions and attributions were assessed using a variety of methods, so converging results across studies indicate the robustness of the findings and provide support for the theoretical model.     

从信任违背到信任修复:道德情绪的作用机制

早期学者已经从认知的角度分析信任违背的原因及修复方式。近年来,情绪对信任修复的影响引起了重点关注,但是情绪在其中的作用机制并未得到解答。当前的研究主要从情绪影响信任的线索依赖效应和离散情绪(内疚、羞愧、愤怒、悲伤等)对信任修复的影响这两个角度着手研究情绪对信任修复的影响。通过文献梳理发现内疚和共情两种道德情绪是影响信任修复最重要的情绪因素:内疚能够促进受信方做出补偿行为,共情能够促进信任方宽恕他人。基于此构建了道德情绪的信任修复模型,并考虑了目标线索和信任方的特质性宽恕的调节作用。同时建议未来的研究进一步探讨其他离散情绪尤其是道德情绪对信任修复的作用,并关注情境与情绪的交互作用。     

Bound to Feel Bad About Oneself: Relations Between Attachment and the Self-conscious Emotions of Guilt and Shame in Children and Adolescents

Two cross-sectional studies were conducted to explore the relationship between attachment and the self-conscious emotions of guilt and shame in childhood. Study 1 was performed in non-clinical children aged 9–13 years (N = 688) who completed a single-item measure of attachment style and a vignette-based instrument for assessing guilt and shame. Results showed that children who classified themselves as insecurely attached displayed higher levels of shame and maladaptive types of guilt as compared to securely attached children. Study 2 was conducted in adolescents aged 12–18 years (N = 135), of whom the majority was referred to a clinical setting because of externalizing problems. Adolescents filled in a dimensional scale for measuring attachment quality to parents and peers and the above mentioned vignette-based instrument of guilt and shame. It was found that the clinical adolescents generally exhibited lower levels of self-conscious emotions as compared to non-clinical adolescents. Within this clinical group, communication to parents and peers was associated with higher levels of self-conscious emotions, and alienation was accompanied by higher levels of maladaptive forms of guilt and shame. Altogether, these results fit with the theory that attachment (in)security is involved in people’s proneness to experience self-conscious emotions.     

The effects of independent and interdependent self-construals on reactions to transgressions: distinguishing between guilt and shame

The self-conscious emotions of guilt and shame are commonly distinguished by the self-reflective processes that foster these emotions. Distinctions based on resulting behavioral reactions, however, have been questioned in recent studies highlighting the role of different self-motivations. The current work draws on the self-construal literature to further clarify the antecedents and consequences of guilt and shame. We hypothesized that conceptualizing the self as independent from (vs. interdependent with) others fosters behavior-related (vs. self-related) cognitions typically associated with guilt (vs. shame). Additionally, we predicted that the deleterious consequences of shame for externalizing blame are more characteristic of independent (vs. interdependent) selves. These hypotheses were supported across two studies that measured (Study 1) and primed (Study 2) self-construals. Overall, our results suggest that the cognitive reactions associated with guilt and shame are differently encouraged by independent and interdependent self-construals.     

What do the TOSCA guilt and shame scales really measure: Affect or action?

Psychologists have long used the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) as an instrument for empirically distinguishing between trait emotions of guilt and shame. Recent assessments of the internal structure of the TOSCA guilt scale suggest that it may not measure the experience of guilt, but rather motivation to make amends for personal wrongdoing. In contrast, TOSCA shame may better assess the tendency to experience negative self-conscious affect. Previous research did not take into account that TOSCA guilt theoretically should only predict emotions in a situation of wrongdoing; we put this idea to the test in two studies. Experimental, but not control, participants received believable feedback that they had shown involuntary prejudice towards a member of a minority group. In both studies TOSCA guilt predicted reparative action after feedback was given, including expressing non-prejudiced views and recommending financial compensation to the minority group. However, TOSCA guilt had no relationship with feelings of guilt or shame after expressing prejudice. In contrast, TOSCA shame was a better predictor of feelings of guilt, shame and other self-critical emotions, but did not predict compensatory action. These findings suggest motivation rather than emotion as a mechanism behind past findings involving TOSCA guilt.     

Exploring the role of emotions in injustice perceptions and retaliation

Although organizational justice scholars often describe unfairness as an emotionally laden experience, the role of emotion is underresearched. In a study of individuals who experienced being laid off (N = 173), the authors found that outcome favorability interacts with both procedural and interactional justice to predict participants' emotions. The pattern of interaction differed for inward-focused (i.e., shame and guilt) and outward-focused (i.e., anger and hostility) negative emotions. Attributions of blame mediated the relationship between fairness perceptions and outward-focused negative emotion. Outward-focused emotion mediated the relationship between fairness perceptions and retaliation.     

The automaticity of emotion recognition

Evolutionary accounts of emotion typically assume that humans evolved to quickly and efficiently recognize emotion expressions because these expressions convey fitness-enhancing messages. The present research tested this assumption in 2 studies. Specifically, the authors examined (a) how quickly perceivers could recognize expressions of anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, fear, happiness, pride, sadness, shame, and surprise; (b) whether accuracy is improved when perceivers deliberate about each expression's meaning (vs. respond as quickly as possible); and (c) whether accurate recognition can occur under cognitive load. Across both studies, perceivers quickly and efficiently (i.e., under cognitive load) recognized most emotion expressions, including the self-conscious emotions of pride, embarrassment, and shame. Deliberation improved accuracy in some cases, but these improvements were relatively small. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for the cognitive processes underlying emotion recognition.     

Group‐Based Shame and Guilt: Emerging Directions in Research

Research on the role of emotion in social identity, group processes, and intergroup conflict is burgeoning. This paper examines recent research on group‐based shame and guilt and describes important themes in this research. Guilt and shame are distinguished by different appraisals and motivations in intergroup contexts. Group‐based shame is associated with threats to group‐image and motivations to protect and repair that image. In contrast, group‐based guilt is associated with efforts to repair and apologize for ingroup wrongdoing. Current research is expanding in several important directions. First, the scope of emotions is expanding beyond that of shame and guilt to consider the roles of emotions such as ingroup‐directed anger in situations that may also provoke group‐based shame and guilt. Second, people’s motivations to avoid feeling group‐based shame and guilt are becoming better understood, particularly in relation to different aspects of social identification. Finally, we argue that dynamic processes in emotion expression and experience, particularly due to the relation between perpetrator and victim groups, are an important future direction in research on group‐based shame and guilt.     

Shame and Guilt—Do They Really Differ in Their Focus of Evaluation? Wanting to Change the Self and Behavior in Response to Ingroup Immorality

Shame and guilt are often theorized to differ on a self versus behavior focus. However, we propose that this is not true when taking a group perspective. In our field study, 196 communal participants were confronted with historical ingroup immorality. Results showed that participants who were old enough to have understood what happened in that time-period felt more guilt and shame than did those who were too young. Partly due to their ingroup anger, shame motivated an intention to change the ingroup self and behavior. In contrast, partly due to personal anger, guilt motivated an intention to change personal self and behavior. This suggests that the distinction between shame and guilt are not as clear-cut as previous research have assumed.     

The Self‐Conscious Emotions: How are they Experienced,Expressed, and Assessed?

The self‐conscious emotions (e.g., embarrassment, guilt, pride, shame) are a special class of emotions that critically involve the self, including the capacity to form stable self‐representations and to evaluate oneself relative to internal and external standards. In this article, we summarize five areas of recent research on self‐conscious emotions: (a) the cognitive elicitors, or causal appraisals, that generate them; (b) their non‐verbal expressions; (c) the underlying neural processes; (d) the degree to which their experience and expression varies across cultures; and (e) the measures that have been developed to assess them. In each section, we provide recommendations for future research directions.     

Visuospatial perspective shifting and relational self-association in dispositional shame and guilt

Although dispositional shame and guilt have been distinguished by perceptions of the self and behavioral responses, the underlying information processing patterns remain unclear. We hypothesized that an ability to contemplate alternatives to perceptions of the current environment, i.e., flexibility in perspective shifting, may be essential to both dispositions. Dispositional shame may additionally relate to negative relational knowledge that involves a self-representation of being rejected. One hundred and six community participants rated the two dispositions, and had their flexibility in perspective shifting and internalized self-association with rejection assessed. Regression analysis indicated that a lower cost of perspective shifting was observed with dispositional guilt and shame. Yet, unlike a direct association with perspective shifting for dispositional guilt, it was an interaction between perspective shifting and negative relational knowledge that accounted for dispositional shame. The association of dispositional shame with perspective shifting was contingent upon the tendency to pair the self with rejection.     

On the Link between Perceived Parental Rearing Behaviors and Self-conscious Emotions in Adolescents

This study examined relationships between the self-conscious emotions of guilt and shame in both clinical (N?=?104) and non-clinical (N?=?477) (young) adolescents aged 11–18?years, who completed a questionnaire to assess perceived parental rearing behaviors (EMBU-C) and a scenario-based instrument to measure proneness to guilt and shame (SCEMAS). Results indicated that parental rearing dimensions were positively related to self-conscious emotions. Regarding the non-clinical sample, both favourable (emotional warmth) and unfavourable (rejection) paternal and maternal rearing dimensions were significant correlates of guilt- and shame-proneness. The results for the clinical sample were less conclusive: only maternal emotional warmth and rejection were found to be significantly associated with guilt and shame. Interestingly, no associations between any of the paternal rearing dimensions and self-conscious emotions emerged. Taken together, these results are in keeping with the notion that parental rearing factors are involved in the development of both adaptive and maladaptive self-conscious emotions in adolescents.     

Cognitive appraisals and emotional experience: Further evidence

Abstract

The present study uses methods derived from Smith and Ellsworth (1985) to investigate the degree to which emotions are associated with distinctive patterns of cognitive appraisal. Subjects described past situations in which they had unambiguously experienced each of eight emotions: guilt. embarrassment, shame. anxiety. anger, hope. joy, and pride. These situations were then rated on each of 10 appraisal scales: unpleasantness. unexpectedness of events from own and from others' perspective, inconsistency of own actions with own and others' behavioural standards, benefit to self and to others, own and others' responsibility for events. and degree to which events were beyond anyone's control. Analysis of these ratings revealed distinctive patterns of appraisal associated with the eight emotions. including discriminable patterns for guilt and shame—emotions that were not distinguished in terms of the appraisal dimensions recovered by Smith and Ellsworth. Thus the present study demonstrates that appraisal dimensions (such as unexpectedness, benefit, and inconsistency with behavioural standards) in addition than those used by Smith and Ellsworth have utility in distinguishing among emotions.