Pickup of Essential Kinematics Underpins Expert Perception of Movement Patterns

In a series of 3 experiments, the authors examined the ability of badminton players of different skill levels (12 experts and 12 nonexperts) to anticipate the direction of badminton strokes. Participants viewed either film or point-light displays under a range of temporal or spatial occlusion conditions. World-class players were able to consistently pick up useful predictive information from the advance (precontact) kinematics of both the lower body and the racquet when the motion of those features was presented in isolation, whereas recreational players' use of the same information depended on the concurrent presence of linked segments. Participants' information pickup closely matched key biomechanical changes in the movement pattern being viewed, although, contrary to a common-coding view of perception and action (e.g., W. Prinz, 1997), some important differences were evident between the characteristics of the experts' movement prediction and those of expert movement production.     

Representation,Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the representational theory of perception, on which the world is represented as being a certain way in perceptual experience, cannot explain how there can be a genuinely epistemic connection between experience and belief. I try to show that we are positively required to deny that perceptual consciousness is contentful if we want to make its fitness for epistemic duties intelligible. (So versions of the representational theory on which experience has a merely causal purchase on belief are not considered.) But my aim is not just negative. I try to defeat representationalism in such a way as to motivate a robustly presentational theory of perception. According to such a theory, perceptions are relations not between a subject and a content but between a subject and an ordinary object (such that if the relation holds at t, an appropriate subject and object must exist at t, and the object must be presented to the subject). I end by sketching an account of perceptual experience that is meant to show that, contrary to a very popular misconception, there is a way to conceive perceptual consciousness as relational and presentational (not intentional and representational) that does not succumb to the celebrated ‘myth of the Given’.     

Richard Rorty and the pragmatic turn in the study of religion

Recent interest in the pragmatic tradition draws much of its impetus from the work of Richard Rorty and his critics. This paper argues that Rorty's late interest in religion derives from his abiding interests in American liberalism and not specifically from his Pragmatism. Students of religion, however, have much to learn from the pragmatic tradition and over the last 25 years work by Wayne Proudfoot, Jeffrey Stout, and others has been important in establishing a pluralist approach to the study of religion that avoids the pitfalls of foundationalism, essentialism, and dogmatism in understanding religion and religious phenomena. The continued pursuit of this approach, the essay concludes, will help students of religion avoid unnecessary worries about theories and methods.     

Meditation and the scope of mental action

While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, the most well developed extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this article, we argue that meditation provides a useful model for understanding a wider range of types of mental action than heretofore recognized. Conclusions yielded by two distinct bodies of current psychological research on meditation and cognition, and meditation and introspection, buttress meditation’s suitability for this role.     

In the Wilderness: The Doctrine of Defilement in the Book of Numbers,Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993

Recent interest in the pragmatic tradition draws much of its impetus fromthework of Richard Rorty and his critics. This paper argues that Rorty's late interest in religion derives from his abiding interests in American liberalism and not specifically from his Pragmatism. Students of religion, however, have much to learn from the pragmatic tradition and over the last 25 years work by Wayne Proudfoot, Jeffrey Stout, and others has been important in establishing a pluralist approach to the study of religion that avoids the pitfalls of foundationalism, essentialism, and dogmatism in understanding religion and religious phenomena. The continued pursuit of this approach, the essay concludes, will help students of religion avoid unnecessary worries about theories and methods.     

Sellars and Quine on empiricism and conceptual truth1

I compare Sellars’s criticism of the ‘myth of the given’ with Quine’s criticism of the ‘two dogmas’ of empiricism, that is, the analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism. In Sections I to III, I present Quine’s and Sellars’s views. In IV to X, I discuss similarities and differences in their views. In XI to XII, I show that Sellars’s arguments against the ‘myth of the given’ are incompatible with Quine’s rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction.     

The intersubjectivity of spiritual experience in the art practice of people with histories of mental distress: a phenomenological study

The therapeutic outcomes gained through engaging with the art making process are well documented. Somewhat less probed are the auxiliary and sometimes enigmatic experiences of art making that impact on the sense of mental wellbeing; experiences which, by their nature, can be difficult to capture. This paper discusses such experiences, described by a group of art makers with histories of mental illness, as being spiritual in nature. A phenomenological approach using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) methodology was used, with Heideggerian concepts of ‘Dasein’ (There-being) and ‘Mitsein’ (With-being) informing an interpretation of the intersubjective. Such experiences were felt to be profound, and were often claimed to be accessible exclusively through an art practice that was sustained over a number of years of regular activity. The paper concludes by pointing out the difficulty in capturing evidence of sustained, non-clinical strategies for wellbeing such as those developed as an inherent part of the experiences reported here, due to their nuanced nature and the reluctance with which they may be narrated.     

The myth of technology in health care

Technology is believed to have liberated health care from dogmas, myths and speculations of earlier times. However, we are accused of using technology in an excessive, futile and even detrimental way, as if technology is compelling our actions. It appears to be like the monster threatening Dr. Frankenstein or like the socerer’s broom in the hand of the apprentice. That is, the same technology that should liberate us from myths, appears to be mythical. The objective of this article is to investigate the background for the re-entrance of the myth: How we encounter it and how we can explain it. The main point is that a myth of technology is normative: it relates ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and directs our actions. This becomes particularly clear in health care. Hence, if there is a myth of technology, it is an ethical issue, and should be taken seriously.     

Intralevel mental causation

This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections to nonreductive physicalism, including versions of the exclusion argument. This paper examines some features of three recent versions of intralevelism defended by John Gibbons, Markus Schlosser, and Amie Thomasson. This paper shows that the distinctive problems faced by these three representative versions of intralevelism suggest that the intralevelist strategy does not provide a viable solution to the exclusion problem.     

Do Perceptual Instructions Lead to Enhanced Performance Relative to Behavioral Instructions?

As people we commonly instruct people in terms of physical actions to carry out to perform any task. However, according to perceptual control theory (Powers, 1973 Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The control of perception. Chicago, IL: Aldine. [Google Scholar]), human action serves to control perception. Using a drawing task, it was hypothesized that instructions describing the perceivable effects of the movement would result in greater accuracy of image drawing than those describing the movement. Participants were asked to draw images using different instructions; describing the expected perceptions and describing the movements. As predicted, it was found that describing the perceptual outcome of the task led to significantly more accurate drawings than describing the movements did. This highlights the importance of instructions based on desired perceptions when precise execution of a skill is necessary.     

表象预期调控生物运动性别信息的识别

生物运动系在运动的生物体身的关键节点安置12～15个光点的运动痕迹形成的动画。研究表明光点生物运动包含了丰富的社会性信息,其社会性信息的识别涉及多个心理活动过程,其中大脑自上而下的知觉调控过程发挥重要作用。本研究通过两个实验探讨了表象预期在大脑自上而下调控光点生物运动性别信息识别的作用。结果发现：（1）表象预期能够加快男性生物运动的性别识别速度;想象中性形象被试倾向于将性别中立的生物运动识别为中性,而较少为男性或者女性。（2）表象预期条件和无表象预期条件下性别中立的光点生物运动性别类型识别都表现出“男性偏差”现象。（3）反应类型能够影响生物运动的性别识别。本研究有利于揭示大脑自上而下调控光点生物运动性别信息识别的心理机制。     

Selective effects of motor expertise in mental body rotation tasks: comparing object-based and perspective transformations

Brain imaging studies provide strong evidence for the involvement of the human mirror system during the observation of complex movements, depending on the individual's motor expertise. Here, we ask the question whether motor expertise not only affects perception while observing movements, but also benefits perception while solving mental rotation tasks. Specifically, motor expertise should only influence the performance in mental body rotation tasks (MBRT) with left-right judgment, evoking a perspective transformation, whereas motor expertise should not affect the MBRT with same-different judgment, evoking an object-related transformation. Participants with and without motor expertise for rotational movements were tested in these two conditions in the MBRT. Results showed that motor experience selectively affected performance in the MBRT with the left-right judgment, but not with same-different judgment. More precisely, motor expertise only benefited performance when human figures were presented in (for non-experts) unfamiliar, upside-down body orientations.     

Family myth,the symbolic realm and the ancestors

Abstract: This paper¹ takes the shape of a diptych. The first part explores the ancestors as embodied ghosts, internal objects or as mediated through ancestral heritage, as these aspects intertwine in a Möbius strip. The second part looks at ancestral heritage and the different ways in which ‘family myth’ appears in a Jungian context and in Systemic Psychotherapy (family therapy). Both share an interface through the current paradigm shifts towards mutual reflexivity in patient and therapist and a focus on the interpersonal space. The ancestors give substance to the eternal riddle: ‘from whence do we come, who are we and where do we go’, which connects past, present and future. Our ancestors are part of our minds, perhaps in the way Damasio (2010) postulates that ancestral experiences mediated through culture shape our brains. The leitmotiv of individuation through mimesis (sameness) and alterity (difference) runs through both parts.     

Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions

Common-sense folk psychology and mainstream philosophy of action agree about decisions: these are under an agent's direct control, and are thus intentional actions for which agents can be held responsible. I begin this paper by presenting a problem for this view. In short, since the content of the motivational attitudes that drive deliberation and decision remains open-ended until the moment of decision, it is unclear how agents can be thought to exercise control over what they decide at the moment of deciding. I note that this problem might motivate a non-actional view of deciding—a view that decisions are not actions, but are instead passive events of intention acquisition. For without an understanding of how an agent might exercise control over what is decided at the moment of deciding, we lack a good reason for maintaining commitment to an actional view of deciding. However, I then offer the required account of how agents exercise control over decisions at the moment of deciding. Crucial to this account is an understanding of the relation of practical deliberation to deciding, an understanding of skilled deliberative activity, and the role of attention in the mental action of deciding.     

The development of a mental health coalition: A case study

Described the development of a local-level mental health coalition to advocate for housing and community support programs for psychiatric consumer/survivors. Resource mobilization theory was used as a framework from which to view and understand the origins, goals, tactics, and outcomes of the coalition. Data were presented indicating that the coalition played a role in obtaining increased funding for housing and community support programs. Also, there was an emphasis on consumer/survivor and family participation in the change process. Benefits and limitations of the coalition after 6 years of operation were reviewed and compared with other advocacy coalitions in mental health. Thanks to Wendy Czarny, Peter Dunn, Mary Earls, John Lord, Ken Parsons, Isaac Prilleltensky, Harvey Simmons, and the reviewers for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.     

The effect of salience on mental accounting: how integration versus segregation of payment influences purchase decisions

Although mental accounting principles are generally robust, the integration‐of‐losses principle often fails. This research argues that when information salience is high, people actively segregate. To demonstrate that effect, this research uses purchase decision making for which the total payment is a key decision factor and compares examples such as the following equivalent total payments: “$120.95 for a stroller plus $19.95 for shipping” (i.e., segregation) versus “$140.90 for a stroller including shipping” (i.e., integration). Two studies demonstrate that integration increases purchase intentions when the salience of the smaller payment is higher. Specifically, integration leads to higher purchase intentions than does segregation when (1) the surcharge is visually more salient, (2) the surcharge is easy to process, and (3) price perceptions are stimulus instead of recall driven. Therefore, this research extends mental accounting by identifying conditions in which the integration‐of‐losses principle is likely to prevail. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Editorial Notice

Abstract

John McDowell has claimed that the rational link between perceptions and empirical judgements allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality, one which extends beyond the objects perceived. In this way, we can be said to have a perceptual awareness of the world. I argue that McDowell's account of this perceptual awareness does not succeed. His account as it stands does not have the resources to explain how our perceptions can present objects as belonging to a wider reality, regardless of the judgements we make about that reality. I suggest that we can give a better account of this perceptual awareness of the world by appealing to transcendental phenomenology. A phenomenological study of perceptual experiences describes how they are structured by a sense of the perceived objects as belonging to a world containing other objects of possible perception. I shall outline this sense we have of the world, and argue that it allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality. Transcendental phenomenology can thus help to explain our perceptual awareness of the world.