Thing Talk Moonlighting

It is controversial whether the truth conditions of attitude sentences are opaque. It is not, or shouldn't be controversial, however, that conditions of apt or unexceptionable usage are opaque. A framework for expressing such uncontroversial claims of opacity is developed, and within this framework it is argued that opacity resides at a locutionary level — that it is a matter of expressed content (which might not be truth-conditional). The same claim is made for a related pattern in attitude talk which is labeled the moonlighting use of thing-talk.     

The Educational Thing

In this essay, I argue that education should be conceived of as a thing in itself. To lift this view, I present aspects of Graham Harman’s philosophy, a speculative realism that can be seen as a radical break with social constructivism and similar approaches. Next, I attempt to outline a rough sketch of an educational “thing”, drawing on concepts such as protection, love, swarm, tension and shadow. Finally, I briefly discuss some implications of this vision for philosophy of education. In particular, I think that my discussion point to philosophy of education as the basic discipline in an educational science.     

A University Is a Many-Faceted Thing

The College and University Environment Scales were given to all freshmen entering the University of Minnesota in 1964 and to other groups of students and staff members in order to determine the homogeneity of college perception and expectation in a complex university. On each of the five CUES scales statistically significant differences were found among the colleges within the University, and on three of the scales significant sex differences were identified. The scores of upperclassmen and staff members differed from those of entering freshmen. In spite of these differences in mean scores, the shapes of the profiles were similar for all groups, and on 15 of the 150 CUES items 90 per cent or more of the freshmen concurred. CUES can be used to generalize about parts of the University but only to a lesser extent to generalize about the entire institution.     

Where the Whole Thing Fell Apart

Abstract

This article examines the intersection of societal prejudice and psychological trauma. In an instrumental case study created through a layered narrative analysis, the author highlights the potentially traumatic effects of racism and discrimination, while also exploring the phenomenon of resilience in a complex ecological system. The findings suggest that the enduring and continual strain of racial prejudice may cause significant psychological distress, particularly when those experiences reinforce early negative experiences within a family; and that assessments of resilience need to consider the contribution of ecological context to psychological outcomes as well as to an individual's ability to mobilize personal resources when such a context finally shifts.     

Contradictory Information: Too Much of a Good Thing

Both I and Belnap, motivated the “Belnap-Dunn 4-valued Logic” by talk of the reasoner being simply “told true” (T), and simply “told false” (F), which leaves the options of being neither “told true” nor “told false” (N), and being both “told true” and “told false” (B). Belnap motivated these notions by consideration of unstructured databases that allow for negative information as well as positive information (even when they conflict). We now experience this on a daily basis with the Web. But the 4-valued logic is deductive in nature, and its matrix is discrete: there are just four values. In this paper I investigate embedding the 4-valued logic into a context of probability. Jøsang’s Subjective Logic introduced uncertainty to allow for degrees of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty. We extend this so as to allow for two kinds of uncertainty—that in which the reasoner has too little information (ignorance) and that in which the reasoner has too much information (conflicted). Jøsang’s “Opinion Triangle” becomes an “Opinion Tetrahedron” and the 4-values can be seen as its vertices. I make/prove various observations concerning the relation of non-classical “probability” to non-classical logic.     

Moral Worth and Doing the Right Thing by Accident

Kantian conceptions of moral worth are thought to enjoy an advantage over their rivals in virtue of accommodating two plausible intuitions—that the praiseworthiness of an action is never accidental, and that how an agent might have acted in other circumstances does not determine the moral worth of her actual conduct. In this paper, I argue that neither the Kantian nor her rivals can adequately accommodate both intuitions, in as much as non-accidentality presupposes counterfactual robustness. If we are to adequately accommodate both claims, then we must reconsider the kind of non-accidentality that really matters to moral worth. I propose that the kind of non-accidentality worth caring about requires only that the agent who does what is right acts competently from morally relevant concerns. Under this account, both the Kantian and (some of) her rivals can ensure that the praiseworthiness of an action is never accidental without counting the behaviour of non-actual agents as being relevant to assessments of moral worth.