What You Expect Is What You Believe (But Not Necessarily What You Get): A Test of the Effectiveness of Subliminal Self-Help Audiotapes

Seventy-eight subjects, ranging in age from 18 to 60 years, participated in an experiment on the effectiveness of commercially produced subliminal self-help audiotapes. Upon completing pretest memory and self-esteem tests, subjects randomly received either a subliminal self-help tape designed to improve memory or increase self-esteem and were told that they had received either a memory or a self-esteem tape. After listening to the tape for 5 weeks in a home environment, subjects returned to the laboratory for memory and self-esteem tests. The results showed that the subliminal self-help tapes did not affect any of the performance measures in a manner consistent with manufacturer claims. However, subjects' perceptions of personal improvement were consistent with their expectations. Specifically, subjects who thought they had listened to a self-esteem tape were more likely to indicate that their self-esteem had improved and subjects who thought they had listened to a memory tape were more likely to indicate their memory had improved regardless of the actual subliminal content.     

Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe

I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert ‘Q and I don't believe that Q’ sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis).     

What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality

The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others’ right to self‐determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what is involved in recognizing them. This paper answers the latter. I argue that, in general, recognition is something that we do to others rather than something that we think about others. In particular, recognition is an intentional action to treat another individual as a legitimate, self‐determining agent. I then show that recognition's realizability requires that agents understand their intentions as dependent on others for their satisfaction. Thus, relations of recognition are instances of collective intentionality.     

On Not Seeing What You Do Not Want to See: Meloen, van der Linden and de Witte on Authoritarianism

Meloen, van der Linden, and de Witte (1996) were puzzled by their finding that their various scales of authoritarian attitudes all correlated at similar low levels with approval for a racist political party. They also reported that the "Directiveness" behavior inventory correlated not at all with political variables. If the validity characteristics of the various scales used are taken into account, however, the implications of their results are clear: The alleged scales of authoritarian attitudes were simply functioning as alternative scales of conservatism and people who preferred leftist political parties were just as likely to be authoritarian as those who preferred racist political parties.     

When What You Want is What You Get: Pay Dispersion and Communal Sharing Preference

The question of whether pay structures should be compressed or dispersed remains unanswered. We argue that pay dispersion can yield uncertainty regarding others' intentions and behaviors; as a result, individuals take a greater risk trusting their group members as pay spreads widen. Accordingly, we explore the conditions under which individuals are more willing to take this risk by viewing their group members as trustworthy even when pay is dispersed. Specifically, preferences for how relationships and resources should be structured in groups should help to determine when pay dispersion relates to trustworthiness perceptions. We hypothesise that the cross‐level interaction between preferences for communal sharing (Level 1)—that is, the extent to which individuals prefer communal, egalitarian structures in their groups—and pay dispersion (Level 2) is associated with trust perceptions. Data drawn from a sample of university professors support our hypothesised cross‐level interaction, and show that when pay dispersion is greater, individuals perceive their group members as more trustworthy only when they have weak preferences for communal sharing. Our results signify the importance of individual attributes to understanding pay dispersion's effects, and show that trust is fostered when preferences and pay conditions are aligned.     

Racial Differences in Work Attitudes: What You See Depends on What You Study

Differences in a constellation of work attitudes were studied with respect to black and white employees using a sample of healthcare workers. Preliminary analyses using MANOVA indicated that blacks had more positive work attitudes than did whites. However, systematic analyses of set of covariates including personal, lifestyle, and organizational variables eliminated all racial differences in work attitudes. Implications of these findings and directions for future research were discussed.     

You Are What You See and Choose: Agreeableness and Situation Selection

Agreeableness positively predicts subjective well‐being, but why does it do so? Recent theorizing has highlighted possible substrates related to emotion regulation. Following suit, the present studies focus on the situation selection stage of the emotion regulation sequence. Undergraduate participants reported on their agreeableness levels and completed a picture‐viewing task (Studies 1 and 2) or a media choice task (Study 3). Studies 1 and 2 found that the tendency to view negative pictures for a longer period of time than positive pictures was evident at low levels of agreeableness and absent at high levels. The Study 3 paradigm asked individuals whether they typically choose to expose themselves to positive or negative stimuli across diverse media sources. Preferences for positive media were more pronounced at higher levels of agreeableness. The results have systematic implications for understanding the emotional lives of disagreeable versus agreeable people.     

What You Feel Influences What You See: The Role of Affective Feelings in Resolving Binocular Rivalry

It seems obvious that what you see influences what you feel, but what if the opposite were also true? What if how you feel can shape your visual experience? In this experiment, we demonstrate that the affective state of a perceiver influences the contents of visual awareness. Participants received positive, negative, and neutral affect inductions and then completed a series of binocular rivalry trials in which a face (smiling, scowling, or neutral) was presented to one eye and a house to the other. The percepts “competed” for dominance in visual consciousness. We found, as predicted, that all faces (smiling, scowling, and neutral) were dominant for longer when perceivers experienced unpleasant affect compared to when they were in a neutral state (a social vigilance effect), although scowling faces increased their dominance when perceivers felt unpleasant (a relative negative congruence effect). Relatively speaking, smiling faces increased their dominance more when perceivers were experiencing pleasant affect (a positive congruence effect). These findings illustrate that the affective state of a perceiver serves as a context that influences the contents of consciousness.     

Critical Psychology: What It Is and What It Is Not

Critical psychology alerts us to the limitations of mainstream research in the discipline, and it promises to put 'social' issues on the agenda in the whole of psychology. A starting point of the stance of critical psychological research is that the claims that psychologists make about human beings often seem to vanish almost as quickly as they are discovered. People, a group or culture do not behave or think like the model would predict, and, more importantly, we find that our awareness, our reflection on a process described by a psychologist changes that process. It is in the nature of human nature to change, to change as different linguistic resources, social practices, and representations of the self become available, and for human nature to change itself as people reflect on who they are and who they may become. That means that any attempt to fix us in place must fail. But it will only fail in such a way that something productive emerges from it if we do something different, and one place to do something different is in psychology. We need to step back and look at the images of the self, mind and behaviour that psychologists have produced, the types of practices they engage in, and the power those practices, those 'technologies of the self' have to set limits on change. When we appreciate this, we can start to look at what psychologists might do instead as part of a genuinely critical approach.     

Tell Me What You Believe and I'll Tell You What You Want: Empirical Evidence for Discriminating Value Patterns of Five Types of Religiosity

On the basis of Wulff's (1997) theoretical model of religious attitudes and of Schwartz's (1992; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) value theory, a refined theoretical framework has been constructed and empirically tested concerning the relation between 5 types of religiosity and personal value orientation. Two theoretical value patterns associated with religiosity were identified: A theological one focused on transcendence and mutual care, and a sociopsychological one focused on acceptance of social order and avoidance of uncertainty. Religious commitment and Hutsebaut's (1996) types of religious attitudes, which are based on Wulff's theoretical model, were, in a theoretically predicted and meaningful way, empirically related to a different value pattern. Moreover, each observed pattern could be explained as a specific combination of the 2 theoretically derived value patterns.     

Aversive Racism and Resistance to Affirmative Action: Perception of Justice Are Not Necessarily Color Blind

This study utilized a factorial survey design to assess attitudes toward affirmative action as a function of targeted group (Black, handicapped, or elderly persons), framing of the policy (with or without social justification), and institutional context (business, college, or social organization). Resistance to affirmative action was aroused more by policies specifying Blacks as the targeted group and by policies presented without justification. Supportive of the aversive racism framework, the level of resistance to the policies presented without justification for Blacks as the target group was higher than for all other targeted groups with or without justification. Implications for these findings for strategies to reduce negative attitudes toward affirmative action are discussed.     

What You Don't Know Can Help You: The Ethics of Placebo Treatment

Is it permissible for a doctor or nurse to knowingly administer a placebo in a clinical setting? There is certainly something suspicious about it: placebos are typically said to be ‘sham’ treatments, with no ‘active’ properties and so giving a placebo is usually thought to involve tricking or deceiving the patient who expects a genuine treatment. Nonetheless, some physicians have recently suggested that placebo treatments are sometimes the best way to help their patients and can be administered in an honest way. These physicians conclude that placebo treatments are a perfectly acceptable, and ethically unproblematic, mode of treatment. While I grant the common idea that placebos are deceptive is correct, I argue that widespread misunderstandings concerning why this is so has led proponents of placebo treatments to respond to the charge of deception in a way that misses the mark entirely. My goal in this paper, then, is to develop a precise conception of what makes something a placebo, which in turn will clarify the central charge concerning the ethics of placebo treatment, viz. that it is deceptive.     

You Can't Always Get What You Want: Infants Understand Failed Goal-Directed Actions

ABSTRACT— At what age do infants understand that goals exist independently of the actions that result from them? Exploring infants' understanding of failed intentional actions—when the goal of the action is unfulfilled and thus not apparent in the actor's movements—is a critical step in answering this question. Using a visual habituation paradigm, we assessed when infants understand that a failed intentional action is goal directed and whether an understanding of successful intentional actions (actions that do overtly attain their goals) precedes an understanding of failed intentional actions. Results demonstrated that 10- and 12-month-olds recognized the goal directedness of both successful and failed reaching actions. Eight-month-olds also recognized the goal directedness of successful actions, but not of unsuccessful attempts. Thus, by the end of the 1st year of life, infants possess an impressive understanding of intentional action, and an understanding of failed intentional actions follows an earlier understanding of successful ones.     

What Incompleteness Arguments are and What They are Not

Cappelen and Lepore (2005) maintain that Incompleteness Arguments for context sensitivity are fallacious. In their view, Incompleteness Arguments are non sequitur fallacies whose conclusions are not logically related to premises. They affirm that the conclusions of Incompleteness Arguments are metaphysical claims about the existence of entities that might be constituents of propositions, while their premises concern psychological data about speakers' dispositions to truth evaluate sentences in contexts of utterance. Cappelen and Lepore reject Incompleteness Arguments because psychological data have no bearing on metaphysical issues. I do not dispute Cappelen and Lepore's claim that psychological data have no relevance to metaphysics. Nonetheless, I argue that Cappelen and Lepore's criticism is vitiated by a misunderstanding of the nature of Incompleteness Arguments that makes them overlook the link between semantics and linguistic competence. I try to shed light on the real nature of Incompleteness Arguments by pointing at the failure of Cappelen and Lepore's criticism. My aim is not to defend Semantic Contextualism, but to bring to attention the link between semantics and linguistic competence that should never be overlooked in debates in the field of semantics.