Naming our concerns about neuroscience: a review of Bennett and Hacker's philosophical foundations of neuroscience

Bennett and Hacker use conceptual analysis to appraise the theoretical language of modern cognitive neuroscientists, and conclude that neuroscientific theory is largely dualistic despite the fact that neuroscientists equate mind with the operations of the brain. The central error of cognitive neuroscientists is to commit the mereological fallacy, the tendency to ascribe to the brain psychological concepts that only make sense when ascribed to whole animals. The authors review how the mereological fallacy is committed in theories of memory, perception, thinking, imagery, belief, consciousness, and other psychological processes studied by neuroscientists, and the consequences that fallacious reasoning have for our understanding of how the brain participates in cognition and behavior. Several behavior-analytic concepts may themselves be nonsense based on thorough conceptual analyses in which the criteria for sense and nonsense are found in the ways the concepts are used in ordinary language. Nevertheless, the authors' nondualistic approach and their consistent focus on behavioral criteria for the application of psychological concepts make Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience an important contribution to cognitive neuroscience.     

Pain, dissociation and subliminal self-representations

According to recent evidence, neurophysiological processes coupled to pain are closely related to the mechanisms of consciousness. This evidence is in accordance with findings that changes in states of consciousness during hypnosis or traumatic dissociation strongly affect conscious perception and experience of pain, and markedly influence brain functions. Past research indicates that painful experience may induce dissociated state and information about the experience may be stored or processed unconsciously. Reported findings suggest common neurophysiological mechanisms of pain and dissociation and point to a hypothesis of dissociation as a defense mechanism against psychological and physical pain that substantially influences functions of consciousness. The hypothesis is also supported by findings that information can be represented in the mind/brain without the subject's awareness. The findings of unconsciously present information suggest possible binding between conscious contents and self-functions that constitute self-representational dimensions of consciousness. The self-representation means that certain inner states of own body are interpreted as mental and somatic identity, while other bodily signals, currently not accessible to the dominant interpreter's access are dissociated and may be defined as subliminal self-representations. In conclusion, the neurophysiological aspects of consciousness and its integrative role in the therapy of painful traumatic memories are discussed.     

Synchronous neural oscillations and cognitive processes

The central problem for cognitive neuroscience is to describe how cognitive processes arise from brain processes. This review summarizes the recent evidence that synchronous neural oscillations reveal much about the origin and nature of cognitive processes such as memory, attention and consciousness. Memory processes are most closely related to theta and gamma rhythms, whereas attention seems closely associated with alpha and gamma rhythms. Conscious awareness may arise from synchronous neural oscillations occurring globally throughout the brain rather than from the locally synchronous oscillations that occur when a sensory area encodes a stimulus. These associations between the dynamics of the brain and cognitive processes indicate progress towards a unified theory of brain and cognition.     

执行功能对言语顿悟问题解决的影响:基于行为与ERPs的研究

执行功能是否影响顿悟问题解决,顿悟问题解决中的表征重组阶段是否涉及执行功能仍存在争议。基于此,通过2个研究探讨执行功能对顿悟问题解决的影响。研究1初步探讨执行功能与个体顿悟能力之间的关系,结果发现个体的执行功能与其顿悟问题解决成绩之间存在显著正相关,刷新功能可以显著预测顿悟成绩;研究2使用汉字字谜任务,通过行为与ERPs技术探讨执行功能对言语顿悟问题解决的影响,其中研究2a,行为实验发现高工作记忆刷新能力的个体反应时显著小于低工作记忆刷新能力的个体,说明执行功能中工作记忆刷新亚成分影响顿悟问题解决。研究2b脑电结果发现,"顿悟"条件较之"无顿悟"条件诱发了一个更强的早期成分P2和N2,以及中晚期P3。P2可能主要反映人脑对思维僵局的早期觉察,受到执行功能高低的影响。280~500 ms内,中晚期P3则主要体现以新旧思路交替为特征的僵局打破过程,不受执行功能高低的影响,结果表明汉字字谜顿悟问题的表征重组阶段并未受到执行功能的影响,更倾向认为该阶段为一个突进的过程。综合2个研究说明,执行功能影响顿悟问题解决,其主要作用于顿悟问题解决过程的问题空间搜索阶段,而表征重组阶段是一个突进式的过程。     

SELF OR NO-SELF? CONVERGING PERSPECTIVES FROM NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND MYSTICISM

Abstract. The nature of self is examined in relation to psychological observations which reveal some form of dissociation of knowledge from consciousness. Such dissociations are apparent in cases of blindsight, and amnesic patients displaying implicit memory effects, among others. While amnesic patients, for example, are unable consciously to recall material previously presented, such material does influence subsequent physiological and psychological processes. Thus, it is not the memories themselves that have been lost, but the ability to make conscious connection to them. In attempting to account for such observations, theoreticians generally have posited some kind of "consciousness system" that may become dissociated from brain modules dealing with specific processing.
It is argued here that a view of self along the lines of the Buddhist concepts of no-self and the conditioned nature of "I" introduces a more parsimonious perspective on the neuropsychological data. A theory of the nature of self is presented that constitutes a synthesis between key ideas drawn from Buddhist and other mainly mystical traditions and the scientific observations in psychology. Central to this theory is the role that the left hemisphere's interpreter (Gazzaniga 1985; 1988a; 1988b) plays in constructing a unified "I." This "I" is, in effect, a hypothesis that the mind generates to introduce some coherence into otherwise fragmentary mental elements. Although it appears to be the causal focus of the individual's behavior and experience, it is in fact a retrospective construction and not a true causal structure of the mind. This theoretical view is discussed in relation to various meanings of the term consciousness and also in relation to the relevant neuropsychological cases.     

Psychogenic amnesia – A malady of the constricted self

Autobiographical–episodic memory is the conjunction of subjective time, autonoetic consciousness and the experiencing self. Understanding the neural correlates of autobiographical–episodic memory might therefore be essential for shedding light on the neurobiology underlying the experience of being an autonoetic self. In this contribution we illustrate the intimate relationship between autobiographical–episodic memory and self by reviewing the clinical and neuropsychological features and brain functional imaging correlates of psychogenic amnesia – a condition that is usually characterized by severely impaired retrograde memory functioning, in absence of structural brain damage as detected by standard imaging. We demonstrate that in this disorder the autobiographical–episodic memory deficits do not exist in isolation, but occur with impairments of the autonoetic self-consciousness, emotional processing, and theory of mind or executive functions. Furthermore functional and metabolic brain alterations involving regions that are agreed upon to exert crucial roles in memory processes were frequently found to accompany the psychogenic memory “loss”.     

Emotional consciousness: a neural model of how cognitive appraisal and somatic perception interact to produce qualitative experience

This paper proposes a theory of how conscious emotional experience is produced by the brain as the result of many interacting brain areas coordinated in working memory. These brain areas integrate perceptions of bodily states of an organism with cognitive appraisals of its current situation. Emotions are neural processes that represent the overall cognitive and somatic state of the organism. Conscious experience arises when neural representations achieve high activation as part of working memory. This theory explains numerous phenomena concerning emotional consciousness, including differentiation, integration, intensity, valence, and change.     

Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness

The article reviews the current knowledge regarding altered states of consciousness (ASC) (a) occurring spontaneously, (b) evoked by physical and physiological stimulation, (c) induced by psychological means, and (d) caused by diseases. The emphasis is laid on psychological and neurobiological approaches. The phenomenological analysis of the multiple ASC resulted in 4 dimensions by which they can be characterized: activation, awareness span, self-awareness, and sensory dynamics. The neurophysiological approach revealed that the different states of consciousness are mainly brought about by a compromised brain structure, transient changes in brain dynamics (disconnectivity), and neurochemical and metabolic processes. Besides these severe alterations, environmental stimuli, mental practices, and techniques of self-control can also temporarily alter brain functioning and conscious experience.     

Consciousness and working memory: Current trends and research perspectives

Working memory has long been thought to be closely related to consciousness. However, recent empirical studies show that unconscious content may be maintained within working memory and that complex cognitive computations may be performed on-line. This promotes research on the exact relationships between consciousness and working memory. Current evidence for working memory being a conscious as well as an unconscious process is reviewed. Consciousness is shown to be considered a subset of working memory by major current theories of working memory. Evidence for unconscious elements in working memory is shown to come from visual masking and attentional blink paradigms, and from the studies of implicit working memory. It is concluded that more research is needed to explicate the relationship between consciousness and working memory. Future research directions regarding the relationship between consciousness and working memory are discussed.     

意识状态改变的心理生理学理论与实证研究

从“意识状态”解释人类意识的本质是当前意识心理学研究的一个重要取向。研究意识状态改变(ASC)的物质生理基础具有十分突出的理论和临床实践意义。意识状态改变可以分为自发、物理和生理原因、心理方式和疾病引起这样四个方面,不同类型的意识状态改变可以从激活、意识域、自我觉察和感觉振荡四个维度进行综合归类和分析。不仅脑结构功能状态、脑动力的暂时变化、神经化学过程和新陈代谢过程等因素影响着人的意识经验改变状态,而且环境变化、心理活动和自我控制及技巧也可以暂时改变人的意识功能状态。     

The brain basis of a "consciousness monitor": scientific and medical significance.

Surgical patients under anesthesia can wake up unpredictably and be exposed to intense, traumatic pain. Current medical techniques cannot maintain depth of anesthesia at a perfectly stable and safe level; the depth of unconsciousness may change from moment to moment. Without an effective consciousness monitor anesthesiologists may not be able to adjust dosages in time to protect patients from pain. An estimated 40,000 to 200,000 midoperative awakenings may occur in the United States annually. E. R. John and coauthors present the scientific basis of a practical "consciousness monitor" in two articles. One article is empirical and shows widespread and consistent electrical field changes across subjects and anesthetic agents as soon as consciousness is lost; these changes reverse when consciousness is regained afterward. These findings form the basis of a surgical consciousness monitor that recently received approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. This may be the first practical application of research on the brain basis of consciousness. The other John article suggests theoretical explanations at three levels, a neurophysiological account of anesthesia, a neural dynamic account of conscious and unconscious states, and an integrative field theory. Of these, the neurophysiology is the best understood. Neural dynamics is evolving rapidly, with several alternative points of view. The field theory sketched here is the most novel and controversial.     

The unconscious and consciousness of the memory: A contribution from neuroscience

Abstract

By integrating data from general psychology and perinatal clinical psychology with neuroscience and psychoanalysis, the author discusses the relations between memory and consciousness, the aim being a unitary definition of the concept of unconscious. Nobody has a brain that can be the same as any other person's: the biology of memory lies in neural networks that have been constructed in the brain of that specific person by their experience. From the fetal stage, each brain progressively learns its own individual functions during its relational neuropsychic development. The author underlines how the continuous emotional biological work of the brain, together with a person's entire relational life, produces the construction of the whole functional and individual mindbrain. The whole construction is memory and this is unconscious; indeed it may be the true unconscious. From the continuous silent work of the mindbrain of a person, some forms of conscious level may emerge in his individual's subjectivity: some functioning of mindbrain makes what an individual person can consciously remember. The unconscious is only what appears in some form in an analyst's consciousness, at some specific moment in his relationship with a patient, and which the analyst translates into some form of his verbal interpretation.     

The predicting brain: Unconscious repetition, conscious reflection and therapeutic change

Neuroscience indicates that 'repetition' is fundamental to brain function. The brain non-consciously predicts what is most likely to happen and sets in motion perceptions, emotions, behaviors and interpersonal responses best adapted to what is expected-before events occur. Predictions enable individuals to be ready 'ahead of time' so reactions occur rapidly and smoothly when events occur. The brain uses past learning as the guide for what to expect in the future. Because of prediction, present experience and responses are shaped by the past. Predictions from early life can be deeply encoded and enduring. Predictions based on the past allow for more efficient brain function in the present, but can lead to mistakes. When what is predicted does not occur, consciousness can be engaged to monitor and correct the situation. But if a perception or emotion seems reasonable for the situation, a person might not notice an error, and a maladaptive 'repetition' may remain unchanged. The author discusses how predictions contribute to psychological defenses and transference repetition, and how conscious self-reflection facilitates therapeutic change. The neuroscience of prediction indicates why, in certain cases, active engagement by the analyst may be necessary. The author makes the argument for use of a 'neuroscience interpretation'.     

A Quantum Biomechanical Basis for Near-Death Life Reviews

Near-death life reviews pose a challenge to current memory research in terms of the sheer amount of instantaneous and empathetic information recall. Advances in quantum physics, biomechanics, holographic information theory, and consciousness studies support for the first time a fully realizable quantum biomechanical basis for near-death life reviews. We introduce the unifying paradigm of the quantum hologram as a non-local carrier of information. We further investigate the interrelated phenomena of non-local communications, and the electromagnetic zero-point field. Recent confirmation of the zero-point field lends credibility to vast memory storage capabilities outside the physical body. Microtubules are considered to be key components in non-local, quantum processes critical to human consciousness. Discovery of the liquid crystalline nature of the human body provides further support for our model. Microtubules, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), and the entire brain are described as communicating non-locally with virtually unlimited memory storage capacity.     

Temporal binding, binocular rivalry, and consciousness.

Cognitive functions like perception, memory, language, or consciousness are based on highly parallel and distributed information processing by the brain. One of the major unresolved questions is how information can be integrated and how coherent representational states can be established in the distributed neuronal systems subserving these functions. It has been suggested that this so-called "binding problem" may be solved in the temporal domain. The hypothesis is that synchronization of neuronal discharges can serve for the integration of distributed neurons into cell assemblies and that this process may underlie the selection of perceptually and behaviorally relevant information. As we intend to show here, this temporal binding hypothesis has implications for the search of the neural correlate of consciousness. We review experimental results, mainly obtained in the visual system, which support the notion of temporal binding. In particular, we discuss recent experiments on the neural mechanisms of binocular rivalry which suggest that appropriate synchronization among cortical neurons may be one of the necessary conditions for the buildup of perceptual states and awareness of sensory stimuli.     

A general latent assignment approach for modeling psychological contaminants

Data from psychological experiments are rife with ‘contaminants’, which can generally be defined as data generated by psychological processes different from those intended as the object of study. Contaminant data can interfere with the testing of substantive psychological models and their parameters, so it is important to have methods for their identification and removal. After noting that current practices in cognitive modeling for dealing with contaminants are not completely satisfactory, we argue for a general latent mixture approach to the problem. We demonstrate the tractability and effectiveness of the approach concretely, through a series of four applications. These applications involve a simple choice problem, a diffusion model of a response time and accuracy in decision-making, a hierarchical signal detection model of recognition memory, and a reinforcement learning model of decision-making on bandit problems. We conclude that developing models of contaminant processes requires the same sort of creative effort that is needed to model substantive psychological processes, but that it is a necessary endeavour that can be coherently and usefully pursued within the latent mixture modeling approach.     

The "What" and "Why" of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior

Self-determination theory (SDT) maintains that an understanding of human motivation requires a consideration of innate psychological needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness. We discuss the SDT concept of needs as it relates to previous need theories, emphasizing that needs specify the necessary conditions for psychological growth, integrity, and well-being. This concept of needs leads to the hypotheses that different regulatory processes underlying goal pursuits are differentially associated with effective functioning and well-being and also that different goal contents have different relations to the quality of behavior and mental health, specifically because different regulatory processes and different goal contents are associated with differing degrees of need satisfaction. Social contexts and individual differences that support satisfaction of the basic needs facilitate natural growth processes including intrinsically motivated behavior and integration of extrinsic motivations, whereas those that forestall autonomy, competence, or relatedness are associated with poorer motivation, performance, and well-being. We also discuss the relation of the psychological needs to cultural values, evolutionary processes, and other contemporary motivation theories.     

Applying global workspace theory to the frame problem

The subject of this article is the frame problem, as conceived by certain cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, notably Fodor for whom it stands as a fundamental obstacle to progress in cognitive science. The challenge is to explain the capacity of so-called informationally unencapsulated cognitive processes to deal effectively with information from potentially any cognitive domain without the burden of having to explicitly sift the relevant from the irrelevant. The paper advocates a global workspace architecture, with its ability to manage massively parallel resources in the context of a serial thread of computation, as an answer to this challenge. Analogical reasoning is given particular attention, since it exemplifies informational unencapsulation in its most extreme form. Because global workspace theory also purports to account for the distinction between conscious and unconscious information processing, the paper advances the tentative conclusion that consciousness may go hand-in-hand with a solution to the frame problem in the biological brain.     

The modal breadth of consciousness

In this paper, I argue that the intentional structure of typical human conscious experience has “modal breadth”—that the contents of experience typically include alternate possibilities. I support this claim with analyses of conscious mental processes such as the perception of temporally extended events, persistent objects, and causality, and the experience of bodily agency. While modal breadth may not be strictly necessary for consciousness per se, it is essential to many cognitive processes that are pervasive and functionally important to normal human consciousness.