The descent of cognitive development

A constructivist theory of the evolution of cognitive development is proposed. Seven propositions are posed plus supporting evidence. Constructing fundamental physical and logicomathematical conceptual universals underlies the development of cognition in primate phylogeny, ontogeny and history. Nevertheless, diverging onset and offset ages, velocity, extent, sequencing and organization mark the evolution of cognitive development in primate phylogeny. Thus, the evolution is heterochronic, not simply recapitulatory. Converging origins followed by diverging development of primates' conceptual constructions insures species‐specific cognitive specializations. Some specializations (e.g. recursive classifying) evolved in great ape development but not in monkey development; while others (e.g. hierarchically integrated classifying) evolved in human development only. Human enculturation and language (symbolic) rearing fosters quantitative but not qualitative progress in most of chimpanzees’ developing cognition. Heterochronic evolution provided humans with the widest and most synchronic ontogenetic window of opportunity for progressive cognitive development. The descendant cognitive development – humans’ precocial, integrated and extended intellectual constructions – bridges the evolution and history of ideas.     

默认网络的神经机制、功能假设及临床应用

认知神经科学的迅速发展使得研究者对大脑的功能有了深刻的认识。近些年来, 研究者对大脑在进行外在注意任务时产生的负激活有了更多的了解, 默认网络(Default Mode Network)的概念被提出, 并引起了很多神经科学家的关注, 关于默认网络的相关理论也已提出。当前综述对默认网络的研究历史, 概念理论, 个体和种系发展, 及其与疾病的关系以及临床应用等方面进行了概括总结。未来研究可从默认网络的个体发展, 种系差异, 与其他大脑网络(如注意网络, 视觉网络, 执行控制网络)的关系以及与具体疾病的关系等角度入手进行研究, 共同来探讨默认网络的神经机制。     

EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN CAPACITY FOR BELIEFS

Abstract. Evolution of the human capacity for beliefs is considered in relation to the emergence in human phylogeny of the ability to formulate propositions, evaluate their worth as bases for action, and make emotional attachments to them. Most of the relevant capabilities had appeared in primate evolution before the emergence of the Hominidae. The combination of capabilities peculiar to evolving hominines was that involved in the development of language, which ontogenetic evidence suggests began as a tool for implementing intentionality in social interaction and whose subsequent elaboration was associated with later reportorial and narrative uses.     

How does cognition evolve? Phylogenetic comparative psychology

Now more than ever animal studies have the potential to test hypotheses regarding how cognition evolves. Comparative psychologists have developed new techniques to probe the cognitive mechanisms underlying animal behavior, and they have become increasingly skillful at adapting methodologies to test multiple species. Meanwhile, evolutionary biologists have generated quantitative approaches to investigate the phylogenetic distribution and function of phenotypic traits, including cognition. In particular, phylogenetic methods can quantitatively (1) test whether specific cognitive abilities are correlated with life history (e.g., lifespan), morphology (e.g., brain size), or socio-ecological variables (e.g., social system), (2) measure how strongly phylogenetic relatedness predicts the distribution of cognitive skills across species, and (3) estimate the ancestral state of a given cognitive trait using measures of cognitive performance from extant species. Phylogenetic methods can also be used to guide the selection of species comparisons that offer the strongest tests of a priori predictions of cognitive evolutionary hypotheses (i.e., phylogenetic targeting). Here, we explain how an integration of comparative psychology and evolutionary biology will answer a host of questions regarding the phylogenetic distribution and history of cognitive traits, as well as the evolutionary processes that drove their evolution.     

Tensions in naturalistic,evolutionary explanations of aesthetic reception and production

Aesthetic universals may plausibly reflect biases in aesthetic reception that arose through evolutionary pressure. However, the role universals play in high-level aesthetic creativity is not well understood. After reviewing evolutionary aspects of aesthetics, some specific proposed aesthetic universals, and the nature of creativity in aesthetic domains, I examine a creative dynamic in which long-term pressure for novelty leads to inexorable tensions with canalized aesthetic biases. Examining the role of aesthetic universals in individuals’ creative processes, as well as more thorough trans-historical assessments of the development of universals, are proposed as methodological strategies for gaining traction on this issue. Such investigations have the potential to inform the role of the audience in shaping the evolution of artist styles, how universals play out in high versus low art, the possibility of identifying new aesthetic universals (perhaps particularly with conceptual art), and the relative value of novelty versus adaptive value in aesthetic creativity.     

Four routes of cognitive evolution

Four routes of cognitive evolution are distinguished: phylogenetic construction, in which natural selection produces qualitative change to the way a cognitive mechanism operates (language); phylogenetic inflection, in which natural selection biases the input to a cognitive mechanism (imprinting and spatial memory); ontogenetic construction, in which developmental selection alters the way a cognitive mechanism operates (face recognition and theory of mind); and ontogenetic inflection, in which developmental selection changes the input to a cognitive mechanism (imitation). This framework integrates findings from evolutionary psychology (i.e., all research on the evolution of mentality and behavior). In contrast with human nativist evolutionary psychology, it recognizes the adaptive significance of developmental processes, conserves the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive mechanisms, and encompasses research on human and nonhuman animals.     

The Permeability of Causal Criteria of Identity for Universals

To analyze the concept of a human merely in terms of the concept of a primate is to let all kinds of monkeys and apes into a category reserved for humans. Criteria of identity for universal attributes formulated merely in terms of causal roles associated with universals involve a similar permeability, since they cannot distinguish universals from non-universal attributes. Without appealing to the existence of noncausal universals or resorting to charges of circularity, I will show that causal criteria of identity for universals are insufficiently informative because they cannot capture a distinctive feature of universals.     

人类大脑、认知与行为进化的整合模型

物种进化的历史进程中,大脑、认知与行为系统的进化机能利于有机体控制社会、生物与自然资源,而有机体所控制的各种资源又会影响自身的生存与繁衍。社会、生物与自然资源可以相对稳定,也可以变化不定。资源的稳定变化所传递的信息会引起大脑、认知以及行为系统做出模块化的自主反应。资源的稳定变化利于人类整合朴素心理学、朴素生物学与朴素物理学,而资源的变化不定所传达出的信息会引起认知与行为系统有意识地进行自上而下的外显行为反应。人类外显行为反应系统的进化导致人类出现自我意识,并具有探索性解决问题的能力。朴素心理能力、意识与问题解决能力可以整合为动机－控制理论     

The compatibility heuristic in non-categorical hypothetical reasoning: Inferences between conditionals and disjunctions

A new theory explains how people make hypothetical inferences from a premise consistent with several alternatives to a conclusion consistent with several alternatives. The key proposal is that people rely on a heuristic that identifies compatible possibilities. It is tested in 7 experiments that examine inferences between conditionals and disjunctions. Participants accepted inferences between conditionals and inclusive disjunctions when a compatible possibility was immediately available, in their binary judgments that a conclusion followed or not (Experiment 1a) and ternary judgments that included it was not possible to know (Experiment 1b). The compatibility effect was amplified when compatible possibilities were more readily available, e.g., for ‘A only if B’ conditionals (Experiment 2). It was eliminated when compatible possibilities were not available, e.g., for ‘if and only if A B’ bi-conditionals and exclusive disjunctions (Experiment 3). The compatibility heuristic occurs even for inferences based on implicit negation e.g., ‘A or B, therefore if C D’ (Experiment 4), and between universals ‘All A’s are B’s’ and disjunctions (Experiment 5a) and universals and conditionals (Experiment 5b). The implications of the results for alternative theories of the cognitive processes underlying hypothetical deductions are discussed.     

非人灵长类的抑制控制能力

抑制控制能力是指个体为实现特定目标对干扰性优势反应进行抑制的能力,是一种高级认知能力。该文综述了对非人灵长类抑制控制能力的研究,从抑制控制能力的行为表现,生理机制及其发生、发展几个方面进行了阐述,提供了一个从演化的角度理解人类的抑制控制能力的视角。     

Timed picture naming in seven languages

Timed picture naming was compared in seven languages that vary along dimensions known to affect lexical access. Analyses over items focused on factors that determine cross-language universals and cross-language disparities. With regard to universals, number of alternative names had large effects on reaction time within and across languages after target-name agreement was controlled, suggesting inhibitory effects from lexical competitors. For all the languages, word frequency and goodness of depiction had large effects, but objective picture complexity did not. Effects of word structure variables (length, syllable structure, compounding, and initial frication) varied markedly over languages. Strong cross-language correlations were found in naming latencies, frequency, and length. Other-language frequency effects were observed (e.g., Chinese frequencies predicting Spanish reaction times) even after within-language effects were controlled (e.g., Spanish frequencies predicting Spanish reaction times). These surprising cross-language correlations challenge widely held assumptions about the lexical locus of length and frequency effects, suggesting instead that they may (at least in part) reflect familiarity and accessibility at a conceptual level that is shared over languages.     

Psychological universals: what are they and how can we know?

Psychological universals, or core mental attributes shared by humans everywhere, are a foundational postulate of psychology, yet explicit analysis of how to identify such universals is lacking. This article offers a conceptual and methodological framework to guide the investigation of genuine universals through empirical analysis of psychological patterns across cultures. Issues of cross-cultural generalizability of psychological processes and 3 cross-cultural research strategies to probe universals are considered. Four distinct levels of hierarchically organized universals are possible: From strongest to weakest claims for universality, they are accessibility universals, functional universals, existential universals, and nonuniversals. Finally, universals are examined in relation to the questions of levels of analysis, evolutionary explanations of psychological processes, and management of cross-cultural relations.     

Perceptual symbol systems

Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components--not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.     

Peer Commmentaries on Jonas Langer’s The descent of cognitive development

Robert W. Mitchell, The role of perception in cognitive development, p. 379 Sue T. Parker, Cascading possibilities through the ontogenetic window of opportunity, p. 381 Jacques Vauclair and Olivier Houde´, Coordination of actions, visual perception and inhibition in non‐human and human primate development, p. 382     

Human-like social skills in dogs?

Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest primate relatives. For example, they use human social and communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid species suggest that these unusual social skills have a heritable component and initially evolved during domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar process may have been an important catalyst leading to the evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The study of convergent evolution provides an exciting opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and communication.     

Monkeys perform as well as apes and humans in a size discrimination task

Whether the cognitive competences of monkeys and apes are rather similar or whether the larger-brained apes outperform monkeys in cognitive experiments is a highly debated topic. Direct comparative analyses are therefore essential to examine similarities and differences among species. We here compared six primate species, including humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas (great apes), olive baboons, and long-tailed macaques (Old World monkeys) in a task on fine-grained size discrimination. Except for gorillas, subjects of all taxa (i.e. humans, apes, and monkeys) were able to discriminate three-dimensional cubes with a volume difference of only 10 % (i.e. cubes of 50 and 48 mm side length) and performed only slightly worse when the cubes were presented successively. The minimal size discriminated declined further with increasing time delay between presentations of the cubes, highlighting the difficulty to memorize exact size differences. The results suggest that differences in brain size, as a proxy for general cognitive abilities, did not account for variation in performance, but that differential socio-ecological pressures may better explain species differences. Our study highlights the fact that differences in cognitive abilities do not always map neatly onto phylogenetic relationships and that in a number of cognitive experiments monkeys do not fare significantly worse than apes, casting doubt on the assumption that larger brains per se confer an advantage in such kinds of tests.     

主动性和反应性认知控制的权衡机制及影响因素

主动性控制和反应性控制是认知控制研究的新视角。前者通过在反应前维持目标相关信息的表征来预防冲突, 后者在反应时重激活目标相关信息以解决冲突。个体能够在这两种认知控制间进行权衡从而形成最优反应。通过AX-CPT等实验范式, 辅以ERP、fMRI技术可分离两种认知控制, 并观察到认知控制相关的脑区在激活时间和强度上的差异。个体生理发展、认知因素(期望、流体智力、训练)、非认知因素(情绪、动机等)均能影响认知控制的权衡。未来的研究应多关注这一权衡的内在神经机制和认知机制, 并与传统认知控制研究相结合, 在理论和应用上取得更进一步的发展。     

Fading perceptual resemblance: A path for rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) to conceptual matching?

Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been intrigued by humans’ and animals’ capacity to respond to abstract relations like sameness and difference, because this capacity may underlie crucial aspects of cognition like analogical reasoning. Recently, this capacity has been explored in higher-order, relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which humans and animals try to complete analogies of sameness and difference between disparate groups of items. The authors introduced a new paradigm to this area, by yoking the relational-matching cue to a perceptual-matching cue. Then, using established algorithms for shape distortion, the perceptual cue was weakened and eliminated. Humans’ RMTS performance easily transcended the elimination of perceptual support. In contrast, RMTS performance by six macaques faltered as they were weaned from perceptual support. No macaque showed evidence of mature RMTS performance, even given more than 260,000 training trials during which we tried to coax a relational-matching performance from them. It is an important species difference that macaques show so hesitant a response to conceptual relations when humans respond to them so effortlessly. It raises theoretical questions about the emergence of this crucial capacity during humans’ cognitive evolution and during humans’ cognitive development.     

Differences in preschool children's conceptual strategies when thinking about animate entities and artifacts.

Two-, 3-, and 4-year-old children viewed 10 stimulus sets. Each set contained a sample picture (e.g., a dog), a basic-level taxonomic match (e.g., another dog), a thematic match (e.g., a bone), and an irrelevant match (e.g., a pen). The children were asked to choose a match that "goes with" each sample. Sample pictures were either animate entities or artifacts. The children's choice behavior indicated that a shift occurs between 3 and 4 years of age from a taxonomic bias to a thematic bias and that, at both ages, animate sample stimuli enhance the children's tendency to adopt thematic conceptual strategies. These data are consistent with recent suggestions that thematic thinking presupposes basic-level taxonomic thinking during early conceptual development and that this developmental progression occurs more rapidly in some domains of knowledge than in others.     

Counting on fine motor skills: links between preschool finger dexterity and numerical skills

Finger counting is widely considered an important step in children's early mathematical development. Presumably, children's ability to move their fingers during early counting experiences to aid number representation depends in part on their early fine motor skills (FMS). Specifically, FMS should link to children's procedural counting skills through consistent repetition of finger‐counting procedures. Accordingly, we hypothesized that (a) FMS are linked to early counting skills, and (b) greater FMS relate to conceptual counting knowledge (e.g., cardinality, abstraction, order irrelevance) via procedural counting skills (i.e., one–one correspondence and correctness of verbal counting). Preschool children (N = 177) were administered measures of procedural counting skills, conceptual counting knowledge, FMS, and general cognitive skills along with parent questionnaires on home mathematics and fine motor environment. FMS correlated with procedural counting skills and conceptual counting knowledge after controlling for cognitive skills, chronological age, home mathematics and FMS environments. Moreover, the relationship between FMS and conceptual counting knowledge was mediated by procedural counting skills. Findings suggest that FMS play a role in early counting and therewith conceptual counting knowledge.