'Making Exceptions': A Response to Shue

abstract   In what follows I respond to Henry Shue's paper by focusing on three principal themes. The first is the relation of philosophical theory to practice, in which I agree that philosophers have to run the risks attendant upon applying reason to concrete cases. The second is the use of examples in moral philosophy, in particular the example used in the justification of torture as an exception; here I draw distinctions between different types of examples in philosophy and the uses to which they are put. Thirdly, in a brief consideration of our responses to climate change I suggest that, contra Shue, we are not being asked to go beyond a normal requirement so much as to re-establish the boundaries of what counts as normal .     

Making Exceptions

abstract   Because we are more comfortable with judgements of conceptual conceivability than with judgements of practical possibility, we content ourselves with imaginary cases, which are useless for making many decisions that practical people most need to make, notably all-things-considered decisions about when to follow an admitted general principle and when to make an exception. The diverse cases of climate change, preventive attack, and torture all illustrate how the avoidance of the difficult task of integrating empirical judgements with conceptual judgements through the flight into the sanitized abstraction of imaginary cases undermines attempts at practical ethics. All three cases involve allegedly exceptional, or emergency, situations, although climate change seems to require more than the usual compliance with general principle while preventive attack and torture supposedly require less than the usual compliance. By my lights the proposed exceptions are, respectively, fully, sometimes, and never justified. But the fundamental point is that one unfortunately cannot decide any of the cases without assessing what is in fact likely as well as what is conceptually possible .     

Exceptions to the Rule: The Effects of Remorse,Status, and Gender on Decision Making1

One of several general rules suggested by past work is that it is advantageous to exhibit remorse when one has committed a transgression. A pair of experiments searched for the boundary conditions of this rule. In Experiment 1, mock jurors rated a remorseful defendant as more guilty when the law was fair than when the law was unfair. In contrast, an unremorseful defendant was viewed as equally guilty under both fairness levels. Study 2 conceptually replicated this result, and revealed a 3‐way interaction among remorse, status, and gender. It is argued that these findings illustrate the importance of violation of expectations on evaluation and judgment, inside the courtroom and elsewhere.     

The Ethics Code Does Not Equal Ethics: A Response to O’Donohue

ABSTRACT

O’Donohue has identified 37 criticisms of the American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (Ethics Code), although many of his criticisms go far beyond what is found written in the APA Ethics Code, to include the process of adjudicating ethics complaints by the American Psychological Association Ethics Committee, and the process by which the Ethics Code was developed. The authors claim that a major shortcoming of O’Donohue’s article is that he adopted an unrealistically expansive role for the Ethics Code that was not clearly linked to furthering the goals of the ethics code revision.     

Naturalism Need Not Be "Made Safe": A Response to William Rottschaefer's Misunderstandings

In this article, I respond to William Rottschaefer's analysis of my writings on religion and science, especially my Religion, Science and Naturalism (1996). I show that I am not trying "to make naturalism safe," as Rottschaefer contends, but rather attempting to explore options available when one endorses naturalistic approaches. I also explain why I object to the label "supernaturalistic naturalism" used by Rottschaefer. Possible limitations to naturalistic projects are discussed, not as limitations imposed but rather as features uncovered.     

When (and When Not) to Make Exceptions: Links among Age,Precedent Setting Decisions,and Argument Evaluation

Negative precedents are set when, in the absence of mitigating conditions, social rules are not enforced by relevant authorities. This study examined the effects of normative (i.e., to enforce rules) and nonnormative arguments (i.e., to “make exceptions”) on decisions that could establish negative precedents and whether those effects differed for children and adolescents. As expected, on baseline problems, age correlated positively with decision-making performance. After receiving normative arguments, normative decisions increased and adolescents—but not preadolescents—transferred their understanding to novel problems. Nonnormative arguments led to decrements in normative decisions across ages. However, only for preadolescents did performance decrements following nonnormative arguments transfer to novel problems. Discussion focuses on the abilities to engage in “metacognitive intercession,” variability in children’s and adolescents’ decisions, and developments in the understanding of the consequences of violating the social rules.     

Characterization of Children's Decision Making: Sensitivity to Punishment Frequency,Not Task Complexity

On a gambling task that models real-life decision making, children between ages 7 and 12 perform like patients with bilateral lesions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), opting for choices that yield high immediate gains in spite of higher future losses (Crone &; Van der Molen, 2004 Crone, E. A. and Van der Molen, M. W. 2004. Developmental changes in decision-making: Performance on a gambling task previously shown to rely on ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Developmental Neuropsychology, 25(3): 251–279. [PUBMED][INFOTRIEVE][CROSSREF][Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). The current study set out to characterize developmental changes in decision making by varying task complexity and punishment frequency. Three age groups (7–9 years, 10–12 years, 13–15 years) performed two versions of a computerized variant of the original Iowa gambling task. Task complexity was manipulated by varying the number of choices participants could make. Punishment frequency was manipulated by varying the frequency of delayed punishment. Results showed a developmental increase in the sensitivity to future consequences, which was present only when the punishment was presented infrequently. These results could not be explained by differential sensitivity to task complexity, hypersensitivity to reward, or failure to switch response set after receiving punishment. There was a general pattern of boys outperforming girls by making more advantageous choices over the course of the task. In conclusion, 7–12-year-old children—like VMPFC patients—appear myopic about the future except when the potential for future punishment is high.     

Exceptions to Hick's law: explorations with a response duration measure

Five experiments used a new response-duration measure in explorations of the conditions necessary for confirmation of Hick's law. Hick's law states that reaction time increases logarithmically with number of choices. Exceptions to the law, venerable as it is, have been reported. They have always included the following conditions: a verbal response; a familiar stimulus with a single dominant name; and a large number of practice trials. These conditions have carried a heavy explanatory burden in accounting for the anamolous results. The present studies use none of these conditions and yet manage to replicate the anamolous result of a very shallow slope across set size, a slope less than one-tenth the usual value. This was accomplished by using a novel task in which the initial component of the response is the same for all stimuli (depression of a single response key) but the termination of the response is different (different durations for each stimulus). Using this task, a slope in the neighborhood of 15 ms per bit of stimulus uncertainty is found, as compared with the usual value of about 150 ms. A number of possible explanations are examined. Among the most important are the possibilities that response overlap is the critical factor (i.e., duration errors overlap); possible stimuli are simply ignored when more than one is involved; and the duration decision is made after the reaction-time interval rather than during it. All three possibilities, as well as some others, are found to be inconsistent with the various experimental outcomes. Instead, a new theory of choice reaction time is presented, which emphasizes the nature of the S-R code that is assumed to represent various reaction-time tasks. This theory leads to a new "law" that is put forward as a replacement for Hick's law. It is RT = a + b(1 - N-1).     

Not Yet Making Sense of Political Toleration

A growing number of theorists have argued that toleration, at least in its traditional sense, is no longer applicable to liberal democratic political arrangements??especially if these political arrangements are conceived of as neutral. Peter Jones has tried make sense of political toleration while staying true to its more traditional (disapproval yet non-prevention) meaning. In this article, while I am sympathetic to his motivation, I argue that Jones?? attempt to make sense of political toleration is not successful.     

A Market Response Model for Sales Management Decision Making

Abstract

Sales managers are faced with a variety of decisions that require the evaluation of the probable response of the market to feasible decision alternatives. A conceptual model of market response is presented to offer management a framework for understanding the market response relationships in their selling situation and to provide an operational approach for evaluating the potential effect of decision alternatives. An empirical test illustrates the usefulness of the model and suggests several improvements in market response modeling. Future research directions are identified and important management implications are discussed.     

To Use or Not to Use: Male Partners' Perspectives on Decision Making About Prenatal Diagnosis

We conducted an exploratory, qualitative pilot study investigating the use of genetic counseling and prenatal genetic technologies between women and their male partners for two referral groups: pregnant women 35 years of age and over (AMA) at the time of delivery and pregnant women with an abnormal maternal serum triple screen (MSAFP3). The convenience sample consisted of 25 semistructured interviews and 50 observations of genetic counseling sessions. Male partners' styles of decision making and the way they viewed prenatal diagnosis decision making were examined. We defined three decision-making styles based on our interpretation of the data: (1) domain, (2) joint-delegated, and (3) saliency. The male partners also seemed to view prenatal diagnosis as either an information decision or an action decision and appeared to take a more active role in decision making when the decision was viewed as an action decision.