共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Valeriano Iranzo 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2008,39(1):115-120
According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific
theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach
to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism
makes no qualifications about the domain where inference to the best explanation is reliable, scientific realists flagrantly
beg the question. A qualified version of reliabilism, on the other side, does not entitle us to infer the realist conclusion.
I conclude, then, that Psillos’s proposal does not make any significant progress for scientific realism.
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Valeriano IranzoEmail: |
2.
ANDREW D. CLING 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2003,66(2):279-303
Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically dependent upon their conclusions—epistemically self‐supporting arguments—need not be viciously circular. R.B. Braithwaite and James Van Cleve use internalist and externalist versions of this strategy in their proposed solutions to the problem of induction. Unfortunately, their arguments for self‐support are unsound and any theory of inferential justification that does not require justified belief in the corresponding conditionals of justification‐affording arguments is unacceptably arbitrary. So self‐supporting arguments cannot be justification‐creating. 相似文献
3.
Daniel G. Campos 《Synthese》2011,180(3):419-442
I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation
(IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peircean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either
abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peircean abduction and IBE in accounting
for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning.
In particular, I claim that Peircean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses,
while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton’s thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating
and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one
hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as
shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific
inference. 相似文献
4.
Putting inference to the best explanation in its place 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper discusses the nature and the status of inference to the best explanation (IBE). We (1) outline the foundational role given IBE by its defenders and the arguments of critics who deny it any place at all; (2) argue that, on the two main conceptions of explanation, IBE cannot be a foundational inference rule; (3) sketch an account of IBE that makes it contextual and dependent on substantive empirical assumptions, much as simplicity seems to be; (4) show how that account avoids the critics' complaints and leaves IBE an important role; and (5) sketch how our account can clarify debates over IBE in arguments for scientific realism.The general line of argumentation developed in this paper owes much to the most recent work of Elliot Sober on simplicity and confirmation; we want to acknowledge that dependence directly. Since writing this paper, we have also come across Yemima Ben-Menahem: 1990, The Inference to the Best Explanation,Erkenntnis
33, 319–44, whose general approach parallels our own. Helpful comments were made on earlier drafts by George Graham, Romane Clark, Yemima Ben-Menahem, and an anonymous referee. 相似文献
5.
Laura Valentini 《European Journal of Philosophy》2012,20(3):450-459
Much contemporary political philosophy claims to be Kant‐inspired, but its aims and method differ from Kant's own. In his recent book, Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein advocates a more orthodox Kantian outlook, presenting it as superior to dominant (Kant‐inspired) views. The most striking feature of this outlook is its attempt to ground the whole of political morality in one right: the right to freedom, understood as the right to be independent of others’ choices. Is Ripstein's Kantian project successful? In this research note I argue that it is not. First, I suggest that Ripstein's notion of freedom is viciously circular. It is meant to ground all rights, but in fact it presupposes an account of those rights. Second, I show that—independently of its inability to ground a whole political morality—such a moralized understanding of freedom is normatively unappealing. 相似文献
6.
Gregory W. Dawes 《Ratio》2013,26(1):62-78
Defences of inference to the best explanation (IBE) frequently associate IBE with scientific realism, the idea that it is reasonable to believe our best scientific theories. I argue that this linkage is unfortunate. IBE does not warrant belief, since the fact that a theory is the best available explanation does not show it to be (even probably) true. What IBE does warrant is acceptance: taking a proposition as a premise in theoretical and/or practical reasoning. We ought to accept our best scientific theories since they are the theories that are most likely to lead to the goal of science, which is that of knowledge. In support of this claim I invoke Bill Lycan's Panglossian reflections regarding Mother Nature. 1 相似文献
7.
Mason Cash 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):93-119
Many now accept the thesis that norms are somehow constitutively involved in people's contentful intentional states. I distinguish three versions of this normative thesis that disagree about the type of norms constitutively involved. Are they objective norms of correctness, subjective norms of rationality, or intersubjective norms of social practices? I show the advantages of the third version, arguing that it improves upon the other two versions, as well as incorporating their principal insights. I then defend it against two serious challenges: (1) If content is constituted by others' normative judgments, how can content be causally efficacious? (2) This account appears to make having contentful thoughts a matter of people having contentful thoughts about your thoughts. That appears to be viciously circular and so can't be naturalistic. 相似文献
8.
Wong Muk Yan 《国际科学哲学研究》2013,27(4):429-446
Reliability and external validity are two fundamental values that pose incompatible constraints on neurobiological experiments. The more reliability an experimental result achieves, the less external validity it earns, and vice versa. In this article, I propose an externalist interpretation of external validity: the external validity of an experimental result depends not only on how much complexity is built into an experimental design, but also on the relationship between the experimental result and other related experiments. This externalist interpretation, which explains how a neurobiological experiment can be reliable and externally valid simultaneously, suggests a new way to understand the epistemology of neurobiological experimentation. 相似文献
9.
Synthese - In this paper, I develop a problem I call the “Conditional Position Problem” that arises for Ernest Sosa’s externalist epistemology. The problem is that, due to a... 相似文献
10.
Silvia Jonas 《Philosophical Studies》2017,174(11):2731-2742
I argue that recent attempts to deflect Access Problems for realism about a priori domains such as mathematics, logic, morality, and modality using arguments from evolution result in two kinds of explanatory overkill: (1) the Access Problem is eliminated for contentious domains, and (2) realist belief becomes viciously immune to arguments from dispensability, and to non-rebutting counter-arguments more generally. 相似文献
11.
Laura Gow 《European Journal of Philosophy》2019,27(2):412-425
The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience is internally constituted. However, my concern in this paper is not with the metaphysical debate but with transparency as a phenomenological feature of perceptual experience. Qualia theorists have presented a number of examples of perceptual experiences which, they claim, do not even seem to be transparent; these experiences involve objects or properties which seem to be internally realized. I argue, contrary to the qualia theorist's claim, that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can in fact be characterized solely with reference to externally located objects and properties, and the sense in which some features of our perceptual experiences do not seem external is due to cognitive, not perceptual, phenomenology. 相似文献
12.
MARC ALSPECTOR-KELLY 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2006,87(3):289-300
Abstract: A popular counterexample directed against externalist epistemological views is that of an agent (Lehrer's "Truetemp" for example) whose beliefs are clearly neither justified nor known but that were generated in the manner that the externalist requires, thereby demonstrating externalism to be insufficient. In this essay I develop and defend an externalist account of knowledge – essentially an elaboration of Fred Dreske's information-theoretic account – that is not susceptible to those criticisms. I then briefly discuss the relationship between knowledge and justification. 相似文献
13.
Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and
some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist
theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology,
which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really
does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for thinking that naturalism in epistemology is compatible with
both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. We also argue that there are some distinctively internalist
aims that are currently being studied scientifically and these notions, and others, should be studied by scientific methods.
This essay is dedicated to Deborah Mayo, who has long advocated using error statistical techniques to analyze and resolve
epistemological puzzles in the philosophy of science. This essay follows the same spirit by advocating that computational
concepts and techniques be applied within the heart of traditional, analytic epistemology. 相似文献
14.
Arthur Peacocke 《Zygon》2000,35(1):119-140
The ambivalent reputation of theology as an academic discipline is attributed to the often circular character of its procedures based on presumed authoritative sources. Recently, science too has come under the shadow of "postmodernist" critiques but, it is argued, has been able to withstand them successfully and make epistemologically warrantedclaims to be depicting reality—thereby vindicating human rationality. Evolutionary epistemological considerations also reinforce confidence in the more general deliverances of the human exploration of reasonableness through inference to the best explanation (IBE). The consequences of applying IBE, with its associated criteria, in theological investigation are considered in relation to theology as it is and as it might be. A number of issues critical for thedevelopment of a credible theology are identified. In spite of the challenging and somewhat negative view of contemporary theology to which this leads, hope is expressed that a genuinely credible "evangelical,""catholic," and liberal theology may yet emerge for the new millennium. 相似文献
15.
A. T. Nuyen 《Dao》2009,8(1):1-11
How is the Confucian moral agent motivated to do what he or she judges to be right or good? In western philosophy, the answer to a question such as this depends on whether one is an internalist or externalist concerning moral motivation. In this article, I will first interpret Confucian ethics as role-based ethics and then argue that we can attribute to Confucianism a position on moral motivation that is neither internalist nor externalist but somewhere in between. I will then illustrate my claim with my reading of Mencius 6A4, showing that it is superior to readings found in the literature, which typically assume that Mencius is an internalist. 相似文献
16.
17.
While epistemic justification is a central concern for both contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, debates in
contemporary epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification have not been discussed extensively by philosophers
of science. As a step toward a coherent account of scientific justification that is informed by, and sheds light on, justificatory
practices in the sciences, this paper examines one of these debates—the internalist–externalist debate—from the perspective
of objective accounts of scientific evidence. In particular, we focus on Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical theory of evidence
because it is a paradigmatically objective theory of evidence that is strongly informed by methodological practice. We contend
that from the standpoint of such an objective theory of evidence, justification in science has both externalist and internalist
characteristics. In reaching this conclusion, however, we find that the terms of the contemporary debate between internalists
and externalists have to be redefined to be applicable to scientific contexts. 相似文献
18.
Joshua C. Thurow 《Philosophical Studies》2009,146(2):273-289
One of Laurence BonJour’s main arguments for the existence of the a priori is an argument that a priori justification is indispensable
for making inferences from experience to conclusions that go beyond experience. This argument has recently come under heavy
fire from Albert Casullo, who has dubbed BonJour’s argument, “The Generality Argument.” In this paper I (i) defend the Generality
Argument against Casullo’s criticisms, and (ii) develop a new, more plausible, version of the Generality Argument in response
to some other objections of my own. Two of these objections stem out of BonJour’s failing to fully consider the importance
of the distinction between being justified in believing that an inference is good and being justified in making an inference.
The final version of the argument that I develop sees the Generality Argument as one part of a cumulative case argument for
the existence of a priori justification, rather than as a stand-alone knock-down argument. 相似文献
19.
Ragnar Francén 《The Journal of Ethics》2010,14(2):117-148
Motivational externalists and internalists of various sorts disagree about the circumstances under which it is conceptually
possible to have moral opinions but lack moral motivation. Typically, the evidence referred to are intuitions about whether
people in certain scenarios who lack moral motivation count as having moral opinions. People’s intuitions about such scenarios
diverge, however. I argue that the nature of this diversity is such that, for each of the internalist and externalist theses, there is a strong prima facie reason to reject it. That much might not be very
controversial. But I argue further, that it also gives us a strong prima facie reason to reject all of these theses. This is possible since there is an overlooked alternative option to accepting any of them: moral motivation pluralism, the view that different internalist and externalist theses correctly accounts for different people’s concepts of moral opinions, respectively. I
end the paper with a discussion of methodological issues relevant to the argument for moral motivation pluralism and of the
consequences of this view for theories about the nature of moral opinions, such as cognitivism and non-cognitivism. 相似文献
20.
David H. Glass 《Synthese》2007,157(3):275-296
This paper considers an application of work on probabilistic measures of coherence to inference to the best explanation (IBE).
Rather than considering information reported from different sources, as is usually the case when discussing coherence measures,
the approach adopted here is to use a coherence measure to rank competing explanations in terms of their coherence with a
piece of evidence. By adopting such an approach IBE can be made more precise and so a major objection to this mode of reasoning
can be addressed. Advantages of the coherence-based approach are pointed out by comparing it with several other ways to characterize
‘best explanation’ and showing that it takes into account their insights while overcoming some of their problems. The consequences
of adopting this approach for IBE are discussed in the context of recent discussions about the relationship between IBE and
Bayesianism. 相似文献