读心的比较研究：非人灵长类与人类在心理理论上的异同点及其解释

利用非人灵长类开展比较研究是探索心理理论本质、起源和进化动因的重要途经。大量实证研究显示非人灵长类可以表现出一些基础心理理论成分,包括联合注意、意图理解和一级观点采择,这表明心理理论在灵长类动物的进化谱系中具有进化连续性。然而,非人灵长类无法像人类一样达成二级观点采择和错误信念理解,潜心智化假说、替代表征假说、最小限度心理理论假说和意识关系假说试图对此差异进行解释。尽管视角与具体内容不同,但这些假说都强调,非人灵长类无法对其他个体关于外部世界的心理信念形成表征,信念表征是非人灵长类与人类读心能力的重要分界点。未来研究需要重点澄清共享意图、语言机制以及社会生态环境因素与心理理论产生的相互影响作用。     

儿童阅读与心理理论间的关系

阅读与心理理论(theory of mind, ToM)在儿童发展过程中都发挥着重要的作用,梳理文献发现两者可能存在双向促进作用。儿童通过与家长或老师的共享阅读,启动联合注意,使用心理状态术语进行对话,进一步根据社会想象力,模拟社会互动,从而促进儿童心理理论发展。另一方面,在阅读过程中,心理理论能够助力儿童从宏观的阅读观的建立、元认知阅读策略的使用、故事情境模型的构建,到微观具体的短语、句子、语篇和多文本的理解等能力的提高,这些证据揭示了心理理论可以从多方面促进儿童阅读能力的发展。进一步的神经生理证据发现,阅读和心理理论这两个过程的神经活动是有一定重叠的。由此推测,两者可能具备潜在的双向促进关系。未来需要更深入和长期的纵向追踪研究为两者的关系提供丰富的实证证据。此外,还应进行更多中国的低龄儿童的研究。随着科技的发展和线上课程的盛行,也应更多关注多媒体内容阅读对儿童心理理论的影响。     

Friendlessness and theory of mind: A prospective longitudinal study

Chronic friendlessness in childhood predicts adverse mental health outcomes throughout life, yet its earliest roots are poorly understood. In theory, developing a theory of mind (ToM) should help children gain mutual friends and one preschool study (Peterson & Siegal, 2002. Br J Dev Psychol, 20, 205) suggested a cross‐sectional connection. We therefore used a 2‐year prospective longitudinal design to explore ToM as a predictor of mutual friendship in 114 children from age 5 to 7 years after controlling potential confounds including language ability and group popularity. Confirming friendship's distinctiveness from group sociometric status, numerous group‐rejected children (53%) had a mutual friend whereas 23% of those highest in group status did not. Five‐year‐olds with a mutual friend significantly outperformed their friendless peers on a comprehensive ToM battery (basic and advanced false belief). Longitudinally, chronically friendless 7‐year‐olds (no friends at either testing time) stood out for their exceptionally poor Time 1 ToM understanding even after controlling for group popularity, age, and language skill. Extending previous evidence of ToM's predictive links with later social and cognitive outcomes, these results for mutual friendship suggest possible interventions to help reduce the lifelong mental health costs of chronic friendlessness.     

Theory of mind: The state of the art*

Abstract

In this article, I reflect on theory of mind as a field (ToM), how it has developed over the years, and focally on the state of current research and theory. Having begun with preschoolers’ understanding of beliefs and desires, the field now includes research from infancy through late life, contributions and contributors from around the world, research on behavior, conversation, neural correlates, gene-environment contributions, evolution, and the social-behavioral antecedents and consequences of the unfolding trajectories of ToM understanding. Several topics in particular portray the current state of the art and my sense of where theory-of-mind research is likely to head in the near future: progressions of theory of mind achievement; cultural experiences plus experiential influences that shape developmental trajectories; developmental cognitive neuroscience; infant ToM insights; research on ToM developments beyond preschool, including children’s increasing interest in and wrestling with extraordinary minds, such as those of God and super-heroes.     

5～8岁儿童对模糊信息具有多重解释的理解

参照Carpendale和Chandler的实验范式,研究儿童对于“人们可能对同样信息给出不同解释”这一现象的理解,考察5~8岁儿童的解释性心理理论的发展。结果表明,5岁儿童不能理解心理过程的解释性,认为同样的信息只有一种合理的解释。从6岁开始,儿童才认识到,模糊信息可以有多种解释,但6、7岁时的这种理解并不完善,成绩随着任务要求而变化。8岁儿童才有比较稳定的解释性心理理论。     

Reflexively mindblind: Using theory of mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention

People commonly interpret others’ behavior in terms of the actors’ underlying beliefs, knowledge, or other mental states, thereby using their “theory of mind.” Two experiments suggest that using one’s theory of mind is a relatively effortful process. In both experiments, people reflexively used their own knowledge and beliefs to follow a speaker’s instruction, but only effortfully used their theory of mind to take into account a speaker’s intention to interpret those instructions. In Experiment 1, people with lower working memory capacity were less effective than people with larger working memory capacity in applying their theory of mind to interpret behavior. In Experiment 2, an attention-demanding secondary task reduced people’s ability to apply their theory of mind. People appear to be reflexively mindblind, interpreting behavior in terms of the actor’s mental states only to the extent that they have the cognitive resources to do so.     

儿童理解误信念的心理机制假设

儿童心理理论是近20年来发展心理学研究热点,对其研究主要是在误信念实验范式之下进行的。儿童理解误信念的心理机制问题是误信念研究的核心问题之一,研究者从不同的角度出发,采用不同的方法,提出了儿童如何理解误信念的几个重要假设,包括：元表征假设、事实掩盖假设、心理理论机制假设、计算资源假设。此文综述了这些假设,以期借鉴使用。     

Post hoc versus predictive accounts of children’s theory of mind: A reply to Ruffman

Ruffman (2014) argues for a minimalist account of infants’ performance on theory of mind tasks. This commentary argues that because Ruffman’s minimalist account is post hoc, it neither generates testable predictions about how infants will respond in new situations, nor does it offer a coherent explanation for existing false-belief findings. An alternative, mentalist account is presented. This account integrates infancy findings with prior theory of mind literature and generates novel predictions about children’s false belief performance.     

Limits on efficient human mindreading: Convergence across Chinese adults and Semai children

We tested Apperly and Butterfill's (2009, Psychological Review, 116, 753) theory that humans have two mindreading systems whereby the efficient‐system guiding anticipatory glances displays signature limits that do not apply to the flexible system guiding verbal predictions. Experiments 1 and 2 tested urban Mainland‐Chinese adults (n = 64) and Experiment 3 tested Semai children living in the rainforests of Peninsular Malaysia (3‐ to 4‐year‐olds, n = 60). Participants – across different ages, groups and methods – anticipated others’ false‐beliefs about object‐location but not object‐identity. Convergence in signature limits signalled that the early‐developing efficient system involved minimal theory‐of‐mind. Chinese adults and older Semai children showed flexibility in their direct predictions. The flexible mindreading system in ascribing others’ beliefs as such was task‐sensitive and implicated maturational and cultural contributions.     

心理理论的ERP研究:基于多重成分框架的视角

心理理论是社会认知的核心能力之一。现有的心理理论ERP研究以心理理论较为公认的4个成分信念、愿望、意图和情绪为框架,表现出了一些一致性的规律:心理理论相关的脑电成分根据不同的心理理论成分而有所区分;不同心理理论成分诱发的相关脑电出现的位置表现出跨任务的一致性;心理理论的ERP发展研究在儿童身上表现出与成人类似的结果,但也具有时间窗口更长,位置分布更宽广的特性。未来的研究需要设计出更符合ERP研究技术要求的任务范式,并注意心理理论概念结构的完整性,还应探寻心理理论各成分加工的共同电生理基础。     

3～6岁儿童信念理解能力的发展研究

研究设计了冲突真实信念任务,用于考察儿童对真实信念的理解;并利用区分信念、冲突真实信念和意外地点的错误信念任务,考察儿童理解信念推理基本规则、真实信念和错误信念的发展顺序。97名3~6岁儿童完成了测试。结果显示,3岁儿童能理解信念推理的基本规则,5岁儿童能理解真实信念,6岁儿童能理解错误信念。结果支持了儿童先理解真实信念,后理解错误信念的发展模式;也说明在理解信念以前儿童已能掌握信念推理的基本规则。     

Using video modeling and reinforcement to teach perspective-taking skills to children with autism

We evaluated video modeling and reinforcement for teaching perspective-taking skills to 3 children with autism using a multiple baseline design. Video modeling and reinforcement were effective; however, only 2 children were able to pass an untrained task, indicating limited generalization. The findings suggest that video modeling may be an effective technology for teaching perspective taking if researchers can continue to develop strategies for enhancing the generalization of these new skills.     

儿童在错误信念任务上的知识偏差

采用3种任务考查儿童在错误信念（FB）推理中是否存在知识偏差。被试为60名3—5岁幼儿,结果表明,对于3岁及4岁儿童来说,FB任务是存在知识偏差的。知识偏差的大小与年龄呈负相关关系,3岁与4岁、4岁与5岁儿童的知识偏差的大小均有显著差异。     

Hermeneutics and theory of mind

In contemporary philosophy and psychology there is an ongoing debate around the concept of theory of mind. Theory of mind concerns our ability to understand another person. The two approaches that dominate the debate are “Theory Theory” (TT) and “Simulation Theory” (ST). This paper explores the connection between theory of mind and hermeneutics. Although both speak of the nature of understanding, and the way we gain and organize our knowledge of others, certain aspects of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics reflect a theory approach, long before TT itself was developed. In contrast, Dilthey’s hermeneutics reflects a simulation approach. In contrast to both of these approaches, I propose a contextual theory, as a parallel to Gadamer’s work in hermeneutics, and as a view that offers the basis for an important critique of both TT and ST.

The cost of thinking about false beliefs: evidence from adults' performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.]). The current studies examined for the first time whether similar interference occurs in adult participants. In two experiments participants read sentences describing the real colour of an object and a man's false belief about the colour of the object, then judged the accuracy of a picture probe depicting either reality or the man's belief. Processing costs for picture probes depicting reality were consistently greater in this false belief condition than in a matched control condition in which the sentences described the real colour of one object and a man's unrelated belief about the colour of another object. A similar pattern was observed for picture probes depicting the man's belief in most cases. Processing costs were not sensitive to the time available for encoding the information presented in the sentences: costs were observed when participants read the sentences at their own pace (Experiment 1) or at a faster or a slower pace (Experiment 2). This suggests that adults' difficulty was not with encoding information about reality and a conflicting false belief, but with holding this information in mind and using it to inform a subsequent judgement.     

4岁儿童对他人记忆的评判与错误信念理解的关系

从观点采择的角度考察儿童对他人记忆的评判及其与错误信念理解的关系。与他人分享记忆时,个体需要同时处理自我与他人对过去的表征和看法;而要顺利完成错误信念任务,个体需要同时加工自我的真实信念与他人的错误信念。因此个体对他人记忆的评判能力可能会与其对错误信念的理解相关。40名4岁儿童完成一系列错误信念任务和评判他人记忆是否正确任务,情境包括视觉、意图解释和情绪解释。结果表明,控制年龄、语言和记忆能力等因素后,被试评判他人记忆的成绩仍然可以预测其对错误信念的理解。这些结果为幼儿在回忆叙述中谈及他人越多,其心理理论越好提供了进一步的证据和可能的解释