Normative and Descriptive Models of Military Decisions to Deploy Precision Strike Capabilities

Precision strike capabilities represent a significant and highly controversial part of present day military operations. And yet, there is a surprising dearth of empirical research on military decision making in this domain. In this article, we therefore review different psychological perspectives on how these decisions can be made. Specifically, we compare the application of normative models of judgment and choice against the empirical research on human decision making, which suggests that people are more likely to employ heuristic strategies. We suggest that several features of decision tasks in the precision strike domain evoke the use of intuitive (heuristic) decision making whereas other features such as the sometimes unfamiliar (or novel) nature of the decision task requires analytic strategies to generate good solutions. Therefore, decisions about precision strike capabilities are best made with a mixture of intuitive and analytic thought, a mode of thinking known as quasirationality.     

Tough Love: The Normative Conflict Model and a Goal System Approach to Dissent Decisions

Most rebels have a cause, and the expression of internal criticism and dissent is vital for healthy civic and collective functioning. Here, we review the normative conflict model (NCM), which posits that social identities are key to understanding conformity and deviance in group contexts. The NCM hypothesizes that strongly identified group members are willing to articulate critical and dissenting opinions when they believe that doing so is in the interest of the collective. In this paper, we conceptually advance the NCM by exploring how responses to group norms can be understood from a goal system perspective, conceptualizing dissent decisions as often involving choices between conflicting goals. We review the evidence for this approach to dissent and outline a range of future directions.     

Normative Influences on Secondary Disturbance: The Role of Social Expectancies

A “new wave” within psychotherapy has introduced the concept of acceptance into people's emotional repertoires. Accepting unpleasant emotional states has been demonstrated as an important pathway towards reducing secondary disturbances and improving emotional and psychological functioning. What is often overlooked, however, is whether this move towards acceptance is reinforced within the social and cultural contexts in which people experience their emotional states. Our research has begun to explore the contribution that normative influences make to secondary disturbance, specifically the perception that feeling happy is a desired state, and that experiencing and expressing negative emotions is undesirable and unacceptable to others. We review evidence here that these perceived “social expectancies” are associated with increased negative emotionality and depression, and reduce well‐being. Furthermore, we highlight that the effects of social expectancies are more apparent in Australia than Japan, consistent with the view that a higher premium is placed on happiness within Australia. We also review experimental evidence that social messages that reinforce these social expectancies serve to increase secondary disturbances. The implications of taking a social perspective on emotion regulation and dysfunction, and specifically implications for promoting happiness and acceptance in the field, are discussed.     

Managers' Reactions to Utility Analysis and Perceptions of What Influences Their Decisions

Recent research on providing utility analysis (UA) information has shown small positive effects on acceptance of selection tests by human resource decision-makers (Carson, Becker, & Henderson, Journal of Applied Psychology, 83 84–96 (1998). In the present study, 218 managers provided reactions to UA information. Not only do our findings replicate the positive effects of UA, we found managers also responded favorably to UA information when asked independently of the decision making process. Specifically, when asked to rank order information in terms of what they perceived to be most influential in helping them make their final decisions, those who received UA information ranked it among the highest.     

Ethnicity of Defendants and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions1

To assess the influence of ethnicity on jury decisions, 480 subjects viewed a videotaped trial of an Anglo or Hispanic defendant. Anglo or Hispanic majority 6-person juries deliberated until a unanimous verdict was reached. The juries that convicted the defendant were asked to determine sentence length and to provide a probation/ parole recommendation. Anglo majority juries convicted the defendant significantly more (M= 79%) than did the Hispanic majority juries (M= 52%), x²= 5.45, p < 0.02. No main effect of defendant ethnicity was obtained, but there was an interaction between the defendant and the jury's ethnicity, x²= 5.41, p < 0.02. Anglo majority juries were more lenient with the Anglo defendant, but the Hispanic majority juries did not differ in their conviction rates. No significant effects were obtained for sentence length. Differences in probation/parole recommendations were a function of jury ethnicity, F(l, 15) = 4.74, p < 0.05. Anglos were more likely to recommend that the defendant serve the full term of the sentence. These results are interpreted in terms of stereotyping and are discussed regarding their implications for a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.     

Religious Influences on the Reproductive Health Decisions of HIV-Positive Latinas on the Border

The number of HIV-positive Latinas of child-bearing age living on the US–Mexico border is a growing concern. Little is known about how religious beliefs influence the reproductive health decisions of these women in light of disease demands and cultural and religious norms that support high fertility rates and childbearing. Such decisions may be further complicated by the stigma of HIV/AIDS and structural issues related to immigration status and trans-border lives. This paper analyzes extant literature and supports the need for further research so that policy makers and heath and social service providers can develop meaningful and comprehensive reproductive-health related interventions.     

The Employment Interview Context: Social and Situational Influences on Interviewer Decisions1

The employment interview context is broad and multifaceted, and it includes a number of social, situational, and affective influences which generate from the interviewee, interviewer, nature of the job in question, and interactions among these factors. The employment interview is proposed to be influenced by nonverbal and self-promotion behaviors of the applicant, interviewer training, and the requirements of the job. These variables then influence the intermediate variables of applicant similarity to the interviewer, perceived competence of the applicant, and interviewer affect toward the applicant. The intermediate variables then influence the perceived job suitability of the applicant. The present study tested and found support for modeling the employment interview context and how it affects interviewer decisions. The contributions and limitations of the present study are discussed, in addition to directions for future research.     

From Normative Spheres to Normative Practices: New Prospects for Normative Theory after Habermas

Abstract

In this paper I argue against Jürgen Habermas’s theoretical dualism between ethics and morality. I do this by showing how his account of normativity is vitiated by an unnecessary superposition of a social-evolutionary and a theoretical-linguistic account of normativity, and that this brings about theoretical problems that in the end cannot be overcome. I also show that Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s distinction is equally doomed to failure, but that his attempt nevertheless invites new and more fruitful avenues for normative theory that are worth exploring. The conclusion of this paper is that traditional notions of ethics and morality can be preserved provided we heavily redefine their meanings and release them from some of the theoretical work they have been expected to accomplish, but that to complete this transition we also need to supersede Forst’s pluralization of normative contexts toward a theory of normative practices that in the end makes the distinction between ethics and morality workable but useless. I begin by first locating the debate about ethics and morality within the context of recent normative theory (§1), and proceed to examine the two main strategies through which Habermas has elaborated his idea of a sharp dualism between ethics and morality (§2). I then introduce a theoretical distinction between what I call a horizontal and a vertical integration of ethics and morality (§3) and contend that whilst only the horizontal is viable, Habermas decidedly prefers the idea of a vertical integration (§4). With this work done, I proceed to complete my critique of Habermas’s argument and show how, by recovering the pragmatist roots of his thought, an alternative solution based on a functionalist understanding of morality could be envisaged (§5). I then conclude by examining Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s account, and show that the failure of Forst’s attempts opens the way for new and more fruitful approaches to normative theory which are more likely to recover the pragmatist roots of Habermas’s thought (§6).     

Impromptu Decisions to Deceive

This research furthers understanding of the factors that induce individuals to choose deception. Its goals were to expand and test a recent account of the cognition of deception, Activation–Decision–Construction–Action Theory (ADCAT), in a mock job interview inviting impromptu deception. Decisions to lie are hypothesized to depend on the truth and other information activated from long‐term memory by the social context. Activated information then guides evaluation of the likely costs of truth telling and benefits of deception; 166 college students participated in the job interview, who learned about the position and then adopted the role of job applicants. Afterward, participants shared their thoughts when responding to five questions from the interview. The most important findings are that the negative expectations of sharing truths and the positive expectations of sharing deceptions each account for unique variance in deciding to lie. Implications for lie reduction and detection are considered. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Normative Appeals to the Natural

Surprisingly, many ethical realists and anti-realists, naturalists and not, all accept some version of the following normative appeal to the natural (NAN): evaluative and normative facts hold solely in virtue of natural facts, where their naturalness is part of what fits them for the job. This paper argues not that NAN is false but that NAN has no adequate non-parochial justification (a justification that relies only on premises which can be accepted by more or less everyone who accepts NAN) to back up this consensus. I show that we cannot establish versions of NAN which are interesting in their own right (and not merely as instances of a general naturalistic ontology) by appealing to the nature of natural properties or the kind of in-virtue-of relation to which NAN refers, plus other plausible non-parochial assumptions. On the way, I distinguish different types of 'in virtue of' claims. I conclude by arguing that the way in which assessment of meta-ethical hypotheses is theory-dependent predicts the failure of non-parochial justifications of NAN.     

A Normative Pragmatic Perspective on Appealing to Emotions in Argumentation

Is appealing to emotions in argumentation ever legitimate and, if so, what is the best way to analyze and evaluate such appeals? After overviewing a normative pragmatic perspective on appealing to emotions in argumentation, I present answers to these questions from pragma-dialectical, informal logical, and rhetorical perspectives, and note positions shared and supplemented by a normative pragmatic perspective. A normative pragmatic perspective holds that appealing to emotions in argumentation may be relevant and non-manipulative; and that emotional appeals may be analyzed as strategies that create pragmatic reasons and assessed by the standard of formal propriety or reasonability under the circumstances. I illustrate the explanatory power of the perspective by analyzing and evaluating some argumentation from Frederick Douglass’s “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July.” I conclude that a normative pragmatic perspective offers a more complete account of appealing to emotions in argumentation than a pragma-dialectial, informal logical, or rhetorical perspective alone, identifies a range of norms available to arguers, and explains why appealing to emotions may be legitimate in particular cases of argumentation.     

Do Normative Facts Need to Explain?

Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse (by which I mean our practice of evaluating beliefs as justified or unjustified, and so forth) are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotentas well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not servethe function of causal explanation.     

How to be a Normative Expressivist1

Abstract. Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does full justice to the core expressivist thesis that, at bottom, a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief.     

The Effective Treatment of Juveniles Who Sexually Offend: An Ethical Imperative

This article raises serious concerns regarding the widespread use of unproven interventions with juveniles who sexually offend and suggests innovative methods for addressing these concerns. Dominant interventions (i.e., cognitive-behavioral group treatments with an emphasis on relapse prevention) typically fail to address the multiple determinants of juvenile sexual offending and could result in iatrogenic outcomes. Methodologically sophisticated research studies (i.e., randomized clinical trials) are needed to examine the clinical and cost-effectiveness of cognitive-behavioral group interventions, especially those delivered in residential settings. The moral and ethical mandate for such research is evident when considering the alternative, in which clinicians and society are willing to live in ignorance regarding the etiology and treatment of juvenile sexual offending and to consign offending youths to the potential harm of untested interventions. Encouraging signs of a changing ethical climate include recent federal funding of a randomized clinical trial examining treatment effectiveness with sexually offending youths and the introduction of separate (i.e., developmentally informed) clinical and legal interventions for juvenile versus adult sexual offenders.