An ecological approach to learning

This paper introduces a special journal issue devoted to the study of learning in ecological and developmental contexts. In the past, the dominant approach to the study of learning has depended upon the choice of arbitrary problems, stimuli, and responses to guarantee the generality of principles discovered in the laboratory. Recently, though, there has been considerable interest in integrating an ecological (functional) account of learning with the strengths of the classic laboratory approach. One form of integration is to use the technology of the laboratory to look for the operation of general learning laws in ecological problems. The approach favored here is to treat learning as a biological phenomenon by first placing it within a functional system of behavior, and then by analyzing where and how learning modifies the operation of that system. Because the results of such analyses are defined with respect to functioning systems rather than procedural paradigms, the ecological approach readily makes contact with issues in evolution, development, and physiology, an ability not completely shared by the classic general-process approach. Concerns about laboratory versus field, function versus mechanism, generality of results, and adaptive “storytelling” can be resolved or further clarified by the present approach. The papers in this issue represent a cross-section of research stemming from an ecological approach to learning, and provide specific analyses of how learning modifies and is expressed in functional systems of behavior.     

An ecological approach to embodiment and cognition

The purpose of this article is to explore the relation between embodiment and cognition from an ecological point of view, which has been given little attention in current studies on embodiment. To begin with, two basic meanings of embodiment are distinguished: the state of being embodied and the act of embodying. This article gives more attention to embodying than to being embodied. Next, the ecological framework to investigate embodiment are presented, with focusing on affordances, tool use, and the body. On this view, it is argued that tools extend action and perception capabilities, which implies that the boundary of the body can be extended beyond the surface of the skin. Then, the empirical studies on perception of affordances, on limb proprioception, and on tool use are outlined. These studies support the idea that the boundary of the body can shift. Finally, the boundary of the body is discussed in reference to perception–action systems, suggesting that research on embodiment should pay more attention to the dynamic nature of the body.     

An ecological approach to mechanisms determining individual differences in perception

In 1982 Satow proposed four hypothetical properties determining mechanisms of individual differences in perceptions; these were supported by results of a factor analysis of responses to a 58-item check list. Present work confirmed the four properties (intense sensitivity, temporal sensitivity, sensory-motor reactivity, and possible range of total stimuli), and obtained a property, preference for intense and prolonged stimuli, from a principal component analysis of data from a 60-item list given to 316 subjects. The 60-item list is a revised version of the 58-item list which asked subjects about their subjective sensitiveness and preferences for environmental sensory stimuli (visual, auditory, olfactory, and tactile). Within subjects relationships among these properties are interindependent, since for individuals correlations of factor-score estimates between pairs of these properties were near zero. This interindepedence supported a model of four hypothetical types of individuals, explaining the individual differences on the grounds of the relations among the properties.     

An ecological approach to cognitive enhancement: Complex motor training

Cognitive training has received a lot of attention recently, yielding findings that can be conflicting and controversial. In this paper, we present a novel approach to cognitive training based on complex motor activities. In a randomized controlled design, participants were assigned to one of three conditions: aerobic exercise, working memory training or designed sport — an intervention specifically tailored to include both physical and cognitive demands. After training for eight weeks, the designed sport group showed the largest gains in all cognitive measures, illustrating the efficacy of complex motor activities to enhance cognition. Designed sport training also revealed impressive health benefits, namely decreased heart rate and blood pressure. In this period of skepticism over the efficacy of computerized cognitive training, we discuss the potential of ecological interventions targeting both cognition and physical fitness, and propose some possible applications.     

Hegel,grandfather of disjunctivism

In this paper, I shall investigate whether Hegel can be considered as a sort of ancestor of McDowell’s disjunctivism. If this hypothesis turns out to be plausible, then the paper offers two gains. On the one hand, it offers an innovative interpretation of the way in which Hegel conceives of our sensible epistemic access to the world. On the other hand, McDowell's own claim that his own theoretical proposal has a Hegelian sound is supported by a previously unexplored argument. I organize my analysis into three parts: I sketch McDowell’s version of disjunctivism (Section 2); I analyze some passages from Hegel that I believe are important for showing some similarities between his and McDowell’s argumentative strategy (Section 3); in the conclusion (Section 4), I highlight a number of core features that Hegel seems to share with McDowell’s disjunctivism and I submit that they are sufficient to label Hegel the “grandfather” of McDowell's disjunctivism.     

An ecological approach to child and family clinical and counseling psychology

The ecological model of child and family clinical and counseling psychology considers mental health service delivery within a health maintenance framework, approaching the complexity of children's behavior in a systematic and organized fashion using science-based intervention practices. The service delivery framework integrates assessment, intervention, and motivation at all phases of an intervention. Assessments enhance the participants' and professionals' appraisal, which in turn impact motivation to change. Interventions are sensitive to assessment-based targets and participant motivation. A menu of interventions range from assessment, feedback, and brief interventions to more extensive mental health services, potentially integrated with other community agencies and school settings. The ecological model suggests revisions in the conceptualization of child and adolescent psychopathology, training for mental health professionals, and strategies for the design and testing of interventions. In general, a reformulation of mental heath services for children and families within an ecological framework enhances the potential for integrating science and practice.     

Max Scheler,cousin of disjunctivism

Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and hallucinations differ in nature. Second, his version of the position is philosophically interesting in its own right. This is so primarily, though not exclusively, in virtue of the positive story he tells us about perceptual content. Third, Scheler’s case proves particularly instructive to the question of whether intentionalism and disjunctivism constitute a fundamental, unbridgeable divide.     

Tyler Burge on disjunctivism (II)

In McDowell (2010), I responded to Burge's attack (2005) on disjunctivism. In Burge (2011) Burge rejects my response. He stands by his main claim that disjunctivism is incompatible with the science of perception, and in a supplementary spirit he argues against the detail of my attempt to defend disjunctivism. Here I explain how disjunctivism is compatible with the science, and I respond to some of Burge's supplementary arguments.     

Cross-cultural differences and similarities in proneness to shame: An adaptationist and ecological approach

People vary in how easily they feel ashamed, that is, in their shame proneness. According to the information threat theory of shame, variation in shame proneness should, in part, be regulated by features of a person's social ecology. On this view, shame is an emotion program that evolved to mitigate the likelihood or costs of reputation-damaging information spreading to others. In social environments where there are fewer possibilities to form new relationships (i.e., low relational mobility), there are higher costs to damaging or losing existing ones. Therefore, shame proneness toward current relationship partners should increase as perceived relational mobility decreases. In contrast, individuals with whom one has little or no relationship history are easy to replace, and so shame-proneness towards them should not be modulated by relational mobility. We tested these predictions cross-culturally by measuring relational mobility and shame proneness towards friends and strangers in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Japanese subjects were more shame-prone than their British and American counterparts. Critically, lower relational mobility was associated with greater shame proneness towards friends (but not strangers), and this relationship partially mediated the cultural differences in shame proneness. Shame proneness appears tailored to respond to relevant features of one's social ecology.     

An approach to why-questions

The purpose of this paper is to give a semantical analysis of why-questions. Why-questions will be construed as requests for knowledge. Special attention will be paid to considering what the conditions for conclusive answerhood are in the case of why-questions. Since explanations can often be thought of as answers to why-questions, we also discuss some topics in the theory of explanation.This study was supported by the Academy of Finland (Valtion humanistinen toimikunta) and by NSF grant No. IST-8310936 (Information Science and Technology), principal investigators Jaakko Hintikka and C. J. B. Macmillan. Scholarships from the Emil Aaltonen Foundation and the Finnish Academy of Sciences (Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia) are gratefully acknowledged.     

An approach to intensional logic

A system of tensed intensional logic excluding iterations of intensions is introduced. Instead of using the type symbols (for ‘sense’), extensional and intensional functor types are distinguished. A peculiarity of the semantics is the general acceptance of value-gaps (including truth-value-gaps): the possible semantic values (extensions) of extensional functors are partial functions. Some advantages of the system (relatively to R. Montague's intensional logic) are briefly indicated. Also, applications for modelling natural languages are illustrated by examples.     

The ecological approach to perception: the place of perceptual content

The kind of perceptual systems that human beings possess enables each of us to respond in highly adaptive deliberate ways that take into account the suitability of particular behaviors to what we are aware of ourself as experiencing perceptually here and now. In deciding what to do next under the perceived circumstances, content is the dimension of perceptual experience that we consult. For perceptual content is how whatever the perceiver is now having perceptual experience of is given in or taken by the respective perceptual experience. Perceptual content includes presentational content, which is all the ways that what you are perceptually experiencing may be appearing to you, and intentional content, which is all the ways that your stream of perceptual experience may take to be that of which you have perceptual awareness in the environment or self. Therefore, perceptual content must be distinguished from the intentional object of perceptual awareness, which is that property, event, or entity of which you have perceptual awareness. Gibson proposed that there is no perceptual content independent of the particular intentional objects that one perceptually apprehends, which are always part of the ecological environment. This externalization of perceptual content was due, no doubt, to Gibson's conception of perceptually apprehending anything at all as not mediated by awareness of anything else, such as something immanent in perceptual experience itself. However, perceptual content need not be, theoretically, a replacement for what the perceiver has perceptual awareness of. During straightforward perceiving, the perceiver does not have awareness of perceptual content but of parts of the ecological environment including the perceiver. Perceptual content is how the external intentional object perspectivally appears from moment to moment and how it is perceptually taken to be, veridically or not. Perceptual taking of an ecological property is always in one or another of the latter's instantiations, and perceptual taking of an ecological entity or event is always with properties. The perceptual intentional object's appearing in a particular manner is distinct from perceptually taking the intentional object. For example, an ecological property may be taken quite veridically yet through a flow of varying appearance. And even when the property appears in a constant way, perceptual awareness may take it differently from one moment to the next. For example, a perceiver may have visual awareness of a surface without noticing the surface's color-texture, though the color-texture may appear to the perceiver throughout looking at the surface, before and after he or she stops noticing the color-texture.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

The role of representative design in an ecological approach to cognition

Egon Brunswik argued that psychological processes are adapted to environmental properties. He proposed the method of representative design to capture these processes and advocated that psychology be a science of organism-environment relations. Representative design involves randomly sampling stimuli from the environment or creating stimuli in which environmental properties are preserved. This departs from systematic design. The authors review the development of representative design, examine its use in judgment and decision-making research, and demonstrate the effect of design on research findings. They suggest that some of the practical difficulties associated with representative design may be overcome with modern technologies. The importance of representative design in psychology and the implications of this method for ecological approaches to cognition are discussed.     

An approach to time-limited humanistic-dynamic counselling

Some of the difficulties, dilemmas and opportunities afforded by working within a time-limited counselling framework are explored. The author's range of work, and the relative importance of time-limited work in it, are briefly described. A brief outline of the change process is then given, which includes a discussion of the author's 'philosophy of the person'—i.e. our fundamental beliefs and assumptions about what we believe a 'person' to be (for example, a mechanistic, soul-less collection of matter, or an indissolubly whole organism with a 'soul' or 'spirit'). This discussion provides the backdrop for some reflections on the extent to which time-limited working is consistent with, and adaptable to, a humanistic-dynamic conception of the person, and on the nature of the 'therapeutic' change process.     

An intrasubject approach to causal attribution

The present investigation draws on the judgment research tradition in order to examine the causal attributions made by individual subjects in an often used attribution task. Formal empirical tests of Kelley's (1967) attribution theory have demonstrated that attributions are influenced by the interaction of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information. None of these studies, however, have separately examined attributions made by individual judges. Implicit assumptions about individual differences, for example, have been made by the template-matching model of causal attribution (Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley, 1975) but have not been scrutinized at the intrasubject level. Log linear modeling of attributions in the present research showed that while subjects were influenced by the causal information in the task, the relation between this information and attributions was more importantly characterized by individual differences than by uniform patterning. The nature of these individual differences and the significance of an idiographic approach to causal analysis are discussed.