Methodenstreit in der Nationalökonomie

Methodenstreit in Economics. This essay offers an account of the Methodenstreit in economics between first Menger and Schmoller and later Max Weber and again Schmoller. It is argued that, for Schmoller, two issues were central; to use economics (widely conceived) as an instrument for economic policy and notably social policy: and to base the science empirically with all the modern methods available. In contrast, the Austrian position had a different view of economics as a science, seeing it more as a system of ideas, which implies a radically different use of empirical evidence. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Jung’s Psychoid Monism

Jung’s final psychoid theory of archetypes was an additional attempt to find a solution to the philosophical problem of how to relate mind and matter. In the following essay Jung’s solution is summarized by a set of 17 theses, and Jung’s philosophy will be called psychoid monism. According to psychoid monism, what ultimately and primarily is, is the psycho-physically neutral domain of instinctual experience. The origin of this view can be traced back to Post-Kantian German Idealism (Schopenhauer, Schelling, Hölderlin), and a systematization of the view requires a dialectic approach and, in particular, contradiction-tolerant dialectic logic.     

A new theory of religion? Introducing the review symposium on Manuel A. Vásquez: More Than Belief (2011)

This essay introduces a review symposium on More than Belief: a Materialist Theory of Religion (2011) by Manuel A. Vásquez. The essay outlines the context and summarizes the structure and argument of the book. The author discusses its limitation as a full-blown theory of religion and summarizes the main points of criticism advanced by the other contributions to the review-symposium.     

A Phenomenological Reading of Anomalous Monism

The essay discusses Donald Davidson’s concept of anomalous monism in the framework of Husserlian phenomenology. It develops in four stages. Section 1 is devoted to a critical presentation of the argument for anomalous monism. Section 2 succinctly examines those Husserlian notions that best provide the ground for a discussion parallel to Davidson’s. In Sect. 3, the aporetic status of “mental causation” is analyzed by providing a genetic-phenomenological account of efficient causation. Section 4 draws some general conclusions concerning the kind of efficaciousness that must be attributed to consciousness and discusses the sense in which anomalous monism can be defended in a phenomenological framework, but not in a naturalistic one.     

Alterity,Intimacy, and the Cultural Turn in Religious Ethics

This essay responds to four critics of Friends and Other Strangers: Studies in Religion, Ethics and Culture: Diana Fritz Cates, Eric Gregory, Ross Moret, and Atalia Omer. Focusing on the book’s organizing concepts of intimacy and alterity, engagement with empirical sources, discussion of Augustine’s thought, and attention to moral psychology and political morality, these interlocutors take up various strands in the book’s argument and extend them into metaethical, normative, and metadisciplinary domains. The author organizes his response under three rubrics: Metaethics and Personal Relationships; Political Morality; and Multidisciplinary Horizons.     

A Review of Jesus: A Psychological Biography

Capps's book uses historical, sociological, and psychological methods to probe the personal identity and self-understanding of Jesus. This reviewer suggests that historical, sociological, and psychological methods are modes of discourse that are modern forms of myth. Myth is understood as any narrative form that is used, and/or taken for granted, as a way of self-understanding and understanding the world. These disciplines are useful critical tools with which to explore the text and its world, but they do not guarantee knowledge about the past. As modern modes of discourse they create narratives (i.e., myths) about the past, that for us are preferred epistemological pathways. Jesus Christ is the ultimate model of the God-person relationship in the Christian west. Therefore, any serious attempt to render a realistic portrait of Jesus using contemporary modes of describing reality has the possibility of effecting a profound transformation of the images of God and Jesus. This then can transform our own relationship with God. The value of Capps's book is not in any knowledge it might give us about Jesus, but in the transformation it can effect within the reader, and the author, of central religious images. Psychoanalytic and developmental theories are limited in their explanatory effectiveness because they are materialistic and personalistic (reductive). The analytical psychology of Carl Jung and the archetypal psychology of James Hillman are proposed in order to add a transpersonal dimension to Capps's approach to the personality of Jesus.     

The controversy around the concept of archetypes

The paper reviews the course of the controversy surrounding Jung's theory of archetypes beginning in the mid 1990s and continuing to the present. Much of this controversy was concerned with the debate between the essentialism of the evolutionary position of Anthony Stevens as found in his 1983 book Archetypes: A Natural History of the Self, and the emergence model of the archetypes proposed in various publications by Hogenson, Knox and Merchant, among others. The paper then moves on to a consideration of more recent developments in theory, particularly as derived from an examination of the philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who introduces Bergson's somnambulistic unconscious into the discussion of Jung's theories. It is suggested that this largely unexamined influence on Jung may provide answers to some of the unanswered questions surrounding his theorizing. The paper concludes by suggesting that the notion of the somnambulistic unconscious may resemble Atmanspacher's argument for a dual‐aspect monism interpretation of Jung.     

From 1799 to 2009: Religious Experience Reconsidered-background, argument, responses

This introductory essay to a review symposium on Religious Experience Reconsidered by Ann Taves (2009) briefly reviews some main stages of the discussion of religious experience in the study of religion\s with special attention to the Romantic tradition and its apologetic legacy and to more recent attempts to revise, rehabilitate, or challenge this key category. The essay then summarizes the argument and structure of Taves' book and highlights main points of the responses.     

The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of the Sense of Touch

In this essay, I review Matthew Fulkerson's The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of the Sense of Touch. In this first philosophical book on the sense of touch, Fulkerson provides an account of the nature and content of tactual experience. Central to Fulkerson's view is the claim that exploratory action plays a fundamental role in touch. In this review, I put pressure on two of his arguments: (1) the argument that tactual experience is unisensory and (2) the argument that tactual experience does not depend on explicit bodily awareness.     

Psyche, Matter and Synchronicity

In 1948, and with Pauli s enthusiastic support, Jung began to write down his thoughts on synchronicity. A two-year correspondence ensued, with a focus on psyche and matter, and the importance of acausality within the frameworks of physics and psychology.
This paper traces the improbable interaction between the physicist and the psychologist, as these great scientists enrich and merge their formative views on acausality. Bolstered by his dreams, Pauli draws a correspondence between psychology and atomic physics, centring on the 'psychophysical problem', including synchronicity. Seminal thoughts are discussed, such as the need to broaden the concept of the archetype, and to recognize that the future of analytical psychology is not to be found primarily in therapy but in a 'unified holistic conception of nature and the status of man within it'. Two world pictures were constructed, identifying a non-causal (non-rational) side to reality, as experienced both in physics and the psyche. Pauli discusses his concept of a 'neutral language', the aim being to bridge the gap between psyche and matter, both of which are seen to rest on a common foundation, known to the alchemists as the unus mundus. The collaboration was highlighted with the publication of their book, The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche (1952), which emphasizes the archetypal influence of archetype on consciousness.     

Mind and Matter: A Physicist's View

Physics explores a universe of wonderful order, expressed in terms of beautiful mathematical equations. Mathematics itself is understood to be the exploration of a realm of noetic reality. Science describes matter in terms of concepts with mind-like qualities. The psychosomatic nature of human persons is best understood in terms of a dual-aspect monism, in which matter and mind are complementary aspects of a unitary being. The new science of complexity theory, with its dualities of parts/whole and energy/information, offers modest resources for the speculative exploration of this idea. The intrinsic unpredictabilities present in nature afford the metaphysical opportunity to consider dissipative systems as exhibiting top–down causality.     

Sexual Ethics in the Age of Epidemic

In this essay I follow one argument strand from Linda Singer's Erotic Welfare. How can we have a forward-looking and affirmative ideal of sexual freedom when the AIDS panic has altered the sexual landscape and instigated new justifications for oppressive sexual disciplines? How can we be sexual subjects when processes of commodification and disciplinary practices have constrained sexual expression while proliferating sexual fetishes? These are some of the questions this book formulates, without answering.     

Place and World: On Jeff Malpas’ Second Edition of Place and Experience

ABSTRACT

Jeff Malpas’ book Experience and Place has become a significant landmark in philosophy. I take the publication of the revised and extended second edition of the book in 2018 as an opportunity to reflect on some key issues in Malpas’ thought. After briefly outlining Malpas’ commitment to topophilia and topoanalysis, I address, in the first part of my essay, the relation of place to subjectivity and normativity, pointing out certain shortcomings or ambiguities in Malpas’ account. I also critically discuss the omission of an account of migration, or, rather, immigration, which seems called for, especially if we realize that the inhabited place always comes with its limit or border, which implies that there is also a view from outside, and that we have moral obligations to the stranger and/or immigrant coming into our place from outside. In the second part of my essay, I engage Malpas’ argument according to which Heidegger ‘derived’ space from time. By an analysis of relevant texts in Heidegger, I show that this argument does not hold.     

WIEMAN'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF DEWEY: THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY DISCUSSION

Abstract. An important issue in the development of the American school of philosophy known as critical naturalism was whether the naturalistic vision implied a humanistic or a theistic interpretation of religion. Is the divine a creativity within nature but more than human effort, or is it the human vision of ideal possibilities and the effort to realize them? This issue is clarified through a study of the concept of the divine developed by the leading naturalist John Dewey in A Common Faith, the misunderstanding of this book by Henry Nelson Wieman, and the discussion of this misunderstanding in the pages of Christian Century. The essay concludes that Wieman's misunderstanding of Dewey is instructive in that it reveals unintended possibilities in Dewey's thought.     

REMEMBERING ARTHUR PEACOCKE: A PERSONAL REFLECTION

I join others who have expressed profound gratitude for the life and thought of Arthur Peacocke. I recall some high points in my interaction with him during a period of forty years as an intellectual companion and personal friend. Some similarities in our thinking about evolution, emergence, top‐down causality, and continuing creation are indicated. Four points of difference are then discussed: (1) Emergent monism or two‐aspect process events? (2) Panentheism or process theism? (3) Creation ex nihilo and/or continuing creation? (4) Voluntary or necessary limitation of God's power? Even when we differed I have benefited immensely from our ongoing interaction.     

Davidson's Argument for Monism

Two criticisms of Davidson's argument for monism are presented. The first is that there is no obvious way for the anomalism of the mental to do any work in his argument. Certain implicit premises, on the other hand, entail monism independently of the anomalism of the mental, but they are question-begging. The second criticism is that even if Davidson's argument is sound, the variety of monism that emerges is extremely weak at best. I show that by constructing ontologically ``hybrid' events that are consistent with the premises and assumptions of Davidson's argument, but entail ontological dualism.My guess is thatif you want to get a lot of physicalism out [ofDavidson's argument], you're going to have to put a lot of physicalism in.Jerry Fodor 1989, 159     

IDENTITY AND DISTINCTION IN SPINOZA'S ETHICS1

Abstract: In Ethics 1p5, Spinoza asserts that “In Nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute”. This claim serves as a crucial premise in Spinoza's argument for substance monism, yet Spinoza's demonstration of the 1p5 claim is surprisingly brief and appears to have obvious difficulties. This paper answers the principle difficulties that have been raised in response to Spinoza's argument for 1p5. The key to understanding the 1p5 argument lies in a proper understanding of the substance‐attribute relationship and the principles of metaphysical individuation that Spinoza accepts.     

On Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science

In his enormously influential The Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor (1983) proposed that the mind was divided into input modules and central processes. Much subsequent research focused on the modules and whether processes like speech perception or spatial vision are truly modular. Much less attention has been given to Fodor's writing on the central processes, what would today be called higher‐level cognition. In “Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science,” he argued that central processes are “bad candidates for scientific study” and would resist attempts at empirical analysis. This essay evaluates his argument for this remarkable claim, concluding that although central processes may well be “messier” than input modules, this does not mean that they cannot be studied and understood. The article briefly reviews the scientific progress made in understanding central processes in the 35 years since the book was published, showing that Fodor's prediction is clearly falsified by massive advances in topics like decision making and analogy. The essay concludes that Fodor's Law was not based on a clear argument for why the complexities of central systems could not be studied but was likely based on intuitions and preferences that were common in psychology at the time.     

THE INSPIRATION OF GOD AND WOLFHART PANNENBERG'S “FIELD THEORY OF INFORMATION”

Abstract This paper will examine the implications of an extended “field theory of information,” suggested by Wolfhart Pannenberg, specifically in the Christian understanding of creation. The paper argues that the Holy Spirit created the world as field, a concept from physics, and the creation is directed by the logos utilizing information. Taking into account more recent developments of information theory, the essay further suggests that present creation has a causal impact upon the information utilized in creation. In order to adequately address Pannenberg's hypothesis that the logos utilizes information at creation the essay will also include an introductory examination of Pannenberg's Christology which shifts from a strict “from below” Christology, to a more open “third way” of doing Christology beyond “above” and “below.” The essay concludes with a brief section relating the implications of an extended “field theory of information” to creative inspiration, as well as parallels with human inspiration.     

A SCIENTIFIC BUDDHISM?

This essay endorses the argument of Donald Lopez's Buddhism and Science and shows how the general thesis of the book is consonant with other historical work on the “discovery” of Buddhism and on the emergence of Western conceptions of religion. It asks whether one of the key claims of Buddhism and Science—that Buddhism pays a price for its flirtation with the modern sciences—might be applicable to science‐and‐religion discussions more generally.