Situating vision in the world

Recently, there has been a great deal of interest in what has been called 'situated cognition', which has included claims that certain forms of representation are inadequate for modeling active organisms or agents such as humans and robots. In this article, I suggest that a weakness in classical theories of visual representation is the way in which representations connect with the real world, which may account for many of the concerns expressed by the situated cognition community. Specifically, I claim that what current theories lack is any provision for a certain form of direct, preconceptual connection between objects in the visual world (visual objects or proto-objects) and their representations in the visual system. This type of connection is akin to what philosophers and semanticists have referred to as an 'indexical' or 'demonstrative' reference and what some cognitive scientists have referred to as 'deictic pointers'. I explain why such a mechanism is needed and suggest that many workers have, in fact, been studying precisely this under the term 'visual index'. The visual index hypothesis is illustrated with the results of some relevant experiments, including multiple object tracking, visual routines and subset-selected visual searches. Indexing theory provides a synthesis that has profound implications for explaining a wide range of psychophysical findings, certain results in infant cognitive development and also some ancient problems in the philosophy of mind.     

Dreaming and REM sleep are controlled by different brain mechanisms

The paradigmatic assumption that REM sleep is the physiological equivalent of dreaming is in need of fundamental revision. A mounting body of evidence suggests that dreaming and REM sleep are dissociable states, and that dreaming is controlled by forebrain mechanisms. Recent neuropsychological, radiological, and pharmacological findings suggest that the cholinergic brain stem mechanisms that control the REM state can only generate the psychological phenomena of dreaming through the mediation of a second, probably dopaminergic, forebrain mechanism. The latter mechanism (and thus dreaming itself) can also be activated by a variety of nonREM triggers. Dreaming can be manipulated by dopamine agonists and antagonists with no concomitant change in REM frequency, duration, and density. Dreaming can also be induced by focal forebrain stimulation and by complex partial (forebrain) seizures during nonREM sleep, when the involvement of brainstem REM mechanisms is precluded. Likewise, dreaming is obliterated by focal lesions along a specific (probably dopaminergic) forebrain pathway, and these lesions do not have any appreciable effects on REM frequency, duration, and density. These findings suggest that the forebrain mechanism in question is the final common path to dreaming and that the brainstem oscillator that controls the REM state is just one of the many arousal triggers that can activate this forebrain mechanism. The "REM-on" mechanism (like its various NREM equivalents) therefore stands outside the dream process itself, which is mediated by an independent, forebrain "dream-on" mechanism.     

Dreaming of white bears: the return of the suppressed at sleep onset

The present study examined the effects of thought suppression on sleep-onset mentation. It was hypothesized that the decrease of attentional control in the transition to sleep would lead to a rebound of a suppressed thought in hypnagogic mentation. Twenty-four young adults spent two consecutive nights in a sleep laboratory. Half of the participants were instructed to suppress a target thought, whereas the other half freely thought of anything at all. To assess target thought frequency, three different measures were used in the wake state and mentation reports were repeatedly prompted by a computer at sleep onset. In support of the hypothesis, results revealed a reversal of target thought frequency at sleep onset: Participants instructed to suppress reported fewer target thoughts than did controls before falling asleep, but more target thoughts afterwards.     

Predicting sleep hygiene: a reasoned action approach

Poor and insufficient sleep causes physical, cognitive, emotional, and social impairments. Unfortunately, little is known about the social‐cognitive predictors of daily sleep habits. The current study examined if sleep hygiene could be predicted using the Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010 ). Across four studies, the model performed well for the prediction of intentions (R²s = .63–.75), and also significantly predicted both self‐reported (R² = .15) and actigraphy‐recorded sleep duration (R² = .11). The results from these studies support the further use of the model toward the goal of designing effective sleep hygiene interventions.     

Evolutionary pressures and a stable world for animals and robots: a commentary on Merker

In his article on The Liabilities of Mobility, asserts that "Consciousness presents us with a stable arena for our actions-the world ..." and argues for this property as providing evolutionary pressure for the evolution of consciousness. In this commentary, I will explore the implications of Merker's ideas for consciousness in artificial agents as well as animals, and also meet some possible objections to his evolutionary pressure claim.     

Electrophysiological examination of embodiment in vision and action

A wealth of behavioral data has shown that the visual properties of objects automatically potentiate motor actions linked with them, but how deeply are these affordances embedded in visual processing? In the study reported here, we used electrophysiological measures to examine the time course of affordance resulting from the leftward or rightward orientation of the handles of common objects. Participants were asked to categorize those objects using a left- or right-handed motor response. Lateralized readiness potentials showed rapid motor preparation in the hand congruent with the affordance provided by the object only 100 to 200 ms after stimulus presentation and up to 400 ms before the actual response. Examination of event-related potentials also revealed an effect of handle orientation and response-hand congruency on the visual P1 and N1 components. Both of these results suggest that activity in the early sensory pathways is modulated by the action associations of objects and the intentions of the viewer.     

Accessing the Eternal: Dreaming "The Dreaming" and Ceremonial Performance

Australian Aboriginal cosmology is centered on The Dreaming, which has an eternal nature. It has been referred to as “everywhen” to articulate its timelessness. Starting with the assumption that “waking” reality is only one type of experienced reality, we investigate the concept of timelessness as it pertains to the Aboriginal worldview. We begin by questioning whether in fact “Dreaming” is an appropriate translation of a complex Aboriginal concept, then discuss whether there is any relationship between dreaming and The Dreaming. We then discuss Aboriginal ceremonial performance, during which actors are said to become Dreaming Ancestors, using as a frame of reference the “flow” experience explicated by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi together with Alfred Schutz's “mutual tuning‐in relationship.”     

Semantic and pragmatic integration in vision for action

According to an influential view, the detection of action possibilities and the selection of a plan for action are two segregated steps throughout the processing of visual information. This classical approach is committed with the assumption that two independent types of processing underlie visual perception: the semantic one, which is at the service of the identification of visually presented objects, and the pragmatic one which serves the execution of actions directed to specific parts of the same objects. However, as our knowledge of vision has improved over the years, this established view has turned out to be only an approximation. This paper sets out the details of a non-modularist approach to visual perception of action possibilities and explains how to resist the lure of cognitive segregation.     

Dreaming and the brain: toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states

Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states.     

Vision for perception and vision for action: normal and unusual development

Evidence suggests that visual processing is divided into the dorsal ('how') and ventral ('what') streams. We examined the normal development of these streams and their breakdown under neurological deficit by comparing performance of normally developing children and Williams syndrome individuals on two tasks: a visually guided action ('how') task, in which participants posted a card into an oriented slot, and a perception ('what') task, in which they matched a card to the slot's orientation. Results showed that all groups performed worse on the action task than the perception task, but the disparity was more pronounced in WS individuals and in normal 3-4-year-olds than in older children. These findings suggest that the 'how' system may be relatively slow to develop and more vulnerable to breakdown than the 'what' system.     

Active vision in passive locomotion: real‐world free viewing in infants and adults

Visual exploration in infants and adults has been studied using two very different paradigms: free viewing of flat screen displays in desk‐mounted eye‐tracking studies and real‐world visual guidance of action in head‐mounted eye‐tracking studies. To test whether classic findings from screen‐based studies generalize to real‐world visual exploration and to compare natural visual exploration in infants and adults, we tested observers in a new paradigm that combines critical aspects of both previous techniques: free viewing during real‐world visual exploration. Mothers and their 9‐month‐old infants wore head‐mounted eye trackers while mothers carried their infants in a forward‐facing infant carrier through a series of indoor hallways. Demands for visual guidance of action were minimal in mothers and absent for infants, so both engaged in free viewing while moving through the environment. Similar to screen‐based studies, during free viewing in the real world low‐level saliency was related to gaze direction. In contrast to screen‐based studies, only infants – not adults – were biased to look at people, participants of both ages did not show a classic center bias, and mothers and infants did not display high levels of inter‐observer consistency. Results indicate that several aspects of visual exploration of a flat screen display do not generalize to visual exploration in the real world.     

Dreaming and waking: similarities and differences revisited

Dreaming is often characterized as lacking high-order cognitive (HOC) skills. In two studies, we test the alternative hypothesis that the dreaming mind is highly similar to the waking mind. Multiple experience samples were obtained from late-night REM sleep and waking, following a systematic protocol described in Kahan (2001). Results indicated that reported dreaming and waking experiences are surprisingly similar in their cognitive and sensory qualities. Concurrently, ratings of dreaming and waking experiences were markedly different on questions of general reality orientation and logical organization (e.g., the bizarreness or typicality of the events, actions, and locations). Consistent with other recent studies (e.g., [Bulkeley and Kahan, 2008] and [Kozmová and Wolman, 2006] ), experiences sampled from dreaming and waking were more similar with respect to their process features than with respect to their structural features.     

Throwing in the dark: improved prediction of action outcomes following motor training without vision of the action

Traditional models of action understanding emphasise the idea that long-term exposure to a wide array of visual patterns of particular actions allows for effective action anticipation or prediction. More recently, a greater emphasis has been placed on the motor system’s role in the perceptual understanding and prediction of action outcomes. There have been attempts to isolate the contributions of visual and motor experience in action prediction, but to date, these studies have relied on comparisons of motor-visual experience to visual-only (observational) experience. We conducted a learning study, where visual experience was directly manipulated during practice. Novice participants practised throwing darts to 3 specific areas of a dartboard. A group trained without vision of their action, only feedback about the final landing position, significantly improved in their ability to predict the landing position of a thrown dart, from temporally occluded video clips. The performance of this ‘no-vision’ group did not differ from a Full-vision group and was significantly more accurate than an observation-only and a no-practice control group (with the latter two groups not improving pre- to post-practice). These results suggest that motor experience specifically modulates the perceptual prediction of action outcomes. This is thought to occur through simulative mechanisms, whereby observed actions are mapped onto the observer’s own motor representations.     

From vision to action: experiments and models of steering control during driving

Experienced drivers performed simple steering maneuvers in the absence of continuous visual input. Experiments conducted in a driving simulator assessed drivers' performance of lane corrections during brief visual occlusion and examined the visual cues that guide steering. The dependence of steering behavior on heading, speed, and lateral position at the start of the maneuver was measured. Drivers adjusted steering amplitude with heading and performed the maneuver more rapidly at higher speeds. These dependencies were unaffected by a 1.5-s visual occlusion at the start of the maneuver. Longer occlusions resulted in severe performance degradation. Two steering control models were developed to account for these findings. In the 1st, steering actions were coupled to perceptual variables such as lateral position and heading. In the 2nd, drivers pursued a virtual target in the scene. Both models yielded behavior that closely matches that of human drivers.     

The role of the saccade target object in the perception of a visually stable world

Although the proximal stimulus shifts position on our retinae with each saccade, we perceive our world as stable and continuous. Most theories of visual stability implicitly assume a mechanism that spatially adjusts perceived locations associated with the retinal array by using, as a parameter, extra-retinal eye position information, a signal that encodes the size and direction of the saccade. The results from the experiment reported in this article challenge this idea. During a participant's saccade to a target object, one of the following was displaced: the entire scene, the target object, or the background behind the target object. Participants detected the displacement of the target object twice as frequently as the displacement of the entire background. The direction of displacement relative to the saccade also affected detectability. We use a new theory, the saccade target theory (McConkie & Currie, 1996), to interpret these results. This theory proposes that retinal (as opposed to extra-retinal) factors, primarily those concerning the saccade target object, are critical for the detection of intrasaccadic stimulus shifts.