Six views of embodied cognition

The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; (6) offline cognition is body based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.     

Fodor on global cognition and scientific inference

This paper addresses the extent to which quotidian cognition is like scientific inference by focusing on Jerry Fodor's famous analogy. I specifically consider and rebut a recent attempt made by Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels to deny the usefulness of Fodor's analogy. In so doing, I reveal some subtleties of Fodor's arguments overlooked by Fuller and Samuels and others. Recognizing these subtleties provides a richer appreciation of the analogy, allowing us to gain better traction on the issue concerning the extent to which everyday cognition is like scientific inference. In the end, I propose that quotidian cognition is indeed like scientific inference, but not precisely in the way Fodor claims it is.     

Special issue on radical views on cognition: introduction

In this paper we present the results of a simulation study of credence developments in groups of communicating Bayesian agents, as they update their beliefs about a given proposition p. Based on the empirical literature, one would assume that these groups of rational agents would converge on a view over time, or at least that they would not polarize. This paper presents and discusses surprising evidence that this is not true. Our simulation study shows that these groups of Bayesian agents show group polarization behavior under a broad range of circumstances. This is, we think, an unexpected result, that raises deeper questions about whether the kind of polarization in question is irrational. If one accepts Bayesian agency as the hallmark of epistemic rationality, then one should infer that the polarization we find is also rational. On the other hand, if we are inclined to think that there is something epistemically irrational about group polarization, then something must be off in the model employed in our simulation study. We discuss several possible interfering factors, including how epistemic trust is defined in the model. Ultimately, we propose that the notion of Bayesian agency is missing something in general, namely the ability to respond to higher-order evidence.

     

Cortical coordination dynamics and cognition

New imaging techniques in cognitive neuroscience have produced a deluge of information correlating cognitive and neural phenomena. Yet our understanding of the inter-relationship between brain and mind remains hampered by the lack of a theoretical language for expressing cognitive functions in neural terms. We propose an approach to understanding operational laws in cognition based on principles of coordination dynamics that are derived from a simple and experimentally verified theoretical model. When applied to the dynamical properties of cortical areas and their coordination, these principles support a mechanism of adaptive inter-area pattern constraint that we postulate underlies cognitive operations generally.     

Interactions dominate the dynamics of visual cognition

Many cognitive theories have described behavior as the summation of independent contributions from separate components. Contrasting views have emphasized the importance of multiplicative interactions and emergent structure. We describe a statistical approach to distinguishing additive and multiplicative processes and apply it to the dynamics of eye movements during classic visual cognitive tasks. The results reveal interaction-dominant dynamics in eye movements in each of the three tasks, and that fine-grained eye movements are modulated by task constraints. These findings reveal the interactive nature of cognitive processing and are consistent with theories that view cognition as an emergent property of processes that are broadly distributed over many scales of space and time rather than a componential assembly line.     

The threshold model of scientific change and the continuity of scientific knowledge

The continuity thesis of the Pozna school threshold model of the growth of scientific knowledge is considered in the light of the example of Van der Waals' and Boyle-Mariotte's laws. It is argued — using both traditional logical means and the structuralist reconstruction of the example — that the continuity thesis does not hold.A distinction between a historical and a systematic point of view is introduced and it is argued that the continuity thesis of the threshold model presupposes the systematic point of view. However, looking at matters from the systematic point of view need not yield the original theory, looked at from the historical point of view. Applied to the case of Van der Waals/Boyle-Mariotte laws, it turns out that the latter law is not a true idealizing special case of the former, contrary to the continuity thesis.     

The cognitive integration of scientific instruments: information,situated cognition,and scientific practice

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Researchers in the biological and biomedical sciences, particularly those working in laboratories, use a variety of artifacts to help them perform their...     

Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness

We propose a new approach to the neuroscience of consciousness, growing out of the ‘enactive’ viewpoint in cognitive science. This approach aims to map the neural substrates of consciousness at the level of large-scale, emergent and transient dynamical patterns of brain activity (rather than at the level of particular circuits or classes of neurons), and it suggests that the processes crucial for consciousness cut across the brain–body–world divisions, rather than being brain-bound neural events. Whereas standard approaches to the neural correlates of consciousness have assumed a one-way causal-explanatory relationship between internal neural representational systems and the contents of consciousness, our approach allows for theories and hypotheses about the two-way or reciprocal relationship between embodied conscious states and local neuronal activity.     

The power of generosity to change views on social power

Intergroup helping behavior by high status group members typically functions to support and further entrench systems of social hierarchy (Nadler, 2002). This research examined whether the virtue of generosity could increase support for more egalitarian group relations, as indexed by reduced social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Pilot testing (N = 367) revealed a negative relationship between self-reported generosity and SDO. In Study 1, two long-term experimental manipulations of generosity in 110 college students reduced SDO. One manipulation involved a nine week community service learning project, and the other involved a five-part reflection paper assignment on generous individuals. In Study 2, a brief generosity prime in 58 college students reduced SDO scores. The potential benefits of targeting SDO directly, and the importance of examining the motives behind generosity are discussed.     

Model change and reliability in scientific inference

One persistent challenge in scientific practice is that the structure of the world can be unstable: changes in the broader context can alter which model of a phenomenon is preferred, all without any overt signal. Scientific discovery becomes much harder when we have a moving target, and the resulting incorrect understandings of relationships in the world can have significant real-world and practical consequences. In this paper, we argue that it is common (in certain sciences) to have changes of context that lead to changes in the relationships under study, but that standard normative accounts of scientific inquiry have assumed away this problem. At the same time, we show that inference and discovery methods can “protect” themselves in various ways against this possibility by using methods with the novel methodological virtue of “diligence.” Unfortunately, this desirable virtue provably is incompatible with other desirable methodological virtues that are central to reliable inquiry. No scientific method can provide every virtue that we might want.     

Oscillatory brain dynamics, wavelet analysis, and cognition

On the basis of a systems theoretical approach it was hypothesized that event-related potentials (ERPs) are superpositions of stimulus-evoked and time-locked EEG rhythms reflecting resonance properties of the brain (Ba?ar, 1980). This approach led to frequency analysis of ERPs as a way of analyzing evoked rhythms. The present article outlines the basic features of ERP frequency analysis in comparison to ERP wavelet analysis, a recently introduced method of time-frequency analysis. Both methods were used in an investigation of the functional correlates of evoked rhythms where auditory and visual ERPs were recorded from the cat brain. Intracranial electrodes were located in the primary auditory cortex and in the primary visual cortex thus permitting "cross-modality" experiments. Responses to adequate stimulation (e.g., visual ERP recorded from the visual cortex) were characterized by high amplitude alpha (8-16 Hz) responses which were not observed for inadequate stimulation. This result is interpreted as a hint at a special role of alpha responses in primary sensory processing. The results of frequency analysis and of wavelet analysis were quite similar, with possible advantages of wavelet methods for single-trial analysis. The results of frequency analysis as performed earlier were thus confirmed by wavelet analysis. This supports the view that ERP frequency components correspond to evoked rhythms with a distinct biological significance.     

Repeated assessment of cognition in children and the measurement of performance change.

There is limited understanding of the problems associated with repeated neuropsychological assessment in children, including the statistics used to guide decisions about cognitive change. This study investigated the utility of a computerized assessment battery that was specifically designed for the repeated assessment of cognitive function in children. Eighty-seven participants aged 8 to 12 years completed the battery four times within a 2-hour testing session. The results support the application of this assessment battery for measuring cognitive change in children. A novel method for calculating measurement error is employed, and its use in the detection of cognitive change in individual children is discussed. An estimate of the measurement error within each of the tests is provided, and recommendations are made regarding the application of this assessment battery for measuring cognitive change in children.     

Learning and expertise with scientific external representations: an embodied and extended cognition model

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - This paper takes an embodied and extended cognition perspective to ER integration – a cognitive process through which a learner integrates external...     

Radical behaviorism and scientific frameworks. From mechanistic to relational accounts.

A substantial portion of B. F. Skinner's scholarship was devoted to developing methods and terms for a scientific study of behavior. Three concepts central to scientific accounts--cause, explanation, and theory--are examined to illustrate the distinction between mechanistic and relational frameworks and radical behaviorism's relationship to those frameworks. Informed by a scientific tradition that explicitly rejects mechanistic interpretations, radical behaviorism provides a distinctive stance in contemporary psychology. The present analysis suggests that radical behaviorism makes closer contact with the "new world view" advocated by physicists and philosophers of science than does much of contemporary psychology.     

Logical dynamics of belief change in the community

In this paper we explore the relationship between norms of belief revision that may be adopted by members of a community and the resulting dynamic properties of the distribution of beliefs across that community. We show that at a qualitative level many aspects of social belief change can be obtained from a very simple model, which we call ‘threshold influence’. In particular, we focus on the question of what makes the beliefs of a community stable under various dynamical situations. We also consider refinements and alternatives to the ‘threshold’ model, the most significant of which is to consider changes to plausibility judgements rather than mere beliefs. We show first that some such change is mandated by difficult problems with belief-based dynamics related to the need to decide on an order in which different beliefs are considered. Secondly, we show that the resulting plausibility-based account results in a deterministic dynamical system that is non-deterministic at the level of beliefs.     

Timing in cognition and EEG brain dynamics: discreteness versus continuity

This article provides an overview of recent developments in solving the timing problem (discreteness vs. continuity) in cognitive neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies have been considered, with an emphasis on the framework of operational architectonics (OA) of brain functioning (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts in Brain Mind 2:291-29, 2001; Neurosci Biobehav Rev 28:827-836, 2005). This framework explores the temporal structure of information flow and interarea interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp EEG, on the millisecond scale. We conclude, based on the OA framework, that brain functioning is best conceptualized in terms of continuity-discreteness unity which is also the characteristic property of cognition. At the end we emphasize where one might productively proceed for the future research.     

Qualitative and quantitative change in the dynamics of motor learning

The experiments examined qualitative and quantitative changes in the dynamics of learning a novel motor skill (roller ball task) as a function of the manipulation of a control parameter (initial ball speed). The focus was on the relation between the rates of change in performance over practice time and the changing time scales of the evolving attractor dynamic. Results showed 3 different learning patterns to the changes in the dynamics as a function of practice that were mediated by the initial ball speed. Only participants who learned the task showed a bifurcation in coordination mode that was preceded by enhanced performance variability. The observed multiple time scales to motor learning are interpreted as the products of the dynamical stability and instability realized from (a) the continually evolving landscape dynamics due to bifurcations between attractor organization and (b) the transient phenomena associated with moving toward and away from fixed-point dynamics.     

Personality change profiles and changes in cognition among middle-aged and older adults

Research on the relationship between personality traits and cognitive abilities has primarily used cross-sectional designs and considered personality traits individually in relation to cognitive dimensions. This study (N = 2652) examined the relationship between Big Five personality change profiles and change in cognitive factors, episodic memory and executive functioning. Latent profile analysis was used to capture patterns of change across the Big Five traits. Three profiles of personality change were defined: Decreasers, Maintainers, and Increasers. The Decreasers declined more in episodic memory compared to the Increasers and Maintainers. Also, the Decreasers declined more in executive functioning compared to the Increasers, but not the Maintainers. The findings advance our understanding of the links between patterns of personality change and cognitive aging.