Thinking about the Needy: A Reprise

This article discusses Jan Narveson’s “Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today’s World,” and “Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?” and their relation to my “Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations.” Section 2 points out that Narveson’s concerns differ from mine, so that often his claims and mine fail to engage each other. For example, his focus is on the poor, mine the needy, and while many poor are needy, and vice versa, our obligations may differ regarding the poor than regarding the needy. Also, Narveson invokes a narrow conception of morality as those rules that government or society may compel people to follow. Given a broader, more plausible, conception of morality, many of Narveson’s claims actually support my substantive views. Section 3 shows that many of Narveson’s claims are relevant to the best means of aiding the needy, but do not challenge the validity of that end. This is true, for example, of his claims about the role of poor governments, the importance of freedom, the undesirability of mere “handouts,” and the effects of bad economic policies. Section 4 defends the importance of my distinction between acting justly and acting for reasons of justice. It illustrates that on several widely shared conceptions of justice there might be agent-neutralreasons of justice to aid the needy, even if from an agent-relative perspective one would not be acting unjustly if one failed to do so. Section 5 contests Narveson’s portrayal of egalitarianism as concerned about inequality of wealth, per se, as insensitive to prior wrongs, and as holding that the worse-off have a right to be made better off at the expense of the well-off. In addition, it rejects Narveson’s contention that egalitarians violate impartiality, and aim to impose their personal tastes on others. Section 6 challenges a fundamental assumption underlying Narveson’s doctrine of mutual advantage. In addition, it denies that egalitarians are irrational merely because equality can conflict with the pareto principle. More generally, by appealing to impersonal ideals, it challenges the widely held view that the pareto principle is a condition of rationality. Section 7 argues that Narveson’s meta-ethical assumptions are controversial, internally inconsistent, in tension with his normative views, and ultimately a version of skepticism. In addition, it challenges Narveson’s view about the role intuitions play in moral theory. Section 8 clarifies points where Narveson’s discussion of my views may be misleading. Finally, the paper notes the role that moral reasons may play in deliberation and action, but emphasizes the philosophical and theoretical nature of my work. My aim is to determine the moral considerations that are relevant to how people should act regarding the needy. Whether people will actually be moved to so act, for those reasons or otherwise, is another matter.     

Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations

This article has three main parts, Section 2 considers the nature and extent to which individuals who are well-off have a moral obligation to aid the world’s needy. Drawing on a pluralistic approach to morality, which includes consequentialist, virtue-based, and deontological elements, it is contended that most who are well-off should do much more than they do to aid the needy, and that they are open to serious moral criticism if they simply ignore the needy. Part one also focuses on the United States, and illustrates both how incredibly wealthy the U.S. is and some of the spending habits of its citizens; however, its considerations apply to the well-off generally. Section 3 considers whether justice provides reasons for helping the needy. Noting that justice in an extremely complex notion, it discusses numerous considerations relevant to justice’s scope and implications, including an extended Rawlsian conception of justice, an absolute conception, a comparative conception, the distinction between natural and social justice, and various elements of common-sense morality. Section 2 also distinguishes between agent-relative justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we act justly, and agent-neutral justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we have reasons of justicefor acting. Correspondingly, it argues that even if one can ignore the needy without acting unjustly, as philosophers like Robert Nozick and Jan Narveson contend, there may be powerful reasons of justicefor addressing their plight. Section 4 briefly address the responsibilities of international organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). Drawing on Section 2, it is suggested that in addition to standard reasons to act justlytowards needy members of the world’s community, there will be reasons of justicefor such organizations to aid the needy in both present, and future, generations. The article concludes by contending that the well-off in countries like the U.S. have reason to view international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO as their agents, and to seek to insure that they alleviate misfortunes amongst the world’s needy.     

On the biological determination of personality structure

The controversy surrounding two particular problems has stymied the development of a consensus view concerning the structure of personality. First, there has been disagreement concerning the ‘independence’ of introversion-extraversion and measures of neuroticism. The other problem concerns the ‘duality’ of introversion-extraversion and whether it is even useful to retain this concept when it may only represent a ‘shotgun wedding’ of ‘sociability’ and ‘impulsivity’. Recent findings are discussed which relate to the neurophysiological underpinnings of personality. It is suggested that these findings, and the associated model, lie outside the circulus vitiosus of factor analysis and therefore that they provide a basis for resolving the independence and duality issues. It is argued that the tendency for introversion-extraversion to correlate with neuroticism only reflects a degree of coincidence and not equivalence. The psychological coincidence is conceived as resulting from the anatomical linkage of different neurophysiological subsystems which provide the substrata for the two personality dimensions. It is also argued that the ‘sociability’ and ‘impulsivity’ duality relates to distinct ‘sensitivity’ and ‘synergistic’ aspects of thalamocortical arousability. These distinct arousability dimensions nevertheless both contribute to the effectiveness of descending inhibitory projections that act on the brain-stem reticular formation and hence determine introversion-extraversion differences. In this scheme of things the three psychological dimensions are different but again there are anatomical linkage correlations reflecting coincidence rather than equivalence.     

ON ULTIMATE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS1

This paper is a contribution to the debate on epistemic foundationalism. Section I expounds and criticises Hans Albert's critical rationalist antifoundationalism position. Section I1 discusses Karl-Otto Apel's ‘transcendental pragmatic’ argument for ultimate epistemic foundations. Section III suggests how the latter argument can be restated so as to avoid ambiguity and yield a plausible case for epistemic foundationalism.     

Remarks on the development of computability

The purpose of this article is to examine aspects of the development of the concept and theory of computability through the theory of recursive functions. Following a brief introduction, Section 2 is devoted to the presuppositions of computability. It focuses on certain concepts, beliefs and theorems necessary for a general property of computability to be formulated and developed into a mathematical theory. The following two sections concern situations in which the presuppositions were realized and the theory of computability was developed. It is suggested in Section 3 that a central item was the problem of generalizing Gödel's incompleteness theorem. It is shown that this involved both the characterization of recursiveness and the attempt to clarify and formulate the notion of an effective process as it relates to the syntax of deductive systems. Section 4 concerns the decision problems which grew from the Hilbert program. Section 5 is devoted to the development of an informal' technique in the theory of computability often called ‘argument by Church's thesis’.     

Anger-provoking events in driving diaries: A content analysis

A previously validated coding scheme of offensive driver behaviour was used to content analyse driving diary entries. A new perceived causation coding scheme was also developed to identify victims' perceptions of why events occurred. Inter-rater reliability of the behaviour coding scheme was very good (kappa = .81). The most frequently reported driver behaviours were weaving and cutting, which was included in 33% of all diary entries, followed by slow driving (20%), speeding (13%), perceived hostile driver displays (13%), and tailgating (11%). These results were contrasted with those of the previous applications of the coding scheme. Assessed independently across all diary entries, inter-rater reliability of the coding of three causation categories was within an acceptable range (kappa = .51, .41, .67 for retaliation, time urgency, and negligence, respectively). When applied exclusively to the critical diary entries identified by each participant as the most negative and upsetting, the reliability improved greatly (kappa = .60, .80, and .81). The most frequently reported source of perceived causation was negligence, involved in 15% of all diary entries and 41% of critical events, followed by time urgency (14% of all entries and 29% of critical events) and retaliation (9% of all entries and 11% of critical events). Future research applications of the content coding systems and implications of the findings for driver safety are discussed.     

Blind Man’s Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-skeptical Stratagem

Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by `scientific' and `theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue epistemology to this end, utilizing it most extensively in critique of Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief (2000). Epistemological externalism presages, I also argue, a new demarcation problem, but a secondary aim of the paper is to suggest reasons to think that `responsibilist externalism,' especially as glossed in virtue-theoretic terms, provides its proponents with the ability to adequately address this problem as we find it represented in a potent thought-experiment developed by Barry Stroud.     

Assessing theories,Bayes style

The problem addressed in this paper is “the main epistemic problem concerning science”, viz. “the explication of how we compare and evaluate theories [...] in the light of the available evidence” (van Fraassen, BC, 1983, Theory comparison and relevant Evidence. In J. Earman (Ed.), Testing scientific theories (pp. 27–42). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Sections 1– 3 contain the general plausibility-informativeness theory of theory assessment. In a nutshell, the message is (1) that there are two values a theory should exhibit: truth and informativeness—measured respectively by a truth indicator and a strength indicator; (2) that these two values are conflicting in the sense that the former is a decreasing and the latter an increasing function of the logical strength of the theory to be assessed; and (3) that in assessing a given theory by the available data one should weigh between these two conflicting aspects in such a way that any surplus in informativeness succeeds, if the shortfall in plausibility is small enough. Particular accounts of this general theory arise by inserting particular strength indicators and truth indicators. In Section 4 the theory is spelt out for the Bayesian paradigm of subjective probabilities. It is then compared to incremental Bayesian confirmation theory. Section 4 closes by asking whether it is likely to be lovely. Section 5 discusses a few problems of confirmation theory in the light of the present approach. In particular, it is briefly indicated how the present account gives rise to a new analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, CG, 1945, Studies in the logic of comfirmation. Mind, 54, 1–26, 97–121.), differing from the one Carnap gave in § 87 of his Logical foundations of probability (1962, Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Section 6 adresses the question of justification any theory of theory assessment has to face: why should one stick to theories given high assessment values rather than to any other theories? The answer given by the Bayesian version of the account presented in section 4 is that one should accept theories given high assessment values, because, in the medium run, theory assessment almost surely takes one to the most informative among all true theories when presented separating data. The concluding section 7 continues the comparison between the present account and incremental Bayesian confirmation theory.     

Inhabiting Forest of Dean borderlands: Feral wild boar and dynamic ecologies of memory and place

Borderlands are dynamic, fluid spaces where multifarious actors and their relations come together in continual tension. The (re)appearance of (nonhuman) animals can lead to the emergence of novel multispecies borderlands, generated through a variety of affective, emotional and material registers with diverging spatial-temporalities. Situated in the Forest of Dean, England, this paper draws on ethnographic research to consider how the unanticipated (re)appearance of feral wild boar has (re-)configured everyday landscapes in myriad ways. In particular, the focus is on how distinct ecologies of memory and place- weaving through pasts and presents, the material and immaterial, individuals and collectives, humans and nonhumans- are created and shaped by embodied practices, encounters, distributed meanings and temporal change. Amidst uncertainty, the ‘Forest’ borderland is shown to be an indeterminate space, where memory simultaneously disrupts and enriches sensations of belonging and emplacement, and can help negotiate interspecies differences. The paper argues it is important to pay attention to the fluxing, fluid agency of animals and how their everyday human relations (dis)connect heterogenous ecologies of memory and place, especially at a time when multispecies landscapes are undergoing rapid, unexpected and un/intentional change.     

Hegel and Sellars on the Unity of Things

ABSTRACT

I have claimed previously that Hegel and Sellars are both, in the end, monistic visionaries, though with radically different visions of the grand unity of things. In this paper I explain and defend that claim. Section one differentiates several kinds of monism; section two discusses Hegel’s vision of the underlying unity of thing, while section three does the same for Sellars. The compare-and-contrast assignment is brought to completion in section four.     

Gender Role Violations and Identity Misclassification: The Roles of Audience and Actor Variables

When people violate certain social role norms, they risk false categorization into a stigmatized group. For example, heterosexual men who perform female stereotypic behaviors are often misclassified as gay. This identity misclassification is aversive because it threatens fundamental psychological needs. Findings presented here reveal that expectations of identity misclassification fuel heterosexual actors’ (N?=?216) discomfort during imagined gender role violations and that audience variables that increase the likelihood of misclassification also increase role violators’ discomfort. Moreover, expectations of misclassification strongly predict people’s discomfort during gender role violations regardless of their standing along relevant actor dimensions (e.g., attitudes and self-views). These findings suggest that people’s—and particularly heterosexual men’s—expectations of identity misclassification are powerful mechanisms that underlie adherence to traditional gender role norms.     

Processes of religious individualisation: stocktaking and issues for the future

Abstract

The paper spells out implications of a perspective on religious individualisation that is both comparative and analytical and discusses the various issues that this line of research has to confront. Arguing against notions of modern Western exceptionalism, it points to the selectivity of Western forms of (religious) individualisation and makes a case for the inclusion of additional forms of articulating individual agency and ‘selfhood'. The paper takes individualisation as an inter-subjective, social phenomenon and connects it to the concept of social imaginaries. Opposing standard concepts of modernisation the paper nevertheless brings processuality centre stage, emphasising contingency. The paper discusses the possibility of the convergence of contextual developmental trends and the question of transculturality of notions of self and agency. With reference to the dimension of critique included in visions of religious individualisation, the paper finally points to the effects processes of religious individualisation can have on human actors within, and beyond, the realm of spirituality, including the recognition of subjectivities and the strengthening of actors’ resilience.     

The psychosocial aspects of a return to sport following serious injury: A review of the literature from a self-determination perspective

ObjectivesThe objective of this paper is to review the literature relevant to the psychosocial aspects of a return to sport following injury using a self-determination theoretical (SDT) framework.MethodsThe literature was reviewed qualitatively. SDT was used to interpret and bring coherence to the diverse array of findings.ResultsThe review is divided into four main sections. In section one, two conceptual models—the biopsychosocial model and the stages of return to sport model—that have been used to describe the return to sport following injury are examined and critiqued. In light of the limitations of these two models, SDT is presented as a potentially useful framework for synthesising the extant literature and making suggestions for future research on return to sport after injury phenomena (Section 2). Analysis of the psychosocial sport injury literature within a self-determination framework (Section 3) reveals the ways in which issues of competence, autonomy and relatedness may be salient during the return transition. In the fourth and final section, the implications of the findings are discussed and suggestions for future research are provided in line with self-determination theoretical contentions.ConclusionsSDT has potential for understanding findings in this area and for guiding future research. From an applied perspective, ensuring athletes’ needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness are met, may yield beneficial return-to-sport outcomes.     

Nietzsche and the Empirical: through the eyes of the term ‘Empfindung’

Abstract

This paper examines Nietzsche’s attitude to the empirical by concentrating on his concept of Empfindung (sensation, perception, feeling). In Section 1, five distinctive features of his use of ‘Empfmdung’ are described in relation to the philosophical tradition and some of his sources in 19^th Century physiology. All five features, I argue, point to Nietzsche’s philosophical concern to stake out the limits of ‘Empfmdung’ as an aspect of human finitude. In Section 2, my attention turns from the term ‘Empfmdung’ to Nietzsche’s actual argumentation. The bewildering variety of perspectives and arguments concerning ‘Empfmdung’ in his writings are broken down into three basic types of argument or discourse with radically different, incompatible presuppositions: a critical, epistemological discourse serving anti-metaphysical ends; a quasi-scientific discourse serving critical-epistemological ends; and a quasi-ontological discourse of life that looks to explain the results of Nietzsche’s critical epistemology. The value of this ‘contradictory’ practice, I contend, is twofold: Nietzsche makes epistemology fruitful for the philosophical problem of life; at the same time he offers a performative critique of epistemology by the manner in which he exceeds it.     

Merging Frameworks for Interaction

A variety of logical frameworks have been developed to study rational agents interacting over time. This paper takes a closer look at one particular interface, between two systems that both address the dynamics of knowledge and information flow. The first is Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL) which uses linear or branching time models with added epistemic structure induced by agents’ different capabilities for observing events. The second framework is Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) that describes interactive processes in terms of epistemic event models which may occur inside modalities of the language. This paper systematically and rigorously relates the DEL framework with the ETL framework. The precise relationship between DEL and ETL is explored via a new representation theorem characterizing the largest class of ETL models corresponding to DEL protocols in terms of notions of Perfect Recall, No Miracles, and Bisimulation Invariance. We then focus on new issues of completeness. One contribution is an axiomatization for the dynamic logic of public announcements constrained by protocols, which has been an open problem for some years, as it does not fit the usual ‘reduction axiom’ format of DEL. Finally, we provide a number of examples that show how DEL suggests an interesting fine-structure inside ETL.     

Thwarted agency and the strange afterlife of Islamism in militant laicism in Turkey

This article critically engages with recent theoretical writing on the anthropology of secularism by way of studying the perceptions and consciousness of those whom I name ‘militant laic actors’ in Turkey. Beginning with their key conviction that the present Government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) possesses a hidden mission to Islamize the country, I argue that rather than relating to the actual policies of the AKP, such a conviction reflects the mood and emotions of laic actors. This perception is not without a social context. It relates to both the enlarged political power of the AKP and to the relative thwarting of social agency experienced by militant laic actors. The paper concludes by noting certain insufficiencies in both Charles Taylor’s and Talal Asad’s work as frameworks for explaining the dynamics of secularism while making a case for the significance of the Turkish situation in contributing to wider debates in the anthropology of secularism.     

Paraconsistent Logic

In some logics, anything whatsoever follows from a contradiction; call these logics explosive. Paraconsistent logics are logics that are not explosive. Paraconsistent logics have a long and fruitful history, and no doubt a long and fruitful future. To give some sense of the situation, I’ll spend Section 1 exploring exactly what it takes for a logic to be paraconsistent. It will emerge that there is considerable open texture to the idea. In Section 2, I’ll give some examples of techniques for developing paraconsistent logics. In Section 3, I’ll discuss what seem to me to be some promising applications of certain paraconsistent logics. In fact, however, I don’t think there’s all that much to the concept ‘paraconsistent’ itself; the collection of paraconsistent logics is far too heterogenous to be very productively dealt with under a single label. Perhaps that will emerge as we go.     

Can’t philosophers tell the difference between science and religion?: Demarcation revisited

In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible and that demarcation was a dead pseudo-problem. This article discusses problems with those conclusions and their application to the quite different reasoning between these two cases. Laudan focused too narrowly on the problem of demarcation as Popper defined it. Distinguishing science from religion was and remains an important conceptual issue with significant practical import, and philosophers who say there is no difference have lost touch with reality in a profound and perverse way. The Kitzmiller case did not rely on a strict demarcation criterion, but appealed only to a “ballpark” demarcation that identifies methodological naturalism (MN) as a “ground rule” of science. MN is shown to be a distinguishing feature of science both in explicit statements from scientific organizations and in actual practice. There is good reason to think that MN is shared as a tacit assumption among philosophers who emphasize other demarcation criteria and even by Laudan himself.