From deed to word: gapless and kink-free enactivism

In their most recent book, Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content (MIT 2017), Dan Hutto and Eric Myin claim to give a complete and gapless naturalistic account of cognition, but it comes with a kink. The kink being that content-involving cognition has special properties found nowhere else in nature, making it the case that minds capable of contentful thought differ in kind, in this key respect, from more basic minds. Contra Hutto and Myin, I argue that content-involving practices are themselves simply a further extension of action and do not therefore warrant being called ‘different in kind’ or ‘kinky’. With the help of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John V. Canfield, I show that Enactivism meets the challenge of explaining higher-level cognition; and, contra continuity sceptics, offer ‘a philosophically cogent and empirically respectable account’ of how human minds can emerge from nonhuman minds.

     

Radical embodied cognitive science and problems of intentionality

Radical embodied cognitive science (REC) tries to understand as much cognition as it can without positing contentful mental entities. Thus, in one prominent formulation, REC claims that content is involved neither in visual perception nor in any more elementary form of cognition. Arguments for REC tend to rely heavily on considerations of ontological parsimony, with authors frequently pointing to the difficulty of explaining content in naturalistically acceptable terms. However, many classic concerns about the difficulty of naturalizing content likewise threaten the credentials of intentionality, which even advocates of REC take to be a fundamental feature of cognition. In particular, concerns about the explanatory role of content and about indeterminacy can be run on accounts of intentionality as well. Issues about explanation can be avoided, intriguingly if uncomfortably, by dramatically reconceptualizing or even renouncing the idea that intentionality can explain. As for indeterminacy, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin point the way toward a response, appropriating an idea from Ruth Millikan. I take it a step further, arguing that attention to the ways that beliefs’ effects on behavior are modulated by background beliefs can help illuminate the facts that underlie their intentionality and content.

     

Experience Influences Affordance Perception for Low Crawling Under Barriers With Altered Body Dimensions

Abstract

We examined the role of experience in affordance perception for low crawling with altered body dimensions under barriers of different heights. Adults decided which of five backpacks (10–30?cm thick) they would be able to wear while low crawling under barriers. Participants were assigned to one of three experience conditions. Participants in the Pre/Post-choice experience condition crawled under the barrier before and after picking a backpack, participants in the Feedback condition crawled under the barrier after picking a backpack, but participants in the No Experience condition received no low-crawling experience. Past research suggests that pre-choice experience with low crawling under the barrier would lead to more accurate responses. Overall, participants in all three conditions scaled the height of the backpack to the barrier height. Pre-choice low-crawling experience strongly influenced backpack choices such that participants in the Pre/Post condition picked significantly smaller backpacks and produced fewer failures than participants in the other conditions. The results provide evidence that brief practice, in an unfamiliar posture, can lead to improvements in affordance perception.     

Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition

We discuss various implications of some radical anti-representationalist views of cognition and what they have to offer with regard to the naturalization of intentionality and the explanation of cognitive phenomena. Our focus is on recent arguments from proponents of enactive views of cognition to the effect that basic cognition is intentional but not representational and that cognition is co-extensive with life. We focus on lower rather than higher forms of cognition, namely the question regarding the intentional and representational nature of cognition found in organisms simpler than human beings, because enactivists do not deny that more sophisticated cognitive phenomena are representational and involve content. After introducing the debate on the naturalization of intentionality (Sect. 2), we briefly review different varieties of enactivism and introduce their central claims (Sect. 3). In Sect. 4 we turn to radical enactivism in order to focus on the arguments for a thoroughly non-representational, enactive account of perception and basic cognition. In particular, we discuss three major issues: First, what is supposed to replace the representational analysis of perception in a radical-enactive explanation of perception? How does the enactive explanation of perception compare to the best scientific work on the neuroscience of perception? Second, what is—on an enactive account—the function of neural processing in the brain for the generation of perception if not to produce representations? This question is especially pressing since one implication of autopoietic enactivism (accepted by radical enactivists) is that even the simplest organisms, i.e. single-celled organisms, have cognitive capacities (Sect. 5). Since they lack brains and nervous systems, enactivists must specify the (possibly) unique contribution of the brain and nervous system in those animals who have them. In Sect. 5, we evaluate the advantages of an autopoietic–enactive approach to the naturalization of intentionality and end with a suggestion how cognition may relate to intentionality and representation.

     

动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

Potentiation of action by undetected affordant objects

The physical attributes of objects that are relevant to motor behaviour, or action, are referred to as affordances (Gibson, 1979). Recent evidence has shown that an object's affordance can potentiate an unrelated motor response even when there is no intention to respond to it (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998). In the five experiments, we examined whether conscious perception of an affordance is necessary to produce motor priming by presenting images of affordant objects (e.g., hammer) under conditions which cause them to be undetectable: Brief masked exposure (BME) and attentional blink (AB). We successfully demonstrated that conscious perception is not necessary for an object's affordance to produce motor priming. Since these findings are consistent with the abilities/disabilities of patients with blindsight and visual form agnosia, it is possible that processing accomplished by the dorsal stream produced this effect, though more research is needed to confirm this assertion.     

Anorexia nervosa and oversized experiences

In this paper, I discuss what I call the oversized experiences that anorexic patients suffer from. It has been known for some time that anorexic patients mentally picture their bodies as larger than reality. While this constitutes one kind of oversized experience, I claim there is another, less explored kind. This is an experience of the body as oversized in relation to the affordances of its environment. I discuss recent evidence suggesting anorexic patients exhibit distorted affordance perception. I then discuss how this distorted affordance perception also constitutes an oversized experience of the body. Along with sociocultural influences, I claim oversized experiences ground negative propositional attitudes regarding body size.     

Reconceiving rationality: situating rationality into radically enactive cognition

Rational beliefs and actions are typically evaluated against certain benchmarks, e.g., those of classical logic or probability theory. Rationality therefore is traditionally taken to involve some sort of reasoning, which in turn implies contentful cognition. Radically Enactive (and Embodied) views of Cognition (REC), on the other hand, claim that not all cognition is contentful. In order to show that rationality does not need to lie outside of REC’s scope of radicalizing cognition, I develop a Radically Enactive notion of Rationality (RER), according to which rationality is embodied, situated and contentless. For RER, an organism acts rationally insofar as it sustains a proficient interaction with its environment, which in turn requires the coordination of cognitive abilities in accordance with environmental constraints. Rationality is thus distinguished from reasoning, for reasoning is understood as a capacity to coordinate representational cognitive abilities.

     

Affordances,context and sociality

Affordances, i.e. the opportunity of actions offered by the environment, are one of the central research topics for the theoretical perspectives that view cognition as emerging from the interaction between the environment and the body. Being at the bridge between perception and action, affordances help to question a dichotomous view of perception and action. While Gibson’s view of affordances is mainly externalist, many contemporary approaches define affordances (and micro-affordances) as the product of long-term visuomotor associations in the brain. These studies have emphasized the fact that affordances are activated automatically, independently from the context and the previous intention to act: for example, affordances related to objects’ size would emerge even if the task does not require focusing on size. This emphasis on the automaticity of affordances has led to overlook their flexibility and contextual-dependency. In this contribution I will outline and discuss recent perspectives and evidence that reveal the flexibility and context-dependency of affordances, clarifying how they are modulated by the physical, cultural and social context. I will focus specifically on social affordances, i.e. on how perception of affordances might be influenced by the presence of multiple actors having different goals.

     

示能性:基于镜像神经元视角的理解

示能性(affordance)概念解释了人的行为与物体功能之间互动、互补的关系。但是,有关示能性生理基础却很少被提及。镜像神经元的发现为示能性生理基础提供了可能的解释。文章根据研究将示能性分为结构示能性和功能示能性,探讨了不同示能性和镜像神经元之间的关系,并提出不同神经通路中的镜像神经元是示能性生理基础的结论。背-背侧分流中的镜像神经元是结构示能性的神经基础,而腹-背侧分流中的镜像神经元是功能示能性的神经基础。     

Extending the notion of affordance

Post-Gibson attempts to set out a definition of affordance generally agree that this notion can be understood as a property of the environment with salience for an organism’s behavior. According to this view, some scholars advocate the idea that affordances are dispositional properties of physical objects that, given suitable circumstances, necessarily actualize related actions. This paper aims at assessing this statement in light of a theory of affordance perception. After years of discontinuity between strands of empirical and theoretical research, the time is ripe for addressing the question of whether the dispositional interpretation of affordance is in accordance with some recent evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience. Following this line, I clarify that there are some cases of affordance-related effects that neither require the actualization of an action, nor the presence of an action-related property bearer in the environment, and that the identification of affordance with physical properties provides only a partial explanation of the wide range of affordance-related effects. Accordingly, I argue in favor of a more general account of affordance perception based on the ability to directly detect perceptual patterns in the environment.     

Individualism versus interactionism about social understanding

In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of social understanding that it is intended to explain. The social capacity in question that is presupposed by these accounts is then analyzed in the second section via a discussion and further development of Searle’s ‘sense of us’ and ‘sense of the other’ as a precondition for social cognition and joint action. After a critical discussion of Schmid’s recent proposal to analyze this in terms of plural pre-reflective selfawareness, we develop an alternative account. Starting from the idea that infants distinguish in perception between physical objects and other agents we distinguish between affordances and social affordances and cash out the notion of a social affordance in terms of “interaction-oriented representations”, parallel to the analysis of object affordances in terms of “action-oriented representations”. By characterizing their respective features we demonstrate how this approach can solve the problem formulated in the first part.     

Perceiving and Interacting Affordances: A New Model of Human–Affordance Interactions

This article introduces a new affordance framework for humans and human design. Based on previous important concepts in product design–affordance, signifier, and product semantics, the authors propose three new concepts to illustrate how people perceive affordance. According to the model, perceptual probability of affordance is the probability that the public can perceive a certain affordance; perceptual threshold of affordance is the threshold at which affordance can be perceived by a person and changed by perceptual information; and situations, in which interactions between affordances and people exist, are crucial influences on human–affordance interactions. An illustration of the model and suggestions for further research are provided.     

Scaling-up skilled intentionality to linguistic thought

Cognition has traditionally been understood in terms of internal mental representations, and computational operations carried out on internal mental representations. Radical approaches propose to reconceive cognition in terms of agent-environment dynamics. An outstanding challenge for such a philosophical project is how to scale-up from perception and action to cases of what is typically called ‘higher-order’ cognition such as linguistic thought, the case we focus on in this paper. Perception and action are naturally described in terms of agent-environment dynamics, but can a person’s thoughts about absent, abstract or counterfactual states of affairs also be accounted for in such terms? We argue such a question will seem pressing so long as one fails to appreciate how richly resourceful the human ecological niche is in terms of the affordances it provides. The explanatory work that is supposedly done by mental representations in a philosophical analysis of cognition, can instead be done by looking outside of the head to the environment structured by sociomaterial practices, and the affordances it makes available. Once one recognizes how much of the human ecological niche has become structured by activities of talking and writing, this should take away at least some of the motivation for understanding linguistic thinking in terms of content-bearing internal representations. We’ll argue that people can think about absent, abstract or counterfactual because of their skills for engaging with what we will call “enlanguaged affordances”. We make use of the phenomenological analysis of speech in Merleau-Ponty to show how the multiple affordances an individual is ready to engage with in a particular situation will typically include enlanguaged affordances.

     

Trans-saccadic perception

A basic question in cognition is how visual information obtained in separate glances can produce a stable, continuous percept. Previous explanations have included theories such as integration in a trans-saccadic buffer or storage in visual memory, or even that perception begins anew with each fixation. Converging evidence from primate neurophysiology, human psychophysics and neuroimaging indicate an additional explanation: the intention to make a saccadic eye movement leads to a fundamental alteration in visual processing itself before and after the saccadic eye movement. We outline five principles of 'trans-saccadic perception' that could help to explain how it is possible - despite discrete sensory input and limited memory - that conscious perception across saccades seems smooth and predictable.     

A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception

In this paper, I offer a discussion concerning the conceptual connection between the notion of vision-for-action and the one of affordance perception. I first analyze the notion of vision-for-action. I then analyze a notion usually coupled with it: the notion of affordance perception, the main insights behind which are guiding several current neuroscientific enterprises and the related philosophical speculations. Then, I argue that we should not couple these two notions with a light heart: though these two processes can be, from a theoretical point of view, related, we should be careful in inferring the actual and effective occurrence of the latter in the presence of the former. This will be done by carrying out a conceptual analysis of the experimental evidence coming from the ‘Two Visual Systems Model’, which is the main reference in the literature on affordance perception and vision-for-action. My point has strong philosophical implications for our view concerning the best interpretation of how vision-for-action really works, and the specific relation it actually entertains with affordance perception.     

Evidence for Direct Perception From Cognition in the Wild

This article describes a portion of a study of cognition in the wild that was conducted to investigate how human operators of nuclear power plants monitor the state of the plant to detect abnormalities. Although the study was originally motivated by applied concerns, it surprisingly led to evidence relevant to basic theories of perception. The findings reveal that the instruments in the control room that operators can use for monitoring are both fallible and limited in their informativeness, thereby occasionally providing an inaccurate indication of plant status. As a result, operators sometimes leave the control room to directly observe components in the plant using their unaided perceptual systems. Because such information is lawfully constrained and not mediated by instruments, it provides a rich, reliable, and therefore, unique and highly valued indication of the true status of the environment. These findings show that Gibson's (1979/1986) distinction between directed and mediated perception is both pragmatically and psychologically relevant. The results also have very important implications for experiments on direct perception based on computer-simulated, rather than lawfully constrained, experimental stimuli.     

Syntax in A Dynamic Brain

Proponents of the language of thought (LOT) thesis are realists when it comes to syntactically structured representations, and must defend their view against instrumentalists, who would claim that syntactic structures may be useful in describing cognition, but have no more causal powers in governing cognition than do the equations of physics in guiding the planets. This paper explores what it will take to provide an argument for LOT that can defend its conclusion from instrumentalism. I illustrate a difficulty in this project by discussing arguments for LOT put forward by Horgan and Tienson. When their evidence is viewed in the light of results in connectionist research, it is hard to see how a realist conception of syntax can be formulated and defended.

     

Multiple systems: A new approach to cognitive theory

Abstract

Cognitive processes turn out to be both more innate and more culturally based than we used to think. On the one hand, ecological and interpersonal perception are innately prepared, available in infancy; on the other, mental development depends critically on social support. Taken together with the emerging multiple/modular structure of the brain, these discoveries demand a new kind of cognitive theory: an ecologically grounded, developmental account of distinct systems in interaction. Three such systems, primarily perceptual in function, are described here: (1) direct perception/action establishes an immediate non-representational sense of self and environment that grounds all other cognition; (2) interpersonal perception/reactivity produces species-specific patterns of social interaction; (3) recognition/representation identifies and classifies what is perceived. These systems are distinguished by neurological as well as psychological criteria: the neuroanatomical “where/what” distinction, for example, reflects the difference between direct perception and recognition. Cooperation among these three systems, which begins near the end of the first year, is basic to language and other forms of cultural learning.